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Towards More Effective Human Security Approaches in the Context of the Emerging Threat of Violent Radicalisation in Jordan, Lebanon, and Tunisia

West Asia-North Africa Institute, August 2017

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Arab Institute for Security Studies

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Desk Research Report

The WANA Institute
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1. Introduction

The rise of violent extremist groups in the West Asia North Africa (WANA) region has brought to the foreground several concerns about the rapid growth of these groups, the enabling local environments, and the failures of the security and political structures in some regional states to contain and curtail this threat. In countries like Syria, Iraq, and Libya the political vacuum, the sectarian frustrations, and concerns of marginalisation and social injustice has led to the rise of these groups. But elsewhere in the region, similar forms of marginalisation and injustice have supplied these groups with a high number of fighters.

The following desk review is part of a three-year regional project that examines the relations between human security, violent extremism, and state-centric security policies in three fragile countries in the WANA region. The project is coordinated by the WANA Institute, and generously funded by the Netherlands Organisation for Scientific Research. The project explores this relation in 18 communities to offer a Theory of Change on how human security approaches can be reconceptualised and implemented to align with, contribute to, and balance policies aimed at countering the transnational threat of violent radicalisation in the WANA region, with a view to enhancing resilience to conflict. With this broader purpose in mind, the following overview is to offer the reader an in-depth understanding of the concepts underlying this project and a general overview of how these factors have been contributing to the rise of violent extremism in the countries under study.

This project focuses in particular on Jordan, Lebanon, and Tunisia. To put forth the justification for this sample, all of the target countries are members of the League of Arab States, and represent both the Mashriq and Maghreb of the Arab world. More importantly nationals of all three countries, particularly Jordan and Tunisia, have joined the ranks of radical groups in noticeable per capita terms, relative to the rest of the Arab world (see Table 1). For Lebanon, an expansion in the activities of violent non-states actors (VNSA) such as Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham (formerly known as Al-Nusra Front), Daesh, and Hezbollah has been observed over the past few years. Additionally, the discussion on state-centric and human-centric policies and programmes is still evolving in these three target countries.

Table 1: Populations and Number of Fighters in Syria

	Total population (millions)[1]	Total fighters in Syria and Iraq[2]	Terrorist per capita
Lebanon	6	900	0.00015
Tunisia	11.4	6000	0.00053
Jordan	9.5	2000	0.00021

Source: Time Magazine (2017), http://time.com/4739488/isis-iraq-syria-tunisia-saudi-arabia-russia/

Furthermore, the three states are situated in a vital geo-strategic locations and share sometimes porous borders with countries currently experiencing civil war (Syria and Libya). The target states have all suffered economic hardships, yet differ on experiencing varying degrees of impact in

[1] "Population, Total," *World Bank,* accessed August 17, 2017, http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.POP.TOTL?locations=LB-JO-TN&year_high_desc=true.
[2] "Foreign Fighters: An Updated Assessment of the Flow of Foreign Fighters into Syria and Iraq," The Soufan Group, December 2015, 8, accessed August 17, 2017, http://soufangroup.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/12/TSG_ForeignFightersUpdate_FINAL3.pdf.

light of the Arab uprisings. One has largely retained its political system and foreign policy dynamics (Jordan), another has witnessed a severe tension over its political challenges (Lebanon), and another has forged a new path forward, gaining in the process a wide recognition as a success story and yet facing large and ongoing internal tensions (Tunisia). As such, while sharing similarities and challenges, the three target countries are selected for standing at three different points of the state/human security spectrum, and thus allowing for a representative analytical examination of state-centric policies.

The Theory of Change that this project seeks to develop will identify challenges, changes, and short-term and mid-term goals towards meeting the long-term objective of aligning policies on Countering Violent Extremism (CVE) with human security programing in the region. To achieve this, the project will examine the impact of state-centric security policies on human security programing and on the rise, or containment, of violent extremism. It then explores the relation between human security programing and violent extremism, particularly how shortfalls in human security programing can contribute to the rise of radicalisation.

This trilateral relation will be examined through qualitative and quantitative methods that seek input from local stakeholders (security personnel, local governments, civil society actors, Imams and preachers, youth and women actors, and implementing partners of human security programs). Views from these stakeholders will be compared and analysed, along with input from individuals who are vulnerable to recruitment to violent extremism groups, and views from key experts in the three countries of study. Put together the project seeks the direct input of around 1500 participants through semi-structured interviews and Focus Group Discussions.

This desk review is designed to assist the research team of grasping the various concerns on human security and state security in the WANA region with emphasis on the three countries in the last five years, from 2011 to 2016. This review will feed into the methodology design and the selection criteria of the 18 communities where field research will take place. The 18 communities will be divided to include 9 radicalisation hotbeds and another 9 control communities. The selection will also include refugee host communities compared to others with majority national populations. Other specific factors will be selected through a bird's-view look into the three countries based on the findings of this desk review.

Human security is an essential solution for protecting individual's interests without jeopardising states' interests. The notion was introduced as a construct by the UNDP in 1994 and indicated a crucial paradigm shift in how security is conceptualised internationally. The complexity of human security requires the decision makers in target states to pursue a non-linear and multi-directional approach. This approach must be mindful and inclusive of human security's seven pillars: economic, food, health, environmental, personal, community, and political.

The analysis presented in this document focuses on the latter four of the seven aforementioned dimensions: environmental, personal, community, and political. These four dimensions revolve around the need to confront the risks, security threats, and/or acts of violent extremism in parallel to empowering the principal participants to be able to do so. In essence, these dimensions represent the core areas of human security for they translate into the freedom "from fear," "from want," and the freedom "to live in dignity." Significantly, achieving these freedoms ensures protecting peoples' interests *without* adversely damaging states' centric security strategic approach. To analyse this, the project examines five elements of human security: social justice, gender equality and women's empowerment, political inclusion, employment and education, and water security. This paper includes a clearer discussion in section three on social justice, and in

section four on gender equality and women's empowerment. The other elements will be discussed in a separate document.[3]

It is also noteworthy that the human security umbrella has widened in recent years to encompass individuals, communities, populations, and governmental and non-governmental institutions alike. This more nuanced approach to human security is still missing in the WANA region, which is why adopting a holistic human security framework is essential for addressing security risks in the region, including acts of violent extremism. Key to adopting this framework is establishing an effective nexus between population security and national security, and further developing the regional understandings of structural violence and direct violence.

This review is divided into six chapters. After this introduction, Chapter Two introduces the key concepts underpinning the analysis in this project. It elaborates on the relations between human security, violent extremism, and the role of state, non-state, and non-governmental actors. The discussion addresses human security and state-centric security frameworks, definitions of violent extremism and radicalisation, how we can understand drivers of violent extremism through a better understanding of violence, and a note on the difference between conflicts and disputes.

Chapter Three discusses state-centric security in the region. As a central element of this project, it is important to consider what such policies look like in practical terms and how it has been utilised across our three focus countries. This section uses quantitative data gathered by our partner organisation the Arab Centre for Security Studies (ACSIS), which can help to create indicators of security programming and is used to measure trends in national sovereignty, deterrence capability, and governance strength in all three countries between 2011 and 2016. This is particularly helpful for comparing trends between the countries, and for ascertaining whether the ongoing preference for state-centric security measures is helping to improve traditional measures of state strength such as sovereignty, or whether an increased coordination with human security programming might be advisable.

Chapter four then highlights the way in which social justice concerns are an integral element of social unrest in the WANA region and explains the clear link that these frustrations can have to violent extremism and radicalisation drivers. It answers the question on the durability of the authoritarian state in the region by discussing the nature of Arab social contract, the weak private sector and fragmented civil society, and explores how states have suppressed dissent. These factors form the background against which manifestations of social injustice are present in the region. The chapter elaborates on marginalisation, rights abuse, and sectarianism. By discussing these, it is possible to ascertain more on the contextual background of the state-centric and human security situation in Jordan, Lebanon, and Tunisia. It then enables researchers and practitioners to suggest ways in which programming needs to change to adapt to citizen's concerns if there can be hope of avoiding a further rise in support for violent extremism.

Women are marginalised socially, economically, and legally in the WANA region. As such, Chapter Five continues the discussion of human security programming and its multiple manifestations by focusing in particular on gender equality and women's empowerment – in theory, in the region, and in each country concerned. In each of the countries profiled, it is clear that there are very strong social and institutional barriers preventing women from taking part in society, particularly in the political field. It has been illustrated in the literature that the participation of women in society is hugely beneficial for economic growth and can also facilitate

[3] Note to NWO: These papers were scheduled to be prepared by The Hague Institute.

in countering conflict and violent extremism. Thus, a shift in human security programming which focuses on a women's empowerment in a culturally-sensitive manner should be an integral part of human security programming in each of the countries profiled.

Chapter Six focuses on the multiple and complex drivers of radicalisation, both regionally and in each country specifically. The chapter discusses the two main contextual drivers of violent extremism in the region: it elaborates on socio-economic factors that link relative deprivation, marginalisation, and unemployment. It then details the political regional factors that contributed to the rise of extremism groups, particularly the frustrated hopes after the Arab Spring and the Sunni political crisis. The contextual factors are succinctly summarised by Owen Fraser and Christian Nunlist have as the potential drivers of violent extremism:

> "chronically unresolved political conflicts; the 'collateral damage' to civilian lives and infrastructure caused by military responses to terrorism; human rights violations; ethnic, national, and religious discrimination; the political exclusion of ethnic or religious groups; socioeconomic marginalization; lack of good governance; and a failure to integrate diaspora communities of immigrants who move between cultures."[4]

The chapter then discusses country-specific factors that have led to the rise of violent extremism and the comparatively high number of foreign fighters these countries have supplied to armed radical groups in Syria and/or Libya.

Once fieldwork has been undertaken for this project, the research output and the Theory of Change it develops should enable stakeholders to better understand which of these factors is most prominent in the communities considered. It will also offer direct steps for stakeholders on reconceptualising human security to include CVE policies and redesign the relation between state-centric security policies to better enable the advancement of human security goals that in the long-run will contribute to the decline of violent extremism in the region.

This desk review, in its six chapters, elaborates on the key theoretical foundations of examining this relation between state-centric security, human security, and violent extremism and highlights the contextual background in Jordan, Lebanon, and Tunisia to better implement the research activities of the project and maximise the research efficiency and validity of the knowledge it will generate to policy makers, practitioners, and donors in the WANA region.

[4] Owen Frazer and Christian Nünlist, "The Concept of Countering Violent Extremism," *(*Zurich: *Center for Security Studies (CSS)*, 2015),http://www.css.ethz.ch/content/dam/ethz/special-interest/gess/cis/center-for-securities-studies/pdfs/CSSAnalyse183-EN.pdf

2. Key Concepts

2.1 Introduction

Policies which respond to phenomena such as radicalisation and violent extremism often come under the banner of Countering Violent Extremism (CVE) or Preventing Violent Extremism (PVE). These are often used interchangeably and include a focus on both human security programming and more state security centric policies. Broadly speaking human security takes a more holistic approach focused upon the individual and their human needs, whereas state centric security policies include a more military and security based angle, premised around protecting the state. A proposed connection between these two security programming approaches, the radicalisation process, and violent extremism is central to this project. Thus, this section will begin by briefly outlining what is meant by human security and state centric security.

It is worth noting that issues inevitably arise when attempting to define terms such as radicalisation and extremism due to their multiple usages in academia, the media, and policy pieces, both as umbrella terms and as signifiers for other phenomena. The EU definition of radicalisation as "the phenomenon of people embracing opinions, views and ideas which could lead to acts of terrorism", is an example of when the meaning of one contentious term – radicalisation, is premised on another – terrorism.[5] The commonality of such ambiguous definitions indicates the importance of spending time considering the meanings of such overused and little understood terms.

Particularly since 9/11 and the start of the 'war on terror' there has been a large conflation between terms. It is imperative therefore to understand that whilst not discrete in nature these terminologies represent different happenings. David Mandel explains the relationship between radicalisation and extremism as follows: "Radicalization is to extremism as velocity is to position. That is, radicalization is a (positive) change in the degree of extremism expressed by an individual or group."[6] Peter Neumann seconds this view by writing that, "at the most basic level, radicalization can be defined as the process whereby people become extremists."[7] Whilst Mandel and Neumann both indicate the relationship between the process of radicalisation and resultant extremism, it is worth mentioning the inherent subjective nature by which a group or individual is considered as 'radical' or 'extreme'. The origins of an author or group can significantly alter their perspective and thus, it is important to consider a range of sources when attempting to reach any set definition. As an Australian team of authors concluded, "about the only thing that radicalization experts agree on is that radicalization is a process. Beyond that there is considerable variation as to make existing research incomparable."[8]

[5] "Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council Concerning Terrorist Recruitment: Addressing the Factors Contributing to Violent Radicalisation," Commission of the European Communities, 2005, 2.
[6] David Mandel, "Radicalisation, what does it mean?" in *Homegrown Terrorism: Understanding the Root Causes of Radicalisation among Groups with Immigrant Heritage in Europe,* ed. Thomas Pick et al. (Brussels: Institute of Physics Press, 2009), 111.
[7] Peter R. Neumann, "The Trouble with Radicalisation," *International Affairs* 89 (2013): 874.
[8] Minerva Nasser-Eddine et. al., "Countering Violent Extremism (CVE) Literature Review," (Canberra: Australian Government, Department of Defense, 2011), 13.

2.2 Human Security and State-Centric Security Frameworks

Human Security as a concept has proliferated since a 1994 Human Development Report authored by the United Nations Development Program(UNDP). It declared there was a situation in which "the concept of security has for too long been interpreted narrowly" and, "forgotten were the legitimate concerns of ordinary people who sought security in their daily lives".[9]As a response to this concern an all-encompassing idea was suggested in which seven central pillars of security were identified: economic, food, health, environmental, personal, political, and communal.[10]However, it is important to note that there is **no consensus** on the exact definition of human security. Unlike the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, or a binding international treaty such as The Genocide Convention, The Rome Statute, or the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, there is **no single non-binding or binding document** that defines human security. Policy makers have expressed their concern at a lack of a consensus definition, and the broadness of the concept could be detrimental to policy programming.[11]As a result, it is difficult to pinpoint the main areas of concern as well as the necessary approaches to handle them.

Roland Paris has argued, "Human security is like "sustainable development" – everyone is for it, but few people have a clear idea of what it means. Existing definitions of human security tend to be expansive and vague, encompassing everything from physical security to psychological well-being, which provides policymakers with little guidance in the prioritisation of competing policy goals and academics little sense of what, exactly, is to be studied."[12] Paris is valid in his criticisms, such a broad definition of what constitutes human security not only makes it difficult to comprehend but also produces multiple, and often conflicting, recommended policy responses.[13]Arguably, both the biggest limitation, and largest power, that human security has is due to its elusive nature. It is difficult to quantify when and how social, natural, political, or economic factors become a risk to individual security. Therefore, one objective of this research project is to work with key stakeholders in the four countries of the study to arrive at a reconceptualisation of human security that encompasses the key elements they perceive crucial for our understanding of human security.

Nonetheless, there are some features of human security that leading scholars and practitioners generally accept. First, **the unit of analysis is the individual**, not the nation, state, or any other group or institution.[14] In this way, it aligns with the shift in recent decades away from focusing on the survival and moral importance of a state or community as a political entity towards the importance of individuals.[15] This is part of a larger shift marked by the importance of human rights since World War II. Second, human security **includes, but is broader than**, **protection from physical violence**. Other aspects involve access to basic goods necessary for life such as nutrition, water, health care, clothing, and shelter. Exactly what these other goods include and exclude, however, is contested. In short, human security defines security at the individual level

[9] United Nations Development Program, *Human Development Report,* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994), 22, accessed August 17, 2017, http://hdr.undp.org/sites/default/files/reports/255/hdr_1994_en_complete_nostats.pdf.
[10] Ibid.
[11] Gary King and Christopher J. L. Murray, "Rethinking Human Security," *Political Science Quarterly* 116 (2001): 585–610, 591-592, accessed August 17, 2017, doi:10.2307/798222.
[12] Roland Paris, "Human Security: Paradigm Shift or Hot Air?"*International Security* 26, no. 2 (2011): 88.
[13] Heather Owens and Barbara Arneil, "The Human Security Paradigm Shift: A New Lens on Canadian Foreign Policy?" *Canadian Foreign Policy Journal* 7, no. 1 (1999): 2, accessed August 17, 2017, doi: 10.1080/11926422.1999.9673195.
[14] Amartya Sen, "Birth of a Discourse," in *Routledge Handbook of Human Security*, ed. Mary Martin and Taylor Owen (London & New York: Routledge, 2013), 18.
[15] King and Murray, "Rethinking Human Security," 588.

rather than a group level and includes a variety of threats to human survival and wellbeing. In the WANA region these threats often relate to broader contextual issues, including regional instability and inequality amongst citizens. Another significant aspect is that the different pillars of human security are mutually reinforcing; if one aspect is improved, it can potentially improve other areas of concern.

Two elements clarify how the concept of human security has developed and how it now compares to traditional security. First, the UN has claimed that the primary features of human security are that it is people-centred, multi-sectoral, comprehensive, context-specific, and prevention-orientated and, that as such, "human security emphasizes the interconnectedness of both threats and responses."[16] This reconceptualisation of security as something which primarily responds to individual **human needs** is indicative of a shift "from traditional, state-centric conceptions of security that focused primarily of the safety of states from military aggression, to one that concentrates on the security of individuals, their protection and empowerment."[17] Whilst this shift from state-centric security policies to human security may be clear, the practical implications of such a move remains ambiguous. What human security entails and how to enact it is the source of much debate amongst academics and policy-makers.

The second clear element of human security is its role as the "rear-guard of human development."[18] Whilst **human development** is focused upon increasing the capacity and opportunities of individuals, "human security focuses on enabling peoples to contain or avert threats to their lives, livelihoods and human dignity."[19] As such, for human development goals to be achieved it is imperative that there are strong human security measures in place. For example, it is going to be almost impossible for someone to develop commercial skills if they do not already have safe and easy access to educational resources. While examples on material human security needs are easier to come by, the inclusion of human dignity complicates our understanding of human development due to its subjective and rubric definition. It is important to note here that the protesters in Tunisia and Egypt in 2010 and 2011 clearly referred to human dignity in their demands. As well as evolving and marrying the concepts of human needs and human development, a real strength of human security is that it is able to look past the traditional state-centric security approaches, and this is particularly relevant to the WANA region, and this project.

2.3 Violent Extremism

Violent extremism is one of the most central terms to this project, and as such, it is necessary to provide a discussion of its differing conceptualisations in the literature. The following section includes a brief mention of the regular conflation of 'violent extremism' and 'terrorism' and, more importantly, a consideration of whether acts of violence are central to what we perceive of as 'violent extremism.'

[16] UN Human Security Unit, "Human Security in Theory and Practice, An Overview of the Human Security Concept and the United Nations Trust Fund for Human Security," (New York: United Nations, 2009), 6.
[17] Ibid., 5.
[18] "Arab Human Development Report 2009: Challenges to Human Security in the Arab Countries," UNDP, May 26, 2009, accessed August 17, 2017, http://www.undp.org/content/undp/en/home/librarypage/hdr/arab_human_developmentreport2009.html.
[19] Ibid.

The Centre for Security Studies in Zurich has highlighted the regularity at which violent extremism and terrorism are confused; "critics regard the two terms as being synonymous, with 'violent extremism' as a cosmetic replacement for the highly politicised term 'terrorism.'"[20] After the proliferation of the use of the word 'terrorism' after 9/11 there have been attempts to find less politically controversial alternatives. There is ongoing debate as to the exact differences between them but for the purpose of this project it should suffice to say that we will be using the term violent extremism.

Operationally, the definition of violent extremism can at times also be particularly narrow. Glazzard and Zeuthen have argued that more so than terrorism, violent extremism is used as a descriptor for specifically Islamist violence. They have written that "although USAID's definition is wide, 'violent extremism' is arguably applied much more narrowly – i.e. to Islamist violence alone, ignoring the many other forms of ideologically motivated or justified violence that affect countries".[21] As a result, the term is often treated as synonymous with some of the WANA region's resident armed Islamist groups.

However, confusion over the meaning of violent extremism also arises because of its breadth when it is used to describe individuals who fund, facilitate, or condone violence, even if they do not actually carry out violent acts themselves. For example, the FBI defines violent extremism as "encouraging, condoning, justifying, or supporting the commission of a violent act to achieve political, ideological, religious, social, or economic goals."[22] This description could describe almost every state because states often carry out violent acts for political ends. More pertinently, this broadening of the definition means that violent extremism can be used to describe a range of activities that do not in fact include violence itself. Condoning violence might fall in the realm of ideological radicalisation without the practical and tangible acts of extremist violence.

The problem is compounded by the comparative or relational nature of extremism as a term, which relies on an understanding of what is 'ordinary' or 'normal' in order to define it.[23] Certain views concerning issues such as gender equality, or the role of religion, may be considered as extreme in certain contexts and not in others. Thus, what is defined as "extremism" depends to an extent on the individual, group, or organisation providing the designation and it is therefore helpful to consider extremism in the same way that the Australian government defined radicalisation in 2015 a report: "radicalisation happens when a person's thinking and behaviour become significantly different from how most of the members of their society and community view social issues and participate politically."[24] Thus, it is imperative to have a clear study of the context in order to understand how radicalisation and extremism are manifesting in reaction and relation to the social, political, religious, and economic surroundings.

Partially as a result of this inherent subjectivity in prescribing what is understood as 'extreme', along with the broader confusions associated with defining 'violent extremism', this project will

[20] Frazer and Nünlist, "The Concept of Countering Violent Extremism."
[21] Andrew Glazzard and Martine Zeuthen,"*Violent Extremism,*" GSDRC, February 2016, accessed August 17, 2017, http://www.gsdrc.org/professional-dev/violent-extremism/.
[22] "What is Violent Extremism?" Accessed August 17, 2017, https://cve.fbi.gov/whatis/.
[23] Alex P. Schmid, *Violent and Non-Violent Extremism: Two Sides of the Same Coin?* International Centre for Counter-Terrorism - The Hague, May 2014, accessed August 17, 2017, https://www.icct.nl/download/file/ICCT-Schmid-Violent-Non-Violent-Extremism-May-2014.pdf; Peter Coleman and Andrea Bartolli, *Addressing Extremism*, The International Center for Cooperation and Conflict Resolution, Columbia University, 2009, accessed August 17, 2017, http://www.libertyunderattack.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/06/Addressing-Extremism-ICCCR-ICAR.pdf.
[24] Chris Angus, "Radicalisation and Violent Extremism: Causes and Responses," NSW Parliamentary Research Service, February 2016, accessed August 17, 2017, https://www.parliament.nsw.gov.au/researchpapers/Documents/radicalisation-and-violent-extremism-causes-and-/Radicalisation%20eBrief.pdf.

adopt a definition of violent extremism which focuses on the specific advocacy or action of violence. Thus, the most important indicator of violent extremism is that an individual, having gone through a process of radicalisation, actively advocates and uses violence to achieve the desired social and political change. In this case, violence refers to direct physical harm.[25]

2.4 Radicalisation

Similar to the confusion in defining violent extremism, the concept of radicalisation is equally contested. The primary causes of confusion include the differentiation between ideological and behavioural radicalisation, whether such a difference exists, and how it impacts upon levels of violent extremism. This project primarily focuses on violent extremism, but as it has been stated that violent extremism is a potential end point for radicalisation it is worth spending a short time considering the literature on radicalisation due to its role in the creation of violent extremism.

Despite the link between radicalisation and increased violent behaviour, radicalisation does not necessarily conclude with acts of violent extremism. Randy Borum has argued that there is no inevitable link between extremist beliefs and violent action, and points out that there will always be far more people who hold extremist views than there will be acts of violent extremism, or terrorism, carried out.[26] As a result, he suggests that the two phenomena, namely extremist political beliefs and violent action, should be studied separately.

According to Borum, and John Horgan, focusing on ideological radicalisation is a mistake because it infers that certain beliefs are a necessary precursor to violent extremism, something evidence suggests is untrue.[27] For them, being ideologically extreme is neither sufficient nor necessary for becoming a violent extremist and therefore not a worthy area of focus in trying to understand or prevent violent extremism. On the other hand, Neumann suggests that studying cognitive radicalisation is particularly important because it might teach us why certain "belief systems resonate with certain populations, and—correspondingly—what combination of factors explains their lack of resonance and decline."[28] Therefore, in Neumann's view studying ideological extremism could help us better understand not just radicalisation, but deradicalisation as well. It can be concluded that it would be naive to completely ignore the role of ideological extremism, however, it is critical to realise that radicalisation does not occur in a vacuum, and any study that does not consider the social movements, and broader contexts from which extremist acts arise, will inevitably be limited.

In another description of the radicalisation process, although this time one from the WANA region itself, Abdul Hussein Sha'ban has identified how intolerance and the rejection of differences can manifest into a suspicion of others.[29] This closely connects to the literature on

[25] Neven Bondokji, Kim Wilkinson and Leen Aghabi, *Understanding Radicalisation: A Literature Review of Models and Driver* (Amman: WANA Institute, 2016), 4-6.
[26] Randy Borum, "Radicalisation into Violent Extremism I: A Review of Social Science Theories," *Journal of Strategic Security* 4 (Winter 2011): 7-36, accessed August 17, 2017, http://dx.doi.org/10.5038/1944-0472.4.4.1.
[27] Ibid.; John Horgan, Remarks at START Symposium, "Lessons learned since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001," Washington, D.C., September 1, 2011, accessed August 17, 2017, https://www.c-span.org/video/?301326-1/lessons-learned-since-terrorist-attacks-september-11-2001.
[28] Neumann, "The Trouble with Radicalisation," p.881.
[29] Abdul Hussein Sha'ban,"Has the Elimination of Extremism Become Intractable? (In Arabic)," *Al Jazeera*, December 26, 2015, accessed August 17, 2017, http://www.aljazeera.net/home/print/6c87b8ad-70ec-47d5-b7c4-3aa56fb899e2/1e700b36-5567-483d-80a6-72b058245548.

radicalisation drawn from Social Identity Theory,[30]within which it is argued an individual's intolerance is compounded by a belief in the supremacy of oneself and the 'otherness' of different groups. In another example of the division between ideological and behavioural radicalisation, Sha'ban suggests that extremism remains in the sphere of thought and can, but does not necessarily, develop into terrorism, which is in the sphere of action.[31] According to Sha'ban, terrorism includes criminal action and requires security and judicial solutions, but he suggests extremism requires counter arguments that uphold religious and political plurality and partnerships.[32]

It has also been reported that the radicalisation process can occur as a result of a personal crisis around identity and a search for meaning.[33] As Atran observes, "becoming part of a fervently committed organization provided a powerful galvanizing identity missing in their lives."[34] Such a crisis is undoubtedly subjective and varies greatly on the context and situation, but it can often involve personal insecurities or a lack of self-esteem or self-worth.[35] This can be the result of multiple factors including a lack of social marginalisation, a lack of economic opportunities, or a lack of community cohesion.[36] The UK counter-extremism think tank Quilliam has highlighted "emotional vulnerability" as a key risk factor in considering why some young Muslims might be more susceptible to violent extremist organisations.[37] It is further argued that such feelings may be heightened during times of transition or crisis when there is more of a perceived need for a life purpose and social support.[38] However, the presence of an identity crisis should not be conflated with specific mental health characteristics or a prevalent set of motivations as there is little evidence to suggest any consistent character traits, sometimes known as a "terrorist personalities", amongst perpetrators of violent extremism.[39]

Despite the divergent views, we argue that radicalisation is a process, and violent extremism is a potential end point of it. The WANA Institute defines radicalisation as

> "a process of personal transformation that an individual goes through in response to contextual grievances. This transformation is marked by a personal crisis in search for role and meaning that eventually leads an individual to support the use of violence against state actors and/or civilians to bring about an ideologically-defined social and political order."[40]

[30] Michael A. Hogg, Deborah J. Terry and Katherine M. White, "A Tale of Two Theories: A Critical Comparison of Identity Theory with Social Identity Theory," *Social Psychology Quarterly* 58, no. 4 (December 1995): 255-269, accessed August 17, 2017, http://www.jstor.org/stable/2787127.
[31] Sha'ban, "Has the Elimination of Extremism Become Intractable? (In Arabic)."
[32] Ibid.
[33] Angus, "Radicalisation and Violent Extremism: Causes and Responses."
[34] Scott Atran, "The Devoted Actor: Unconditional Commitment and Intractable Conflict across Cultures," *Current Anthropology* 57 (June 2016): S192-S203, accessed August 17, 2017, http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/doi/pdfplus/10.1086/685495.
[35] Neven Bondokji, Kim Wilkinson and Leen Aghabi, "Social Identity and Radicalisation: A Review of Key Concepts," (Amman: The WANA Institute, forthcoming 2017).
[36] Ibid.
[37] Ruth Manning and Courtney La Bau, "In and Out of Extremism: How Quilliam Helped Ten Former Far-Right and Islamists Change," Quilliam Foundation, August 2015, 12.
[38] Angus, "Radicalisation and Violent Extremism: Causes and Responses."
[39] Didier Bigo et al., "Preventing and Countering Youth Radicalisation in the EU," (Brussels: European Parliament, 2014), accessed August 17, 2017, http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/etudes/join/2014/509977/IPOL-LIBE_ET(2014)509977_EN.pdf.
[40] Bondokji, Wilkinson and Aghabi, *Understanding Radicalisation: A Literature Review of Models and Driver*, 3.

Within this definition, 'support' for the use of violence may develop through the radicalisation process. However, radicalisation does not *inevitably* lead to violent extremism, but violent extremism is inevitably preceded by radicalisation.

2.5 Countering Violent Extremism and Preventing Violent Extremism

An important reason for attempting to better grasp what is exactly meant by violent extremism is in order to understand how this then feeds into designing Countering Violent Extremism(CVE) and Preventing Violent Extremism(PVE) policies. Furthermore, one of the central considerations of this project is how human security programming and state-centric security measures interact with one another, and either separately or collectively, impact upon drivers of violent extremism.

The use of the word 'counter' in CVE suggests an assumed pre-existence of violent extremism and has thus often been associated with state security approaches. However, operationally, CVE includes engagement at the local level in communication initiatives, education reform, and development approaches. Partially as a result of this, there is increasingly a shift from the term CVE to PVE, although many treat them as interchangeable. Both CVE and PVE refer to the 'soft' side of counterterrorism and focus on the drivers encouraging people to take part in politically or ideologically motivated violence. Fraser and Nunlist clarify that whilst this could take multiple forms, "in practice, the current focus is on violent Islamist movements."[41]

PVE has been described as "the U.N.'s acronym for C.V.E" because the UN "has long laid strong emphasis on preventive measures and thus prefers the abbreviation PVE."[42] On February 12, 2016, UN Secretary-General presented his "Plan of Action to Prevent Violent Extremism" to the General Assembly, and within it gave a clarification over the difference between CVE and PVE:

> "Over the past two decades, the international community has sought to address violent extremism primarily within the context of security-based counter-terrorism measures adopted to 'counter' (CVE) the threat posed by Al-Qaida and its affiliated groups. This Plan is a call for a comprehensive approach encompassing not only essential security–based counter-terrorism measures but also systematic preventive steps (PVE) to address the factors that make individuals join violent extremist groups."[43]

This broader understanding of PVE has been reflected by researchers and practitioners. For example, Ahmed Rehab suggests that PVE strategies need to stress the individual agency of **youth**, a recommendation which inherently infers the need for human security policies.[44]According to Rehab, the difference between governments and radical groups is that the later perceive youth as agents and provide them the opportunity to act. Whereas, when using state-centric security policies, governments prescribe youth as actors to be contained and marginalised.

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[41] Ibid.
[42] Ibid.
[43] "FAQ- GENEVA CONFERENCE ON PREVENTING VIOLENT EXTREMISM," United Nations Counter-Terrorism Implementation Task Force, 2016, accessed August 17, 2017, https://www.un.org/counterterrorism/ctitf/en/faq-geneva-conference-preventing-violent-extremism.
[44]Ahmad Rehab, "Intervention at Expert Meeting on Radicalism and Violent Extremism," (Ankara, Turkey, March 1-2, 2016).

Mustafa El Sagezli, commenting on the situation in Libya, also suggests that one of the best ways to counter violent extremism is to break through the barriers of **communication** and superiority constructed by radical groups. By enabling mothers of fighters to talk with fighters in armed groups El Sagezli argues fighters were persuaded to come back and weaknesses were created within the groups' ranks. This can be seen as an approach premised on the human needs for family and social support.[45]

Georgia Holmer has explored the role the informal sector can be expected to play in **community policing**. She argues this can encourage a feeling of public ownership over community-level security; however, it is vitally premised on a shared understanding within the community as to the values and behavioural norms they wish to uphold.[46] Within the WANA region this can manifest in the limiting of certain civil society groups which are seen to encourage values not approved of by the government, security services, or international donors. In such a case CVE measures, even when placed within a human security framework, can in fact restrict civil society space and thus hinder other human security goals.[47] As such, **CVE measures can at times misunderstand one of the most fundamental elements of human security – that its pillars need to mutually reinforce each other to be most effective.**

Frazer and Nunlist claim that CVE has gained particular traction amongst state actors since 2015 as a vital policy instrument in the war against Daesh and the phenomenon of Foreign Terrorist Fighters (FTF).[48] CVE in such a format **combines state security and human security measures**. In other words, it is not enough to try and tackle violent extremism with solely military and security measures, but instead, "the structural causes of violent extremism must also be tackled, including intolerance, government failure, and political, economic, and social marginalization."[49] As such it is clear that CVE is not solely attempting to combat the manifestation of violent extremism but instead to derail the process which leads up to it.

But PVE is perhaps a more accurate and nuanced understanding as the use of the word 'prevent' suggests a more explicit understanding of the fact that violent extremism cannot be combatted solely through a military-security approach. Instead, the underlying causes of economic, political, and social/cultural drivers must be addressed to contain the rise and spread of violent extremism. However, it is clear that CVE and PVE have become somewhat interchangeable within policy declarations but broadly relate to similar tactics and thus, it is necessary to acknowledge the usage of both. More importantly for this project, CVE and PVE both attempt to successfully combine human security and state-centric security policies in order to effectively combat violent extremism, and as such, relate very closely to our research.

[45] Mustafa Al-Sagezli, "Lessons from Libya CVE Efforts" (presentation, Expert Meeting on Radicalism and Violent Extremism, Ankara, Turkey, March 1-2, 2016).
[46] Georgia Holmer and Fulco van Deventer, "Special Report 352: Inclusive Approaches to Community Policing and CVE" (Washington DC: United States Institute of Peace, 2014), 3.
[47] Isabelle Geuskens, "Shrinking Space: The Impact of counter-terrorism measures on the Women, Peace and Security agenda," Sustainable Security, May 8, 2015, accessed August 17, 2017, https://sustainablesecurity.org/2015/05/08/shrinking-space-the-impact-of-counter-terrorism-measures-on-the-women-peace-and-security-agenda/.
[48] Frazer and Nünlist, "The Concept of Countering Violent Extremism."
[49] Ibid.

3. State Security in WANA region

3.1 Introduction

Since their independence, and in pursuit of maintaining sovereignty and territorial integrity, Jordan, Lebanon and Tunisia have followed a traditional approach to state-centric security as opposed to a human-centric security one. While using such systems relatively limited success has been demonstrated in addressing, and responding to, weakness and vulnerability, particularly those resulting from regional turmoil and instability. For instance, security risks have increased in Jordan and Lebanon due to the unresolved Syrian and Iraqi crises, the resulting porous state borders, and the violent non-state actors (VNSA) that have emerged/been strengthened.

Yet, more acknowledgment of the need to go beyond traditional state-security approaches towards human-centric ones has also been observed. Despite reported deficiencies, there is increasing attention on asserting human security as a conceptual framework for addressing social, economic, political, cultural, and local environmental grievances in the three countries of this project. A clearer inclusive vision for human security has become, theoretically at least, an urgent challenge for decision-makers and stakeholders in the three concerned countries. However, state-centric security policies are still the primary focus and thus it is important to provide a tentative theoretical analysis of the state centric security policies which are adopted in Lebanon, Tunisia, and Jordan, in response to violent conflict and threats or acts of violent extremism. This section will attempt to do so.

The literature on violent extremism strongly suggests that it revolves around grievances linked to various factors, such as: "social marginalization, political exclusion, lack of access to justice and resources, and repression or abuse by state and security services."[50] Yet, these pertinent factors may not apply all at once to triggering violent extremism; rather, the domestic and external settings can either inflame violent extremism or create a conducive environment for establishing peace, security and national development, especially in socio-economic terms. Therefore, thwarting violent extremist tendencies requires going beyond traditional state-centric security and more towards cementing human security. Key to this transition is boosting **good governance**. To do so requires an established understanding of the root causes of violent extremism, and appreciating that such causes are deeply entrenched in social and economic problems which can not be solved by military solutions alone.

Adopting strict state-centric security policies adversely impacts human security programs in the MENA region. Favouring such security policies over human security programming hinders the ability of countries to effectively counter violent conflict/extremism. This is primarily because adopting strict state-centric security policies leaves no room for the development of a people-oriented approach which comprehensively tackles challenges and formulates preventive measures while ensuring both protection and empowerment.

[50] See: "The Causes and Consequences of Violent Extremism and the Role of Foreign Assistance: Testimony Submitted for the Record Senate Appropriations Subcommittee on State, Foreign Operations and Related Programs," United States Institute of Peace, 114th Cong. (2016) (testimony of Nancy Lindborg, President of USIP), accessed August 17, 2017, https://www.usip.org/publications/2016/04/causes-and-consequences-violent-extremism-and-role-foreign-assistance; "Guide to the Drivers of Violent Extremism," USAID, February 2009, accessed August 17, 2017, http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/Pnadt978.pdf; and Dave Allen, et. al., "The Big Spin: Corruption and the Growth of Violent Extremism," Transparency International, February 2017, accessed August 17, 2017, http://ti-defence.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/02/The_Big_Spin_Web.pdf.

3.2 State – Centric Security Programs

It is no surprise that 'security' is a highly contested term. However, a consensus is established over what has traditionally framed the discussions about security: the notion of "referent objects."[51] In essence, the type of referent object determines the type of security, and dictates not only what "threats"[52] the referent object is faced with, but also the "means"[53] to protect it. Accordingly, the state is the referent object of state-centric security, the same way the individual/human is the referent object of human-centric security.

As the referent object shapes the discussion of security, a look at traditional state-centric security programs reveals three key pillars that directly relate to the security of the 'state': **national sovereignty, deterrence,** and **governance**. Any state-centric security program entails, and feeds into, one or more of these three key pillars. Yet, prior to providing clear indicators, along with definitions and justifications of these three pillars, this section will also offer a brief regional overview of state-centric security programs in Lebanon, Jordan, and Tunisia, which includes **diagnosis of the situation**, **overcoming the challenges,** and **the future outlook**.

3.2.1 Jordan

Jordan's state-centric security policies focus on preserving the nation-state from current and potential security threats which endanger its internal and external settings. The survival of Jordan as a nation-state is at a stake due to the turmoil in the Middle East, and the accompanying and recurrent violent acts. In semantic terms, King Abdullah's II approach towards extremism and terrorism centres on describing ISIS as the "outlaw of Islam" or "*Khawarej*."[54] This comes on the heal of launching the "Amman Message"[55] in November 2004 aimed at rectifying the image of Islam as well as reassessing the religion's position in the contemporary era.

Violent Non-State Actors (VNSA's) operations in Jordan go back more than 10 years, prior to the birth of ISIS. Jordan witnessed three terrorist bombing events which killed 60 and injured about 300 in 2005;[56] Al-Qaeda claimed responsibility for these tragic events. Recently, Daesh and the threat of violent extremism (VE) constitute core elements of endangering state-centric security and adversely affecting national sovereignty and Jordanian territorial integrity. An important feature of such an orientation is closely related to Jordan's determination to maintain national sovereignty over contiguous highly inflamed areas near to the Iraqi and Syrian frontiers. The Jordan Risk Report highlights the closure of its northern and eastern borders marking them as "closed military zones,"[57] following a suicide attack that killed six Jordanian soldiers in an area located near Syria and Iraq.

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[51] Pauline Kerr, *The Evolving Dialectic between State-centric and Human-centric Security*, Department of International Relation at the Australian National University, September 2003, accessed August 17, 2017, https://openresearch-repository.anu.edu.au/bitstream/1885/42112/2/03-2.pdf.

[52] Ibid.

[53] Ibid.

[54] Scott Pelley, "Keeping Jordan's Balance Amid Crisis," CBS News, accessed August 17, 2017, http://www.cbsnews.com/news/60-minutes-king-abudallah-jordan-amid-crisis/.

[55] More is found on Amman's Message official website: "The Amman Message," accessed August 17, 2017, http://ammanmessage.com/.

[56] "Jordan Hotel Blasts Kill Dozens," *BBC News,* November 10, 2005, accessed August 17, 2017, http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/middle_east/4423008.stm.

[57] "Jordan Risk Report: Security Travel Advice for Jordan," Intelligent Protection International Limited, accessed August 17, 2017, https://www.intelligent-protection.co.uk/jordan-country-brief.html.

In the meantime, the 2016 review of the World Bank (WB) found that socio - economic peace in Jordan has created a conducive political - security environment whereby the country can confidently pursue long-term "structural reforms in education, health, privatization and liberalization."[58] Along this line of argument, Jordan has managed to introduce a series of reform measures, such as "social protection systems and reformed subsidies, [whilst] creating the [proper] conditions for public-private partnerships in infrastructure and making tax reforms."[59] In parallel terms, the country has established a national strategic framework for overcoming various challenges facing state-centric security policies due to the push and pull factors that may accelerate violent extremist tendencies. However, according to the World Bank Report, more concrete areas of concern also need to be attended to, such as enhancing the investment environment, and easing and implementing plans of doing business. With limited real progress achieved in the realm of economic development it would be even more difficult to achieve a steady rate of economic growth. Unfortunately, economic growth has declined in 2016 for the second year in a row.[60] Furthermore, on top of Jordan's socio-economic problems, the country has increasingly suffered from escalating pressures on already squeezed natural resources, particularly in water and energy resources. Controlling, and ultimately eliminating, corruption, is a further essential part of overcoming critical challenges to state-centric security policies.

Good governance is an essential starting point for triggering and boosting real rates of economic growth. Hence, any real improvement in GDP growth – though not guaranteed – can be perceived as a good sign of supporting the country's campaign in combating VE. Part of good governance is the need to fulfil human security commitments and aspirations for all people residing in Jordan (including the rising refugee population mainly from Syria). In this light, it becomes evident that with the Syrian crisis persisting for more than 6 years, Jordan's socio-economic burdens has to be speedily relieved in the form of strengthening sustainable strategic plans of development to cover Jordanians and non-Jordanians.

In spite of its various problems, Jordan continues to rise in the ranks of the HDI (Human Development Index) across recent years (2011-2016). The indicator covers 3 major areas of human development concern: a long and healthy life, access to knowledge, and a decent standard of living.[61] However, there is a dire need for reactivating a unit for combating violent extremism as a coordinating body between government institutions, civil society and the research community in the country. Until the government starts to genuinely acknowledge and embrace the importance of human security as an aspect of CVE opposed to treating it as tokenistic gesture, there seems little opportunity for the potentially positive relationship between development and security to grow.

3.2.2 Lebanon

Lebanon is characterized as the most religiously diverse country in the Middle East and the single Arab country with the largest Christian population. In conjunction, Lebanon has a long tradition of liberal democracy, which is the oldest in the Middle East. In realpolitik terms,

[58] "The World Bank in Jordan: Overview," The World Bank, accessed August 17, 2017, http://www.worldbank.org/en/country/jordan/overview.
[59] Ibid.
[60] "The World Bank in Jordan: Overview," The World Bank.
[61] "Human Development Report 2016: Human Development for Everyone," UNDP, 2016, accessed August 17, 2017, http://hdr.undp.org/sites/all/themes/hdr_theme/country-notes/JOR.pdf.

Lebanon's "National Charter"[62] of 1943 established a sectarian-religious constitutional system whereby political power is shared by Christians, Sunni, and Shia, according to an agreement between the respective communities. From the perspective of geopolitics, the Lebanese condition is unique in that the successive Lebanese authorities have skilfully shaped a consensual sectarian political framework of relatively peaceful coexistence. However, the reality of managing the intricacies of the sectarian system and building a secularized liberal approach has not been efficient or easy. Along this line of argument, the much awaited election of Lebanese President Michel Aoun on October 31, 2016 represented the minimum acceptable level of consensus among the major drivers of the sectarian system. Meanwhile, the almost two and a half years of political void at the Presidential level has led - among other factors - to a paralysis of the political process. It is important therefore to provide a relatively objective analysis of how state-centric security policies respond and overcome the internal and external challenges confronting the Lebanese state in its current, vulnerable, form.

Difficult times warrant critical measures in responding to and overcoming serious challenges facing state-centric security policies in Lebanon. The repercussions of the Syrian civil war heightened the prospects of infiltration by foreign fighters along Lebanon's frontier with Syria. Lebanon's vulnerable security situation was characterized by the Lebanese Premier Saad Al-Hariri (Head of the Future Movement Party) as approaching "breaking point because of the pressures of hosting more than one million Syrian refugees."[63] The interventionist role by Hezbollah (part of the current Lebanese government) in the Syrian crisis has inflamed the tempo of the Lebanese crisis to an unprecedented degree.

In the first phase of the Syrian crisis, Hezbollah successfully managed to expel "Salafi extremists" from Al-Nusra who were based in the Syrian towns of Qusair and Yabrud, and in late July 2017 from the Lebanese town of Jaroud Arsal.[64] According to the retired Lebanese Army General, Elias Farhat, there is good reason for Hezbollah to play a role in the Syrian crisis: "had it [Hezbollah] not done so, the terrorists would have invaded the Lebanese territories just like they did in Ninevah and Anbar in Iraq."[65] However, while this military strength may be helpful Hezbollah's role in the Syrian war has also raised tensions between Sunnis and Shia within Lebanon. Moreover, the Lebanese Premier Saad Al-Hariri has warned of risks of violent extremism due to various burgeoning tensions emanating between the refugees and the local Lebanese communities. Addressing the ramifications of the Syrian crisis has become a matter of necessity to the Lebanese government due to the fact that the Syrian refugees have grown to constitute about a quarter of the local Lebanese population. In response, the Lebanese governmental authorities continue its persistent calls to impose its national sovereignty throughout the entire Lebanese geographical landscape. Thus, the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) have also indulged in stamping out violent extremists across Lebanese territory including in the various Palestinian refugee camps hosting thousands of Syrian refugees. Due to a widespread mistrust of the government and the military, along with strong sectarian divides

[62] "National Reconciliation Charter of Lebanon," accessed August 17, 2017, http://confinder.richmond.edu/admin/docs/leb.pdf.
[63] "PM Hariri: Lebanon at 'Breaking Point' Due to Refugees," *Al Jazeera,* April 1, 2017, accessed August 17, 2017, http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2017/04/saad-al-hariri-lebanon-big-refugee-camp-170401045951087.html.
[64] "Lebanon's Hezbollah is Gaining Valuable Experience in a Tough Border Battle with Islamist Militants," *Business Insider,* July 26, 2017, accessed August 17, 2017, http://www.businessinsider.com/r-lebanons-hezbollah-faces-tough-terrain-in-border-battle-2017-7.
[65] Ali Rizq, "Why Lebanon Could Be Spared from Recent Terrorism Bloodshed," *Al Monitor,* January 16, 2017, accessed August 17, 2017, http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/ar/contents/articles/originals/2017/01/lebanon-terrorist-threat-syria-neighboring-countries.html.

across the country such military responses to violent extremism are often viewed with scepticism and as a way to settle private disagreements.

To tackle such scepticism, there has to be a well-thought out and transparent plan aimed at ensuring Lebanon maintain sovereign control over its territory. From this perspective, strengthening the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) is a matter of priority. Whenever the Lebanese political system has displayed weaknesses, the stakes of Hezbollah's growing influence into Lebanon and beyond will be raised at the expense of shaping an effective state centric-security system. With control over some Lebanese territories under contention - particularly those bordering Israel in the southern region - it seems essential to the Lebanese government to lean on the UN to strengthen UNIFIL's (United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon) role in keeping the peace across the Lebanese-Israeli borders and curtailing Hezbollah's power.

Furthermore, solidifying Lebanon's national sovereignty has led the UN to support Lebanon in its future strategic outlook by adopting the UN Strategic Framework (UNSF) for 2017-2020. This projected new initiative will hopefully replace the UNDAF (United Nations Development Assistance Framework) for Lebanon (2016-2020). Under this new promising initiative, 3 core priorities are projected to be accomplished: 1. All people in Lebanon should have peace and stability, 2. Lebanon will enjoy domestic stability and practice effective governance, 3. Lebanon will reduce poverty rates and promote sustainable development (in accordance to UN's Human Development 2030 Agenda), whilst also addressing the immediate need to respond to human rights/gender sensitive matters.[66] While all of these are clearly worthy goals there seems a large disconnect between what they attempt to be achieved and the reality of inefficiency and stagnation on the ground.

It is essential to extend the deterrence capability framework in Lebanon beyond the hard power (military-economic) dimension to include soft power dimensions as represented in national-political–diplomatic fields. Such measures rely on civic spaces, political participation, and creating a sense of agency and individual stake in the state. As such efforts need to be made to build a Lebanese sense of nationhood and shared identity, something which is currently critically weak and divided.

3.2.3 Tunisia

Since its independence on March 20, 1956, Tunisia has known five Presidents. The first two spanned nearly fifty years: Habib Bourguiba, the liberator from the French colonial powers and founding father of the state, and Zine el-Abidine Ben Ali who usurped power in a bloodless coup d'état in 1987. Since the 2011 revolution, three presidents have been elected: Fouad Mebazaa, Moncef Marzouki, and Mohamed Beji Caid Essebsi.

Prior to the country's 2011 revolution, home grown violent extremists were considered a peripheral affair to be strictly controlled. However, the increase in civil liberties since 2011 has coincided with the adverse repercussions of the Libyan Revolution and a blossoming of Islamism within the country, leading eventually to the eruption of terrorist incidents across the country, committed by two main terrorist groups: Ansar Al-Sharia of Tunisia and Okba Ibn

[66] "United Nations Strategic Framework (UNSF): Lebanon 2017-2020," *Relief Web,* October 4, 2016, accessed August 17, 2017, http://reliefweb.int/report/lebanon/united-nations-strategic-framework-unsf-lebanon-2017-2020.

Nafaa.[67] These extremist groups launched targeted attacks against secular political officials, foreign tourists and military personnel. Furthermore, it is important to reiterate that Tunisia is known to have exported the largest number of foreign fighters per capita to Syria and Iraq, estimated at around 6000.[68] Other Tunisian fighters are thought to be located in Libya, and armed with heavy military capabilities.[69] Terrorist incidents, and their huge damage to the tourism industry that Tunisia is so reliant on, have left their mark on the Tunisian security situation and triggered various CVE attempts, however ongoing disorganisation and distrust amongst partners makes it difficult for them to be effective. There has also been a lack of genuine attention on human security programming as part of CVE efforts.

An attack in November 2015 targeted a bus carrying 12 Presidential Guards and prompted the Tunisian President Beji Caid al-Essebsi to declare a 30 day state of emergency and also impose a curfew in the Tunisian capital.[70] Whilst strengthening current security the state of emergency has empowered the executive authorities to ban internationally recognized national rights such as strikes, demonstrations, and gatherings. According to the Tunisian scholar Hamza Meddeb such measures adversely affect the goals of the 2011 revolution: "Social justice and political liberalism [both] fading each day in the name of a category of democracy that has been stripped of its political and social meaning."[71] Tunisia's battle to balance out the goals of the revolution whilst ensuring state-centric security measures are being played out in the state's reaction to its pressing problem of violent extremism. Thus the pressing question has become, are Tunisian democratic gains too fragile to withstand the country's CVE agenda?

Political stability has been progressing in reasonably good terms. But there are more efforts needed to protect Tunisian national sovereignty and territorial integrity. Similar to Jordan and Lebanon, good governance has to be stressed in intermediate and long-term strategic terms. From this perspective, civil society associations and NGO's have to be encouraged to play a salient role in accelerating the pace of overall reform on all important fields of public interest. In this regard, human security is conceived of as a crucial part of successful reform, not only targeting vulnerable Tunisians, but the society at large.

3.3 Indicators of State-Centric Security

Having presented a brief overview of the security situations in the three countries of this project, the next section will provide clear indicators of state-centric security programming. This will include definitions and justifications of why it is worth spending time considering three pillars of state-centric security in particular, namely: national sovereignty, deterrence, and governance.

To gain an overall perception of state-centric security policies in the three targeted countries, the analysis relies on a composite of indicators for the timeframe covering the years 2011 to 2016.

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[67] "Tunisia: Extremism & Counter-Extremism," *Counter Extremism Project,* accessed August 17, 2017, https://www.counterextremism.com/countries/tunisia.
[68] Ian Bremmer, "The Top 5 Countries where ISIS Gets Its Foreign Recruits," *Time Magazine,* April 14, 2017, accessed August 17, 2017, http://time.com/4739488/isis-iraq-syria-tunisia-saudi-arabia-russia/.
[69] Hair Malka and Margo Balboni, "Libya: Tunisia's Jihadi Nightmare," June 2016, accessed August 17, 2017, http://foreignfighters.csis.org/tunisia/libya.html.
[70] Chris Stephen, "Tunisia President Declares State of Emergency after Bus Bombing," *The Guardian,* November 25, 2015, accessed August 17, 2017, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/nov/24/explosion-on-tunisian-military-bus.
[71] Nadia Marzouki and Hamza Meddeb, "Tunisia: Democratic Miracle or Mirage," *Jadaliyya*, June 11, 2015, accessed August 17, 2017, http://www.jadaliyya.com/pages/index/21863/tunisia_democratic-miracle-or-mirage.

Three main pillars, which can be broken down into 10 indicators, were used to characterise and visualise state-centric security policies. These are summarised in Figure 1 below:

Figure 1: Pillars of State-Centric Security Policies



To conduct the numerical analysis, the 10 selected indicators were translated into quantitative values for a period of 6-years. Data reliability is essential, hence the values presented were based on the Global Peace Index (GPI) calculations. GPI ratings are expressed using a five-point scaling system, with the three targeted countries coded on a scale from 1 to 5, which respectively corresponds to very low-very high.

Initially each pillar will be briefly explained before the figures themselves are discussed for each country.

3.3.1 National Sovereignty

National Sovereignty is the supreme power that an independent state legally possesses, exercises, and protects against infringement. According to the legal dictionary, sovereignty is defined as the "power of a state to do everything necessary to govern itself, such as: making, executing and applying laws; imposing and collecting taxes; making war and peace; and forming treaties or engaging in commerce with foreign nations."[72] A solid national sovereignty entails a proper control over territorial integrity. For the purpose of this analysis, the vulnerability of national sovereignty will be measured for Jordan, Lebanon, and Tunisia, using three prime indicators: terrorism impact; political terror; and intensity of internal conflicts.

[72] "Sovereignty," The Free Dictionary, accessed August 17, 2017, http://legal-dictionary.thefreedictionary.com/National+sovereignty.

Terrorism Impact[73]

Alarmingly, global terrorism is on the rise.[74] Hence, the impact of terrorism is a significant indicator of how states are responding to the threat in order to protect their populations and properties from the wide ranging adverse implications of terrorism, including increased deaths (see Figure 2 below). Despite the different and competing definitions of terrorism,[75] it is important to identify how each of the three targeted countries managed the rising trend of terrorism-related violence. The indicator is calculated based on a weighted average of the last five years of the number of fatalities, injuries, and property damage caused by terrorism. Data reflecting this indicator utilizes "Global Peace Index" calculations which are based on the Global Terrorism Database and the Institute for Economics and Peace.

Figure 2: Number of Deaths due to Terrorism



Source: "Is Terrorism on the Rise? Here's What the Data Tells Us, (2017)
http://visionofhumanity.org/terrorism/is-terrorism-on-the-rise/

Political Terror[76]

This indicator emphasises the need of a given state to strengthen its national sovereignty by preventing and challenging violent non-state actors represented in the form of violent extremists and terrorist organisations. Here, countries are coded according to the level of terror described in the previous year in Amnesty International and US Department Country Reports. Data reflecting this indicator utilizes "Global Peace Index" calculations which are based on Gibney, M., Cornett, L., & Wood, R., Political Terror Scale.

Intensity of Internal Conflicts[77]

As a state witnesses an increased intensity of conflict there is every prospect that the state concerned will lose a significant part of its national sovereignty to the advantage of other violent non-state actors. The indicator provides a qualitative assessment of the intensity of conflict/s

[73] "Global Peace Index 2017," Vision of Humanity, accessed August 17, 2017, http://visionofhumanity.org/indexes/global-peace-index/.
[74] Camilla Schippa, "Is Terrorism on the Rise? Here's What the Data Tells Us," Vision of Humanity, accessed August 17, 2017, http://visionofhumanity.org/terrorism/is-terrorism-on-the-rise/.
[75] See for example, Alex P. Schmid and Albert J. Jongman, Po*litical Terrorism: A New Guide to Actors, Authors, Concepts, Data Bases, Theories and Literature* (New York, Routledge, 2017).
[76] "Global Peace Index 2017," Vision of Humanity.
[77] Ibid.

within the country. Data reflecting this indicator utilizes "Global Peace Index" calculations which are based on the Economist Intelligence Unit.

3.3.2 Deterrence

In simple terms, **deterrence** revolves around the measures taken by the state or an alliance of states to prevent hostile action by (an)other state(s).[78] Key elements of deterrence theory include rational choice and risk management; with the former relying upon the premise that people are rational actors, and the latter relating more to how decision makers measure the likelihood of an event occurring and the resulting impact.[79] Here, it is worth noting that traditional deterrence theory, which was long limited to the military domain -nuclear in specific - is now being challenged into expanding to other domains, including cybersecurity for instance.[80]

For the purpose of this analysis, deterrence will be measured for each of the states using three prime indicators: nuclear and heavy weapons, weapons import, and armed services personnel.

Nuclear and Heavy Weapons[81]
This indicator is essential in reflecting how much power the state has obtained in cementing and absorbing newly advanced military and security technologies for the purpose of deterrence. It refers to the numbers of heavy weapons calculated using a combination of the Military Balance[82] (International Institute for Strategic Studies), and United Nations Register of Conventional Arms (starting in 2010, data is weighted by destructive capability). Data reflecting this indicator utilises the "Global Peace Index" calculations which are based on the Institute for Economics and Peace.

Weapons Imports[83]
This indicator contributes to the state's military power as it faces the challenges of hostile acts to its own nation and territory. The indicator relates to the transfer of equipment or technology from one country, rebel force, or international organisation, to another. Major conventional weapons include: aircraft, armoured vehicles, artillery, radar systems, missiles, ships, and engines. Data reflecting this indicator utilizes "Global Peace Index" calculations which are based on SIPRI[84] Arms Transfers Project Database.

Armed Services Personnel[85]
This indicator plays an essential part in enhancing state's power in order to confront the challenges posed by other rival states and/or violent non-state actors. Active armed services personnel comprise all of serviceman and women on full time duty in the army, navy, air force

[78] "Sovereignty," The Free Dictionary, accessed August 17, 2017, www.thefreedictionary.com/deterrence.
[79] Chris Mark, "A Failed State of Security," 2012, accessed August 17, 2017, https://maritimerisk.files.wordpress.com/2012/03/deterrence-theory-in-cybercrime_final.pdf.
[80] More on this discussion can be found here: Annegret Bendiek and Tobias Metzger, "Deterrence Theory in the Cyber-Century," German Institute for International and Security Affairs, May 2015, accessed August 17, 2017, https://www.swp-berlin.org/fileadmin/contents/products/arbeitspapiere/Bendiek-Metzger_WP-Cyberdeterrence.pdf.
[81] "Global Peace Index 2017," Vision of Humanity.
[82] Which conducts the annual assessment of global military capabilities and defence economics. See more: "The Military Balance 2017," International Institute for Strategic Studies, accessed August 17, 2017, http://www.iiss.org/en/publications/military-s-balance.
[83] "Global Peace Index 2017," Vision of Humanity.
[84] Stockholm International Peace Research Institute. See more: "SIPRI Arms Transfers Database," Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, accessed August 17, 2017, https://www.sipri.org/databases/armstransfers.
[85] "Global Peace Index 2017," Vision of Humanity.

and joint forces (including conscripts and long term assignments from the reserves). Data reflecting this indicator utilizes "Global Peace Index" calculations which are based on the International Institute for Strategic Studies, the Military Balance referred to earlier.

3.3.3 Governance

In a 1997 policy paper, UNDP defined governance as:

> "the exercise of economic, political and administrative authority to manage a country's affairs at all levels. It comprises the mechanisms, processes and institutions through which citizens and groups articulate their interests, exercise their legal rights, meet their obligations and mediate their differences."[86]

Recent World Bank Group Surveys with opinion leaders confirm that addressing governance is now at the top of countries' policy priorities.[87] As such, the World Bank sees governance as a global practice which supports client countries to help build "capable, efficient, open, inclusive and accountable institution."[88] For the purpose of this analysis, governance will be measured for each of the three targeted states using three prime indicators: political instability, deaths from internal conflict, and violent demonstrations.

Political Instability[89]
This indicator reflects the degree of importance attached to good governance, and provides a qualitative assessment of the political instability within each country. It addresses the degree to which political institutions are sufficiently stable to support the needs of its citizens, businesses and overseas investors. Data reflecting this indicator utilizes "Global Peace Index" calculations which are based on the Economist Intelligence Unit.

Death from Internal Conflicts[90]
This indicator aims to reveal the degree of success of internal security policies. The indicator provides the number of battle deaths from internal armed conflict, which is defined by the Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP) as a "contested incompatibility that concerns government and/or territory where the use of armed force between two parties, of which at least one is the government of a state, results in at least 25 battle-related deaths."[91] Data reflecting this indicator) utilizes "Global Peace Index" calculations which are based on the International Institute for Strategic Studies' Armed Conflict Database.

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[86] "Governance for Sustainable Human Development," UNDP, 1997, accessed August 17, 2017, http://www.undp.org/content/dam/undp/library/Democratic%20Governance/Discussion-Paper--Governance-for-Sustainable-Development.pdf.

[87] Jing Guo, "Strengthening Governance is Top-of-Mind for Opinion Leaders in Developing Countries," World Bank, March 30, 2017, accessed August 17, 2017, http://blogs.worldbank.org/publicsphere/strengthening-governance-top-mind-opinion-leaders-developing-countries.

[88] "Governance," World Bank, last updated April 17, 2017, accessed August 17, 2017, http://www.worldbank.org/en/topic/governance/overview.

[89] "Global Peace Index 2017," Vision of Humanity.

[90] Ibid.

[91] The Uppsala Conflict Data Program has recorded ongoing violent conflicts since the 1970s. See more: "Definitions," Uppsala Universitet, accessed August 17, 2017, http://www.pcr.uu.se/research/ucdp/definitions/.

Violent Demonstrations[92]

The importance of this indicator is due to the need for states to establish the rule of law and order internally. The indicator provides a qualitative assessment of the likelihood of violent demonstration within the country. Data reflecting this indicator utilises "Global Peace Index" calculations which are based on Economist Intelligence Unit.[93]

3.4 Analysing State-Centric Security Policies.

Having identified the indicators influencing the three pillars of state centric security policies, it is important to note that the identified indicators cited are loosely connected sets of data since they represent independent variables. Thus, it is helpful to combine these factors into a meaningful representative value which can be associated with each indicator for the six-years period considered by this study.

To achieve this, the analysis develops a representative indicator for each pillar, this is calculated by taking the mathematical average for the identified independent indicators in a given year. By doing so, the analysis will arrive at a representative figure which is proportional to the summation of indicators. Averaging the sum of indicators ensures that the representative figure is still presented on a scale of 5 points (0 corresponding to very low - 5 corresponding to very high).

For example, in 2011, primary indicators for Jordan on national sovereignty, pointed to a terrorism impact score of 1.481/5, a political terror score of 3/5, and an intensity of internal conflict score of 1/5. Hence, the meaningful representation of national sovereignty for Jordan for the year 2011 is the mathematical average of this sum, which is 1.827 (5.481 divided by 3). The same methodology was employed to calculate the representative figures for each pillar, for all the three targeted countries.

It is hoped that such an analysis carries two significances: it allows for measuring the local dynamics within each country from 2011-2016, as well as comparing the situation between various countries during the given period of time.

3.4.1 National Sovereignty

Terrorism Impact[94]

Country	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016
Jordan	1.481 / 5	1.222 / 5	1.776 / 5	1.668 / 5	1.646 / 5	1.629 / 5
Lebanon	2.854 / 5	2.678 / 5	2.68 / 5	3.436 / 5	3.461 / 5	3.519 / 5
Tunisia	1.421 / 5	1.864 / 5	1.66 / 5	2.254 / 5	2.404 / 5	3.125 / 5

[92] "Global Peace Index 2017," Vision of Humanity.
[93] "Global Peace Index 2015," Institute for Economics & Peace, 2015, accessed August 17, 2017, http://economicsandpeace.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/06/Global-Peace-Index-Report-2015_0.pdf.
[94] "Global Peace Index 2017," Vision of Humanity.

Political Terror[95]

Country	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016
Jordan	3 / 5	3.5 / 5	3 / 5	3 / 5	3 / 5	3 / 5
Lebanon	2.5 / 5	2.5 / 5	2.5 / 5	3 / 5	3 / 5	3 / 5
Tunisia	3 / 5	3 / 5	2 / 5	2.5 / 5	3 / 5	2.5 / 5

Intensity of Internal Conflicts[96]

Country	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016
Jordan	1 / 5	1 / 5	1 / 5	1 / 5	2 / 5	2 / 5
Lebanon	4 / 5	4 / 5	4 / 5	4 / 5	4 / 5	4 / 5
Tunisia	3 / 5	3 / 5	4 / 5	4 / 5	3 / 5	3 / 5

Table 1: National Sovereignty Indicator (Weighed average of 3 indicators)

Country	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016
Jordan	1.827	1.907	1.925	1.889	2.215	2.2097
Lebanon	3.118	3.059	3.06	3.4786	3.487	3.5063
Tunisia	2.474	2.621	2.553	2.918	2.801	1.8750

Poor national sovereignty is inversely proportional to state centric policies, meaning that a non-operational sovereign system suggests that the country is not equipped to dealing with security challenges. The indicators chosen to represent this pillar reflect factors that negatively affect national sovereignty. The calculated representative indicator measures poor sovereignty in a given state. Put simply, the higher the indicator the weaker the national sovereignty. Figure 3 shows a graphical representation of the lack of sovereignty in Jordan, Lebanon and Tunisia.

The chart indicates that whilst all three countries have gone through fluctuations in the last 6 years Lebanon has consistently had the lowest levels of sovereignty within the country. Jordan appears to have weakened in national sovereignty, particularly since 2014, whilst interestingly Tunisia has strengthened. It is worth briefly discussing in more detail the trends for each country and what may explain such trends.

Jordan: According to calculations, Jordan witnessed a relatively steady weakness of sovereignty during the period 2011-2014. The lack of sovereignty witnessed a minor increase in 2015 (around 17%) and relative stability in 2016. The reported decline in sovereignty in 2015 could be attributed to the declining economic situation and the increase in turmoil in neighbouring Iraq and Syria. Additionally, it can be attributed to the rising number of home-grown terrorist attacks, and the challenges these presented to Jordan's national sovereignty.[97] One could clearly notice an

[95] Ibid.
[96] Ibid.
[97] Beverley Milton-Edwards, "Jordan's Troubles in Its Own Backyard," The Brookings Institution, February 22, 2017, accessed August 17, 2017, https://www.brookings.edu/blog/markaz/2017/02/22/jordans-troubles-in-its-own-backyard/.

increase in the challenge during 2015 and 2016, when Jordan was the target of several terrorists incidents, including one in Kerak which left 19 people dead.[98]

Figure 3: Weak National Sovereignty between 2011-2016 for Tunisia, Jordan, and Lebanon



Lebanon: The sense of a fragile national sovereignty gradually decreased during the period 2011-2013, then experienced a growth in 2014 (around 14%), and plateaued between 2015-2016. The decrease in Lebanon's sovereignty can be linked to the growing turmoil within Syria, it's immediate neighbour. Surprisingly, the election of a new Lebanese president in 2016 to fill an office which was vacant for two and a half years has not improved the reported lack in sovereignty. As shown in Figure 3, the year in which the "Islamic Caliphate" was declared (2014) corresponds to a relatively significant decrease in Lebanon's national sovereignty. This decrease must be seen through not only the challenge and danger that Daesh posed to Lebanon's stability, but also through the resulting expansion of Hezbollah's role in Lebanon to fight back against Daesh.[99]

Tunisia: In comparison to Jordan and Lebanon, the sense of a fragile national sovereignty takes a different form in Tunisia. Following a stable level of national sovereignty between 2011 and 2013, the perception takes a sudden, yet limited, deterioration in 2014, followed by a remarkable improvement in national sovereignty during 2015-2016 (an improvement level around 31%). The deterioration should not be surprising given the looser controlled borders and the reported infiltration of non-state actors into Tunisia, in comparison to Jordan for instance during the same period (2011-2015). Similarly, the reported improvement should not be surprising if analysed in conjuncture with the 2015 international solidarity campaign which supported the Tunisian government following a wave of terror attacks. The response of the government included closing Tunisian airspace for flights from Western Libya, where violent extremists are

[98] More on this: Dana Gibreel and Ezzeldeen al-Natour, "The Road to Karak Castle: The Path of the Attack and Backgrounds of Some of Those Involved," *7iber*, December 20, 2016, accessed August 17, 2017, https://www.7iber.com/politics-economics/the-road-to-karak-castle-the-path-of-the-attack-and-backgrounds-of-some-of-those-involved/; and Ian Black, "Terrorist Attacks and Security Lapses Fuel Fears for Jordan's Stability," July 25, 2016, accessed August 17, 2017, https://www.theguardian.com/world/on-the-middle-east/2016/jul/25/terrorist-attacks-and-security-lapses-fuel-fears-for-jordan-stability.

[99] More on this and the larger role of Hezbollah in Syria, see: Ali Rizk, "Why Lebanon Could Be Spared from Recent Terrorism Bloodshed," *Al Monitor*, January 16, 2017, accessed August 17, 2017, http://fares.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2017/01/lebanon-terrorist-threat-syria-neighboring-countries.html.

reportedly trained, as well as ordering the army to protect Tunisia's major cities, with civilian police also increasing their presence across different cities.[100]

3.4.2 Deterrence

Nuclear and Heavy Weapons[101]

Country	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016
Jordan	1.661 / 5	1.661 / 5	1.661 / 5	1.623 / 5	1.623 / 5	1.623 / 5
Lebanon	1.181 / 5	1.181 / 5	1.181 / 5	1.184 / 5	1.184 / 5	1.184 / 5
Tunisia	1.109 / 5	1.109 / 5	1.109 / 5	1.12 / 5	1.12 / 5	1.12 / 5

Weapons Import[102]

Country	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016
Jordan	2.465 / 5	2.684 / 5	3.079 / 5	2.861 / 5	2.731 / 5	2.495 / 5
Lebanon	1.2 / 5	1.544 / 5	1.535 / 5	1.622 / 5	1.697 / 5	1.407 / 5
Tunisia	1.255 / 5	1.01 / 5	1.022 / 5	1.022 / 5	1.022 / 5	1.066 / 5

Armed Services Personnel[103]

Country	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016
Jordan	3.359 / 5	3.329 / 5	3.371 / 5	3.046 / 5	2.941 / 5	2.91 / 5
Lebanon	3.088 / 5	3.088 / 5	3.121 / 5	2.862 / 5	2.744 / 5	2.616 / 5
Tunisia	1.522 / 5	1.522 / 5	1.512 / 5	1.498 / 5	1.492 / 5	1.487 / 5

Table 2: Deterrence Representative Indicator (Weighed average of 3 indicators)

Country	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016
Jordan	2.495	2.558	2.704	2.510	2.432	2.343
Lebanon	1.823	1.938	1.946	1.889	1.875	1.736
Tunisia	1.295	1.214	1.214	1.213	1.211	1.224

Deterrence is the second pillar influencing state centric security policies. Indicators chosen to envisage this pillar (heavy weapons, weapons import, and armed services personnel) reflect factors that positively contribute to deterrence capabilities in a given state. The inverse of this

[100] Tom Burson, "How Tunisia Tourism Industry is Recovering from the Recent Attac," *Paste Magazine,* April 1, 2015, accessed August 17, 2017, https://www.pastemagazine.com/articles/2015/04/how-tunisia-tourism-industry-is-recovering-from-th.html.
[101] "Global Peace Index 2017," Vision of Humanity.
[102] Ibid.
[103] Ibid.

indicator provides an accurate indication of state vulnerability. In other words, the higher the indicator the stronger the deterrence measures of the state.

Figure 4 shows a graphical representation of the deterrence representative indicator in Jordan, Lebanon, and Tunisia.

Figure 4: Deterrence Representative Indicator in Jordan, Lebanon, and Tunisia between 2011-2016



It is clear from Figure 4 that Jordan has by far the strongest deterrent capabilities, and Tunisia the weakest. However, both Lebanon and Jordan appear to have lost a level of capability since 2012, whilst Tunisia remains more consistent throughout the analysed time frame.

Jordan: Deterrence capabilities witnessed a steady increase until 2013, followed by a marginal drop during the period 2013-2016 (a decline of about 6%). Although Jordanian armed and security forces witnessed a positive development in security capabilities together with a steady increase of personnel recruitment, the slight decline could be attributed to the limited budget devoted to weapons purchases. According to World Bank Data, Jordan's military expenditure as a percentage of GDP has decreased between the years 2011 and 2016, dropping from 5.53% to 4.578%.[104]

Lebanon: During 2011-2013 deterrence capabilities appear stable followed by a noted decrease from 2014-2016 (around 10%). A further decrease in deterrence capabilities is likely as a result of the Saudi halt on military funding and aid to Lebanon. After pledging the Lebanese Army $3 billion in aid in 2013, Saudi Arabia suspended the deal in 2016 shortly after Lebanon's refusal to vote on a joint Arab statement condemning the attack on the Saudi mission in Tehran.[105]

Tunisia: Unlike the situation in Jordan and Lebanon, deterrence capabilities in Tunisia witnessed a slight drop in 2011-2012 (around 5%), followed by a surprising constant stability for the period 2013-2016. The reported drop in deterrence following 2011 is logically associated with the eruption of the Tunisian revolution, which downsized the state's capability to deter possible threats. Yet, the reported stability following 2012 contradicts certain facts which one would

[104] "Military Expenditure (% of GDP), Jordan," The World Bank, 2017, accessed August 17, 2017, http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/MS.MIL.XPND.GD.ZS?end=2016&locations=JO&name_desc=false&start=2010&view=chart.

[105] "Saudi Arabia Halts $3 Billion Package to Lebanese Army, Security Aid," *Reuters,* February 19, 2016, accessed August 17, 2017, http://www.reuters.com/article/us-saudi-lebanon-idUSKCN0VS1KK.

assume to be relevant, including the harsh economic situation facing the country and the reported increase of terrorist activities and threats.[106] Some in Tunisia, including government officials, are arguably worried "that the security apparatus was fatally weakened by post-revolutionary reforms."[107] It is thus important to consider that perhaps while these measurable deterrence capabilities have remained the same the level of threat they are trying to counteract has grown larger and thus, their efficacy might be significantly weakened.

3.4.2 Governance

Political Instability[108]

Country	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016
Jordan	4 / 5	3.25 / 5	3.375 / 5	3.5 / 5	3.5 / 5	3.5 / 5
Lebanon	4 / 5	3.5 / 5	3.75 / 5	4 / 5	3.5 / 5	3.625 / 5
Tunisia	2.5 / 5	3.375 / 5	3 / 5	3 / 5	2.25 / 5	2.375 / 5

Death from Internal Conflicts[109]

Country	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016
Jordan	1 / 5	1 / 5	1 / 5	1 / 5	1 / 5	1 / 5
Lebanon	2.002 / 5	1.522 / 5	2.099 / 5	2.136 / 5	2.212 / 5	2.192 / 5
Tunisia	1 / 5	1 / 5	1 / 5	1 / 5	1 / 5	1 / 5

Violent Demonstrations[110]

Country	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016
Jordan	3 / 5	3 / 5	3 / 5	3 / 5	3 / 5	3 / 5
Lebanon	4 / 5	4 / 5	4 / 5	4 / 5	4 / 5	4 / 5
Tunisia	2 / 5	3.5 / 5	4 / 5	4 / 5	4 / 5	4 / 5

Table 3: Governance Representative Indicator (Weighed average of 3 indicators)

Country	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016
Jordan	2.66	2.42	2.46	2.5	2.5	2.5
Lebanon	3.33	3	3.28	3.38	3.237	3.27
Tunisia	1.83	2.625	2.66	2.66	2.42	2.46

[106] A brief overview of security and terrorist threats in Tunisia is found here: Amira Fathalla, "Sousse Attack: Tunisia Faces Major Terror Threat, One Year On," *BBC News,* June 25, 2016, accessed August 17, 2017, http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-36629059; and a more thorough analysis here: Christian Caryl, "Why Does Tunisia Produce So Many Terrorists?" *Foreign Policy*, July 15, 2016, accessed August 17, 2017, http://foreignpolicy.com/2016/07/15/why-does-tunisia-produce-so-many-terrorists-nice-france-truck-terrorist-attack/.

[107] Caryl, *Why Does Tunisia Produce So Many Terrorists?*

[108] "Global Peace Index 2017," Vision of Humanity.

[109] Ibid.

[110] Ibid.

Poor or weak negatively impacts a country's ability to deal with security challenges. Three indicators were chosen to envisage this pillar (instability, death from internal conflicts, and violent demonstrations) because all are factors that negatively affect good governance. The inverse of this indicator provides an accurate indication of good governance in a given state. Put simply, the higher the indicator figure the weaker the state's governance.

Figure 5: Lack of Governance in Jordan, Lebanon, and Tunisia between 2011-2016



In keeping with the figures produced regarding weak sovereignty in each country (Figure 3) it is clear that Lebanon also has the poorest governance measures, while Tunisia and Jordan have higher rates of good governance and are more similar to one another. All three countries have remained fairly consistent since 2012 with only smaller fluctuations having taken place since then. A brief look at each country in turn is below.

Jordan: Governance levels in the country remained at a steady state from 2012-2016.[111] During this period of time, improved levels of governance are observable compared to the 2011 level, which may have been particularly impacted by the wave of protests that took place across the region and in Jordan. Given the huge number of incoming refugees, sustaining governance is imperative for Jordan's stability. Whilst the governance indicators suggest that the powers in Jordan appear to be keeping control over the population, it is also worth considering that individuals in Jordan may be nervous about demonstrating or moving internally due to the political situation in the region. The civil wars in Syria, Libya, and Yemen since 2011 acted as a warning sign for many who would otherwise challenge local governance structures. This can also partially explain why measures such as internal demonstrations and conflicts have remained low despite huge socio-economic pressures.

Lebanon: Lebanon has had fairly consistent levels of poor governance since 2011. The country has been strongly affected by ongoing deep social and economic sectarian divisions and the large flux of Syrian refugees. However, as is the case with Jordan, it is likely that many in the country

[111] An interesting discussion of stability/violence/protests in Jordan by looking into the phenomenon of violence at Jordanian universities is found here: Daniel Cantini, "On Violence, Protests, & the University of Jordan," *Muftah*, July 24, 2013, accessed August 17, 2017, https://muftah.org/on-violence-protests-the-university-in-jordan/#.WZAFSVEjHIU.

may have felt uncomfortable staging large protests or demonstrations in recent years due to fears of what increased instability in the country. There is also a certain apathy in Lebanon about what the centralised government may be able to achieve and, thus, search for support is generally focused on community groups. Those particularly eager to join a violent group are also able to cross the border relatively easily into Syria.

Tunisia: Following the revolution in 2011, governance in Tunisia went through an acute drop estimated at 37% in 2012. This is attributable to the overthrow of bin Ali's regime, elections of a new government, and the necessary political adjustments which took place after that. Impressively, the government appears to have been able to quickly begin to stabilise the situation during 2012-2014. In 2015, this short lived phenomenon witnessed a slight deterioration which is likely linked to the rise in terrorist attacks within the country and the subsequent measures by the government to try and counter violence in the country.

At the same time there were rising frustrations amongst citizens about the seemingly unfulfilled promises of the revolution. As has been mentioned in regard to Jordan and Lebanon it is difficult to tell if some of measures used to indicate governance are more affected by the government itself or the decision of individuals not to demonstrate due to a fear of repercussions or instability. Likewise, the many Tunisians wishing to engage in violent conflicts may have crossed the border to Libya or travelled to Syria and Iraq.

3.5 Conclusion

Like most states, Jordan, Lebanon, and Tunisia are all traditionally focused on state-centric security measures. Despite recent acknowledgements of the importance of corresponding human security measures there has been little concerted effort towards developing or implementing such policies. Attempts to tackle violent extremism have often focused around state-centric security measures such as increased surveillance, arrests, and border controls. However, it is clear from the literature concerning drivers of radicalisation that these are measures that tend only to the symptoms opposed to the causes of extremism. Nonetheless, due to their ongoing usage and role in the security structures it is worth spending a little time considering the state-centric security measures which have been used in each country, along with the context of their usage, and an attempt to measure their efficacy.

Three different measures have been highlighted by which to measure the strength of security in each of the states considered. These are national sovereignty, deterrence capabilities, and governance levels. Furthermore, these were then subdivided in order to create clear indicators for how Lebanon, Tunisia, and Jordan fared under such measurements and what we could learn from the changing trends in such indicators between 2011-2016. Obviously all three states have been affected by many of the same factors: in particular, the regional instability which has proliferated since the wave of revolutions in 2011, the ongoing civil war in Syria and Libya, and porous borders with unstable and violent states. Despite such similarities in external context there are clear variations between each country in the results provided. It is helpful for building a contextual understanding of the security situation in each country to appreciate this and attempt to understand the nuances causing them.

Concerning pillar 1, National Sovereignty, it is of little surprise that Lebanon has fared far more poorly than Tunisia and Jordan given its ongoing and divisive sectarian divides, and the lack of a centralised government. However, it is interesting to note that when breaking down the variables

which contribute to the final indicator score for this pillar, it can be observed that while Lebanon may have a higher level of internal conflicts than Tunisia and Jordan, it scored equally or less in terms of political terror throughout the time frame considered. Also, while all three countries have increased between 2011-2016 on their levels of terrorism in the country, the proportional increase for Tunisia is far higher than either Jordan or Lebanon. Thus while Tunisia may have a lower indicator score, overall this can be partially explained by the fact that it was starting from a lower point. If one extrapolated into the future, it could be suggested that Tunisia's levels of internal terrorism could overtake Lebanon if they continue at a similar rate. However, when taken together as a central indicator of national sovereignty, it is clear that Tunisia remains the strongest country between the three, but its variation in the last six years suggest that this is not necessarily and consistent or reliable factor. Concurrently, while Jordan and Lebanon have both decreased in national sovereignty in recent years, both have far less erratic and unpredictable trends and thus it could be argued that they may be easier to predict, control, or mitigate.

Pillar 2 has focused on the level of deterrence in each country with the contributory measures including nuclear and heavy weapons, weapons import, and the number of armed service personal. It is worth noting that whilst each of these measures clearly can be used to indicate the military strength of a nation it does not take into account the efficacy, training and funding of such elements. Unsurprisingly, given its strong relation with foreign armies and donors, Jordan appears to be the strongest in terms of its deterrent capabilities (although they have decreased in recent years). Meanwhile, Lebanon and Tunisia, who are both far more unpredictable in terms of governance and thus a riskier bet in terms of foreign investment and support, have weaker deterrence indicators. It is important to also note than some of these measures, such as the number of nuclear and heavy weapons have barely changed within each country from 2011-2016. The primary variable which would have affected the trends over the given time period is the number of armed services personnel. However, it could be argued that the number of forces is irrelevant if they are not given appropriate training, support, or share a national identity and loyalty.

Finally, pillar 3 attempted to quantify levels of governance. Its indicator is made up of three measures: political instability, deaths from internal conflicts, and violent demonstrations. Each of these elements can be used to indicate signs of a weak governance structure. However, it is also worth noting that variables such as the number of demonstrations can also be affected by the number of individuals who feel safe and comfortable in publicly voicing their demands without fear of repercussions or the ensuing instability. Since watching the crackdown on revolutions in neighbouring countries or the unsatisfying turns that some such revolutions have taken many may feel apathetic or cynical about the productivity of demonstrating. While Tunisia and Jordan have remained consistently low in their levels of deaths from internal conflicts, Lebanon has slightly increased since 2011, likely as a result of sectarian tensions. Conversely, Tunisia has increased in its number of violent demonstrations, while Jordan and Lebanon have remained the same. All three countries have relatively high levels of political instability and demonstrations and yet appear to have continually managed to stop this boiling over into an increased number of internal deaths.

While all three pillars can give us an interesting insight into the efficiency of each state's ability to reinforce its power and control they have inevitable limitations. As with most quantitative data there is little nuance or room for clear contextual understanding. What can be clearly ascertained from the date though is that there has been no clear improvement in any of the security measures for any of the countries, despite an increased global focus since the 2011 revolutions, ensuing regional instability and refugee crisis. Thus, it can be suggested that traditional state-

centric security measures are doing little to help reinforce state control, and in certain cases they may in fact be fuelling resentment and radicalisation by limiting certain freedoms and reinforcing feelings of distrust between the state and its citizens. This helps to reinforce the argument that an increased focus should be placed on human security efforts to both reinforce state control and help CVE efforts.

4. Social Justice

4.1 Introduction

While the term social justice lacks a consensual definition for either policy-makers or practitioners, social justice can be best understood as a network of the fundamental rights and freedoms outlined in the international jurisprudential framework. At its core is the idea that individual rights such as the right to livelihoods, security, and protection are imperative, but do not comprehensively encapsulate other elements necessary for a life of dignity and wellbeing.

Governance, for example, must extend beyond service provision to include participation, checks and balances on power, and an empowered civil society. Likewise, a utilitarian end such as economic growth can only be socially just when it promotes equity in wealth distribution, safe and decent employment, and equality of opportunity. Gains must also be shared reasonably, so as to not feed inequality, and must be made without negative environmental consequences. Social justice is thus an inter-disciplinary and multi-dimensional understanding of rights; it sees environmental, socio-cultural, governance, and economic justice as complementary and mutually constituting constructs. In short, **social justice envisages improving lives beyond a rights-based framework through the realisation of human security, dignity, and sustainable development.**[112]

An alternate way of defining social justice is to view it as being made up of separate components. UN-DESA, for example, breaks social justice down into different socially desirable goods or ends: the fair distribution of goods, opportunities and rights, income, assets, work opportunities; access to knowledge, health services, and social security; and the provision of a safe environment, civic, and political participation.[113] Another useful definition is proposed by the International Labour Organization (ILO), which understands social justice as being "based on equality of rights for all peoples and the possibility for all human beings without discrimination, to benefit from economic and social progress everywhere."[114]

Social justice represents an interesting point of departure within the human rights discourse in that it is composed of both individual and communitarian ends. Certainly, social justice rights are realised at the level of the individual and emphasise individual agency. Bertelsmann Stiftungs' work on social justice centres around the individual capabilities that give people the equal opportunity needed for self-realisation.[115] The OECD likewise sees social justice as a vehicle of empowerment through equality of opportunity.[116] Yet, it is in its collective form that social

[112] Social justice should not be confused with legal empowerment – which is an approach that sits within, and is complementary to, the broader concept of social justice. It is grounded on the idea that poverty persists partly because the poor do not enjoy legal rights or the power to exercise those rights. Breaking this cycle requires more than a strengthening of the formal justice system; it requires a reliable and efficient framework that addresses the specific needs of vulnerable groups. The theory of change is that giving people power in the form of information, skills and tools, they will be able to protect and uphold their rights, access services equitably and demand accountability.

[113] United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs, *Social Justice in an Open World: The Role of the United Nations* (New York: The United Nations, 2006), 15-16, accessed August 14, 2017, http://www.un.org/esa/socdev/documents/ifsd/SocialJustice.pdf.

[114] Marek Herm et. al., "Public Law," in *The Law of the Baltic States*, ed. Tanel Kerikmäe, et. al. (Switzerland: Springer Publishers, 2017), 92.

[115] See for example, Daniel Schraad-Tischler and Christof Schiller, "Social Justice in the EU – Index Report 2016," *Social Inclusion Monitor Europe* (Germany: Bertelsmann Stiftungs, 2016).

[116] "Access to Justice," OECD, n.d., accessed August 14, 2017, http://www.oecd.org/gov/access-to-justice.htm.

justice arguably imparts its greatest benefit. Social justice understands governments as owing responsibilities, not only to individuals, but also to society as a rights-holding constituency. Social goods must not only be delivered, but be provided with distributional equality so as to avoid marginalisation or discrimination.

Social justice can hence be seen as a tool for balancing the distribution of power and a check on the relationship between government and citizens. Importantly, as a distributive mechanism, social justice should not be seen to imply equality, but instead equitability. More succinctly, inequality in the allocation of goods, services, or opportunities is not necessarily unjust if this serves to level the playing field or account for other forms of resource misallocation.

The question of equity and opportunity, as well as the broader concept of social justice, are understood in this report as part of the human security structure. As a concept, social justice captures the underlying nuances of various pillars of human security like economic security (equal opportunity), personal security (access to justice and freedom from repression), political security (inclusion and representation), and communal security (equal enforcement of the law and power-sharing and representation of various social groups). Working to advance human security in its various manifestations requires providing safeguards for promoting and integrating social justice into the core workings of governance in the region.

The chronic crisis of social injustice throughout the region – through forms of marginalisation and corruption, state-actioned rights abuse, and sectarian policies – have further delegitimised the social contract in WANA countries and paved the way for instability. Various disenfranchised and disillusioned socio-political actors have seized the opportunity and used the illegitimate power structure and instability to gather ground and project itself as a powerful and capable actor nationally and regionally. These took the form of sectarian political actors as is the case in Lebanon or extremist armed groups as is the case in Libya, Syria, and Iraq. In other countries of the region, the quest for social justice and human security is the driving force behind disengagement and alienation that feeds into the radicalisation of youth.

This report discusses the relation between social justice – as a human security pillar – and how social injustice contributes to the rise of violent extremism in the West Asia-North Africa (WANA) region. It starts by discussing the durability of authoritarianism in the region. The discussion examines the nature of the Arab social contract, consolidating power through a contained and weak private sector and civil society, and repressive policies towards dissent. The link between social injustice and violent extremism is then explored through the lens of marginalisation, rights abuse, and sectarianism. To illustrate the practical implications, the report concludes with three brief highlights on the sectarian public service structure in Lebanon, Equity in Jordan's judicial system, and the Economic Reconciliation Bill in Tunisia.

4.2 Social Justice and the Durability of Authoritarianism in the WANA Region

Separate from its attention in legal philosophy and the international policy discourse, social justice has become a *terme de jour* in the West Asia and North African (WANA) region. The 2011 Arab Spring has been explained as an uprising against social injustice as much as a breakdown in

the social contract.[117] Indeed, in Egypt, the mantra 'bread, dignity, and social justice' cut to the population's demand for, among other things, a more equitable redistributive system.[118]

While it is important not to conflate social injustice solely with deficiencies in the social contract, it must be recognised that the two are interrelated insofar as the region's ruling bargains provided a context for, or otherwise precipitated, many of the social injustices that groups have begun to challenge. Phrased differently, it is the Arab social contract (i.e. the exchange of political power for various goods, services, and socio-economic benefit), coupled with concerted action to minimise threats on power, and dealing swiftly and harshly with dissent, that generally explains the durability of authoritarianism in the region.[119] As explored below, these three components have fed into a political architecture around which a culture of institutionalised social injustice has been able to evolve.

4.2.1 The Arab Social Contract

While the countries of the region lie on a wide spectrum of economic functionality and political stability, they have adopted an almost identical social contract, whereby citizens rely heavily on the state for public goods such as education, health, food and even wealth.

The most literal and direct manifestation of the Arab state as a welfare provider is its role as a primary employer. In much of the region, the public sector employs between 14-40 percent of all workers; government wages in the region amount to 9.8 percent of GDP, the highest rate worldwide.[120] This manifests in government institutions that are overstaffed and over-remunerated compared to the private sector.[121]

Another way Arab states extend welfare is through subsidies. The Jordanian government allocated JOD215 million in subsidises for bread flour in 2017,[122] while Egypt spends up to USD5 billion annually subsidising bread, rice, oil and sugar.[123] Beyond pushing up state deficits,

[117] On the relationship between social justice and the Arab Spring see: John Foran, "Taking Power, Re-Making Power: The Threads of the Cultures of Resistance behind the Arab Spring," in *The Evolving Ruling Bargain in the Middle East,* Center for International and Regional Studies, Georgetown University School of Foreign Service in Qatar, Summary Report No. 9 (2013), 5.

[118] David Weinberger, "Bread, Freedom, Social Justice: A Report From Egypt," *Huffington Post*, November 26, 2011, accessed August 17, 2017, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/david-weinberger/bread-freedom-social-just_b_1114936.html.

[119] See further on the enduring nature of authoritarian in the region: Eva Bellin, "The Robustness of Authoritarianism Reconsidered: Lessons of the Arab Spring," *Comparative Politics* 44, no. 2, (2012); Eva Bellin, "The Robustness of Authoritarianism in the Middle East: Exceptionalism in Comparative Perspective," *Comparative Politics* 36, no. 3, (2004); Steven Heydemann, "Social Pacts and the Persistence of Authoritarianism in the Middle East," in *Debating Arab Authoritarianism: Dynamics and Durability in Nondemocratic Regimes*, ed. Oliver Schlumberger (California: Stanford University Press 2007); Steven Heydemann, *Authoritarianism in Syria: Institutions and Social Conflict*, 1946-1970 (NY: Cornell University Press, 1999).

[120] Lida Bteddini, *Governance and Public Sector Employment in the Middle East* (The World Bank, 2012).

[121] As will be discussed, the policy is not even particularly effective; unemployment is still high even in countries with disproportionate public sectors. Against the 'generally tolerable' figure of 4 percent unemployment in healthy economies, Egypt, Lebanon, and Jordan hold unemployment rates of 12.80 percent, 6.5 percent, and 12.3 percent respectively. *Egypt Unemployment Rate*, Trading Economics, available at http://www.tradingeconomics.com/lebanon/unemployment-rate; *Lebanon Unemployment Rate,* Trading Economics, available at http://www.tradingeconomics.com/lebanon/unemployment-rate; *Jordan Unemployment Rate*, Trading Economics, available at http://www.tradingeconomics.com/jordan/unemployment-rate.

[122] Laila Azzeh, "JD180m Earmarked for Wheat, Fodder Subsidies for 2017," Jordan Times, 2017, available at http://www.jordantimes.com/news/local/jd180m-earmarked-wheat-fodder-subsidies-2017%E2%80%99.

[123] "Smart cards for Egypt's bread: achieving what was once rendered impossible?" *AlBawaba News,* 2016, *available at* http://www.albawaba.com/business/egypt-food-subsidies--557253.

subsidies are generally regressive in that they tend to benefit the rich more than the poor. In Egypt, Iran, Jordan, and Lebanon, the poorest quintile receives 15–25 percent of total bread subsidies;[124] while in Egypt, nearly 50 percent of the *baladi* bread subsidy goes to the top 40 percent of income recipients.[125]

Energy subsidies create similar impacts by asserting fiscal pressure (Gulf Cooperation Council, GCC, countries spend more than USD160 billion on energy subsidies annually)[126] and diverting public spending. They also represent an opportunity cost. For oil-exporting countries, total pre-tax energy subsidies exceed spending on education and health, while in Egypt, Jordan, and Lebanon spending on pretax energy subsidies outshone spending on capital, health, or education.[127] Again, such subsidies are regressive. In Tunisia, the gap in energy subsidies between the highest-income households and the lowest-income ones is around 40 times more,[128] while in Jordan, the richest quintile received nearly 12 times more in fuel and gasoline subsidies than the poorest quintile.

It is important to highlight that Arab states' ability to act as a subsidy and employment provider is contingent upon their accrual of and reliance upon rents and other unproductive sources of income. For the region's oil and gas-exporting countries, selling fossil fuels to foreign markets has long been the principal means of wealth distribution. In states without oil, rentierism comes in the form of foreign aid and remittances. WANA countries receive the highest overseas development assistance in per capita terms (USD73 compared to USD49 in Sub-Saharan Africa), whereas North Africa has consistently been the biggest recipient of net aid per capita since the 1960s.[129]

In both cases, the wealth redistribution rentierism facilitates is central to the social contract upon which the Arab political model is built; rents enable governments "to function without taxing the incomes of citizens …".[130] The model is criticised for driving a detachment between what governments do and what citizens want,[131] and by weakening the ability and tools available for citizens to hold states to account.[132] There are also serious economic implications. Rents inflate local currency, skew investment, and weaken growth, somewhat explaining WANA states' sluggish economic performance and high levels of unemployment.

The importance of the 'provider state' to the social contract is illustrated in how some governments reacted to the Arab Spring. After the fall of Mubarak regime, Saudi Arabia

[124] Carlo Sdralevich et. al., *Subsidy Reform in the Middle East and North Africa: Recent Progress and Challenges Ahead* (Washington, D.C.: The International Monetary Fund, 2014), 18.
[125] Ibid.
[126] "Gulf energy subsidies worth US$160b a year: World Bank," *International Business Times,* November 5, 2014, accessed August 14, 2017, http://www.businesstimes.com.sg/energy-commodities/gulf-energy-subsidies-worth-us160b-a-year-world-bank.
[127] Carlo Sdralevich et. al., *Subsidy Reform in the Middle East and North Africa: Recent Progress and Challenges Ahead* (Washington, D.C.: The International Monetary Fund, 2014), 19.
[128] Ibid.
[129] Egypt and Jordan, by virtue of their strategic location, have historically derived significant external rents through foreign aid. In Egypt alone, two-thirds of foreign exchange revenues accrue from gas, aid and revenues from the Suez Canal. Adeel Malik and Bassem Awadallah, *The Economics of the Arab Spring* (Oxford and Jeddah: Centre for the Study of African Economies, December 2011), 9.
[130] Paul Collier, *Wars, Guns and Votes: Democracy in Dangerous Places* (New York: HarperCollins, 2010), 126.
[131] Ibid.
[132] Malik and Awadallah, *The Economics of the Arab Spring*, 7.

committed USD10.7 billion as a social welfare package.[133] In one month, handouts totalled USD37 billion; this was followed by another USD93 billion in March.[134] This was part of an initial GCC-wide response "to sharply increase current spending to accommodate social pressures and to pledge intra-regional fiscal transfers to less endowed members."[135]

4.2.2 A Stunted Private Sector and Civil Society

Another means by which governments have maintained stability is through an architecture that vests control in a small and centralized power-base, away from other centres of power such as the private sector and civil society.[136] Such control serves government interests by minimising the risk that economic or civic power could transfer to political power, but is damaging to economic growth and societal development.[137]

A first indicator is the absence of a private sector that is independent, competitive, and integrated within global markets.[138] Small and medium-sized enterprises represent just 25 percent of the GDP in Saudi Arabia and 33 percent in Egypt, compared to more than half of the GDP contribution in the US and Germany.[139] Private business activity in the WANA region is notable for its limited export presence, few productive spillovers across firms, and one of the lowest rates of productivity in the world.[140] Even countries that have made serious strides towards liberalising their markets and opening state-owned enterprises to privatisation and foreign investment still rank low on the World Bank's Ease of Doing Business Index.[141] As of 2014, the regional average was 114 out of 189, with most of the region's economies ranking below 100, with the exception of the UAE and Turkey (Figure 1).

Another indicator is the restrictive legal and policy environment that states have imposed upon civil society. Features include restrictions on political participation, civic activity, and societal discourse.[142] In some states political parties are entirely banned, while in others they are permitted but their activities severely constrained.[143] Other political processes can be seen as largely perfunctory, or calculated 'pressure value' moves, designed to reduce public frustration while not representing any real regime threat.

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[133] "To Stave Off Arab Spring Revolts, Saudi Arabia and Fellow Gulf Countries Spend $150 Billion," *The Wharton School of the University of Pennsylvania,* September 21, 2011, accessed August 14, 2017, http://knowledge.wharton.upenn.edu/article/to-stave-off-arab-spring-revolts-saudi-arabia-and-fellow-gulf-countries-spend-150-billion/.

[134] Ibid.

[135] Ibid.

[136] Brian Whitaker, *What's Really Wrong With the Middle East* (London: Saqi Books, 2014), 93.

[137] Certainly in Syria, Sunnis dominated the business community and the Alawite regime felt threatened by this. Bassam Haddad, *Business Networks in Syria: The Political Economy of authoritarian Resilience* (California: Standford University Press, 2012).

[138] Malik and Awadallah, *The Economics of the Arab Spring*, 5.

[139] Richard Shediac, Samer Bohsali, and Hatem Samman, *The Bedrock of Society: Understanding and Growing the MENA region's Middle Class* (UAE: Booz and Company, 2013), 11. A robust private sector is a requirement for development because it generates productive income and value-added economic activity that is independent of the state; Malik and Awadallah, *The Economics of the Arab Spring*, 5.

[140] Malik and Awadallah, *The Economics of the Arab Spring*, 7.

[141] Prime examples are Jordan, Egypt, and the Gulf States in general; The World Bank ranks economies according to their ease of doing business, from 1–189. A high ease of doing business ranking means the regulatory environment is more conducive to the starting and *operation* of a local firm.

[142] Marc Lynch, *The Unfinished Revolutions of the New Middle East* (New York: Public Affairs, 2013), 11-12.

[143] James L. Gelvin, *The Arab Uprisings: What Everyone Needs to Know* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), 38.

Figure 1: Ease of Doing Business Rankings for Sample WANA Economies



Source: The World Bank, 'Ease of Doing Business Rankings' (2015) http://www.doingbusiness.org/rankings

ESCWA notes the many indices, such as the World Bank Governance indicators and other statistics on political freedom and inclusion, rank the region far below that of other emerging markets.[144] Polity IV, a comprehensive dataset measuring governance, ranks 13 states in the region as closed anocracies, autocracies or failed states; only three are ranked as democracies and full democracies. Similarly, a tracking model of civil society 'space' in 195 countries developed by Civicus[145] ranked the 23 countries making up the WANA's region as either closed (8), repressed (9) or obstructed (6). None ranked as narrowed or open (Table 1).

Even the WANA countries that rank middle-order, score badly on specific civic performance indicators. Jordan, for example, despite its 5,700 civil society organizations, grades poorly in terms of civic engagement (scoring 36.8 points out of 100), civic organization (55.3 points out of 100) and perception of impact (46.9 points out of 100).[146] Explanations include the rigidity of organizations, their use of obsolete engagement techniques and poor performance in reforming public agendas.

[144] Jihad Azour, *Social Justice in the Arab World* (New York: ESCWA, 2014), accessed August 14, 2017, https://www.unescwa.org/sites/www.unescwa.org/files/publications/files/e_escwa_sdd_14_bp-1_e.pdf

[145] Civic space is the bedrock of any open and democratic society. When civic space is open, citizens and civil society organisations are able to organise, participate and communicate without hindrance. In doing so, they are able to claim their rights and influence the political and social structures around them. This can only happen when a state holds by its duty to protect its citizens and respects and facilitates their fundamental rights to associate, assemble peacefully and freely express views and opinions. These are the three key rights that civil society depends upon. The CIVICUS Monitor analyses the extent to which the three civil society rights are being respected and upheld, and the degree to which states are protecting civil society. How they do rankings found at https://monitor.civicus.org/Ratings/

[146] "The Contemporary Jordanian Civil Society: Characteristics, Challenges and Tasks", Analytical Country Report: Jordan, *Al Urdun Al Jadid Research Center* (2010), accessed August 20, 2017, http://www.civicus.org/images/stories/csi/csi_phase2/jordan%20acr%20final.pdf

Table 1: Civicus Rankings of Civil Society Space

Closed	Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, UAE, Iran, Libya, Syria, Sudan, Sth Sudan
Repressed	Yemen, Iraq, Palestine, Egypt, Algeria, Turkey, Oman, Qatar, Mauritania
Obstructed	Kuwait, Israel, Tunisia, Lebanon, Jordan, Morocco
Narrowed	-
Open	-

Source: https://monitor.civicus.org/

Knowledge-generating institutions operate in a similar environment. The region is home to around five percent of the world's think tanks, and few rank internationally.[147] Challenges include the limited space for independent and critical analysis, the difficulty permeating government structures, and the top-down orientation of public institutions.[148] The weakness of the sector translates into poor performance when compared to countries of similar size and income; examples include the number of patent applications, spending earmarked for research and development, and published journal articles.[149] The impacts include a stunting of foreign investment, limited sector growth and an overall contribution to stagnating living standards.

4.2.3 Dealing with Dissent

A final tool for explaining the durability of authoritarianism is how governments — at least in some states — have manufactured a culture of fear by dealing with dissent decisively and severely. This has been facilitated by expansive and robust security services that are usually located under the sovereign's direct control.[150] Bellin argues that these "exceptionally muscular coercive apparatus endowed with both the capacity and will to repress democratic initiatives originating from society" are the most potent explanation for the enduring nature of authoritarianism in the region.[151]

An instructive example was Hafez al Assad's ironclad grasp on the military[152] which enabled him to quell the 1982 rebellion in Hama.[153] Thirty years later, the manner by which Bahrain's

[147] Of the five top-ranked institutions, two are US subsidiaries (the Carnegie Middle East Centre in Lebanon and the Brookings Institution in Qatar), and two are based in states whose views are not widely accepted (Israel's Institute for National Security Studies and Qatar's Al-Jazeera Centre for Studies).

[148] A third issue is that the region's think tanks do not have a strong reputation for academic or methodological rigor; policy makers, donors and development actors often still need to reach to the international market to source information and analysis that meets their needs. This operates as a self-fulfilling prophecy. A final challenge relates to funding. Against chronic and severe humanitarian needs, policy research is often deprioritized by donors. This is somewhat counter-intuitive; arguably more evidence-based decisions and development innovation is what is needed to set the region on a more positive trajectory. The result, however, is that funding is increasingly project-based and short-term, limiting the scope for think tanks to maintain an independent research agenda.

[149] Melodena S. Balakrishnan, "Methods to Increase Research Output: Some Tips Looking at the MENA Region," *International Journal of Emerging Markets* 8 (2013): 215-239.

[150] "The Arab Human Development Report 2005: Towards the Rise of Women in the Arab World", *UNDP* (2006): 15, Accessed August 17, 2017, http://hdr.undp.org/sites/default/files/rbas_ahdr2005_en.pdf

[151] Eva Bellin, "Reconsidering the Robustness of Authoritarianism in the Middle East: Lessons from the Arab Spring," *Comparative Politics* 44 (2012): 127-149, 128.

[152] Volker Perthes, *The Political Economy of Syria Under Asad*, (London: I.B. Taurus, 1995).

government quashed unrest following civil protests in 2011 is another.[154] The regime met its objectives but with a disturbing balance sheet; 30 — mostly demonstrators or bystanders — were killed, hundreds were arrested and incarcerated, prominent opposition leaders were imprisoned (including eight life-sentences), and others were tried in special security courts.[155] Particularly interesting is how concerned neighbours (particularly Saudi Arabia) rushed to put their support behind the government. GCC forces, composed of 1,000 Saudi troops and 500 police from the UAE, were sent to reinforce the Bahraini security forces.[156]

Current policies in Iraq,[157] Egypt,[158] Morocco,[159] and Saudi Arabia[160] illustrate the point in question and attest to the largely unchanged role and control of security apparatus and repressive forms of governance. This curbs civil freedoms, contributes to feelings of injustice, and further alienates citizens from the corrupt elites in power.

Repressive governances have directly driven the rise of extremism in the region as well. In her discussion of social trust and the collapse of the old order of authoritarianism that ruled the region, Wittes argues that the way different regimes handled the protests of 2011 has determined the state of affairs today. In her argument Syria and Libya have descended into civil wars because their leaders invested in a personalised form of governance. When they failed to curb the protests with containment and resorted to violence, the state collapsed totally. These poor responses by the government enabled the rise of extremist groups.[161]

4.3 Manifestations of Social Injustice and the Link of Violent Extremism

The above discussion on how WANA states have maintained their ruling bargains is critical, insofar as it explains a principal source of perceived social injustice. The ruling bargains that characterise the social contract in the region have periodically come under pressure. Most

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[153] He ordered raids on Muslim Brotherhood positions, then methodologically subdued each neighbourhood, with estimates of the number of people killed ranging from 10,000-25,000. Fred H. Lawson, "Social Bases for the Hama Revolt," *Middle East Report* 110 (1982): 28-28; David Kenner, "Massacre City," *Foreign Policy*, August 5 2011, accessed August 14, 2017, http://foreignpolicy.com/2011/08/05/massacre-city-2/.

[154] International Crisis Group, *Popular Protest in North Africa and the Middle East (VIII): Bahrain's Rock Road to Reform,* Middle East/North Africa Report No. 111, July 28, 2011, 3.

[155] Ibid.

[156] "Gulf states send forces to Bahrain following protests," *BBC News*, March 14, 2011, accessed August 14, 2017, http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-12729786.

[157] "Iraq 10 Years Later, Creeping Authoritarianism: US, UK and Iraqi Governments Contribute to Abuses, Lack of Security," Human Rights Watch, March 19, 2013, accessed August 14, 2017, https://www.hrw.org/news/2013/03/19/iraq-10-years-later-creeping-authoritarianism.

[158] "Egypt: Consolidating Repression Under al-Sisi: Unprecedented Steps to Eliminate Independent Groups," Human Rights Watch, January 12, 2017, accessed August 14, 2017, https://www.hrw.org/news/2017/01/12/egypt-consolidating-repression-under-al-sisi.

[159] Human Rights Watch, "Morocco: Repression Undercuts Reform Pledges Overhaul Laws, Practices to Support New Constitution," Human Rights Watch, January 22, 2012. https://www.hrw.org/news/2012/01/22/morocco-repression-undercuts-reform-pledges

[160] "Saudi Arabia: Intensified Repression of Writers, Activists, Rising Arrests, Prosecutions," Human Rights Watch, February 6, 2017, accessed August 14, 2017, https://www.hrw.org/news/2017/02/06/saudi-arabia-intensified-repression-writers-activists.

[161] Tamara Cofman Wittes, "Want to Stabilize the Middle East? Start with Governance," Brookings Institute, November 22, 2016, accessed August 14, 2017, https://www.brookings.edu/blog/markaz/2016/11/22/want-to-stabilize-the-middle-east-start-with-governance/.

notably, changes to subsidies reflect regime's efforts to maintain and strengthen state legitimacy.[162] In 2011, the ruling bargains were again called into question. For some governments, fear, coercion and/or a bout of political liberalisation,[163] was sufficient to forestall rebellion. In other states, it was the knock-on effects, or indirect consequences, of the ruling bargain that were the root problem. Rentierism, bloated public sectors, and a shrinking middle class, had all contributed to an environment of impeded opportunity, nepotism, inequality, and marginalisation, within which citizens had few avenues of redress. Moreover, these norms had become pervasive, and thus could not be easily nor quickly addressed.[164]

In this context, social injustice became an umbrella term that synthesized the economic, political, social, and moral discontent confronting the people. The overall perception was that governments had failed their people and abandoned their core responsibilities. This in turn has fuelled feelings of marginalisation, indifference, and intensified socio-political frustrations that have eventually contributed to the rise of violent extremism.

An alternate way of thinking about the linkage between drivers of violent extremism and social injustice is that low incomes, economic inequality, poverty, limited opportunity, repression, sectarian conflict and, in particular, poorly functioning and illegitimate institutions, all weaken a community's 'immune system' against radicalisation.[165] While drivers are multifarious, tipping points are often justice-related. According to Chaynes, these include four categories as clarified by Harper:[166]

- **"Poor access to justice**: courts are inaccessible, corrupt, biased, or the legal framework does not uphold basic rights. As shown in Table 2 below, WANA states — although performing moderately well in terms of enforcement — are less able to deliver civil and criminal justice and perform poorly in terms of basic rights provision. Corruption likewise fuels grievances by undermining institutional effectiveness and social norms, as demonstrated during the Arab uprisings.
- **Exclusion,** in terms of political participation and opportunity based on ethnicity, religion or geographical location. Iraq and Syria are examples of where non-representative and exploitative governance created a widespread sense of injustice.
- **Economic and social inequality** — a phenomenon that is particularly problematic in the WANA region. Moreover, inequality is closely connected to the notion of human dignity, and related concepts of class and power relations.

[162] For example, Egypt's Anwar Sadat triggered riots when he cut the bread subsidy in 1977, while President Hosni Mubarak faced unrest in 2008 when the rising price of wheat caused shortages.
[163] Mehran Kamrava, "The Rise and Fall of Ruling Bargains in the Middle East," in *Beyond the Arab Spring: The Evolving Ruling Bargain in the Middle East,* ed. Mehran Kamrava (Doha: Center for International and Regional Studies, 2014), 18.
[164] Malik and Awadallah, *The Economics of the Arab Spring*, 7.
[165] "World Development Report 2011: Conflict, Security, and Development". *World Bank*, (2011), Accessed on August 10, 2017, https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/handle/10986/4389 License: CC BY 3.0 IGO.
[166] Sarah Chaynes, *Corruption: The Priority Intelligence Requirement* (Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2014), accessed August 14, 2017, http://carnegieendowment.org/2014/09/09/corruption-priority-intelligence-requirements-pub-56572.

- **Exploitative government,** which may use oppression, rights abuses and authoritarian approaches to maintain order."[167]

Table 2: Rule of Law in Select WANA Countries

Country	Civil justice		Criminal justice		Enforcement		Fundamental rights		Absence of corruption		Constraints on Govt		Open Government	
	Rate	Rank	Rate	Rank	Rate	Rank	Rate	Rank	Rate	Rank	Rate	Rank	Rate	Rank
Jordan	0.62	31	0.55	34	0.51	34	0.52	68	0.59	32	0.49	69	0.46	76
Iran	0.56	40	0.39	60	0.54	35	0.22	102	0.42	64	0.37	94	0.35	99
Lebanon	0.45	78	.39	62	0.41	83	0.55	57	0.37	76	0.56	59	0.45	81
Morocco	0.51	54	0.33	86	0.53	39	0.45	86	0.49	48	0.57	49	0.51	60
Tunisia	0.52	49	0.49	41	0.52	43	0.54	62	0.4	44	0.62	34	0.51	59
UAE	0.63	29	0.77	9	0.68	21	0.5	75	0.82	13	0.58	45	0.48	69
Egypt	0.39	93	0.43	55	0.39	93	0.32	98	0.47	52	0.39	91	0.42	91

Source: Drawn from the World Justice Project, Rule of Law Index (2015), https://worldjusticeproject.org/sites/default/files/roli_2015_0.pdf

Taken in this broader context, the discussion below focuses on three areas of concern to illustrate how social injustice has influenced the rise of violent extremism in response to socio-economic marginalisation, states' rights abuse, and sectarianism.

4.3.1 Marginalisation: Lack of Opportunity, Corruption, and Inequality

A first area of social injustice can be loosely defined as lack of opportunity and spin off restrictions on upwards social mobility. This is most visibly reflected in the region's employment crisis. WANA states' high unemployment rates couple with weak livelihood and other social welfare safety-net systems. Youth unemployment is most disturbing — the highest in the world,[168] at 27.2 and 29 percent in the Middle East and North Africa respectively.[169] Unemployment not only undermines the economic security of individuals but it also threatens communal security. Financially and socially frustrated youth – due to their inability to meet their social needs like marriage, status as a productive individual, etc – turn to alternative ways to

[167] Erica Harper, *The 2030 Sustainable Development Agenda: Why Goal 16 on Justice is Critical for the WANA Region* (Amman: The WANA Institute, 2015), 17.
[168] James Reinl, "Arab 'Brain Drain' Accelerates after Arab Spring: UN," *Middle East Eye,* May 8, 2015, accessed August 14, 2017, http://www.middleeasteye.net/news/un-arab-brain-drain-accelerates-after-arab-spring-1752815577.
[169] Ibid; Among the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries, Kuwait, Qatar and the UAE have persistently high youth unemployment rates, with the highest found in Saudi Arabia at 30 percent. "Youth unemployment in Rich Middle East a Liability," *CNBC,* October 15, 2015, http://www.cnbc.com/2014/10/15/youth-unemployment-in-rich-middle-east-a-liability-wef.html.

meeting these needs, including joining violent extremist groups that offer status, role and purpose, and often times financial gains.[170]

Equally debilitating is the corruption and nepotism that controls how the few job opportunities are distributed; those who possess *wasta* undoubtedly progress faster and easier. The connection between corruption and unemployment appears to particularly drive feelings of marginalisation and disenfranchisement. During focus group discussions held with youth in Jordan's Salt, participants questioned why corrupt officials are not held accountable when they are "stealing people's money", and why qualified young men are jobless when unqualified individuals receive high-paying positions.[171] Corruption is also perceived as a tool of marginalisation insofar as its drives unfair competition, distorts resource allocations, and fuels unbalanced growth.

Closely related to unemployment is the notion of poverty as a social injustice. The region's real GDP per capita is certainly not low by international standards, averaging USD7125 in 2016[172] compared to USD1640 in South Asia,[173] and less than USD1450 for Sub-Saharan Africa.[174] But these figures are largely artificial. They are buttressed by the exceptional wealth of the region's oil-producing economies. Yemen and Somalia, for example, exist at the bottom end of the spectrum: Poverty is also prevalent in the region's middle-income economies;[175] in 2013, 26 percent of Egypt's population and 14 percent of Jordan's lived below the poverty at some point during the year.[176] Since then, economic conditions in both countries have deteriorated. For these families, against growing inflation and rising prices, access to food, water, and electricity have become critical issues. Health and education services are also severely lacking, as well as access to adequate housing, infrastructure, public transportation and recreation facilities.

Even for states where the government does deliver material wealth, such as the GCC states, this is not matched by equivalent scores with respect to well-being. One case in point is Qatar scored 31st on the Human Development Index in 2014, while at the same time ranking highest worldwide on GDP.[177]

Most pernicious, however, is how poverty is distributed across the region (the region's inequality) and within each country. The income share held by the poorest 20 percent of the region is a

[170] For a discussion on this from Jordan for example, see Neven Bondokji, Kim Wilkinson, and Leen Aghabi, *Trapped Between Destructive Choices: Radicalisation Drivers Affecting Youth in Jordan* (Amman: The WANA Institute, 2017), 9-10, accessed August 14, 2017, http://wanainstitute.org/en/publication/trapped-between-destructive-choices-radicalisation-drivers-affecting-youth-jordan.

[171] Ibid.

[172] "GDP per capita (current US$), Middle East & North Africa" The World Bank, accessed August 14, 2017, http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.PCAP.CD?locations=ZQ.

[173] "GDP per capita (current US$), South Asia," The World Bank, accessed August 14, 2017, http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.PCAP.CD?locations=8S.

[174] "GDP per capita (current US$), Sub-Saharan Africa," The World Bank, accessed August 14, 2017, http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.PCAP.CD?locations=ZG.

[175] As defined by the World Bank, Middle Income Economies are those whose GNI per capita is more than USD $1,026 but less than USD12,475. "New country classifications by income level," The World Bank, July 1, 2016, accessed August 14, 2017, https://blogs.worldbank.org/opendata/new-country-classifications-2016.

[176] "Hunger, Poverty Rates in Egypt Up Sharply Over Past Three Years – UN report," *UN News Centre,* May 21, 2013, accessed August 14, 2017, http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=44961#.Vegp7fmqqkp.

[177] Selim Jahan, *Human Development Report* (New York: UNDP, 2016), accessed August 14, 2017, http://hdr.undp.org/sites/default/files/2016_human_development_report.pdf. The Human Development Index (HDI), a metric that takes into account life expectancy, literacy, education, standards of living, and quality of life for countries worldwide. The scale used in figure 3 is 1-60, as opposed to 1-10 in figure 4. This discrepancy becomes more striking in comparison to OECD economies (see Figure 4). In these economies, not only are rankings of GDP per capita and HDI aligned, but HDI rankings at times outperform GDP per capita rankings, which is never the case in Gulf economies.

negligible 6.8 percent of the total.[178] Inequality is particularly stark in South Sudan, Iran, Tunisia, Qatar, Djibouti and Morocco.[179] In practical terms, this manifests in gross national imbalances in terms of development, growth and provision of services, which again feeds the narrative of purposeful marginalisation and the idea that centralised (top-down) planning overlooks the interests of lesser regions and the poor. The relative deprivation thesis also extends to water, food[180] and electricity.[181]

One clear example of wealth inequality is the rising poverty levels in Saudi Arabia, the worldest largest producer of oil. While the country's GDP per capita averaged USD20,028 in 2016,[182] unemployment rate reached 12.3 percent among males and 32 percent among women in 2016. No official statistics are available on poverty rate in Saudi Arabia, but several news agencies have raised the concerns about increasing poverty rates in the kingdom and austerity measures planned within the 2030 economic restructuring plan.[183]

A further impact of inequality is that it translates into a shrinking middle class. As set out in Table 3 below, the WANA region represents only a five percent share of the global middle class. Despite various economic and social definitions of middle class,[184] generally it is understood as a major force of stability in any society and, a prerequisite for economic and political development.

Table 3: Global Number (in Millions) of Middle Class Individuals and Share of Global Population (Actual and Projected)

	2009		2020		2030	
North America	338	18%	333	10%	322	7%
Europe	664	36%	703	22%	680	14%
Central and South America	181	10%	251	8%	313	6%
Asia Pacific	525	28%	1740	54%	3228	66%
Sub-Saharan Africa	32	2%	57	2%	107	2%
WANA	105	6%	165	5%	234	5%
World	1845	100%	3249	100%	4884	100%

Source: Homi Kharas, *The Emerging Middle Class in Developing Countries* (OECD Development Centre, 2010), 16.

[178] Mthuli Jcube, John Anywawu, and Kjell Hausken, *Inequality, Economic Growth, and Poverty in the Middle East and North Africa* (African Development Bank Group, 2013) , 10.
[179] Ibid.
[180] Relative deprivation in terms of food security is addressed in: Henk-Jan Brinkman and Cullin S. Hendrix, *Food Insecurity and Violent Conflict: Causes, Consequences, and Addressing the Challenges,* Occasional Paper No. 24 (World Food Programme, 2011), 5.
[181] On Theory of Access, see Jesse C. Ribot and Nancy Lee Peluso, "A Theory of Access," *Rural Sociology* 68 (2003).
[182] "GDP per capita (current US$), Middle East & North Africa," The World Bank.
[183] "Poverty in the Land of Black Gold," Al Jazeera, July 12, 2017, accessed August 14 ,2017, http://www.aljazeera.net/news/ebusiness/2017/7/12/%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B3%D8%B9%D9%88%D8%AF%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D9%85%D9%81%D8%A7%D8%B1%D9%82%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%81%D9%82%D8%B1-%D9%81%D9%8A-%D8%A8%D9%84%D8%AF-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B0%D9%87%D8%A8-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A3%D8%B3%D9%88%D8%AF.
[184] For definitions of middle class and considerations of education and income, see the discussion in Steven Pressman, "Defining and Measuring the Middle Class," Working Paper 007, American Institute for Economic Research, August 2015, accessed August 14, 2017, https://www.aier.org/sites/default/files/Files/Documents/Standard/WP007-Middle%20Class.pdf.

Apart from the damaging impacts of these phenomena in terms of growth and fragility, it is important to set out why unemployment, corruption, and inequality are perceived as social injustices i.e. wrongs by the state against its people. As discussed above, the link to social injustice comes from the nature of the ruling bargains in play. Under the social contract, the state is responsible for delivering jobs, goods, services, and even wealth. Governments' failure to deliver has not only created unmet expectations, and a resulting loss of legitimacy,[185] but rentierism[186] has stunted the growth of new and productive markets and dissuaded foreign investment, limiting opportunity and economic self-determination. Indeed, the WANA region would fall into Acemoglu and Robinson's classification of *extractive* governments, where leaders have few incentives to promote the opportunities or innovation that creates growth, which risks a diminution of their power.[187]

A final question is the extent to which these phenomena can drive radicalisation and extremism. Recent scholarship on radicalisation and violent extremism finds no direct evidence that poverty and unemployment lead to radicalisation. This applies mainly to fighters from the WANA region and the West. A final question is the extent to which these phenomena can drive radicalisation and extremism. Recent scholarship on radicalisation and violent extremism finds no direct evidence that poverty and unemployment lead to radicalisation. This applies mainly to fighters from the WANA region and the West. For example, fighters from Jordan who joined armed groups in the region were mainly employed and educated.[188] Similarly, evidence on fighters from the West negates any direct role for poverty in their radicalisation.[189] However, poverty and unemployment has played a role in recruiting fighters to Boko Haram and fighters from Central Asia, who have joined armed groups to either improve their economic status or for the prospects of securing a financial loan after they join a group.[190]

However, it is the idleness that results from unemployment that plays a direct role in radicalisation. To clarify this link, one Syrian participant in a focus group discussion conducted by the WANA Institute noted: "Where would anyone who finished high school go? To university? A Syrian refugee cannot work here [in Jordan], so what would he do?"[191] As became clear in a series of discussion, these young idle men spend time online watching media content that includes propaganda by armed groups, or sometimes join local sports groups, some of

[185] Malik and Awadallah, *The Economics of the Arab Spring*, 7.
[186] Because the state is occupied with collecting rents, there are insufficient incentives to engage in or promote productive economic activity/oil revenues crowd out productive economic activity.
[187] Daron Acemoglu and James A. Robinson, *Why Nations Fail: The Origins of Power, Prosperity, and Poverty* (London: Profile Books, 2012), 68.
[188] Mercy Corps, *From Jordan to Jihad: The Lure of Syria's Violent Extremist Groups* (Oregon, USA: Mercy Corps, 2015), accessed August 14, 2017, http://www.mercycorps.org/research-resources/jordan-jihad-lure- syrias-violent-extremist-groups.
[189] See for example, Rik Coolsaet, *Facing the Fourth Foreign Fighters Wave: What Drives Europeans to Syria, and to Islamic State? Insights from the Belgian Case* (Brussels: Royal Institute for International Relations, 2016), accessed August 14, 2017, http://www.egmontinstitute.be/wp-content/uploads/2016/02/egmont.papers.81_online-versie.pdf.
[190] On Boko Haram fighters, see *Motivation and Empty Promises: Voices of Former Boko Haram Combatants and Nigerian Youth* (Portland, Oregon: Mercy Corps, 2016), accessed August 14, 2017, https://d2zyf8ayvg1369.cloudfront.net/sites/default/files/Motivations%20and%20Empty%20Promises_Mercy%20Corps_Full%20Report_0.pdf. On fighters from Central Asia, see Cholpon Orozobekova, "Central Asia and the ISIS Phantom," *The Diplomat*, October 2, 2015, accessed August 14, 2017, http://thediplomat.com/2015/10/central-asia-and-the-isis-phantom/ and Noah Tucker, *Central Asian Involvement in the Conflicts in Syria & Iraq: Drivers & Responses* (VA, USA: Management Systems International and USAID, 2015), iii, accessed August 14, 2017, https://www.usaid.gov/sites/default/files/documents/1866/CVE_CentralAsiansSyriaIraq.pdf.
[191] Syrian Male in a Focus Group Discussion, Irbid, 28th of August 2016, as qtd in Bondokji, Wilkinson, and Aghabi, *Trapped Between Destructive Choices*, 10.

which proved to be recruiting grounds.[192] Several studies have examined the success and influence of media in the recruitment for extremist groups.[193]

Poverty, unemployment, and idleness together contribute to and lead to a number of socio-economic frustrations. These include the low prospects of marriage, thus leading to social and sexual frustrations that are met then by extremist groups.[194] They also result in low self-esteem and social stigma. This pushes young men and women to search for alternative ways for self-actualisation and to assert their relevance and value in society. By joining an extremist group, they attain status, power, and often-times authority. This applies to both men and women.[195]

One of the most important findings from the WANA Institute's research into radicalisation drivers is how ideological justifications for joining an extremist group are activated because of socio-economic frustrations. In their search for a way out of these continuous pressures, youth find refuge in ideological justifications that turn the high risk factors into plausible and rewarding religious exercises based on an assumed higher moral ground and gains in afterlife.

> Socio-economic burdens lead individuals to adopt ideological responses to their frustrations. One participant explained, "Poverty and want make a person think that [by joining armed groups], he can support his family and at the same time become a martyr."[196] These statements are significant in that they clarify that the conviction or desire to join the '*jihad*' is a secondary consideration. Had there been sources of income and stability in the form of a family and future in Jordan, the desire to join the fight may not have materialised in the first place.[197]

Social injustice – particularly in the unequal distribution of resources – accentuates feelings of marginalisation. Marginalised youth lose trust in governments and state institution, and with that they slowly disengage from local communities and search for entities that can meet their socio-economic needs. To take the example from Tunisia, Ghirbali argues that Salafism and other forms of strict ideological groups emerged in poor urban areas of Tunisia and formed closed communities in protest against, and response to, systematic state marginalisation.[198] Similarly in Lebanon, weak state institutions and decades of marginalisation has led to the rise of a number of non-state actors and criminal groups that operate in, and control, areas that have been long

[192] Ibid.
[193] See for example, Luna Shamieh and Zoltán Szenes, "The Propaganda of ISIS/DAESH through the Virtual Space," *Defence Against Terrorism Review* 7 (2015), accessed August 14, 2017, http://www.tmmm.tsk.tr/publication/datr/volumes/datr10.pdf#page=8; William M. Marcellino et. al., "Measuring the Popular Resonance of Daesh's Propoganda," *Journal of Strategic Security* 10 (2017): 32-52, accessed August 14, 2017, http://scholarcommons.usf.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1527&context=jss.
[194] A number of youth in Jordan have explained the financial burdens of getting married and how the prospect of marriage and/or sex contributes to the pull factors of joining extremist groups operating in Syria. Bondokji, Wilkinson, and Aghabi, *Trapped Between Destructive Choices,* 21.
[195] Research into radicalisation drivers pointed to similar push and pull factors affecting women. The one addition in push factors influencing women is when their husbands join as fighters and they would then like to join them to keep the family together. Bondokji, Wilkinson, and Aghabi, *Trapped Between Destructive Choices,* 18.
[196] Jordanian Female in a Focus Group Discussion, Rusayfeh, 14th of July 2016, as qtd in Bondokji, Wilkinson, and Aghabi, *Trapped Between Destructive Choices: Radicalisation Drivers Affecting Youth in Jordan*, 9.
[197] Bondokji, Wilkinson, and Aghabi, *Trapped Between Destructive Choices*, 9.
[198] Foad Ghirbali, "Youth and Religion in Tunisia: A Study of New Identity Expression of Tunisian Youth," *Idafat Journal* 23 and 24 (2013): 41-42.

marginalised by the state. Small sleeper cells are active in the country and are ready to join in when needed with operations in Syria or within Lebanon.[199]

To the extent that corruption fuels grievance and undermines government institutions, there is a clear link to radicalisation and extremism. "At their core, corruption and violent extremism must be understood as byproducts of bad governance."[200] This takes place within a vicious cycle. Governments respond to threats of radicalisation by curbing democratic rights and maintaining the status quo on corruption. Resentment among citizen increases. As a result they accept or at least become indifferent towards extremist groups fighting the state. A Jordanian young man argued, "Many young men feel the injustice; they are not attaining their rights. When one feels they have no future, one is obliged to join them [armed radical groups]."[201]

Research by Transparency International has also examined how corruption is used in Daesh recruitment narratives to discredit state actors in the WANA region and attract fighters. The same research then documents how different levels of corruption impact the rise of violent extremism. In Nigeria, Iraq, and Libya state and army corruption have led to the armament and rise of extremist groups.[202]

When taken together, the findings suggest that unemployment, poverty, and corruption and are determinant push factors that influence youth's search for alternatives to the status quo. Young men feel that they have nothing to do and that there is no future awaiting them because they lose opportunities to corruption and marginalisation. This reinforces feelings of being trapped in a network of lost opportunity and injustice.

4.2.2 State-Actioned Rights Abuse

In WANA states, the justice and security sectors are reputed for their brutality, bureaucracy, and failure to uphold the rule of law. This has fed into the dynamics that bread violent extremism and radical ideology as will be clarified below. Many countries in the region boast exceptional courts, which dispense justice harshly and offer few procedural guarantees,[203] while regime-perpetrated rights violations, including arbitrary arrest, prolonged detention without charge and targeted political killings, are well documented in the media. Torture is known as a widely-used tool to suppress dissent and coerce confessions, regardless of Constitutional protections.[204] Such practices have often been facilitated by periodic 'states of emergency' that empower executive authorities to the diminution of other state apparatus,[205] or other pieces of legislation. A clear

[199] Franklin Lamb, "ISIS (DAESH) Now Recruiting in Palestinian Camps in Lebanon—who are these guys?" Al Manar TV, July 1, 2014, accessed August 14, 2017, http://archive.almanar.com.lb/english/article.php?id=159179.
[200] Eguiar Lizundia and Luke Waggoner, "Is Systematic Corruption Driving Violent Extremism?" *The Diplomatic Courier*, May 26, 2017, accessed August 17, 2017, http://www.iri.org/resource/iri-experts-explore-connection-between-corruption-and-terrorism-diplomatic-courier.
[201] Jordanian Male in a Focus Group Discussion, Ma'an, 30th of August 2016, as qtd in Bondokji, Wilkinson, and Aghabi, *Trapped Between Destructive Choices*, 10.
[202] Dave Allen et. al., *The Big Spin: Corruption and the Growth of Violent Extremism* (UK: Transparency International, February 2017), accessed August 14, 2017, http://ti-defence.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/02/The_Big_Spin_Web-1.pdf.
[203] Donald J. Planty, "Security Sector Transformation in the Arab Awakening," Special Report (Washington D.C.: USIP, September 2012), accessed August 14, 2017, https://www.usip.org/publications/2012/09/security-sector-transformation-arab-awakening
[204] See for example: Amnesty International, *Torture in 2014 30 Years of Broken Promises* (UK: Amnesty International, 2014), 38-40, accessed August 14, 2017, https://www.amnestyusa.org/files/act400042014en.pdf.
[205] Michael Young, "Turn of the Srew: Interview with Amr Hamzawy," Carnegie Middle East Center, May 15, 2017, accessed August 14, 2017, http://carnegie-mec.org/diwan/69829.

example of the latter is Tunisia's Anti-Terrorism Act (2003), which was used to try thousands of people during the rule of Zine El-Abidine Ben Ali in violation of basic defence rights.

But it is less the abuses, than it is the victims' inability to bring perpetrators to account that is most relevant to discussions on social injustice. Justice systems across the region are highly prone to executive control and interference, lack independence, and/or have high levels of corruption.[206] In pre-occupation Iraq, for example, the Ba'ath party had removed the judiciary as a distinct branch of government by incorporating the civilian courts into the military court system.[207] Politicisation, or the use of the judicial system for political ends is another enduring problem. In Egypt, the sentencing of hundreds of people — mostly Muslim Brotherhood members — to death in one hearing, drew international condemnation.[208]

For the most part, this architecture has proven to be a powerful deterrent to regime opposition.[209] Recent events, however, have demonstrated that repression can reach a tipping point, and even serve as an Achilles' heel for authoritarian powerholders. The decision to employ *baltagiya* (or thugs) against protesters in Egypt, in what became known as 'The Battle of the Camel', is an illustrative example, as was Assad's detention and abuse of the children suspected of penning counter-regime graffiti in Daraa, and their excessive use of force against protesters.[210] Stretching back even further back, the Syrian uprisings have been connected to Hafez Al-Assad's scorched earth tactics in the 1982 Hama rebellion, by being labelled by some as the "revenge of Hama".[211]

The significance of political grievance and abuse in radicalism is increasingly discussed in the academic literature from the region. One example is a perception study of Jordanian students conducted in 2015 which positively linked radicalisation to political factors such as lack of freedom of expression and repression (although these factors were deemed less significant than social and religious factors).[212] More general scholarship references linkages between radicalisation and police brutality, detention without charge, the targeting of minority groups, punitive sentencing. Indeed, the rights violations against detainees that took place in Abu Ghraib prison in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Guantanamo Bay as part of the US practice of extraordinary rendition have been capitalised upon by numerous armed extremist groups. Likewise, "Al Shabaab has used footage of police harassing Kenyan Muslims, and (non-verified) images of arbitrary arrests, detentions, and extra-judicial killings of Kenyan Muslims and Somalis in their recruitment videos and propaganda efforts; and Daesh has attempted to recruit American

[206] See generally Charles T. Call, ed., *Constructing Justice and Security After War* (Washington, D.C.: USIP, 2007).
[207] "Establishing the Rule of Law in Iraq," USIP, April 2003, accessed August 14, 2017, http://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/resources/sr104.pdf.
[208] David D. Kirkpatrick, "Uproar in Egypt after Judge Sentences More Than 680 to Death," The New York Times, April 28, 2014, accessed August 14, 2017, https://www.nytimes.com/2014/04/29/world/middleeast/egypt-sentences-hundreds-to-death.html.
[209] Carrie Rosefsky Wickham, *Mobilizing Islam: Religion, Activism, and Political Change in Egypt* (New York, Columbia University Press, 2002), 204.
[210] *Syria: Government Crackdown Leads to Protester Deaths: Authorities Should Halt Use of Excessive Force on Protesters,* Human Rights Watch, March 21, 2011, accessed August 14, 2017, https://www.hrw.org/news/2011/03/21/syria-government-crackdown-leads-protester-deaths.
[211] Larbi Sadiki, "Syria: The Revenge of Hama, 30 Years On," *Al Jazeera,* February 3, 2012, accessed August 14, 2017, http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2012/02/20122382325175537.html.
[212] Alaa' al-Rawashdeh, "Ideological Extremism from the Perspective of Jordanian Youth (in Arabic)," *Arab Journal for Security Studies and Training* 31 (2015).

Muslims dissatisfied at police brutality and racial discrimination in the context of recent [2015] Baltimore riots."[213]

There is also some research that identifies prison environments as fertile recruiting grounds for violent extremism. Inmates can be exposed to radical ideology at the hand of those serving terms after their return from Afghanistan, Iraq, and Lebanon.[214] Those detained in what they perceive to be unjust circumstances, are arguably more open to such indoctrination. Extended and harsh prison sentences for those who allegedly sympathise with extremist groups can also lead to the radicalisation of these individuals, or to the radicalisation of their friends or siblings who reject this form of injustice. For example, starting 2017, the State Security Court in Jordan started issuing sentences up to 10 years for supporting and/or promoting extremist groups.[215]

These types of grievance also find connection to another well-documented radicalisation push factor: the desire to right or avenge injustices. This usually affects individuals who have a strong attachment to their in-group. Fighters have joined Daesh, for example, to protect Sunni Muslims against injustice. This applies to both Western fighters and those from the WANA region.[216] Discussing why Tunisian make a majority among Arab Daesh fighters, one article argues:

> "Violent organizations also offer a life purpose for most of these youths, an offer that their governments have failed to match. The atrocities committed by Assad's regime in Syria and the injustice of the former Maliki regime in Iraq, under the silence of the international community, reinforced the so-called jihadi narrative. Many foreign fighters perceive jihad as giving them a purpose in life, not necessarily by fulfilling an "Islamic" duty but rather by saving the oppressed from the oppressor."[217]

Daesh in particular has excelled in using well-documented oppression by ruling regimes in the region to present itself as a powerful agent for justice. One fighter from Jordan joined an extremist group in Syria because of sensational media content.[218] He was driven by Arab norms of Hameyyah (protecting the oppressed from the same in-group) to fight for the protection of Syrian women and children. This was also found to be the major driver affecting fighters from Jordan in a separate study.

Concerns over injustice and oppression of the in-group indirectly affect fighters from outside Syria and Iraq. But the experiences of Syrians tell a story of direct humiliation and injustice.

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[213] Harper, *The 2030 Sustainable Development Agenda*, 17; On the use of Baltimore riots in recruitment, see Aaron Morrison, "Baltimore Uprising: Is ISIS Using The Riots To Recruit Black American Muslims?" *International Business Times*, April 29, 2015, accessed August 14, 2017, http://www.ibtimes.com/baltimore-uprising-isis-using-riots-recruit-black-american-muslims-1901484.

[214] Abdul Rahman al-Hajj, "Salafism and Salafis at Syria: From Reform to Jihad (in Arabic)," *Al-Jazeera*, May 26, 2013, accessed August 14, 2017, http://studies.aljazeera.net/ar/reports/2013/05/2013520105748485639.html.

[215] "First Alleged Female Daesh Supporter on Trial," *Jordan Times*, April 19, 2017, accessed August 14, 2017, http://www.jordantimes.com/news/local/first-alleged-female-daesh-supporter-trial.

[216] On Western fighters, see Peter Neumann, "Western European Foreign Fighters in Syria: An Overview," in *Countering Violent Extremism: Developing an Evidence Base for Policy and Practice,* ed. Sara Zeiger and Anne Aly (Australia: Curtin University, 2015), 13-19, accessed August 14, 2017, http://www.hedayahcenter.org/Admin/Content/File-23201691817.pdf; and Maajid Nawaz, *Radical* (United Kingdom: WH Allen, 2013), 83. On Arab fighters, see for example, *From Jordan to Jihad*, Mercy Corps.

[217] "Why Many Tunisians and Few Algerians Fight in Syria," *Chronicles of the Middle East and North Africa*, May 7, 2017, accessed August 14, 2017, https://chronicle.fanack.com/extremism/why-many-tunisians-and-few-algerians-fight-in-syria/.

[218] Neven Bondokji and Erica Harper, *Journey Mapping of Select Jordanian Fighters* (Amman: The WANA Institute, forthcoming 2017).

Talking about why some Syrians have joined the fight, one Syrian refugee in Jordan commented on his own experience: "The injustice I experienced after losing my brother and having my family disintegrated built up my frustration. And if I see anyone of those who tortured me, I will drink his blood".[219] 'Drink his blood' is an Arabic expression that signifies a desire for extreme revenge. Revenge is a well-documented driver behind extremism. As one scholar puts it, "revenge for humiliation by an oppressor is, in fact, an ancient cultural tradition with direct link to the current violence in the Middle East."[220]

4.2.2 Sectarianism

Sectarianism and how it can manifest in forms of social injustice can be seen as having both facilitated the development of armed radical organisations, and as driving radicalisation and violent extremism in individuals. The identity politics that sectarianism protects are often used by state powers and armed actors in their contest over legitimacy and control.

Sectarian animosity in the WANA region today does not reflect the doctrinal and theological disagreements that gave rise to the two main sects of Islam, or even the religious divides among Muslim and Christian Arabs. Instead, political interests and geopolitical considerations dictate sectarian sentiments for both state powers and extremist groups.

The sectarian politics of Nuri al Maliki in Iraq between 2006 and 2014 are well documented in how he marginalised and threatened the Sunnis of Iraq, who were eager for a political role and stake in post Saddam Iraq. Marginalised Sunni youth and disenfranchised former Baath leaders joined hands in the alliance that brought Daesh its military and recruitment successes. For example, in April 2013 he killed 50 peaceful protestors in Kirkuk.[221] To dismiss the grievances of peaceful protesters in 2013 and 2014, Maliki argued that the protestors are supported by Turkey and Gulf countries, and that the protestors are driven by anti-Shia sentiment.[222] This has radicalised some of the Shia population,[223] and further alienated the Sunni population who have been protesting corruption and poor water and electricity services. In this perspective, Maliki's policies account to three of Chaynes' forms of social injustice as mentioned above: political exclusion, social and economic inequality, and exploitative governance that have contributed to the rise of Daesh in Iraq.

Similarly, the repression of the Sunni regime in Bahrain against its Shia majority has taken the form of arbitrary arrests, exile, withdrawing opposition nationalities, and various other forms of repression. In assessing the state of affairs, Desmukh notes:

> "This situation encourages disaffected youth to turn to radical sectarian movements, resulting in the increasing use of disorganized violent tactics by Shi'ite youth against security forces, which in turn boosts support for the

[219] Syrian Male in a Focus Group Discussion, Irbid, 28th of August 2016, as qtd in Bondokji, Wilkinson, and Aghabi, *Trapped Between Destructive Choices: Radicalisation Drivers Affecting Youth in Jordan,* 10.
[220] Jeff Victoroff, "The Mind of the Terrorist: A Review and Critique of Psychological Approaches," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 49 (2005): 28.
[221] Suadad al-Salhy, "Iraq raid on Sunni protest sparks clashes, 44 killed," Reuters, April 23,2013, accessed August 17, 2017, http://www.reuters.com/article/us-iraq-protests-idUSBRE93M07D20130423.
[222] Arab Center for Research and Policy Studies, "Is it Maliki Policies and Miscalculations or Is it the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria?" (Doha: Arab Center for Research and Policy Studies, June 2014), 2, accessed August 14, 2017, http://www.dohainstitute.org/file/Get/7d259832-4c9c-4f5f-88fe-caedcdb7be7f.pdf.
[223] Ibid.

> regime amongst its traditional allies who fear Iranian influence. This conversion of national socioeconomic questions into identity politics - the 'vertical segmentation' of society - suits the needs of the Al Khalifa regime to maintain its control of power."[224]

Lebanon embodies the regional sectarian challenges and can foretell the future of a country like Iraq. Lebanon's 18 sectarian communities maintain a delicate balance of power in the country through alliances to external powers, maximising the states institutional weaknesses and reinforcing sectarian identities. Parallels can be drawn with US and Israeli support to the Kurds in northern Iraq and Iranian support to the Shias of southern Iraq. [225]

But more challenging is the question on the future of Lebanon after the war in Syria comes to an end. How will the Shia-Sunni conflict shape Lebanese politics, and to what extent Iran and Saudi Arabia will play their geopolitical conflict out in Lebanon are questions that challenge the very nature of the confessional power sharing formula in Lebanon and puts the future of Lebanese Christians into question.[226] These questions become existential when one considers how the Iranian-Saudi conflict is playing out in Yemen since 2013.

Tunisia, on the other hand, represents a different case of underlying sectarianism in the region. The small and contained tensions that emerged in the country towards the small Shia minority reflect the larger geopolitical conflict between Sunni Arabs and Iran.[227] However, the tension between Salafis and secularists in Tunisia holds the mark of sectarian conflict. In an investigative article, Packer argues that the Jasmine Revolution in Tunisia has given Tunisians the freedom to act upon their unhappiness. Some sought to join extremist groups in Syria and Iraq, others opted to support local Salafi groups, and a third group sought to protect the legacy of top-down sectarianism that was long enforced by Bourguiba and Ben Ali.[228] These tensions express existential threats in relation to inclusion and equality in terms of employment, political participation and rule of law in Tunisia.

Taken in a regional perspective the rise of sectarianism questions the future of state-building and the nature of state institutions in the region. Sectarian politics in the WANA region today are the direct result of the collapse of older forms of authoritarian governances after 2011. But since new forms of governances have not yet taken form, old guards and various stakeholders resort to sectarian politics in the hope of maintaining a share of authoritarian control. As discussed above, different forms of authoritarian control impede social justice and undermine political and economic inclusion, socio-economic equality, and representative modes of governance. In the absence of these basic needs and rights, frustrations build up and individuals find an answer in extremist groups in a sign of protest against and anger towards the state.

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[224] Fahad Desmukh, "Bahrain Is Using Sectarianism to Deny Social Justice," Al Ahed News, May 30, 2017, accessed August 14, 2017, https://english.alahednews.com.lb/essaydetails.php?eid=38653&cid=499#.WYsmPYSGPIU.

[225] Bassel F. Salloukh, "Sectarianism and the Search for New Political Orders in the Arab World," The Middle East Institute, July 17, 2015, accessed August 14, 2017, http://www.mei.edu/content/map/sectarianism-and-search-new-political-orders-arab-world#_ftnref2.

[226] Ibid; Aurelie Daher, "Hezbollah and the Syrian Conflict," The Middle East Institute, November 4, 2015, accessed August 14, 2017, http://www.mei.edu/content/map/hezbollah-and-syrian-conflict.

[227] Synda Tajine, "Sectarian Tensions in Tunisia Reflect Larger Geopolitical Rivalry," Al Monitor, August 30, 2012, accessed August 14, 2017, http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/politics/2012/08/sunni-shiite-tensions-augur-tough-future-for-tunisia.html#ixzz4pHyDAZ10.

[228] George Packer, "Exporting Jihad: *The Arab Spring has given Tunisians the freedom to act on their unhappiness,"* The New Yorker, March 28, 2016, http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2016/03/28/tunisia-and-the-fall-after-the-arab-spring.

4.3 Social Justice in Lebanon, Tunisia and Jordan: Case Studies

The sectarianism, repression, and marginalisation that impede social justice in the region contribute to the poor status of human security in the three countries of focus in this project. Different forms of social injustice have influenced the rise of violent extremism and adherence to radical ideology. Given the different country-specific conditions in Lebanon, Tunisia, and Jordan, the following case studies briefly highlight the relation between legal structures, practical shortfalls, and challenges to human security in these country-specific challenges. Taken together, these case studies illustrate the cycle of unmet rights and governance failures that contributes to violent extremism regionally.

4.4.1 Lebanon

Lebanon is often considered a "weak state"[229] and has limited capacity to deliver a wide range of public services. The country experiences shortages of electricity[230] and water[231] and the government struggles to provide healthcare, education, and regular waste collection. Thus far, the government has not provided significant policy solutions to address these public service delivery deficits.

In the absence of government involvement, sectarian parties and entities are some of the primary actors providing public services such as healthcare and education. For instance, as of 2011, about 17 per cent of medical facilities are run by Christian charities, and another 11 per cent are managed by Muslim charities.[232] This mechanism of public service delivery can lead to inequities. As Melani Cammett notes, "[sectarian parties] distribute benefits on a discretionary basis, locking the poor and vulnerable into unequal relationships of clientelist exchange."[233] Cammett also finds that those engaged in "riskier forms of behavior" such as participation in riots are more likely to receive assistance.[234] Sectarian groups that are considered radical, such as Hezbollah,[235] are also important players in the delivery of services.[236] Their service provision may grow their base of popular support, contributing to radicalisation in Lebanon.

The government's failure to deliver public services has led to growing resentment and anger among Lebanese citizens. These frustrations came to a boiling point in July 2015, when protests

[229] Mehran Kamrava, "Weak States in the Middle East," Summary Report No. 11, *Georgetown University Center for International and Regional Studies,* 2014, accessed August 14, 2017, https://repository.library.georgetown.edu/bitstream/handle/10822/711114/CIRSSummaryReport11WeakStates2014.pdf.
[230] Sylvia Westall, "No Light at End of Tunnel for Lebanon's Power Crisis," *Reuters*, October 26, 2015, accessed August 14, 2017, http://www.reuters.com/article/us-lebanon-electricity-idUSKCN0SK1LH20151026.
[231] Tamara Saade, "Lebanon May Face Water Shortage…Again," *The Daily Star*, July 11, 2016, accessed August 14, 2017, http://www.dailystar.com.lb/News/Lebanon-News/2016/Jul-11/361342-lebanon-may-face-water-shortage-again.ashx.
[232] Melani Cammett, "Partisan Activism and Access to Welfare in Lebanon," *Studies in Comparative International Development* 46 (2011): 70-97.
[233] Melani Cammett, "Political and Sectarian Dimensions of Welfare Provision in Lebanon," *The Lebanese Center for Policy Studies*, November 2015, accessed August 14, 2017, http://www.lcps-lebanon.org/featuredArticle.php?id=57.
[234] Cammett, "Partisan Activism and Access to Welfare in Lebanon."
[235] Justyna Pawlak and Adrian Croft, "EU Adds Hezbollah's Military Wing to Terrorism List," *Reuters*, July 22, 2013, accessed August 14, 2017, http://www.reuters.com/article/us-eu-hezbollah-idUSBRE96K0DA20130722. "Arab League Labels Hezbollah a 'Terrorist' Group," *Al Jazeera, March 12, 2016*, accessed August 14, 2017, http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2016/03/arab-league-labels-hezbollah-terrorist-group-160311173735737.html.
[236] Melani Cammett, "How Hezbollah Gets Help (and What It Gets Out of It)," *Washington* Post, October 2, 2014, accessed August 14, 2017, https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2014/10/02/how-hezbollah-helps-and-what-it-gets-out-of-it/?utm_term=.92f2a0d51a51.

erupted in connection with the failure of the government to collect waste. With the closure of Naameh landfill, the beyond-capacity dumping grounds for waste in Lebanon, 40 protesters initially blocked the entrance to the landfill, demanding that authorities not reopen the overflowing location but rather identify a new location for waste disposal.[237] Following this initial spark, protests coalesced into a wider movement known as the "You Stink" movement. Protests wound down within several months with no significant, concrete changes in government policy.[238]

Even as protests have ended, the "You Stink" movement revealed the extent of a widespread and shared dissatisfaction with government public service provision. Despite the fact that service provision can itself be structured by sectarianism, as Cammett finds, the protests revealed how public service provision can also be perceived in terms of a common, shared grievance across Lebanese society. As Sami Nader observes of the "You Stink" movement, "this new movement transcends all denominations, gathering young people from different religions and sects and calling for the removal of both literal and symbolic garbage.[239]

Public service provision continues to be a challenge for Lebanon's government. While the You Stink movement ultimately wound down, as Al Jazeera reporter Imtiaz Tyab put it, "Lebanon's trash crisis was never truly over."[240] In September 2016, waste began to pile up again. The government's plans to open a recycling facility and a waste treatment center had not been executed,[241] despite a temporary solution that involved the resumption of waste collection eight months after protests first began in 2015.[242] Most recently, the government's plan involved directly dumping waste into the sea.[243] Likewise, delivery of other services continues to pose a challenge.

While Lebanon has yet to implement a socially just and equitable solution to the crisis of public service delivery, doing so can play a significant role in efforts to counter radicalisation. This indirect relation becomes clear when one considers the prominence of public service delivery, such as provision of healthcare and education in advancing the human security of citizens. Education, healthcare, infrastructure, and other forms of public service contribute to various pillars of human security including health security, food security, water security, and communal security. Failure to provide these needs increase the frustration of individuals and increases the trust gap between citizens and governments, opening the door slowly to other actors to fill in these gaps. Later on these actors acquire legitimacy because of their public service provision. This has been the case of Hezbollah in Lebanon and the Muslim Brotherhood in Jordan and Egypt for example.

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[237] "Protesters Enforce Naameh Dump Closure," *The Daily* Star, July 17, 2015, accessed August 14, 2017, http://www.dailystar.com.lb/News/Lebanon-News/2015/Jul-17/307104-activists-to-act-as-human-shields-in-naameh-landfill-closure.ashx.

[238] Sami Nader, "Why Lebanon's 'You Stink' Movement Lost Momentum," *The Daily Star*, October 23, 2015, accessed August 14, 2017, http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2015/10/lebanon-civil-movement-protests-violence.html.

[239] Ibid.

[240] "Lebanon Struggling with Rubbish Collection Again," *Al Jazeera*, September 23, 2016, accessed August 14, 2017, http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2016/09/lebanon-struggling-rubbish-collection-160923162318470.html.

[241] Ibid.

[242] "Rubbish Pickup Resumes in Lebanon in Bid to End Crisis," *Al Jazeera*, March 23, 2016, accessed August 14, 2017, http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2016/03/trash-pickup-resumes-lebanon-month-garbage-crisis-beirut-160320035647973.html.

[243] "This Lebanese Minister's Solution to the Garbage Crisis? Dump It in the Sea!" *The New Arab*, June 14, 2017, accessed August 14, 2017 https://www.alaraby.co.uk/english/blog/2017/6/14/video-lebanon-admits-to-dumping-garbage-into-the-sea.

4.4.2 Tunisia

Transitional justice in post-conflict contexts ensures the smooth transition to stability and heals social wounds after the outbreak of violence.[244] In the case of Tunisia, measures for transitional justice include the public hearings of the Truth and Dignity Commission (TDC) as an act of asserting the public access to truth. One part of the TDC work is its investigation of corruption as a widespread problem in Tunisia. This could have been a promising act in protecting the economic security of individuals within wider efforts for advancing human security in Tunisia after the years of Bin Ali's rule.

In November 2016, Tunisia began broadcasting hearings of the TDC to a rapt audience of thousands of citizens, disseminating detailed stories of human rights abuses faced by Tunisians during the Ben Ali regime.[245] Overall, about a third of the Tunisian population, or 3.8 million people, tuned in to the first of the public hearings.[246] The TDC has documented over 60,000 harrowing testimonies. Even Ben Ali himself has watched the hearings, according to his lawyer.[247]

In addition to stories of torture and physical repression, it is within the TDC's mandate to investigate corruption crimes.[248] This element is designed to address the more common "oppression by means of a diabolically intrusive system of state corruption."[249] If the TDC does not prosecute the cases itself, it can also refer them to the Tunisian justice system.[250] In this way, the TDC represents a major step forward for transitional justice in Tunisia, providing a basis for social justice in the country.

However, a new economic reconciliation bill reintroduced to parliament in April 2017[251] negates the TDC's mandate to oversee corruption cases. The economic reconciliation bill effectively grants amnesty to businessmen and government officials who committed economic or financial crimes during the Ben Ali regime, as long as they pay a fee to the state.[252] The funds collected through this process would be injected back into the economy in the form of development and job creation projects.[253] It "puts on hold all [corruption] related prosecutions" against individuals

[244] "What is Transitional Justice?" International Center for Transitional Justice, 2009, accessed August 17, 2017, https://www.ictj.org/sites/default/files/ICTJ-Global-Transitional-Justice-2009-English.pdf.
[245] "Tunisia to Broadcast Victims' Testimony at Truth Commission," *The Guardian*, November 17, 2016, accessed August 14, 2017, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/nov/17/tunisia-to-broadcast-victims-testimony-at-truth-commission-into-authoritarian-rule.
[246] Caroltta Gall, "Tunisia's Truth-Telling Renews a Revolution's Promise, Painfully," *New York Times,* April 22, 2017, accessed August 14, 2017, https://www.nytimes.com/2017/04/22/world/africa/tunisias-truth-telling-renews-a-revolutions-promise-painfully.html.
[247] Ibid.
[248] Amna Guellali, "The Law that Could Be the Final Blow to Tunisia's Transition," *Human Rights Watch,* May 23, 2017, accessed August 14, 2017, https://www.hrw.org/news/2017/05/23/law-could-be-final-blow-tunisias-transition.
[249] Sarah Chayes, "Corruption is Still Tunisia's Challenge," *Los Angeles Times,* June 10, 2012, accessed August 14, 2017, http://articles.latimes.com/2012/jun/10/opinion/la-oe-chayes-tunisia-corruption-20120610.
[250] Ibid.
[251] Ibid.
[252] Elissa Miller and Katherine Wolff, "Will Tunisia's Economic Reconciliation Law 'Turn the Page'?" *Atlantic Council,* September 29, 2015, accessed August 14, 2017, http://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/menasource/will-tunisia-s-economic-reconciliation-law-turn-the-page.
[253] "Rached Ghannouchi Soutient le Projet de Réconciliation National," *Business News*, August 26, 2015, accessed August 14, 2017, http://www.businessnews.com.tn/raed-ghannoui-soutient-le-projet-de-reconciliation-nationale,520,58459,3.

by the TDC,[254] and "negates all articles" in the Transitional Justice Law,[255] under which the TDC was created.[256]

The economic reconciliation bill raises questions about the future of the judicial system, the practice of corruption, and economic security in Tunisia. The economic reconciliation law allows for corruption cases to be dealt with in secrecy, whereas the TDC would hold public hearings.[257] The bill provides for an administrative body appointed by the executive branch, meaning that the independence of the commission established under the bill to review corruption cases is a key concern.[258] Finally, the core of the reconciliation bill — the ability provided to Tunisia's elite to buy their way out of facing legal consequences for their crimes — represents the inequities of Tunisia's judicial system. In this way, the economic reconciliation law lets the rich off the hook, to some extent, and sets a precedent for a judicial system that favors the powerful – thus reinforcing state-protected social inequality in the country.

Moreover, the reconciliation bill offers a relatively weak weapon with which to tackle corruption, itself a major source of grievance and injustice in Tunisia, where corruption is a widespread source of dissatisfaction with the government. While only 8 per cent of Tunisians polled by the International Republican Institute (IRI) in April 2017 indicated that "corruption and transparency" should be the government's top priority, 34% of Tunisians believe that the top priority should instead be employment. However, when asked what "specific government policies" should be implemented to address their top priority, 40 per cent indicated reduced corruption. According to a Transparency International report from 2016, the majority of Tunisians (64 per cent) believe that corruption has gotten worse in the past year.[259]

Corruption also has negative effects on progress for social justice. As Human Rights Watch reports, corruption in Tunisia under Ben Ali "obstructed the development of a dynamic economy, preventing fair competition and job creation, while also fueling civil and political rights abuses."[260] Likewise, research by IRI finds that "institutional corruption is a contributing grievance that motivates violence." Thus, corruption is tied to other injustices and is perceived by Tunisians to be linked to the progress of their country.

Despite these concerns, supporters note that the economic reconciliation law could speed up the transitional justice process and allow Tunisia to focus more on development, job creation, and investment in the economy. The TDC has been criticized for its slow pace; in 2015, by the time the economic reconciliation law was introduced, the TDC had not yet scheduled any public hearings.[261] In the same vein, Nidaa Tounes spokesperson Boujemaa Remili pointed out that

[254] "Transparency International Condemns Tunisian Draft Law That Would Set the Corrupt Free," *Transparency International,* August 31, 2015, accessed August 14, 2017, https://www.transparency.org/news/pressrelease/transparency_international_condemns_tunisian_draft_law_that_would_set_the_c.
[255] Miller and Wolff, "Will Tunisia's Economic Reconciliation Law 'Turn the Page'?"
[256] "ICTJ Welcomes Tunisia's Historic Transitional Justice Law," *International Center for Transitional Justice,* December 17, 2013, accessed August 14, 2017, https://www.ictj.org/news/ictj-welcomes-tunisia's-historic-transitional-justice-law.
[257] "Tunisia: Amnesty Bill Would Set Back Transition," *Human Rights Watch,* July 14, 2016, accessed August 14, 2017, https://www.hrw.org/news/2016/07/14/tunisia-amnesty-bill-would-set-back-transition.
[258] Ibid.
[259] "People and Corruption: Middle East & North Africa," *Transparency International*, May 3, 2016, accessed August 14, 2017, https://www.transparency.org/whatwedo/publication/people_and_corruption_mena_survey_2016.
[260] Amna Guellali, "The Law that Could Be the Final Blow to Tunisia's Transition."
[261] Farah Samti, "In Tunisia, a New Reconciliation Law Stokes Protest and Conflict Instead," *Foreign Policy Magazine,* September 15, 2015, accessed August 14, 2017, http://foreignpolicy.com/2015/09/15/in-tunisia-a-new-reconciliation-law-stokes-protest-and-conflict-instead/.

"Today, [the TDC] has received some 16,000 complaints. So, if every year it treats 1,000 complaints, it will complete its work towards the year 2031. Can the country really wait that long [for reconciliation]?"[262] In short, as supporters of the bill point out, it would be a chance for Tunisia to move forward quickly and focus on job creation and economic growth, in partnership with investors and businessmen.

The new economic reconciliation bill is currently awaiting a vote.[263] As Tunisia undergoes political transition, the future of its judicial system and the precedent for corruption, both of which are closely linked with social justice, have yet to be determined. If social justice gets further undermined through legal and legislative tools, this can seriously undermine efforts for a peaceful transition in the only country in the WANA region to show positive indicators of political transition after the 2011 revolts.[264] A setback on social justice in Tunisia will have serious repercussions regionally and further undermine the national socio-political and economic context that has already produced the highest number of foreign fighters in the region.[265]

4.4.3 Jordan

Nominally, Jordan's judicial system fares well compared with those of other countries in the region and internationally. Jordan was ranked by the World Justice Program in 2016 as second regionally and 42nd internationally in terms of rule of law,[266] and in 2016 only 1-5 percent of Jordanians paid bribes for access to court services, compared with significantly higher numbers in several other Middle East countries, such as Egypt, Morocco, and Yemen.[267] Trust in courts is relatively high, with 70 percent of Jordanians reporting a great deal or quite a lot of trust in the legal system in 2017. Trust in the legal system has held relatively consistent overtime;[268] in 2006, 76 percent of Jordanians reported trust in the legal system.[269]

Even so, Jordan's legal system faces a number of structural impediments that may disproportionately affect marginalised communities. One of the primary challenges is lack of access to legal representation and legal aid. According to a national survey in Jordan, 17,000 people in 2010 faced legal problems, and they were disproportionately low income. In addition, the majority did not access "any type of legal assistance."[270] The Jordan Center for Legal Aid found that in 2012 the large majority of defendants were either not represented during

[262] Miller and Wolff, "Will Tunisia's Economic Reconciliation Law 'Turn the Page'?"
[263] Oussama Kardi, "Tunisia's Parliament Delays Vote on Amnesty Law as Protests Erupt," *Middle East Eye,* July 28, 2017, accessed August 14, 2017, http://www.middleeasteye.net/news/tunisia-s-parliament-delays-vote-controversial-amnesty-law-protests-erupt-780645157.
[264] Michael Robbins, *Tunisia Five Years After the Revolution: Findings from the Arab Barometer,* Arab Barometer, May 15, 2016, accessed August 17, 2017, http://www.arabbarometer.org/country/tunisia.
[265] Ian Bremmer, "The Top 5 Countries Where ISIS Gets Its Foreign Recruits," *Time Magazine*, April 14, 2017, accessed August 17, 2017, http://time.com/4739488/isis-iraq-syria-tunisia-saudi-arabia-russia/.
[266] "Jordan Ranked Second in Region on Rule of Law," *Jordan Times*, October 20, 2016, accessed August 14, 2017, http://www.jordantimes.com/news/local/jordan-ranked-second-region-rule-law.
[267] "People and Corruption: Middle East & North Africa," *Transparency International*, May 3, 2016, accessed August 14, 2017, https://www.transparency.org/whatwedo/publication/people_and_corruption_mena_survey_2016. One to five percent of Tunisians paid bribes; data is not available for Lebanon.
[268] Huseyin Emre Ceyhun, "Jordan Five Years after the Uprisings," *Arab Barometer*, August 1, 2017, accessed August 14, 2017, http://www.arabbarometer.org/content/arab-barometer-iv-jordan.
[269] Fares Braizat, "Arab Barometer Survey Project: Jordan Report," *Arab Barometer,* 2006, accessed August 14, 2017, http://www.arabbarometer.org/content/arab-barometer-i-jordan.
[270] "Legal Aid in Jordan," Jordan Center for Legal Aid, accessed August 14, 2017, http://www.jcla-org.com/en/legal-aid-jordan.

investigation and pre-trial stages, or were not represented in court.[271] According to Arab Renaissance for Democracy & Development (ARDD), "very few people in Jordan benefit from legal aid."[272] Furthermore, legal aid is not widely available because in the past there have not been "established government institutional mechanisms for the provision of legal aid that are regulated and widespread."[273]

The 1.4 million[274] Syrian refugees in Jordan face added challenges in accessing justice due to their legal status. The Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC) finds that 70 percent of refugees lack basic documentation, often because documents were left behind or destroyed in Syria. NRC also found that almost one quarter of Syrian refugee children were not properly registered, and that 50% of married refugees do not have documentation. Documentation is a basic human right and is the basis upon which refugees can access other rights and humanitarian aid.[275] In addition, legal protection for refugees is particularly weak in Jordan that has not signed the international refugee convention Instead a Memorandum of Understanding regulates the work of UNHCR in Jordan and allows refugees a minimal degree of protection under the law.

In addition to challenges refugees face in accessing justice, tribal law is another potential impediment to the full functioning of the rule of law, at least under certain conditions. Tribal law is often used in place of Jordan's courts to resolve disputes and legal issues. On the one hand, this system can have benefits when it complements, rather than replaces, Jordan's state legal system; as Kristen Kao notes, "When the state is strong, this strategy of governance can work quite well and can serve to buttress the power of the regime."[276] However, tribal law can also lead to inequities in access to justice. For instance, the practice of tribal law can reflect and perpetuate "gender asymmetries and patriarchal biases" present in society, and indeed women are frequently not part of tribal dispute resolution processes.[277]

Despite these issues, Jordan is making progress on judicial reform. In October 2016, King Abdullah II created the Committee for Developing the Judiciary and Enhancing the Rule of Law, headed by former Prime Minister Zaid al-Rifai.[278] The committee provided 49 recommendations for judicial reform, which are intended to be implemented throughout 2017. Human Rights Watch called the recommendations "a major step forward for human rights in Jordan."[279] In March 2017, the government approved all the recommendations made by the

[271] Ibid.
[272] Nina Gora, "Provision of Legal Services in Jordan," ARDD, October 2009, accessed August 14, 2017, https://ardd-jo.org/sites/default/files/resource-files/legal_aids_report_on_legal_services_in_jordan_0.pdf.
[273] Safiyah Muyeen, "Why Legal Aid Matters," ARDD, 2015, accessed August 14, 2017, https://ardd-jo.org/sites/default/files/resource-files/why_legal_aid_matters_en.pdf.
[274] Sally Hayden, "Forced Back to Syria? Jordan's Unregistered Refugees Fear Deportation," Reuters, February 22, 2017, accessed August 14, 2017, http://www.reuters.com/article/us-mideast-crisis-jordan-refugees-idUSKBN16100I.
[275] "Syrian Refugees' Right to Legal Identity: Implications for Return," *Norwegian Refugee Council,* December 21, 2016, accessed August 14, 2017 https://www.nrc.no/globalassets/pdf/briefing-notes/icla/final-syrian-refugees-civil-documentation-briefing-note-21-12-2016.pdf.
[276] Kristen Kao, "Do Jordan's Tribes Challenge or Strengthen the State?" *Washington Post,* May 28, 2015, accessed August 14, 2017, https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2015/05/28/do-jordans-tribes-challenge-or-strengthen-the-state/?utm_term=.43c538578db1.
[277] Naomi Johnstone, *Tribal Dispute Resolution and Women's Access to Justice in Jordan*, (Amman: WANA Institute, 2015), 20-21, accessed August 14, 2017, http://wanainstitute.org/en/publication/tribal-dispute-resolution-and-women's-access-justice-jordan.
[278] "King Receives Report on Judiciary Reform," *Petra News Agency,* February 26, 2017, accessed August 14, 2017, http://www.petra.gov.jo/Public_News/Nws_NewsDetails.aspx?Site_Id=1&lang=2&NewsID=290971&CatID=13&Type=Home&GType=1.
[279] "Jordan: A Strong Move for Justice Reform," *Human Rights Watch,* March 3, 2017, accessed August 14, 2017, https://www.hrw.org/news/2017/03/14/jordan-strong-move-justice-reform.

Royal Committee for Reforming the Judiciary and Enhancing the Rule of Law.[280] The recommendations include measures to increase access to legal representation, create a legal aid fund, reduce pretrial detention, protect women from violence, and strengthen women's rights, among other things.[281] Implementation continues to move forward; in March 2016 Jordan released a National Comprehensive Human Rights Plan.[282]

However, despite these steps, it remains to be seen how quickly and fully judicial reforms are implemented. As Daoud Kuttab notes, government officials need to "walk the walk" and "a serious and robust effort must be done to punish violators, to protect whistle-blowers and to do so in a transparent manner."[283] While the approval of the recommendations of the Royal Committee for Reforming the Judiciary and Enhancing the Rule of Law is a good first step, implementation of those recommendations and their translation into concrete improvements is equally as important.

Increasing equity in the judicial system represents one way Jordan can address social injustices that play a role in the radicalisation process. There is growing interest in rule of law approaches to countering violent extremism. An American Bar Association report contends that rule of law approaches should be a "fundamental component" of countering violent extremism going forward. Among other things, the report points out that rule of law approaches can "reduce social and political alienation that can lead to violent extremism."[284] This point is clarified by voices from youth in Jordan who lamented the unequal access to justice and protection under the law for Jordanians who lack the *wasta* and connections to grant them this access and protection.[285]

Access to justice and equal enforcement of the law determine the level of personal and communal security. More importantly they directly reflect good governance. Failure to do so paves the way for violent extremist groups that grants equality under its limited and ideological form of justice:

> "When poor governance is combined with repressive policies and practices which violate human rights and the rule of law, the potency of the lure of violent extremism tends to be heightened."[286]

[280] "Cabinet Embraces Judicial Reform Suggestions," *Jordan Times,* March 16, 2017, accessed August 14, 2017, http://www.jordantimes.com/news/local/cabinet-embraces-judicial-reform-suggestions.
[281] "Jordan: A Strong Move for Justice Reform."
[282] "Comprehensive National Plan for Human Rights," 2016, accessed August 14, 2017, http://www.petra.gov.jo/library/635974500772435385.pdf.
[283] Daoud Kuttab, "The Rule of Law in Jordan," *Jordan Times*, October 27, 2016, accessed August 14, 2017, http://www.jordantimes.com/opinion/daoud-kuttab/rule-law-jordan.
[284] Nicholas Robinson and Catherine Lena Kelly, "Rule of Law Approaches to Countering Violent Extremism," *American Bar Association,* May 2017, accessed August 14, 2017, https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/directories/roli/misc/rule-of-law-approaches-to-countering-violent-extremism-2017.authcheckdam.pdf.
[285] Bondokji, Wilkinson, and Aghabi, *Trapped Between Destructive Choices: Radicalisation Drivers Affecting Youth in Jordan*, 10-11.
[286] "Plan of Action to Prevent Violent Extremism," *United Nations General Assembly,* December 24, 2015, accessed August 14, 2017, http://peaceoperationsreview.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/01/plan_action_prevent_violent_extremist.pdf.

4.4 Conclusion

This section has attempted to unpack the causal relationships between social justice, human security, and violent extremism. Specifically, it has sought to identify the main manifestations of social injustice in the WANA region and how they, if at all, contribute to processes of radicalisation and violent extremism. The discussion aimed to address this relation through the link between social justice and authoritarianism in the region.

The success of Arab regimes in maintaining authoritarian styles of governance was made possible through a social contract of rentierism, subsidies, and inflated public sector. Governments bought loyalties through handouts and not much has changed eve after the Arab Spring revolts. The government aimed to contain discontent in various forms that inflated the public sector to the extent that it can no longer meet the services it is expected to provide.

This was matched also by a weak and fragmented private sector and civil society, the two potential threats in this form of governance. In this way, the state maintains its monopoly over power and service provisions. Any form of dissent is met harshly in various forms of emergency laws, repressive policies, and denial of various forms of human rights.

In this context, it is not difficult to see how violent extremist groups can gain ground and how different state failures have actually enables the rise of violent extremist. One example is the marginalisation in socio-economic sectors as well as corruption and unequal opportunities. As one form of social injustice, these factors have driven social discontent to an extent that extremist groups became an empowering agent to disenfranchised youth.

The repressive policies in which the sate has crushed dissent, popular protests, and other forms of discontent has also contributed to the legitimacy of violent extremist groups. Over decades, these policies alienated citizens from the state and sharply decreased trust levels in governments. It is no surprise that any non-state actor can enjoy a legitimacy and presence that exceeds that of governments.

Finally, sectarian policies used by state actors and various political groups and movements have further undermined the social fabric and stability in the region. Larger conflicts in the region in Syria and Iraq and the cold war between Iran and Saudi Arabia have affected the mechanisms of self-protection for minorities in the region and for Sunnis who feel unprotected and unrepresented politically. Sectarian violent extremist groups gain support in environments of threats and fear.

When considered from this angel, the rise of violent extremist groups signifies the quest for justice in its different manifestations. It is a search for equality, inclusion, and protection. The failure of the state in the WANA region to meet these needs in its social contract has led to chronic failures in government responsibilities, severe weakness of other stabilising actors like civil society and the middle class. Social injustice is the making of governments of the region, who have – through these failures – paved the way for extremist groups.

5. Gender Equality and Women's empowerment

5.1 Introduction

While gender gaps have been narrowing for decades, males continue to outscore females on a range of development indicators, from educational enrolment and achievement, to labour force participation, earning power, and infant mortality.[287] As a result, the principle of gender equity has become entrenched in international human rights law, national action plans, global development objectives and humanitarian best practice. It is therefore unsurprising that the link between peace, security, and gender equality has been stated formally in various forms since the 1990s. For example, on International's Women's Day in 2000, the UN Security Council formally declared the inextricable link between gender equality and peace.[288] However, despite such declarations there is still an ongoing dearth of literature on the way in which gender relations fits within the framework of human security. All social structures, including their practices and symbols, are gendered, and a realisation of this makes it evident as to why a consideration of gender is crucial for effective and considerate human security, and CVE, programming.[289] While the levels of intensity will vary depending on context, **all pillars of human security are affected by gender**, and it is naïve and impractical to suggest otherwise. In short, and as Khadija Haq has argued, "we can never talk meaningfully about human security without discussing gender equality first."[290] Thus, it seems integral for this project to consider the way in which gender can affect human security programming, radicalisation, and CVE.

It is worth noting that gender equality is often treated as interchangeable with women's empowerment. This automatically assumes certain premises. Firstly, that problems with gender equality are primarily a result of women's subordination, both formally and informally. Secondly, that reaching gender equality is a social process, as it is centred on one's position of power, or level of agency, in relation to others. As such, the empowerment process has to be linked to the community.[291] These assumptions are helpful in highlighting the link between empowerment and community, and the persistent and widespread marginalisation of women across the world. However, they can be limiting by overlooking the strength of **gender roles placed upon both men and women**. There is a tendency to treat problems concerning women as to do with gender, while those to do with men are seen as simply social or political problems. As such, women are defined by their gender first and the other elements of their identity second, whilst the same tendency is not adhered to for men. There is an encouraging shift in the literature being produced that suggests there is a growing acknowledgement of this imbalance[292] but it is helpful

[287] Esther Duflo, "Women Empowerment and Economic Development," *Journal of Economic Literature* 50 (2012): 1051-79, accessed August 17, 2017, http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/jel.50.4.1051.
[288] "Women's Empowerment in the Context of Human Security," Inter-Agency Network on Women and Gender Equality, December 7-8, 1999, http://www.un.org/womenwatch/ianwge/collaboration/Rep1999_WE.PDF.
[289] Susan Mackay, "Women, Human Security, and Peace-building: A Feminist Analysis," IPSHU English Research Report Series No.19, *Conflict and Human Security: A Search for New Approaches of Peace-Building* (2004), http://pdf2.hegoa.efaber.net/entry/content/511/women_human_security_peacebuilding_feminist_analysis.pdf.
[290] Khadija Haq, "Human Security for Women," Address at the Human Security and Global Governance Conference, Toda Institute for International Peace, June 5-7, 1997, http://mhhdc.org/wp-content/themes/mhdc/reports/Human%20Security%20of%20Women.pdf.
[291] Nanette Page and Cheryl E. Czuba, "Empowerment: What is it?" *Journal of Extension* 37 (1999), accessed August 17, 2017, https://www.joe.org/joe/1999october/comm1.php.
[292] For example: S. El Feki, B. Heilman, G. Barker, eds, "Understanding Masculinities: Results from the International Men and Gender Equality Survey (IMAGES) - Middle East and North Africa," 2017, accessed August 17, 2017, http://promundoglobal.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/05/IMAGES-MENA-Multi-Country-Report-EN-16May2017-web.pdf.

to be aware of these double standards. Thus, while this section will be primarily focused upon women, including their status, both formally and informally, and their relationship to VE and CVE, it will also hope to take into account considerations of masculinities and the way strict gender roles affect all elements of human security.

5.2 Women's Empowerment in Theory and Action.

Women's empowerment is a modality for both thinking about gender equality and a means to realizing its ends. It understands gender inequality as being rooted in **power imbalances** between males and females. Women engaging in the public sphere, enjoying access to the opportunities and resources, and using their agency in meaningful and constructive ways, are all positive manifestations of women's empowerment by asserting power and control over their lives.[293]

Gender equality and protection against discrimination are among the most fundamental of **human rights**; that women and girls fare more poorly than their male counterparts against almost all development indicators is morally unacceptable. Moreover, against the body of evidence connecting an empowered female populous to outcomes ranging from economic growth, to improved health statistics and environmental sustainability — gender equality is also a development imperative.[294] In short, societies with "large, persistent gender inequalities pay the price of more poverty, malnutrition, illness, and other depravations", whereas more equal societies grow, share the fruits of improved living standards and are more peaceful.[295]

A central blockade to gender equality is that in many areas where inequality prevails, the marginalisation of women serves the interests of traditional power-holders in terms of resource control, sexual commoditisation, and monopolisation of decision-making. A further nuance, and one that is particularly relevant to the WANA region, is how the lack of empowerment, poverty, and dysfunctional institutional structures are mutually reinforcing. As Nabila Kabeer explains, empowerment — insofar as it is about power — manifests in the ability to make choices.[296] To be disempowered means to be denied choice, while empowerment allows those who have been originally denied such options to be able to make choices. However, for there to be genuine choice, alternatives must exist, and for women living in poverty, often there are very few. For example, a woman's choice to work, continue education, or exercise healthcare decisions, is often contingent upon a level of economic independence. Likewise, women's 'choice' to engage in public life may be overshadowed by the absence of a functional participatory system free of corruption and nepotism.

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[293] "Important Concepts Underlying Gender Mainstreaming," Office of the Special Adviser on Gender Issues and the Advancement of Women, United Nations, 2001, accessed August 17, 2017, http://www.un.org/womenwatch/osagi/pdf/factsheet2.pdf.

[294] "World Survey on the Role of Women in Development 2014: Gender Equality and Sustainable Development," UNWOMEN, 2014, accessed August 17, 2017, http://www.unwomen.org/-/media/headquarters/attachments/sections/library/publications/2014/unwomen_surveyreport_advance_16oct.pdf?la=en&vs=2710.

[295] "Engendering Development: Through Gender Equality in Rights, Resources and Voice," World Bank Policy Research Report, 2000, 8, accessed August 17, 2017, http://siteresources.worldbank.org/PGLP/Resources/Engendering_Development.pdf.

[296] Nabila Kabeer, "Reflections on the Measurement of Women's Empowerment," Discussing Women's Empowerment – Theory and Practice, Sida Studies, 2000, 19, accessed August 17, 2017, http://www.sida.se/contentassets/51142018c739462db123fc0ad6383c4d/discussing-womens-empowerment---theory-and-practice_1626.pdf.

In an attempt to carry out programming that can achieve or facilitate women's empowerment there has been a proliferation of attempts to quantify what women's empowerment is. This is inevitable when a concept shifts from the theoretical to the practical, especially when it becomes associated with donors and policy which have limited resources and cost/benefit calculations.[297] However, this need to measure results is seen by some as potentially damaging the authenticity of the empowerment. For some people the usefulness of the term is in its vagueness and as soon as it is associated with external instrumentalist programming the women in question become measureable objects to empower in prescriptive ways.[298] If women's empowerment is linked to making choices then the danger of measurable women's empowerment programs is that the choices on offer become controlled and used to encourage an empowerment which suits those organising the programme.

Perhaps as a response to this concern about empowerment becoming a tool for furthering a predefined agenda certain reports have highlighted the need for empowerment to ensure individuals gain the abilities to make their own decisions, uninfluenced. For example, Nanette Page and Cheryl Czuba have defined empowerment as a "multi-dimensional social process that helps people gain control over their own lives. It is a process that fosters power in people, for use in their own lives, their communities, and in their society, by acting on issues that they define as important."[299] It is clear to see why this would be the preferred idea of empowerment, due to its encouragement of individual agency and freedom of choice but the realities of situations mean that it is almost impossible to develop an empowerment model which does not inherently promote a distinct manifestation of empowerment.

Many large international organisations, such as the World Bank, take a pragmatic approach in which women's empowerment consists of the acquisition and use of agency in strategic fields relevant to development. In such a format, empowerment is often defined as including the control of economic assets.[300] To realize this, women may be measured on their ability to access employment income, the right to own land and inherit, benefit from pensions, social security and alimony, and assert decision-making with respect to household finances.[301] A second, commonly used measure of empowerment is the level of decision-making a woman might have in her family and personal life. Relevant indicators include the gender roles assigned to wives, how citizenship is determined and passed on, whether there are protections against violence and child marriage, women's rights within marriage, freedom of movement, and the ability to work and access identity documents.[302] Finally, empowerment is seen as having a voice in society and policy, which may be exercised through political participation and representation, or engagement in collective action.[303]

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[297] Ibid., 18.
[298] Srilatha Batliwala, *Empowerment of women in South Asia: Concepts and Practices* (New Dehli: Columbo, 1993).
[299] Page and Czuba, "Empowerment: What is it?"
[300] "Facts and Figures: Economic Empowerment," UNWOMEN, accessed August 17, 2017, http://www.unwomen.org/en/what-we-do/economic-empowerment/facts-and-figures.
[301] "Gender Equality and Development," The World Development Report 2012, The World Bank, accessed August 17, 2017, https://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTWDR2012/Resources/7778105-1299699968583/7786210-1315936222006/Complete-Report.pdf.
[302] "Women's Rights are Human Rights," United Nations Office of the High Commissioner, 2014, accessed August 17, 2017, http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Events/WHRD/WomenRightsAreHR.pdf.
[303] Pilar Domingo et. al., "Women's Voice and Leadership in Decision-Making," Overseas Development Institute, April 2015, accessed August 17, 2017, https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Pilar_Domingo/publication/282133333_Women%27s_Voice_and_Leadership_in_Decision-Making_Assessing_the_Evidence/links/57ed005c08ae92eb4d27d443/Womens-Voice-and-Leadership-in-Decision-Making-Assessing-the-Evidence.pdf.

An area of women's empowerment which has been universally accepted as beneficial to both the individuals themselves and their communities is women's education. Women with education are shown to make better household spending decisions,[304] their children have better health and development outcomes,[305] and their families are less likely to fall into poverty.[306] There are also community-wide impacts; women's education is positively correlated with lower HIV/AIDs transmission rates and higher vaccination rates, for example.[307] Education also increases economic growth.[308] It is here that a synergy appears to unfold — the combination of education *and* engagement in paid employment seems to unlock the exercise of agency.[309] Educated and employed women better participate in household decisions, and through this enjoy positive gains in areas as diverse as domestic violence through to determining family size. They are also more likely to participate in governance and public decision-making, and beyond this, their involvement tends to augment the allocation of resources towards human development priorities, including education, health, nutrition, employment and social protection.[310]

In both theory and practice it can be clearly illustrated that women's empowerment is beneficial for all. As with any donor-driven development goal there are often going to be difficulties in ascertaining what is truly best for the individual opposed to what fits into a broader agenda. However, it seems clear that empowering women, whether financially, socially, or politically, is beneficial for both themselves and the broader community. Furthermore, women's empowerment, and gender more widely, connects to every one of the human security pillars and thus, should always be considered within human security program. In relation to this project in particular it is logical that if women's empowerment can help to improve the situation for a broader community and is linked to the encouragement of peace women should have a central role within CVE recommendations and programming.

5.3 Women in the WANA Region

The extent that women in the WANA region are particularly disadvantaged is exemplified in the global gender gap index; in 2016, the region registered the world's widest gap at 40 percent and based on current trends, this gap will take 356 years to close.[311] Not a single country in the WANA region, excluding Israel, ranked in the top 115 countries in the world for gender equality.[312] While the region scores well for 'educational attainment' and 'health and survival' there is a huge disparity between the number of men and women in employment and the levels of political empowerment between the genders.[313] It would appear that while education is

[304] "Facts and Figures: Economic Empowerment," UNWOMEN, accessed August 17, 2017, http://www.unwomen.org/en/what-we-do/economic-empowerment/facts-and-figures.
[305] Ana Revenga and Sudhir Shetty, "Empowering Women is Smart Economics," *Finance & Development* 49 (2012), accessed August 17, 2017, http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/fandd/2012/03/revenga.htm.
[306] "Gender and Extreme Poverty," USAID, September 2015, accessed August 17, 2017, https://www.usaid.gov/sites/default/files/documents/1870/Gender_Extreme_Poverty_Discussion_Paper.pdf.
[307] Duflo, "Women's Empowerment and Economic Development," 1056.
[308] "Facts and Figures: Economic Empowerment," UNWOMEN.
[309] "Gender Equality and Development," The World Bank.
[310] Torben Iversen and Francs Rosenbluth, "Work and Power: The Connection Between Female Labor Force Participation and Female Political Representation," *Annual Review of Political Science* (2008): 479-495, accessed August 17, 2017, 10.1146/annurev.polisci.11.053106.151342.
[311] "The Global Gender Gap Report 2016," World Economic Forum, accessed August 17, 2017, http://www3.weforum.org/docs/GGGR16/WEF_Global_Gender_Gap_Report_2016.pdf.
[312] "The Global Gender Gap Report 2016," 11.
[313] Ibid.

positively encouraged and supported there are still large structural and powerful social barriers curtailing women's roles within the public sphere. When the UN Arab Human Development Report was issued in 2005, which particularly focused on Gender, "it cited that the most important barrier to the future of a more prosperous and peaceful region was the lack of full participation of women in every sphere of society, but importantly in the economy."[314] Over a decade later gender equality is still a significant barrier to development in the region, the region has some of the lowest global rates for women's involvement in the economy, and peace is sparse. By highlighting some of the differing areas in which women's involvement can be measured the following sections should help to illustrate more clearly some of the barriers, both structural and imagined, to women's empowerment in the region.

Before referring to multiple specific elements of women's rights, or lack there of, in the WANA region it is worth very briefly mentioning **the role of Islam within women's lives**. This is relevant in particular because one of the primary threats to effective human security programming is a fundamental rejection of it by the target community, and this is particularly poignant when it is attempting to deal with such sensitive topics as gender roles. The perceived influence of secularism has been central to the development of women's rights in Muslim countries. According to Annalisa Bezzi, "family law in West Asia and North African countries has often been described as the 'last bastion' of Islamic law, lasting long after the introduction of European-based, codified civil and criminal systems. This is because Western colonial powers preferred not to amend family law, focussing instead on what they perceived to be public matters."[315] At the time, colonial powers were happy to leave family matters in the hands of the indigenous populations as a trade off for introducing other codified laws which they deemed as more important.[316]

As a result family law often remained premised upon *Shari'a,* even after creeping codification.[317] This set a precedent in which family issues have often been used, during the colonial period and ever since, as a tool to appease conservatives. As Bezzi has commented, "family relations . . . have come to symbolize tensions between traditionalism and modernisation-secularisation."[318] Others, such as Dr. Magdy Abdel Hameed Belal, have argued that men use Islamic traditions as a way to restrict women and that the patriarchal culture goes far beyond simply religious teachings and is instead founded in tradition and culture, but that Islam is often used as a bargaining chip for justifying and reinforcing it.[319] Whatever the case it is clear that historically the position of women in the WANA region has been used as a political and religious bargaining tool and women's status and rights have been primarily based upon the desires of those in control opposed to a genuine concern over the needs and wants of the individuals affected. As previously discussed, the literature on women's empowerment focuses in particular on certain social, legal, and political measures: five of the most pertinent of these within the WANA region are discussed in more detail below.

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[314] Dina H. Powell and Jane Kinninmont, "Women's Economic Empowerment in the Middle East and North Africa," Chatham House, July 6, 2015, accessed August 17, 2017, https://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/files/chathamhouse/field/field_document/20150706Women%27sEconomicEmpowerment.pdf.

[315] Annalisa Bezzi, "Women and The Law in Jordan: Islam as a Path to Reform," The WANA Institute, October 2016, 23-24, accessed August 17, 2017, http://wanainstitute.org/en/publication/women-and-law-jordan-islam-path-reform-0.

[316] Abdullahi A An-Na'im, *Islamic Family Law in a Changing World: A Global Resource Book* (London: Zed Books, 2002), 17.

[317] Bezzi, "Women and The Law in Jordan."

[318] Ibid. 24.

[319] "Political Empowerment for Women in the Middle East," Global Fund for Women, accessed August 17, 2017, https://www.globalfundforwomen.org/political-empowerment-for-women-in-the-middle-east/#.WYgteq2B3BI.

Political participation: Despite improvements on women's electoral rights and political representation, women in the WANA region remain grossly underrepresented in political life. In 2014, compared to the global average of 21.8 percent, women parliamentarians in Arab States accounted for only 16 percent, with Gulf states and Egypt scoring particularly poorly.[320] Countries such as Jordan, Iraq, and Palestine, which have introduced quotas, fair slightly better, although experts are divided on whether such presence has translated into a genuine women's voice in party politics.[321] Such interventions are also often seen by locals as the result of international meddling.[322] It is certainly not a given that representation has translated into increased rights or protection, and in many cases women do not enjoy the decision-making power or influence of their male counterparts. Marwa Shalaby has argued this is largely to do with the dominant political systems across the region which have little interested in any change which might threaten the incumbent power structures:

> "Female candidates do face numerous challenges to garner voter support and confidence, but the real issue lies at the top levels of power where electoral outcomes are manufactured, even manipulated, by the ruling elites to ensure their survival while maintaining the facade of fair and free elections."[323]

In other cases, women are elected based on their conservative policy standpoints, and thus have not contributed to policies and laws that empower women. However, it has been suggested that quotas had impacts beyond politics, including by challenging traditional gender norms, and women's sense of political efficacy, and had a synergistic impact by encouraging more women to run for office.[324]

Table 1: Women's Political Empowerment (Rank out of 144 countries)[325]

	Women in parliament (World Ranking – out of 144)	Women in ministerial positions (World Ranking – out of 144)	Political empowerment score (World Ranking – out of 144)
Jordan	111	103	123
Lebanon	137	135	143
Tunisia	37	109	71

Source: "The Global Gender Gap Report 2016" http://reports.weforum.org/global-gender-gap-report-2016/

[320] "Women in Politics: 2014," UNWOMEN, Inter-Parliamentary Union, accessed August 17, 2017, http://www.ipu.org/pdf/publications/wmnmap14_en.pdf.
[321] Assaf David and Stefanie Nanes, "The Women's Quota in Jordan's Municipal Councils: International and Domestic Dimensions," *Journal of Women, Politics and Policy* 32 (2011), accessed August 17, 2017, http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/1554477X.2011.613709?scroll=top&needAccess=true&journalCode=wwap20.
[322] Ibid.
[323] Marwa Shalaby, "Women's Political Representation and Authoritarianism in the Arab World," Project on Middle East Political Science, March 11, 2016, accessed August 17, 2017, https://pomeps.org/2016/04/14/womens-political-representation-and-authoritarianism-in-the-arab-world/.
[324] Aili M. Tripp, "Do Arab Women Need Electoral Quotas?" *Foreign Policy*, January 19, 2012, accessed August 17 ,2017, http://foreignpolicy.com/2012/01/19/do-arab-women-need-electoral-quotas/.
[325] Among 144 countries globally included in the index, the highest ranked Middle East country, excluding Israel, is Qatar and the lowest ranked is Yemen (with scores of 119 and 144, respectively). "The Global Gender Gap Report 2016," World Economic Forum, accessed August 16, 2017, http://reports.weforum.org/global-gender-gap-report-2016/.

Employment: Women's labour force participation in the region — at around 24 percent and 18 percent for young women — is among the lowest worldwide.[326] Young women in the region are often educated and yet unemployment rates for young women are thought to be at 47 percent, compared to 16 percent globally.[327] This is significantly higher than the already high male youth unemployment rate in the region of 24 percent (compared to 13 percent globally).[328] It is also worth noting that female unemployment is higher for those with more education.[329] Where women do work, it is principally in the education, health, social work, and public administration sectors — sectors that offer more family-sensitive working conditions and are generally perceived as more culturally appropriate venues for women's economic participation.[330] The region also exhibits a 'marital status' economic participation gap — an underrepresentation of middle-aged and more senior women in the workforce — driven by a cultural expectation that women should leave the workforce after marriage or child birth, or if employment is impacting upon their household responsibilities.[331] In such a case the lack of employment opportunities for women is only partially to do with economic concerns and instead particularly relates to social structures and expectations. The Islamic Reporting Initiative argues that "The cultural mindset of an economy is paramount in enabling women . . . All over the world, it is the prevailing cultural mindset where the real challenges are found."[332]

Significantly, these barriers tend to persist regardless of a woman's age and education. Furthermore, a woman's lack of employment and participation in the workforce when young can affect her throughout her life. Egypt and Jordan have some of the worst gender gaps in the world when it comes to pensions, where, "62 per cent and 82 per cent of men, respectively, receive a pension compared to only 8 per cent and 12 per cent of women."[333] Such disparities mean that women are financially reliant on men throughout their lives. Not only do these trends drive market inefficiencies, the lack of women in the labour force also means that men disproportionately occupy both senior jobs, and jobs in the more lucrative, high growth, and high productivity sectors of ICT, engineering, and manufacturing.[334] Occupational sex segregation translates into higher wages and executive-managerial positioning for males, creating a **vicious cycle of gender disempowerment**.[335] Because women do not economically advance, they participate less, driving wages lower, further compounding the economic dependency of women and girls.[336]

[326] "Youth and the Prospects for Human Development in a Changing Reality," Arab Human Development Report 2016, accessed August 17, 2017, http://www.arab-hdr.org.
[327] Ibid.
[328] Ibid.
[329] The World Bank, "The Status and Progress of Women in the Middle East and North Africa," 2009, accessed August 17, 2017, http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTMENA/Resources/MENA_Gender_Compendium-2009-1.pdf.
[330] The World Bank, "The Status and Progress of Women in the Middle East and North Africa," 2009, accessed August 17, 2017, http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTMENA/Resources/MENA_Gender_Compendium-2009-1.pdf.
[331] Ibid.
[332] "Women's empowerment in the Middle East," Islamic Reporting Initiative, March 24, 2016, accessed August 17, 2017, https://islamicreporting.org/womens-empowerment-middle-east/.
[333] "Transforming Economies, Realizing Rights," 2015, 147, accessed August 17, 2017, http://progress.unwomen.org/en/2015/pdf/UNW_progressreport.pdf.
[334] "The Case for Gender Equality," World Economic Forum, 2015, accessed August 17, 2017, http://reports.weforum.org/global-gender-gap-report-2015/the-case-for-gender-equality/
[335] "Occupational Segregation,"*A Dictionary of Sociology* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998), accessed August 17, 2017, http://www.encyclopedia.com/social-sciences/dictionaries-thesauruses-pictures-and-press-releases/occupational-segregation.
[336] "Arab Human Development Report 2005: Towards the Rise of Women in the Arab World," UNDP, accessed August 17, 2017, http://www.arab-hdr.org/Reports/2005/2005.aspx

Table 2: Women in the Labour Market

	Women's labour force participation	WEF Gender Gap Index[338]
World	40%[339]	-
Region	23%[340]	-
Jordan	17%[341]	0.603
Lebanon	25%[342]	0.598
Tunisia	27%[343]	0.361

Table 3: Labour Force Distribution[337]

	Agriculture	Industry	Services
World	6.3%	30.2%	62.8%
Jordan	4.2%	29.6%	66.2%
Lebanon	5.7%	25%	69.4%
Tunisia	10.1%	28.3%	61.6%

Asset control: While almost all countries in the region allow women to enjoy full property rights, women's property ownership is extremely low, depriving them of a critical link to augmenting their bargaining power at the household level.[344] Low rates of property ownership are partially driven by weak economic participation, which makes it more difficult for women to accumulate autonomous assets. But they also reflect social and cultural influences. It is a cultural norm that working women contribute to the family income by giving their salaries to their families.[345] Furthermore, while women have rights of inheritance under Islamic law (and usually Personal Status Laws), many women are pressured to waive such rights especially with respect to property, in order to maintain property ownership within the male lineage.[346] Across the region, there is inadequate legal protection against women being forced to waive their inheritance rights and no guarantees that they will be compensated.

Education: Women's access to education is perhaps the region's most significant achievement in terms of addressing the structural barriers to gender equality and as previously discussed it is one of the most accepted and readily adopted elements of gender equality within development models. Most states provide free access to public education for girls and boys. In 2013, net enrolment among girls in primary education reached nearly 83 percent in the region, against a world average of 88.3 percent.[347] The ratio of female-to-male primary school enrolment in the

[337] "The World Fact book 2016," Central Intelligence Agency, accessed August 16, 2017, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/.
[338] "The Global Gender Gap Report 2016," World Economic Forum, accessed August 16, 2017, http://reports.weforum.org/global-gender-gap-report-2016/.
[339] Jonathan Woetzel et Al., "The Power of Parity: How Advancing Women's Equality Can Add $12 Trillion To Global Growth", *Mckinsey Global Institute,* September 2015.
[340] Ibid.
[341] The World Bank Data, 2014, Accessed August 16, 2017, http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SL.TLF.TOTL.FE.ZS?end=2014&locations=JO&start=2009&view=chart
[342] Ibid.
[343] Ibid.
[344] The World Bank, "The Status and Progress of Women in the Middle East and North Africa," 2009, http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTMENA/Resources/MENA_Gender_Compendium-2009-1.pdf.
[345] Ibid.
[346] Edouard Al-Dahdah et. al., "Exclusion and Norms: Enforcing Women's Rights to Property in Jordan," in *Rules on Paper, Rules in Practice: Enforcing Laws and Policies in the Middle East and North Africa*, July 2016, https://doi.org/10.1596/978-1-4648-0886-9.
[347] "Youth and the Prospects for Human Development in a Changing Reality," in Arab Human Development Report 2016, UNDP, Accessed August 17, 2017, http://www.arab-hdr.org.

region was 96 percent in 2013, against 98.3 percent worldwide.[348] However, for those children not attending school, the statistics still favour boys. For example, in 2011, the number of female children of primary school age who were out of school ranged from 2,500 in Qatar and Syria to 597,200 in Yemen while, for male children, the corresponding numbers ranged from around 2,200 in Oman and Qatar to 351,750 in Yemen.[349] This is especially the case for families in poverty and rural areas. Encouragingly though gender gaps in literacy throughout the Arab Region have narrowed. In 1990, there were 90 literate young women for every 100 literate young men; by 2010, the ratio had narrowed to 95 women for every 100 men.[350]

Table 4: Literacy and Enrolment Rates for Women

	Literacy (% adult female)	**Female Primary school enrolment (% net)**	**Secondary enrollment (% net)**	**Tertiary enrollment, (Gender Parity Index)**
Jordan	97%	89%	84%	1.112
Lebanon	92%	79%	65%	1.157
Tunisia	73%	97%	Not available	1.651
World	81%	89%	65%	1.115
Region	74%	92%	69%	1.017

Violence against women: Patriarchy, norms of subordination and entrenched male dominance, contribute to an environment where women are subject to domestic and institutionalised violence. Violence against women is broadly considered a matter to be kept within the private sphere, because of its direct connection to a woman and her family's reputation and honour. Laws fail to provide women sufficient protection to uphold their rights, particularly with respect to sexual and gender-based crimes, coupled with lenience towards male perpetrators.[351] The existence of legal frameworks that favour leniency towards male perpetrators compound sexist attitudes that encourage victim blaming and internalised misogyny. The association with honour, both for the individual and family, also means that there is a social context in which going to the authorities or speaking out about gender based violence, particularly within the home, is strongly discouraged. There has been a slow but encouraging shift in recent years in attitudes towards violence against women, for example, more countries have criminalised marital rape and abolished 'marry your rapist' laws.[352] However, there seems to be an ongoing unwillingness amongst states to legislate what is seen as private familial matters, and a heavy shame culture placed upon women who do speak up about such issues.

In summary, women's disempowerment in the WANA region is driven by a complex and overlapping set of structural, legal, and socio-cultural factors. Deficiencies in the legal protection

[348] Ibid.
[349] Ibid.
[350] Ibid.
[351] "Arab Human Development Report 2005," UNDP,
[352] Somini Sengupta, "One by One, Marry-Your-Rapist Laws are Falling in the Middle East," *The New York Times*, July 22, 2017, accessed August 17, 2017, https://www.nytimes.com/2017/07/22/world/middleeast/marry-your-rapist-laws-middle-east.html.

framework are reinforced by traditional attitudes towards the roles and responsibilities of women, and norms that support subservience and patriarchy.[353] This creates opportunities for, and normalises, rights violations. Likewise, women's economic rights are broadly incompatible with traditional conceptualisations of a woman's role within families and society. This sets up a host of mutually reinforcing conditions that restrict women's participation in the labour market, and thus operate to disadvantage society overall, but women and their families in particular. Gender stereotyping and cultural restrictions limit women's labour market participation and career progression, and drive lower wages and benefits. Without significant representation in the workforce, particularly at senior and management levels, women have been unable to fight against the structural constraints maintaining the status quo, such as culturally acceptable and affordable transport and child care, maternity rights and lack of protection against workplace harassment. Moreover, poor workforce participation prevents the accumulation of assets, which has knock-on effects for agency exercised both within the home and in public life, reinforcing women's dependence, lack of agency, and marginalisation.

5.4 Women as Agents in Violent Extremism and CVE

Much of the early scholarship regarding women and their relationship to violent extremism exhibits gender-laden assumptions regarding women's vulnerability to radicalisation and recruitment into violent groups. This discourse highlights the supposed ease at which women can be coerced and their desire to marry as principal push and pull factors. There is certainly evidence that in highly gendered contexts, where women are dependent upon men for their protection and livelihoods, females may have no choice but to acquiesce when their male relatives join a radical group and are more vulnerable to physical coercive methods such as rape.[354] Even in less virulent contexts such as Jordan, experts believe that pressures on women to conform and respect male family leaders can lead them to follow general social trends, including towards radicalisation.[355] Furthermore, there is evidence that women have been targeted for strategic purposes, including because they are less prone to detection. In such cases, assumptions regarding women's lack of agency and reliability will often rule them "out of suspicion", leaving them less likely to be apprehended by authorities.[356] However, it would be foolhardy to deem women impervious to using violence to express their beliefs, and thus that their participation in violent extremist groups is always involuntary.[357] The evidence is that while some are pressured, forced, or influenced, many women – perhaps a majority – join radical extremist groups by choice.[358] Thus, whether they are pushed or pulled, it is clear that women, and in some cases girls, are being radicalised and actively recruited into violent extremist groups.[359]

[353] Bezzi, "Women and The Law in Jordan."
[354] Margo Alderton,"Women and Violent Radicalisation in Jordan," UN WOMEN and The Jordanian National Commission for Women, 2016, accessed August 17, 2017, http://www.unwomen.org/-/media/headquarters/attachments/sections/library/publications/2016/women-violent-radicalisation-jordan-en.pdf?la=en&vs=3843.
[355] "The Role of Families is Critical in Preventing Violent Extremism," Global Counterterrorism Forum, 2016, accessed August 17, 2017, https://www.thegctf.org/Portals/1/Documents/Toolkit-documents/English-The-Role-of-Familes-in-PCVE.pdf.
[356] Naureen Chowdhury Fink, Sara Zeiger and Rafia Bhulai, "A Man's World? Exploring the Roles of Women in Countering Terrorism and Violent Extremism," Hedayah and The Global Center on Cooperative Security, 2016, accessed August 17, 2017, http://www.globalcenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/07/AMansWorld_FULL.pdf.
[357] Ibid.
[358] Jayne Huckerby, "Why Women Join ISIS," *Time Magazine*, December 7, 2015, accessed August 17, 2017, http://time.com/4138377/women-in-isis/.
[359] Aryn Baker, "How ISIS Is Recruiting Women From Around the World," *Time Magazine*, September 6, 2014, accessed August 17, 2017, http://time.com/3276567/how-isis-is-recruiting-women-from-around-the-world/.

Groups often capitalise on traditional tropes in order to attract women, as well as men, with the promise of a pious and meaningful life. Daesh have been particularly effective at this and appear to offer a historically unprecedented opportunity for Muslims to live a traditional Islamic life.[360] The participation of women in radical armed groups, as supporters, planners and operatives, is by no means a new phenomenon.[361] What is more surprising than simply their presence is the evolving roles of women in the armed extremist groups active in the WANA region today. Initially, groups generally took a gender-stereotypical approach to women's engagement in theatre. For example, Al-Shabaab has previously stated that it is 'un-Islamic' to use female fighters in attacks.[362] Initially, DAESH made good on its highly-conservative modus operandi by confining women to roles either in the private sphere as wives, mothers, teachers, and domestic workers, or as sex slaves.[363] In recent years, however, these roles have expanded significantly. As well as sometimes becoming actual fighters or suicide bombers women have also found utility operating as money and weapons couriers between cells, particularly in the Horn of Africa.[364]

The controlled anonymity social media has offered women, coupled with their capacity to draw upon personal relationships with other women and younger adults, has allowed them to also become effective recruiters and solicit recruits in high numbers. Babatunde Taiwo reasons that women's traditional roles as nurturers "empowers them to become protectors of cultural, social and religious values and to transmit them to the next generation" — a role that they have, in some cases, capitalised upon to influence family members to radicalise.[365] Finally, and perhaps due to heavy battlefield losses, women are increasingly being fielded into militant roles.[366] Key examples include Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi's appointment of a female fighter to lead a new battalion in North-Eastern Syria in 2016, and Daesh's all-female Al-Khansa brigade in Raqqaa.[367]

The more recent scholarship finds few or no gender variations in the dominant radicalisation drivers, and moreover that the *process* of radicalisation is similar for males and females.[368] Such findings have held across continents, with studies in Africa, Europe, and the Middle East yielding consistent results.[369] One such study concluded that context, as opposed to gender, is more likely to explain an individual's decision to join an extremist group — the implication being that strategies should favour a "balanced inclusion of both genders", but be structured with high attention to local conditions.[370] However, while men and women may be driven by similar push and pull factors, these drivers may manifest differently in the two sexes and are usually bound up tightly with gender roles.

[360] Fink, Zeiger and Bhulai, "A Man's World?"
[361] Naureen Chowdhury Fink, Rafia Barakat and Liat Shetret, "The Roles of Women in Terrorism, Conflict and Violent Extremism," Center on Global Counterterrorism Cooperation, April 2013, accessed August 17, 2017, http://www.globalcenter.org/publications/the-roles-of-women-in-terrorism-conflict-and-violent-extremism-lessons-for-the-united-nations-and-international-actors/.
[362] Babatunde Taiwo, "Background Note: Women and Violent Extremism in Somalia and the Horn of Africa," UNWOMEN, 2017.
[363] Fink, Zeiger and Bhulai, "A Man's World?"
[364] Ibid.
[365] Babatunde Taiwo, 'Background Note: Women and Violent Extremism in Somalia and the Horn of Africa', UNWOMEN, 2017.
[366][366] Fink, Zeiger and Bhulai, "A Man's World?"
[367] Ibid.
[368] Ibid.
[369] Ibid.
[370] Ibid.

During discussions conducted by the WANA Institute in Jordan three main push factors were highlighted as influencing a woman's radicalisation: "religious duties, the search for alternatives to the repressive environments they lived in, and revenge."[371] Some women expressed their religious duty for *jihad* in relation to the need to follow their husband's instructions, and thus following him to Syria if requested.[372] For others *jihad* provides a alternative option to a very limited life, in which the only other option for escape might be suicide, and in such desperate times *jihad* can appear a more acceptable root to self-destruction.[373] In this case, female desperation and frustations over limited socio-economic opportunities are parallel to those of men, and perhaps even heightened by increased social limitations. Perhaps most interestingly, findings suggest that women, particularly Syrian refugees who have lost family members since the beginning of the civil war, cite revenge as a cause to join *jihad* more so than men do.[374]

Another element of women's susceptibility to violent extremist groups is that while youths of both sexes are highly vulnerable to fundamentalist online messaging and charismatic recruiters who can knowledgably quote scriptures. Women, who have less access to religious education and information, tend to be more prone to believing content-manipulated Islamic preaching.[375] Indeed, some studies have found that lack of knowledge or education on Islam, is the "most important predisposing factor or catalyst through which youths acquire radical or distorted views of religion".[376] A final difference in the manifestation of radicalisation drivers between the genders is that while marriage is a driver influencing both men and women to travel to Syria — men seem to be more motivated by sex whereas women leave for the prospect of marriage.[377]

Extremist groups understand these nuances and have tailored their propaganda accordingly. Like in the case of men, the techniques used to recruit women include both offline methods, such as the promotion of Da'wahl, and online methods, such as the Internet and encrypted messaging systems.[378] Such techniques use specific language and approaches. Targeted messaging includes promises of 'sisterhood' and recreates 'Florence nightingale-like' imagery where women fulfil nurturing roles, such as caring for soldiers and raising the children of the new caliphate.[379] Al-Qaeda propaganda, for example, draws upon Quranic verses "urging women to support their husbands, educate their children, and encourage them in their mission of Jihad".[380] Likewise, Taliban messaging will often target the mothers of military personnel who have been killed in combat, capitalizing on their bereavement while reiterating the deficits of the state in protecting and meeting the needs of its citizenry.[381]

It is obviously naïve to suggest that women are somehow immune to the same push and pull drivers which influence a man's decision to join a violent extremist group. While there are undoubtedly social differences in the way that women might be accessed or influenced by extremist groups it is clear that many of the same radicalisation drivers exist between the genders, such as a search for meaning and purpose, along with economic pressures and

[371] Bondokji, Wilkinson, and Aghabi, "Trapped Between Destructive Choices," 18.
[372] Ibid.
[373] Ibid.
[374] Ibid., p. 19.
[375] Madison Springfield Inc., "Factors Impacting Propensity an Influence Pathways Towards Violent Extremism in Jordan," January 12, 2017, accessed August 17, 2017, https://jordankmportal.com/resources/factors-impacting-propensity-and-influence-pathways-toward-violent-extremism-in-jordan-executive-summary.
[376] Fink, Zeiger and Bhulai, "A Man's World?"
[377] Ibid.
[378] Taiwo, "Women and Violent Extremism in Somalia"
[379] Fink, Zeiger and Bhulai, "A Man's World?"
[380] Ibid.
[381] Ibid.

frustrations. Furthermore, violent extremist groups appear to have begun to shift in their attitudes towards women's participation and their willingness to use women in multiple roles. It is therefore imperative that future research always takes the role of gender into account.

The question remaining is whether gender equality and women's empowerment can either prevent radicalisation and violent extremist acts, or aid in de-radicalisation, rehabilitation, and resilience building. Certainly, there is strong evidence that women's participation — both in the security sector and as pillars of their local community more generally —leads to greater effectiveness in violence reduction and conflict prevention.[382] Practitioners believe that this is because the gender perspective they bring facilitates a more in-depth understanding of key actors and conflict dynamics.[383] Women can also have a superior ability to obtain information from key stakeholders.[384] Female police, for example, improve operational effectiveness through their ability to collect information, search and interact with both men and women.[385] These findings are reflected in UNSCR 1325 which calls for women to be part of the solution to conflicts at both policy and programming levels.[386] Applying similar logic, it is reasonable to suggest that women's empowerment could result in more effective Preventing Violent Extremism (PVE) and Countering Violent Extremism (CVE) interventions.

But perhaps the most important role for women in CVE-PVE efforts lies outside the security sector. Work in the WANA region has shown women to have in-depth insights into community dynamics, ideological patterns, and behavioural trends that differ from those available to men.[387] Women are also trusted confidents; field work conducted by the WANA Institute in Jordan has clarified that woman preachers are the first point of contact for women dealing with radical male relatives. Mothers, in particular, seek the help of women preachers and trusted civil society activities in their local communities.[388] Within families, mothers are often able to recognize signs of pre-radicalisation and radicalisation including anger, anxiety, and withdrawal.[389] With such insights, mothers can use their traditional roles within families in shaping norms to promote tolerance and non-violence and build resilience. Later, mothers of radicalised youth are strategically placed — both physically within the home and through their emotional influence — to assist their children navigate their way out of challenges. For instance, mothers were the main force behind the return of some Jordanian fighters back from Syria.[390] Importantly, women are keen to exercise this role; not only do they have a strong interest in preventing their children from becoming radicalised, they also have a vested interest insofar as radicalisation affects

[382] Security Council, "'Wherever There Is Conflict, Women Must Be Part of the Solution,' Security Council Told in Day-Long Debate Urging Their Inclusion in Restoring Fractured Societies," United Nations Media Coverage and Press Releases, November 30, 2012, accessed August 17, 2017, https://www.un.org/press/en/2012/sc10840.doc.htm.
[383] Fink, Zeiger and Bhulai, "A Man's World?"
[384] Ibid.
[385] Ibid.
[386] "Landmark resolution on Women, Peace and Security," UN Security Council, October 31, 2000, accessed august 17, 2017, https://www.un.org/womenwatch/osagi/wps/#resolution.
[387] See for example, *Women and Violent Radicalization in Jordan,* UNWomen, 2016, accessed August 17, 2017, http://www.unwomen.org/en/digital-library/publications/2016/7/women-and-violent-radicalization-in-jordan;[387] Fink, Zeiger and Bhulai, "A Man's World?"
[388] As clarified in 16 Focus Group Discussions with women, civil society activists, and female preachers in four cities in Jordan for an unpublished study.
[389] Anita Orav, Anja Radjenovic, and Rosamund Shreeves, "Radicalisation and Counter-Radicalisation: A Gender Perspective," accessed August 17, 2017, April 21, 2016, http://www.europarl.europa.eu/thinktank/en/document.html?reference=EPRS_BRI(2016)581955.
[390] Neven Bondokji and Erica Harper, *Journey Mapping of Select Jordanian Fighters* (Amman: The WANA Institute, forthcoming 2017).

women negatively and directly.[391] It is therefore clear that women should be centrally involved in considerations of how to design and implement effective CVE policy.

5.5 Women's Disempowerment in Jordan, Lebanon, and Tunisia: Case Studies

The general cultural norms and structural challenges that limit the empowerment of women in the region affect the three countries examined in this project. Limited legal protection for women victims of gender-based violence, challenges of legal empowerment, and women's status as second class citizens who are not allowed to grant citizen for their children are all common factors. Despite these similarities, particular important nuances and practical legal consequences are highlighted in the country-specific sections to follow. For example, levels of political participation remain low despite better success in Tunisia compared to Jordan and Lebanon, whereas the level of personal freedoms enjoyed by women in Lebanon exceeds that in the other two countries. These factors affect human security programing on women empowerment and can highlight the vase programing gaps that need to be filled if women are to actively engage in CVE efforts.

5.5.1 Jordan

Jordan has long been associated with tribal rule whereby certain areas of the country are dominated by large families. Unofficially, the rules of the tribe are implemented socially within the areas of control of said tribes. In this context, women are often viewed as untouchable objects representing honour, much like and equitable to the lands occupied by tribes.

As such, traditional male-female roles are ingrained into the fabric of society, through tribal rule, as well as religious cultures. The positioning of women in the Jordanian context is plagued with different forms of oppression. As a result, there are multiple visible and hidden ways in which the participation of women socio-economically and politically is strongly discouraged if not outwardly prevented. Even in areas where women are portrayed as being in control it is often ultimately men that have control, both socially and legally. For example, women have a dominant role in child rearing, however, in most cases the male has the 'final say' in matters relating to the household. Gender-based violence is a long-time and ongoing issue in the Kingdom. Notwithstanding the daily harassment all women face in the streets of Jordan, other crimes include: indecent exposure, rape, physical (domestic) violence,[392] honour killings, child molestation,[393] and more.[394]

[391] Edit Schlaffer and Ulrich Kropiunigg, "Can Mothers Challenge Extremism?" Women Without Borders, 2015, accessed August 17, 2017, http://www.women-without-borders.org/files/downloads/CAN_MOTHERS_CHALLENGE_EXTREMISM.pdf.
[392] Nadine Sayegh,"Challenges to an Integrated CVE and Human Security Approach in Jordan" (Amman: WANA Institute, forthcoming, 2017), 14-15.
[393] For detail on crimes against children, see "Overview | Children | Jordan River Foundation," Jordan River Foundation, 2012, accessed August 17, 2017, http://jordanriver.jo/?q=content/jrcsp/overview.
[394] For details on male and female dynamics and intimate partner violence, see Diab M. Al-Badayneh, "Violence Against Women In Jordan," *Journal Of Family Violence* 27 (2012): 369-379, accessed August 17, 2017, doi:10.1007/s10896-012-9429-1. For further detail see, Rana Husseini, "Only 3% Of Gender-Based Violence Victims Would Seek Police Help — Study," *Jordan Times,* February 28, 2016, accessed August 17, 2017, http://www.jordantimes.com/news/local/only-3-gender-based-violence-victims-would-seek-police-help-%E2%80%94-study.

Women have internalised these norms and as a result are more reluctant to participate in public spheres. In addition, as is the case elsewhere in the WANA region, the female body is often primarily regarded as an incubator for future generations, and as such is viewed, primarily, as an object of reproduction. This objectification is also internalised, and many women regard it as a social and religious duty to procreate. The legal framework of the Kingdom is generally unsupportive of women's rights; this extends to inheritance, marriages, and domestic violence.[395]

Fortunately, there has been some headway in creating a safer society for women. For example, on 1 August 2017, a protest took place in front of the Jordanian Parliament building while members of parliament debated the controversial Article 308 of the Penal Code. The efforts of the protests may have influenced the final decision to abolish the article. Article 308 is similar to many laws in the region.[396] A basic explanation of the law indicates that in the case of rape the rapist is permitted to marry his victim, with her permission, to relieve himself of charges; the marriage must last a minimum of three years before the charges are dropped. This 'benefits' both parties, as the woman can retain her 'honour' whilst the man is freed from punishment. The law is more nuanced and some progressive parliamentarians voted to keep the law in place to protect cases of youth engaging in sexual relations out of wedlock. However, it remains that Article 308 was used to justify and legalise rape through this mechanism and its abolishment indicates a positive step forward. It is imperative to understand that on this level of policy making, it is likely only certain socio-economic strata stand to benefit from this change. As male dominance is not only engrained in the judiciary but in the society as well, the abolishment will mean little to those living in impoverished pockets in rural areas where the rule of law is not fully implemented. This is a much needed change to the status quo, but there is much more to be done.

In Jordan, there is certainly a structural problem with a lack of protective mechanisms for women. In forthcoming WANA research, a research participant highlighted the reluctance of ministries to make information public. For example, the interviewee attempted to access a report supervised by the Ministry of Justice that sheds light on the number of illegal abortions that take place in the Kingdom, but was denied the information. As the participant engages with issues of human rights, this information is crucial to inform policy and programs.[397] As such, we can infer that the cultural norms are fed into the legal and political framework of the state.

While there are indeed developments in the legal sphere, there are painful remnants of these successes. During the first four months of 2017, seven women were recorded as having been murdered in cases of gender-based violence.[398] Unfortunately, there are still other laws in place that dominate the female body. For example, honour killings, the murder of a woman for shaming her family, generally due to extramarital relations, are often given lighter sentences within the existing legal framework. According to Yara al-Wazir, "Article 340 of Jordan's Penal Code reduces the penalty if a man kills or attacks a female relative if she commits adultery. This is a further extended under article 98 of the penal code, which reduces the penalty for murder if

[395] Khetam Malkawi, "Personal Status Law Among World's 'Highly Discriminatory' Laws Against Women," *Jordan Times*, May 5, 2015, accessed August 17, 2017, http://www.jordantimes.com/news/local/personal-status-law-among-world%E2%80%99s-highly-discriminatory%E2%80%99-laws-against-women%E2%80%99.

[396] It is worth noting that while many consider that the rape laws were created by the men of the respective countries, new research is revealing that many of the rape-marriage laws were created and passed on by colonial powers, namely France. For more see, "Rape Laws Aren't Part Of Islam, But Colonialism: Study," Telesur, August 3, 2017, accessed August 17, 2017, http://www.telesurtv.net/english/news/Rape-Laws-Arent-Part-of-Islam-but-Colonialism-Study-20170803-0024.html.

[397] Sayegh, "Challenges to an Integrated CVE and Human Security Approach in Jordan," 16.

[398] "Seven Murdered in Gender-Based Violence In 2017," *Jordan Times*, April 11, 2017, accessed August 17, 2017, http://jordantimes.com/news/local/seven-murdered-gender-based-violence-2017%E2%80%99.

the killer is in a "state of great fury.""[399] As such, the battles won at parliament must be followed closely and new initiatives must be made to abolish the remaining articles that overtly forgive grave crimes against women.

A separate notion indicating the status, legal or otherwise, of women in Jordan is the inability of mothers to pass on their citizenship to their children. This is indicative of the lack of importance placed on women. Considering the persistent occupation of the female body and her internalised goal of creating offspring, the inability for a woman to pass on her citizenship is indicative of a woman's de-legitimised social status in the eyes of the law. While this law may be set in place for political reasons,[400] it remains that the mother of a child is not permitted to share her legal status through national identification because she is female.

With respect to human security programs which target women in Jordan, successes are apparent but there is much room for improvement. As previously mentioned the aspect of internalised misogyny acts as a barrier to implementing efficient empowerment projects. Many Jordanian women have understood that their primary and often singular role is in the home. As such, particularly economic empowerment programs, are difficult to execute due to a lack of voluntary participation.[401] However, a variety of programs are present on-the-ground. For example, projects exist which encourage political participation in the upcoming elections as part of the broader decentralisation of power project, an amplitude of micro-funds are available for women's projects, and work on issues regarding gender-based violence are ongoing.[402]

However, it must be noted that in order to efficiently provide support to these women, their culture and beliefs must not be undermined. Often programs adhere to Western values and modalities of female empowerment and risks disenfranchising the vulnerable population of women in the Kingdom. The purpose of human security is to place the individual in the centre of the security discussion and as such injecting Jordanian women into the work force, specifically in governorates outside Amman, will not gain the ideal outcome. Sensitive program design, such as home businesses, may be a better alternative.[403] It is for this reason that it is crucial to include grass-roots movements to balance the need for progression and cultural norms.

5.5.2 Lebanon

Superficially, women in Lebanon experience many freedoms compared to their regional neighbours. For example, the level of economic participation is higher than Jordan. Data from the World Bank highlights that in 1990 women comprised of 18 percent of the nation's labour force. As of 2016, this figure has increased to 24 percent (a 6 percent increase). Comparatively, in 1990 Jordanian women made up a total of 9 percent of the national labour force; in 2016 this

[399] Yara al-Wazir, "Jordan Abolishes Rape Law, It Must Follow Suit with Honor Killing Law," *Al Arabiya English*, April 30, 2017, accessed August 17, 2017, http://english.alarabiya.net/en/views/news/middle-east/2017/04/30/Jordan-abolishes-rape-law-it-must-follow-suit-with-honor-killing-law.html.

[400] There is a similarity between Jordan and Lebanon in this aspect. Multiple sources cite authorities concerns with sharing nationalities to children and husbands in fear of disturbing power shares and demographic balance. For more see, Elisa Oddone, "Jordanian Progeny Gain Ground In Nationality Fight," *Al Jazeera*, May 5, 2015, http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2015/05/jordanian-progeny-gain-ground-nationality-fight-150504100629097.html.

[401] Sayegh, "Challenges to an Integrated CVE and Human Security Approach in Jordan."

[402] Ibid.

[403] Ibid.

increased to 14 percent (5 percent increase).[404] While these statistics indicate similar trajectories, Lebanon is not bound by traditional tribal cultures though it instead battles lasting sectarian divides in the community. This then means that each belief system has an approach, similar or differing to regional positions, towards women. In majority of cases this equates to social, which is inherently gender, inequality.[405]

There is a higher level of female social and political participation in Lebanon compared to other countries in the region, and Lebanese civil society is vibrant with agencies that tend to the needs of women. Agencies that have made impactful differences in Lebanese society in this regard include KAFAA: Enough Violence and Exploitation, a not-for-profit that works to move away from domestic violence, violence against children, and violence against migrant workers.[406] Also, ABAAD, a resource centre for gender equality that has achieved great successes.[407] These agencies have created powerful media campaigns geared towards ending the country's 'rape law' as well as other discriminatory practices.

Despite this, discrimination is still present, at the most level basic women experience harassment in the streets and in many homes on a daily basis. While in theory women have a more prominent standing in society, in practice this is unclear. To highlight, the Lebanese Parliament has once again excluded the equal quota representation, which would have allocated 30 percent of the seats to women. Currently, female representation stands at approximately 3 percent.[408] Journalist Joana Aziz says:

> "Women in Lebanon are not a minority. They constitute almost half of the population, further demonstrating, given their dismal representation, how women have been systematically marginalised as policy-makers and underlining why this quota should be implemented."[409]

The positioning of Lebanese society, in legal perspectives, still has much room for improvement. Discriminatory practices, such as honour killings, are present but in a much lesser extent than in Jordan, for example. However, domestic violence is a concern and while there are laws in place to protect women, they may not be implemented.[410] The recently abolished Article 308 of the Jordanian Penal Code has a sister law in Lebanon, Article 522. However, heavy-handed activism is underway to see the law abolished as in the remainder of the region (Tunisia, Morocco, and Jordan).[411] A Reuters article explains, "In Lebanon, rights group ABAAD is campaigning against the country's law with billboards of women in bloodied and torn wedding gowns. The caption reads: "A white dress doesn't cover up rape."[412] As it stands, today in Lebanon, should a woman or girl be victim to the crime of rape, her rapist is permitted to marry her in order to avoid criminal charges.

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[404] "Labor Force Participation Rate, Female (% Of Female Population Ages 15+) (Modeled ILO Estimate)," World Bank Data, 2017, accessed August 17, 2017, http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SL.TLF.CACT.FE.ZS?page=3.
[405] Ibid.
406 "KAFA," accessed August 17, 2017, http://www.kafa.org.lb/.
[407] Sengupta, "One By One, Marry-Your-Rapist Laws Are Falling In The Middle East."
[408] Joana Aziz, "Why Women Are Almost Invisible In Lebanon's Parliament", Middle East Eye, 2017, http://www.middleeasteye.net/columns/why-we-failed-reach-womens-quota-lebanon-2143710437.
[409] Ibid.
[410] Florence Massena, "Lebanese Women Not Safe Despite Domestic Violence Law", Al-Monitor, 2014, http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2014/12/lebanon-law-domestic-violence-women.html.
[411] Sengupta, "One By One, Marry-Your-Rapist Laws Are Falling In The Middle East."
[412] Heba Kanso, "Arab World Urged To Ditch Laws Which Push Girls To Marry Their Rapists," *Reuters*, July 28, 2017, accessed August 17, 2017, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-middle-east-rape-law-idUSKBN1AD29B.

There remain other legal issues that leave women in victimised positions such as issues concerning nationality. As in Jordan, women in Lebanon are not entitled to pass on their citizenship to their children. This is justified due to the refugee influxes that the state has received in history. Most prominently this was put in place to prevent Lebanese women from marrying Palestinian men and passing on their nationalities to their husbands and families. As Lebanon's political system is sectarian, and the large majority of Palestinians are Sunni Muslims, marriages would disrupt the distribution of sects and shift the balance of power.[413] However, this view is not shared by all.[414] One woman highlights the 'justification' she was given, "They say if you reform the law then all Palestinian men will marry Lebanese women and they will never return to Palestine, thereby taking away the right of Palestinian refugees to return home."[415] This positioning stands in the way of property ownership as well as total security and rights of a citizen. While there may be political motivations behind this rule, it is clear that there is a target on the backs of women that removes the possibility of gender equality.

Considering the bleak state of gender equality in Lebanon, it is encouraging that there is a vibrant group of agencies working tirelessly to amend the status quo. Most work in Lebanon is centred on amending the constitutional injustices against women. Currently, and apparently, the head of the agenda is attempting to abolish Article 522.[416] Not only do such attempts tie closely to efforts to improve social justice and human security but it has been repeatedly discussed how these things can help to mitigate drivers of radicalisation. The largest challenge in Lebanon continues to exist as a result of the lack of a centralised, organised administrative system and thus, coordination between efforts, which are often divided along sectarian lines, is imperative for future successes.

5.5.3 Tunisia

Socially and culturally, Tunisian women are in similar situations to that of their regional counterparts. There are high rates of violence against women, ranging from the most prominent domestic abuse to statutory rape. Despite this, Tunisia has been hailed as a progressive country in the WANA region. For example, in 1965, two years before France made the move, abortion was made legal in the country.[417] However, this liberating step did not affect the levels or extent of violence against women in the country nor the severity of crimes committed against women.

Speaking on a popular Tunisian radio show in 2016, the Head of Communications at the Ministry of Women, Family, and Children said:

> "The figures are quite contradictory as 47.6% women were victims to violence, [but] 83% of men said that they were opposed to violence against

[413] Matthew DeMaio, "Lebanon's New Citizenship Drive Is Both Sexist and Sectarian," *Muftah*, March 17, 2017, accessed August 17, 2017, https://muftah.org/lebanons-new-citizenship-drive-is-both-sexist-and-sectarian/#.WYxNf4iGO00.
[414] Zoi Constantine, "Law That Deprives Lebanon'S Children of Their Nationality," *The National*, April 17, 2012, accessed August 17, 2017, https://www.thenational.ae/world/mena/law-that-deprives-lebanon-s-children-of-their-nationality-1.473073.
[415] Ruth Pollard, "Lebanese Citizenship Law Strips Women Of Identity And Property," *Reuters*, May 26, 2016, accessed August 17, 2017, http://www.reuters.com/article/us-lebanon-women-property-rights-idUSKCN0YH03O.
[416] "Lebanon Rape Law: Wedding Dresses Hang in Beirut Sea Front Protest," *BBC,* April 22, 2017, accessed August 17, 2017, http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-39680838; "Lebanon: Don't Let Rapists Go Free! Repeal Article 522 of the Penal Code," Equality Now, accessed August 17, 2017, https://www.equalitynow.org/action-alerts/lebanon-dont-let-rapists-go-free-repeal-article-522-penal-code.
[417] Hortense Lac, "Abortion In Tunisia: A Right Under Pressure (In French)," *Inkyfada*, 2016, accessed August 17, 2017, https://inkyfada.com/2016/07/avortement-pression-tunisie-droit-femmes-tunisie/.

> women. A further alarming figure is that 90% of abused women do not report their cases to police, which show a mistrust in both the country's security and legal institutions."[418]

As in the vast majority of the WANA region, catcalling and sexual harassment on the streets is the standard rather than the exception in Tunisia. While this may seem benign to some, the reality of the situation is that many women are often terrorised and develop psychological issues as a result and these tactics become used as tools for intimidation.[419] Women are also culturally, and until recently, structurally discouraged to retaliate and few have a network of support.

As recent as last year, an Amnesty International report highlights the need to address longstanding issues such as domestic rape. One victim said, "No is not an option, he doesn't like that, so whatever situation I'm in, whether I'm tired or sick, I have no choice. If I say no he forces me and beats me – as long as he gets what he wants." Her family's response was to simply, "deal with it."[420] These attitudes also extend to other realms of social life. For example, female economic participation is on the lower end of the spectrum internationally, similar to that in Lebanon and Jordan. The data shows that in 1990 women made up twenty percent of the labour force; in 2016 this percentage grew five points to twenty five percent.[421]

However, the status quo may yet be met with a shocking upheaval after a recent bill was passed in Tunisian parliament that strengthens human rights across multiple domains. Tunisia has proudly abolished many discriminatory laws against women this year and in their stead introduced protective mechanisms that, if implemented, may improve women's social, cultural, and political standing. According a report from the Human Rights Watch the law discusses specifically the types of violence imposed onto women. It explains that violence against women is defined as:

> "any physical, moral, sexual or economic aggression against women based on discrimination between the two sexes and resulting in damage or physical, sexual, psychological or economic suffering to the woman, including threats of such aggression, pressure or deprivation of rights and freedoms, both in public and private life."[422]

This specificity has empowered the different security mechanisms to impose punishments for violent crimes against women and has allowed for protection in vulnerable places such as the home. Crucially it, "also criminalizes sexual harassment in public spaces, and the employment of children as domestic workers, and fines employers who intentionally discriminate against women in pay."[423] Crimes in public spaces and the workplace will now have a fine of approximately 2000 USD. This law also closed degenerative loopholes, similar to Lebanon and Jordan, which

[418] Zeineb Mazrouk, "Official Figures Show Almost Half Of Tunisian Women Victims Of Violence," *Tunisia Live*, January 19, 2016, accessed August 17, 2017, http://www.tunisia-live.net/2016/01/19/official-figures-show-almost-half-of-tunisian-women-victim-of-violence/.
[419] Radhika Sanghani, "Catcalling happens to most women between the ages of 11 and 17," *The Telegraph*, May 29, 2015, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/women/womens-life/11637697/Catcalling-Women-sexually-harassed-on-the-street-from-puberty.html.
[420] "Tunisia – Stop Punishing Survivors," Amnesty International, December 3, 2015, accessed August 17, 2017, https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/campaigns/2015/12/my-body-my-rights-tunisia/.
[421] "Labor Force Participation Rate, Female," World Bank Data.
[422] "Tunisia: Landmark Step To Shield Women From Violence," Human Rights Watch, July 27, 2017, accessed August 17, 2017, https://www.hrw.org/news/2017/07/27/tunisia-landmark-step-shield-women-violence.
[423] Ibid.

permitted a rapist to marry his victim to bypass charges and states, "men who have sex with underage girls will no longer be allowed to escape prosecution by marrying their victims."[424] Six months from 26 July 2017, the date the law was passed, full implementation is expected.[425]

This landmark change shows promise for progressing the ends of gender inequality on a structural level, which may then be followed through to a substantial shift in social attitude. However, it remains many issues of social life are dominated by theological teachings. For example, inheritance inequality is an issue that affects the entire Islamic world. Through Islamic jurisprudence, upon the death of a father, the son is entitled to double the amount that the daughter would be. This is an issue that activists in Tunisia still aim to battle in order to obtain total equality.

As in the remainder of the region, there is an apparent effort on the part of international and United Nations agencies to implement female empowerment projects. The programs saw a spike post the so-called Arab Spring due to the apparent involvement of Tunisian women in the revolution. Historically, Tunisia has been considered a beacon in the region. A report from the Wilson Center explains, "Women's empowerment in society rests increasingly not in the political but in the economic and business domains. While women have made considerable progress in the political arena, the economic power is still a male domain in all countries."[426] As such, considering the legal, social, and political wins that Tunisian women have achieved, a focus must be placed on increased economic participation in order to obtain a total equilibrium of gender inclusion and empowerment.

5.6 Conclusion

It is evident that in general women are not treated as equal to their male counterparts throughout the world and that in the WANA region this is reinforced both socially and structurally. To try and separate gender from broader human security issues is misguided and counter-productive. Human (in)security affects the entire population and women as 50 percent of that should not be treated as a minority or marginalisation issue. Gender inequality affects both men and women, and is related to issues across every one of the human security pillars.

It is clear from the human development literature that women's empowerment increases economic prosperity and it is thus a beneficial policy to empower women for the community and country at large as well as the individuals targeted. Outlines of what constitutes women's empowerment have been 82entralized82 by various implementing and funding bodies and typically consist of a women's ability to be economically, socially, politically, and judicially independent, without undue pressure and influence from those around her. However, despite the logic in encouraging these cyclical benefits for both women and those around her, barriers are reinforced when those in control have little interest in changing the status quo and often see such a change as a threat to their power. Such barriers are particularly strong in the WANA region where tribal values of honour and shame, combined and reinforced with religious traditions, are still perceived as a central backbone to society's moral fibre.

[424] "New Tunisian Law Takes Long Stride Toward Gender Equality," *Al-Monitor*, July 28, 2017, accessed August 17, 2017, http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/en/originals/2017/07/tunisia-new-law-women-protection-violence-rape-2018.html.
[425] Ibid.
[426] Luke Hagberg and Haleh Esfandiari, "Progress And Challenges To Women's Empowerment: Lessons From Tunisia," Wilson Center, September 8, 2010, accessed August 17, 2017, https://www.wilsoncenter.org/event/progress-and-challenges-to-womens-empowerment-lessons-tunisia.

The fact that women are facing many of the same social and economic frustrations as men, and sometimes even more so, makes it unsurprising that they are also susceptible to the same drivers of radicalisation. There is an increasing awareness of the naivety of the idea that women can only be attracted to violent extremist groups as a result of coercion or trickery. Whilst women are undoubtedly vulnerable to physical or sexual pressures from men, particularly when they are also reliant on them for their homes or livelihoods, it is also evident that women can be attracted to violent extremist groups of their own free will. Such groups can 83entralize on traditional tropes in which they offer a pious and meaningful life to their male and female recruits but they can also offer both genders a purpose and freedom which may be lacking at home. Women are increasingly used in a majority of roles and can be beneficial to radical groups for their ability to influence communities and go undetected by the security authorities.

The way in which violent extremist groups produce their propaganda suggests a growing awareness of the nuances of how women may be particularly influenced by the push and pull factors of radicalisation. It is therefore imperative that CVE/PVE programming does the same. As with human security problems it is counter-productive to pretend that women are not as affected by men. Even if it is not themselves going to fight women can either encourage or discourage their loved ones who may be susceptible to do so, as well as being best placed to identify the early signs of radicalisation in their households and communities, and/or can face the prospect of abandonment and increased economic problems when left behind by the men they financially rely on.

Women in the WANA region are particularly disadvantaged when compared globally. What is particular about the region is the disparity in the different measures of women's rights. In some areas conditions for women have improved markedly, such as literacy rates, access to education, and standards of healthcare received. Concurrently, other elements such as political participation and employment rates are strikingly low for women and the gender gap for such indicators is still large and showing no real sign of closing in the near future. While certain conditions, such as the high unemployment rates, are also true for men, they are always significantly worse for women, despite the reality that levels of education between men and women are now equal in many countries, if not slightly higher for women. This suggests a gender bias across employment sectors in which despite an equality in qualifications men are still favoured or deemed as more appropriate to hire than their female counterparts. It is likely that this links to social preconceptions of men as the main breadwinner in the family, which can make it awkward for women to succeed in their place when limited opportunities are on offer.

Across all three of the countries primarily considered in this project there are clear indicators of the way in which women are mistreated both socially and institutionally. While an encouraging shift is beginning to take place in certain areas, such as the growing trend of abolishing 'marry-your-rapist' laws, there are still worryingly high rates of gender-based violence, domestic abuse, political marginalisation of women, and a lack of legal rights for women, particularly pertaining to family issues, across Lebanon, Tunisia, and Jordan. All three have a dearth of appropriate human security programming to address such issues and support for victims of gender injustice usually falls to informal groups or NGOs. Furthermore, there is often a strong stigma attached to accessing such services. While it is encouraging that certain judicial changes are beginning to take place there are still large gaps in legal support for women, and even if such changes occur it does not ensure a change in social attitudes, particularly in poorer or more rural areas where tribal or sectarian loyalties and traditions can have far more sway than 83entralized legal rulings.

It is worth finally and briefly reiterating the fact that gender issues have become almost exclusively correlated with issues pertaining to women throughout the region. Clearly, gender is concept that is applicable to both men and women. However, the positioning of gender issues as interchangeable with women's issues has caused the dislocation of women from broader social programs. This phenomenon is present in the WANA region and targeting women separately for human security programs risks discriminating against them in the long-term. Thus, in order to further gender equality, programs targeting women should also include men – particularly concerning activities such as awareness raising. Battling gender inequality should be an inclusive effort using both men and women as a means to this end and it is imperative to understand that gender inequality is social inequality as well.

6. Drivers of Violent Extremism

6.1 Introduction

The previous chapters of this desk review have examined the key concepts addressed in this project followed by a detailed examination of state-security policies in the three countries of the study (Jordan, Lebanon, and Tunisia). The chapters then discussed social justice and women empowerment as pillars of human security that will be investigated in this project in addition to political inclusion, employment and education, and water security, that will be discussed in a separate report. In an attempt to connect the three concepts of this project, namely human security, state-centric security, and violent extremism, this chapter briefly discusses general drivers of violent extremism in the WANA region with particular focus on country-specific salient factors.

For examining this trilateral relation (human security, state-centric security, and violent extremism), it is imperative to start this discussion with the acknowledgement that in most cases the structural (economic, social, and political) factors that lead to violent extremism are related to failures in meeting and protecting long-term human security goals. These failures are often described in the literature on development and human security as government service black holes.

This understanding of drivers of violent extremism as human security failures rests on the fact that radicalisation does not occur in a vacuum. While ideology and individual psychology should not be dismissed as a driving factor for people seeking to join radical groups, it is often more beneficial and helpful for the development of CVE programming to consider the contextual factors which encourage support for extremist views. As a UK report in 2010 wrote,

> "regarding the Government's analysis of the factors which lead people to become involved in violent extremism, we conclude that there has been a pre-occupation with the theological basis of radicalisation, when the evidence seems to indicate that politics, policy and socio-economics may be more important factors in the process."[427]

Similar views are voiced in the WANA region. Individuals adhere to violent extremist ideology because of contextual frustrations.[428] They adopt a new worldview and identity roles in their search for alternatives to their personal status quo.[429] As a result, it is these social, economic, and political factors that this section will focus on in particular due to the direct connection these have with human security programing and state-centric security policies.

[427] "Brief on Countering Extremism (CVE)," The Council on American-Islamic Relations, July 2015, accessed August 17, 2017, https://www.cair.com/government-affairs/13063-brief-on-countering-violent-extremism-cve.html.

[428] Neven Bondokji, Kim Wilkinson, and Leen Aghabi, *Trapped Between Destructive Choices: Radicalisation Drivers Affecting Youth in Jordan,* (Amman: WANA Institute, 2017), 9-21, accessed August 17, 2017, http://wanainstitute.org/en/publication/trapped-between-destructive-choices-radicalisation-drivers-affecting-youth-jordan.

[429] Similar findings also apply to some Muslim Brotherhood youth in Egypt who are currently experiencing a shift towards violent extremism due to their frustration with Muslim Brotherhood strategies and the overall political and socio-economic context in Egypt. See: Ahmad Nour-al-Dein, "The Nihistic Brothers: From al-Banna Papers to Al-Bafra Papers (in Arabic)," *Sassapost*, April 20, 2017, accessed August 17, 2017, https://www.sasapost.com/the-nihilist-brotherhood-from-banna-paper-to-bafra/.

As clarified in the chapter on key concepts, radicalisation and violent extremism are stages in one process, but with violent extremism as the behavioural end of it. Therefore, the factors that lead to ideological radicalisation that can later develop to behavioural violent extremism are similar. It is only in later stages that factors like direct contact with a recruiter or armed group, or the desire to revenge the death of a dear one can trigger the direct engagement of an individual in violent extremism. But factors that contribute to the earlier stages of radicalisation are the same as those that later contribute to the turn towards violent extremism.

These factors are often categorised in the literature into push and pull factors. This classification clarifies how some aspects push individuals to join radical armed groups (like marginalisation, living under occupation, and alienation), while pull factors lure vulnerable individuals through financial, social, and ideological incentives.[430] Contextual and individual drivers of radicalisation determine these push and pull factors. Some drivers pertain to general socio-economic and political conditions affecting a social group, while others pertain to the vulnerabilities and psychological needs of individuals.

There are certain similarities in the driving forces behind why some individuals from the countries considered in this study, join extremist groups. Thus, the first part of this section will consider two of those shared drivers that are directly associated with the goals of this project: socio-economic drivers and political drivers of violent extremism. Other drivers, notably social, ideological, and psychological drivers, equally contribute to the rise of violent extremism in the region. This discussion will be limited to these two contextual set of drivers. The section will then move on to consider the more particular contexts of each country and their national drivers of radicalisation.

6.2 Relative Depravation, Lack of Opportunities, and Unemployment

There is evidence from throughout the WANA region of the role that economic and social factors play in pushing people to join radical groups. This will be explored a little more in each country profile but it is worth noting that, according to the UNDP, Arab countries were less industrialised in 2007 than they had been in 1970, indicating a chronic stagnation in development and employment opportunities.[431] Compounding the problem is the **unprecedented number of young people in the region.** For example, the national median age in Jordan is currently 22 and two-thirds of the population is under the age of 30.[432] The combination of a large number of young people and a stagnant economic environment contributes to the reality that "the unemployment rate among the young in the Arab countries is nearly double that in the world at large."[433] Whilst unemployment in itself is not a cause of support for violent extremism, the feelings of frustration and lack of purpose that it cultivates can contribute to a susceptibility to alternative narratives which may promise to provide meaning and purpose.

Compounding the problem of unemployment and underemployment is the culture of **nepotism**

[430] Neven Bondokji, Kim Wilkinson, and Leen Aghabi, *Understanding Radicalisation: A Literature Review of Models and Drivers,* 13; Bondokji, Wilkinson and Aghabi, *Trapped Between Destructive Choices,* 9-21.
[431] "Arab Human Development Report 2009: Challenges to Human Security in the Arab Countries," UNDP, May 26, 2009, 10, accessed August 17, 2017, http://www.undp.org/content/undp/en/home/librarypage/hdr/arab_human_developmentreport2009.html.
[432] *World Population Prospects: The 2015 Revision*, UN Department of Economic and Social Affairs, 2015.
[433] Arab Human Development Report 2009, UNDP.

and **corruption** which was cited in studies from all three countries as a cause of frustration and dissatisfaction with the state.[434] A respondent to a study in Tunisia suggested that many "felt that only people with money and connections can get jobs, and those who lack financial or social standing may seek for any opportunity to escape the country for income, even if that means joining violent extremist organizations."[435] Nepotism can intensify feelings of social injustice and powerlessness while limiting the agency of young people to create positive change for themselves. Similar to unemployment, it is not that nepotism in itself causes support for violent extremism but that the corresponding social, economic and emotional symptoms which it creates can make the rhetoric offered by some violent extremist groups appear more appealing.

High unemployment rates and a culture of nepotism can contribute to a feeling of **relative depravation** in which it is not simply that individuals are poor or unable to access provisions but that they feel an injustice at what is available to them in relation to others and in keeping with their own abilities and qualifications. Thus, CVE responses to the feeling of relative depravation need to focus on the provision of equal and appropriate economic opportunities.[436]

Despite initial suggestions, there is no empirical evidence suggesting the presence of refugees increases engagement in violent extremism in the region, or that refugee communities are a large source of radicalisation.[437] However, a large refugee presence can be a contributing factor to feelings of frustration and relative depravation among the host communities, which can push people towards extremism. This is particularly the case when the host country does not have a strong economic infrastructure to support the host population, let alone the large influx of refugees as well. Jordan and Lebanon have both had vast numbers of Syrians enter their countries, particularly as a proportion of their original population. Concurrently, Tunisia has received a large number of Libyan refugees in recent years. All three countries have weak economies and high unemployment rates, which have been further exacerbated by the increasing competition for jobs from refugees, who are often equally, if not more, qualified than local applicants.[438] This has built a resentment amongst some local groups towards refugee populations, particularly when it is perceived that refugees receive increased support from international communities. A large influx of refugees can heighten a sense of injustice amongst host communities, and compound frustrations with the government in failing to deal with economic problems.

The range of factors which can drive feelings of frustration and relative depravation means that identifying and reaching vulnerable and marginalised groups can pose a significant problem for CVE programming in the region. Although certain groups may have clear ethnic, tribal, or religious affiliations, identities can also be widespread and difficult to pinpoint. For example, young people can be seen as a marginalised group, as can those living in certain certain geographical areas such as Western Tunisia, Northern Lebanon, or Southern Jordan.

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[434] Samar Muhareb, "A New Social Contract for the Middle East: The Case of Jordan," The Fletcher Forum of World Affairs, January 30, 2017, accessed August 17, 2017, http://www.fletcherforum.org/home/2017/1/29/a-new-social-contract-for-the-middle-east-the-case-of-jordan; "Drivers of Instability, Conflict and Radicalisation: A Snapshot from Akkar," Levant7, January 2015; "Understanding Local Drivers of Violent Extremism in Tunisia," International Republican Institute, Winter 2016, accessed August 17, 2017, http://www.iri.org/sites/default/files/2017-6-1_vea_report_-_beja.pdf.

[435] "Understanding Local Drivers of Violent Extremism in Tunisia," International Republican Institute, 11.

[436] Hafez Ghanam, "Economic Inclusion Can Help Prevent Violent Extremism in the Arab World," (Washington DC: Brookings, November 10, 2015), accessed August 17, 2017, https://www.brookings.edu/blog/up-front/2015/11/10/economic-inclusion-can-help-prevent-violent-extremism-in-the-arab-world/.

[437] Sean Yom and Katrina Sammour, "Counterterrorism and Youth Radicalisation in Jordan: Social and Political Drivers," (New York: CTC Sentinel, April 2017), 26.

[438] "Drivers of Instability, Conflict and Radicalisation: A Snapshot from Akkar," Levant7, 16.

Furthermore, "In the Arab world, women could also be considered as a marginalized group, with very low labor force participation rates and very high unemployment rates."[439] Despite their position as a marginalised group susceptible to the same radicalisation drivers as their male counterparts, women are commonly overlooked and perceived of as passive in radicalisation literature. There has been a certain amount of research done focusing on female recruits from the West[440], but little done in the WANA region, including the three countries focused on in this study. However, since the rise of ISIS there has been a sharp increase in female foreign fighters, and women are not only becoming *'jihadi*-brides' but are also utilized "for a range of activities including logistics, recruitment, political safeguarding, operations, suicide bombing and combat."[441] The appeal of extremist groups for women relates to the agency which such groups appear to offer them. In their work on *jihadi* feminism, Abu Ruman and Abu Hanieh draw attention to a number of key points of analysis.[442] First, they attribute the increase in female ISIS members to the political project ISIS represents, one which offers western and Arab women an alternative compared to what is available for them in their home communities. Second, compared to their traditional and limited role in al-Qaeda, women join ISIS as fighters and have been engaged in violent attacks and confrontations with police in their home countries and in ISIS-controlled areas. Finally, even if martyrdom is acceptable to them, women go with the aim of living, not just dying, in ISIS-controlled areas.

Female engagement in violent terrorism is a direct response to the frustration and resentment they have towards the socio-political conditions in the region. On this particular point they are similar in their motivations to their male counterparts. It is clear that the range of frustrated and marginalised groups is large, and identifying who is susceptible to radicalisation as a result of relative depravation is difficult, and can make effective and efficient CVE/PVE programming harder as a result.

6.3 Frustrated Political Hopes and the Sunni Political Vacuum

Scholars generally refer to the political situation in Iraq in the 2000s when analysing the rise of violent extremist groups in the region. In particular, they refer to the US occupation of Iraq and the subsequent political vacuum it created,[443] sectarian policies of the Maliki government in Iraq,[444] and the experiences in US prisons as providing the space for recruitment of

[439] Ghanam, "Economic inclusion can help prevent violent extremism in the Arab world."
[440] Sara Zeiger, "Policy and Program Recommendations: Role of Women in Countering Radicalisation and Violent Extremism," Hedayah Center, 2015, accessed August 17, 2017, http://www.hedayahcenter.org/Admin/Content/File-3032016135138.pdf; Erin Marie Saltman and Melanie Smith, "Till Martyrdom Do Us Part," Institute for Strategic Dialogue, 2015; Jayne Huckerby, "When Women Become Terrorists," *The New York Times*, January 21, 2015, accessed August 17, 2017, https://www.nytimes.com/2015/01/22/opinion/when-women-become-terrorists.html.
[441] Saltman and Smith, "Till Martyrdom Do Us Part: Gender and the ISIS Phenomenon," 5.
[442] Mohamad Abu Ruman and Hasan Abu Hanieh, *In Love with Martyrdom: Formation of Jihadi Feminism from al-Qaeda to the Islamic State (in Arabic),* (Amman: Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, 2017).
[443] Kheir al-Deen Haseeb, "Daesh: The American Responsibility (in Arabic)," Mustaqbal al-Arabi443 (2016): 7-17; Lina al-Khatib, "The Islamic State's Strategy: Lasting and Expanding (in Arabic)," (Beirut: Carnegie Middle East Center, June 29, 2015), 7, accessed August 17, 2017, http://carnegie-mec.org/2015/06/29/ar-60542/ibk6.
[444] Abdulrazzaq Jedi, "An Evaluation of the Syrian Spill over in Iraq" (seminar presentation, "From Beirut to Baghdad: The Regional Impact of the Syrian Conflict," Doha, Qatar, April 14, 2014), accessed August 17, 2017, http://www.brookings.edu/events/2014/04/14-regional-impact-syrian-conflict.

disenfranchised Sunni youth and Ba'ath senior leaders.[445] These factors explain the underlying political and sectarian environment that contributed to the rise of violent extremist groups in the region. Four other regional considerations have influenced the country-specific dynamics discussed in the following sections.

First, great hopes were raised during the revolts of 2011. The euphoria of these demonstrations was based on the realisation that political change is possible and the will of the people can prevail despite decades of authoritarian rule. This desire for change was expressed in the rise of a number of ideologically-diverse political parties,[446] and the rise of previously suppressed groups like the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt or Ennahda in Tunisia. This gave young people hope that their legal and open participation in the political domain was possible and through it, a sense of agency in the possibility of bringing about change was awakened.

But as the prospects for development and dignity faded in the years after the protests, and with the return of the army to power in Egypt and the political upheavals in Syria, Libya, and Yemen, youth were pushed back to the margins. But this peripheral position was no longer acceptable to the youth who had become aware of their potential, and their disadvantaged position. In their **search for agency,** and with the desire for immediate change, violent extremist groups emerged as the actor able to assert its power on the ground and to provide youth with role and aspiration. Syria became a possible destination for enacting this suppressed youth agency.

Secondly and closely related to the previous factor is the **Sunni political crisis** in the region. The two sectarian rivals in the region, Saudi Arabia and Iran, continue to compete politically and ideologically in Iraq, Syria, and Yemen. On the one hand, Iran has harnessed a number of political successes evident in the nuclear deal with the US, extending its influence in Syria and Iraq, and succeeding as a major actor in Yemen. On the other hand, Saudi Arabia has failed to present itself as a trustworthy and capable political actor able to protect and represent Sunni political interests in the region.[447]Concurrently, Egypt, the traditional regional rival of Saudi Arabia has declined in influence.[448]

For the Arab Sunni population, this current landscape means that they stand politically weaker in influencing any regional change. And with **the search for a powerful Sunni actor in the region**, young people have supported violent extremist groups, even when they do not support their ideology or accept their brutality.[449] This search is deeply rooted in identity politics. According to Rawashdeh, the hundred years between 28 June 1914 that mark the start of the First World War and 28 June 2014 that mark Baghdadi's announcing his *caliphate*, help to explain

[445] Abdel Bari Atwan, *The Secret History of al Qaeda* (London: al-Saqi, 2006), 44-50; Christopher Reuter, "The Terror Strategist: Secret Files Reveal the Structure of Islamic State," Der Spiegel, April 18, 2015, accessed August 17, 2017, http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/islamic-state-files-show-structure-of-islamist-terror-group-a-1029274.html; Will McCants, *The Believer; How an Introvert with a Passion for Religion and Soccer became Abu Bakr Al-Baghdadi Leader of the Islamic State* (Washington, DC: Brookings, September 1, 2015), accessed August 17, 2017, http://www.brookings.edu/research/essays/2015/thebeliever; Martin Chulov, "ISIS: the Inside Story," *The Guardian*, December 11, 2014, accessed August 17, 2017, http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/dec/11/-sp-isis-the-inside-story.
[446] Shadi Hamid, *Political Party Development Before and After the Arab Spring* (Washington, DC: Brookings, December 2014), accessed August 17, 2017, https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/Beyond-the-Arab-Spring.pdf.
[447] Osama Al-Sabbagh, "Arab Sunnis between Extremism and Alliance (in Arabic)," *Rai Al-Youm*, July 3, 2015, accessed August 17, 2017, http://www.raialyoum.com/?p=281660.
[448] Maged Mandour, "The Weakening of Egypt's Regional Role," *Open Democracy*, April 24, 2017, accessed August 17, 2017, https://www.opendemocracy.net/north-africa-west-asia/maged-mandour/weakening-of-egypt-s-regional-role.
[449] Al-Sabbagh, "Arab Sunnis between Extremism and Alliance (in Arabic)."

the Arabs' deep identity crisis and search for relevance.[450] The fall of the Ottoman *Caliphate*, dividing the region into arbitrary nation-states, the Balfour Declaration, and the occupation of Palestine, all represent major setback in the consciousness of Arabs.[451] Viewed this way, the rise of violent extremism is just one aspect of the complicated scene of identity politics in the region.

Third, ISIS established a *caliphate* and revitalised the image of Muslim community or *umma*. The appeal of this strategy and discourse was captured by marginalised and disengaged youth. The **weak national identities in the region were easily discarded in favour of a newly crafted powerful identity**. Sectarian, sub-national, and ideological identities prevail over national identities in the region. In a country like Lebanon, for example, state institutions are designed to accommodate and allocate for the different sectarian groups in the country, in a step that reinforces and empowers sectarian identities over national ones. In Jordan, tribal identities continue to dominate the political scene where voting for parliamentarians is usually determined by the clan and tribal alliances. Ministerial positions also carefully balance northern, southern, and central tribal power centres in the country. In Tunisia, decades of bin Ali's authoritarian rule meant that the competition between secularists and Islamists emerged to full force in the years after the revolution. Brahem notes that the previous upper hand of the state over religion was reversed, until it was finally regulated in the constitution. Meanwhile, a number of religious ideologies entered Tunisia and gained support locally.[452]

At the same time state repression continues in the region. Although there is no linear relation between repression and extremism, since attacks take place in democratic countries, repression of the state leads to the frustration of citizens and can lead to radicalisation.[453] This peculiar relation between state repression and the rise of violent extremism should attain significance in this project. It is argued that repressive security policies have pushed individuals towards radicalisation when human rights are undermined,[454] and when authorities crackdown on relatives of those convicted of radicalisation crimes.[455] These policies reinforce the *takfiri* argument within *salafi-jihadi* groups that the state is their enemy. For example, in his discussion of Iraq, Saeed notes how in 2010 the predecessor of ISIS (the Islamic State of Iraq) defined the conflict as one tenth against the crusaders (American forces) and the rest is targeted against the apostates (army and police).[456]

This ideology is prevalent among adherents of violent extremist groups who perceive the state as their number one enemy. In this regard, state-centric security policies are perceived not in their broader purpose of stabilising the country but as tools for repression. For the purpose of this

[450] Hussain Al-Rawashdeh, "Jordan's Approach to Counter-Extremism (in Arabic)," in *Methods of Preventing and Combating Terrorism in the MENA Region and in the West* (Amman: Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, 2017), 111.
[451] Ibid.
[452] Sami Brahem, "Tunisia's Approach to Fighting Terrorism through the 'National Counter-Terrorism Strategy' (in Arabic)," in *Methods of Preventing and Combating Terrorism in the MENA Region and in the West* (Amman: Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, 2017), 149-150.
[453] Khalil Anani,"On the 'Radical' Arab State (in Arabic)," *Al Araby*, April 14, 2017, https://www.alaraby.co.uk/opinion/2017/4/13/المتطرفة-العربية-الدولة-عن-1?utm_campaign=magnet&utm_source=article_page&utm_medium=related_articles.
[454] Georgia Holmer, "Violent Extremism & Human Rights: A Path to Prevention," USIP, August 16, 2016, accessed August 17, 2017, https://www.usip.org/blog/2016/08/violent-extremism-human-rights-path-prevention.
[455] For example, after the Karak attacks in December 2016 in Jordan, several distant cousins of the radicals involved in the attacks were discharged from the army. This was interpreted as an unfair and uncalled for when these individuals do not support the attacks or adhere to violent extremist ideologies. Anonymous civil society leader, Extremism and Hate Speech Awareness Session, organised by Strong Cities Network, Salt, May 25, 2016.
[456] Haider Saeed, "The Islamic State in Iraq and Al-Sham in Iraq: Integrating the Sunni Policy in the Salafist Ideology (in Arabic)," in *The Rise of Religious Radicalisation in the Arab World: Significance, Implications and Counter-Strategies* (Amman: Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, 2015), 67.

project, the impact of these policies on human security and CVE efforts will be examined to measure how the relation between hard security, human security, and CVE can be re-aligned in the region.

6.4 Drivers of Violent Extremism in Jordan, Lebanon and Tunisia: Case Studies

The relationship between the different sets of radicalisation drivers (socio-economic, political, psychological, and ideological) is often too complex to allow for clearly defined border lines. The section above has broadly discussed two sets of crucial drivers in the WANA region, namely the socio-economic and the political. In the sections below, a detailed analysis of country-specific drivers of radicalisation are discussed with important historical and socio-economic links that can better explain why certain factors are more salient compared to others when examining the rise of violent extremism in each of the three countries.

6.4.1 Jordan

Some of the most prevalent factors mentioned as drivers of support for violent extremism in Jordan include: a search for personal identity and purpose,[457] the presence of corruption and cronyism,[458] distrust in the government,[459] weak youth engagement,[460] economic pressures and unemployment,[461] *Jihadi Salafi* ideology,[462] and a strong opposition towards Israel and the West.[463] These should not be viewed as discrete elements but instead the combination of certain factors can help explain why Jordan has produced one of the highest numbers of foreign fighters per capita.[464] Whilst many of the factors are common across the WANA region it is worth spending a bit of time considering how the economic and political context of Jordan particularly affects, or encourages, them.

Whilst practical support for violent extremism is low in Jordan, it is clear that levels of extremist thought are perceived to be fairly high. Part of this may be the result of a Western lens that tends to dictate what is 'the norm' and thus what is comparatively 'extreme'. For example, a study conducted in Jordan in 2013, which surveyed 304 university students, found that whilst Jordanian youth reject radical ideology in general, they often adhere to 'radical' views on non-Muslims, the West, and interactions between different sexes.[465] For many from outside the

[457] Confidential unpublished report titled "Countering Violent Extremism in Jordan," September 2016.
[458] Ibid; Ali Younes, "Jordan: Violent Protests in Dhiban over Unemployment," *Al Jazeera*, June 23, 2016, accessed August 17, 2017, http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2016/06/jordan-violent-protests-dhiban-unemployment-160623100230190.html.
[459] "Women and Violent Radicalisation in Jordan," UNWOMEN, March 2016, 27.
[460] Arab Human Development Report 2016, "Youth and the Prospects for Human Development in a Changing Reality," (UNDP, November 29, 2016).
[461] Yom and Sammour, "Counterterrorism and Youth Radicalisation in Jordan;" "Women and Violent Radicalisation in Jordan," UNWOMEN; "Factors Impacting Propensity and Influence Pathways Toward Violent Extremism in Jordan: Executive Summary," Madison Springfield Inc., November 2016; Confidential unpublished report titled "Countering Violent Extremism in Jordan."
[462] Yom and Sammour, "Counterterrorism and Youth Radicalisation in Jordan."
[463] "Factors Impacting Propensity and Influence Pathways Toward Violent Extremism in Jordan: Executive Summary," 9; Confidential unpublished report titled "Countering Violent Extremism in Jordan."
[464] Ian Bremmer, "The Top 5 Countries where ISIS gets its foreign recruits," *Time Magazine*, April 14, 2017, accessed August 17, 2017, http://time.com/4739488/isis-iraq-syria-tunisia-saudi-arabia-russia/.
[465] Alaa' Al-Rawashdeh, "Ideological Extremism from the Perspective of Jordanian Youth (in Arabic)," *Arab Journal for Security Studies and Training* 31 (2015).

region such views are seen as an indication of radicalisation, but more than one study has suggested they are the norm amongst Jordanian youth.[466] Hence, levels of extremist thought in Jordan may be perceived as high but should not be confused with support for violent extremism. A recent and extensive study, commissioned by USAID and carried out by Madison Springfield Inc., has further reinforced this view. The study, which included qualitative and quantitative elements such as in-depth interviews, guided questionnaires and expert interviews in target locations across Jordan found that:

> "While VE does not appear to be common in Jordan, research revealed that extremism is much more common across the country. Levels of sectarianism and intolerance are high in Jordan, across all governorates. In particular, the belief that violent *jihad* is justifiable in certain circumstances was surprisingly widespread, notably with regards to violent *jihad* in Europe, Israel and against Shias."[467]

Whilst these views do not automatically translate into the adoption of violent extremism they may create an enabling environment for violent extremist groups, particularly amongst vulnerable communities.[468] Certain geographic clusters, including the cities of Zarqa, Salt, and Ma'an, and particular community groups, such as *Salafi*[469] and refugee populations[470], were cited in the same report as having higher levels of extremist thought than others in Jordan.[471] However, the report concluded that it is wrong to suggest that support for violent extremist groups is only found amongst certain socio-economic groups, and that high levels of extremist thought does not naturally translate into increased support for violent extremist organisations. The lack of correlation between particular socio-economic backgrounds and support for violent extremism is something also commented upon in multiple other reports.[472]

The role of ideology and religion in the radicalisation process is something that was discussed earlier on in this report but it is worth briefly mentioning the ways in which the *Salafi* community in Jordan has been portrayed in the literature in order to consider its role as local radicalisation driver. According to Sean Yom and Katrina Sammour, the *Salalfi* community in Jordan facilitates youth radicalisation, and the Jordanian government has responded to this by attempting to monitor mosques, imams, and sermons.[473] But this view is inaccurate. In Jordan, all six types of *Salafism* enjoy a degree of support.[474] Only *salafi-jihadism* encourages and advocates political change through violence. While *salafi-jihadi* ideology has been traditionally linked to impoverished cities like Zarqa and Ma'an, sympathy for violent extremism is spread among young people in different geographic areas, and is no longer primarily shared in mosques, but instead online or

[466] Confidential unpublished report titled "Countering Violent Extremism in Jordan;" "Arab Human Development Report 2016: Youth and the Prospects for Human Development in a Changing Reality;" Al-Rawashdeh, "Ideological Extremism from the Perspective of Jordanian Youth (in Arabic)."
[467] "Factors Impacting Propensity and Influence Pathways Toward Violent Extremism in Jordan," 8.
[468] Ibid.
[469] The report referred to Salafis and Salafi Quietists, and did not distinguish between Salafis in general and Salfi-jihadis. Only the latter subscribe to violent extremist views.
[470] There has been no clear evidence found however, that refugee communities have any clear links to Violent Extremist Organisations, or are more susceptible to radicalisation than any other communities.
[471] "Factors Impacting Propensity and Influence Pathways Toward Violent Extremism in Jordan," 8.
[472] Confidential unpublished report titled "Countering Violent Extremism in Jordan;" "From Jordan to Jihad: The Lure of Syria's Violent Extremist Groups," Mercy Corps, September 2015, accessed August 17, 2017, https://www.mercycorps.org/research-resources/jordan-jihad-lure-syrias-violent-extremist-groups.
[473] Yom and Sammour, "Counterterrorism and Youth Radicalisation in Jordan," 27.
[474] For details on Salafism, see Mohammad Abu Rumman, *I am a Salafi: A Study of the Actual and Imagined Identities of Salafis (in Arabic)*, (Amman: Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, 2014), 33-50.

through social networks.[475] But fragmentations within the *salafi-jihadi* community itself emerged in 2015 and a disconnect between their preachers and young people in Jordan is making attempts to control their teachings and outreach difficult.[476] Thus, while there is evidence of a spread of salifism it does not neatly correlate with support for violent extremism. Instead, the presence of a larger number of young people in Jordan's demographic than ever before, and a wider trend of generational disconnect from traditional authorities, whether state or religious, appears to hold more clues to Jordan's relationship with violent extremism.[477]

A report conducted by UNWomen found that 82% of respondents in Jordan perceived social and economic factors to be the biggest radicalisation drivers in the country.[478] Another report, carried out in 2016, found that 79% believed anger over unequal economic opportunities is a very, extremely or important factor in attracting Jordanians to violent extremism.[479] Another study, carried out amongst university students, cited social factors such as dysfunctional families, peer influence, weak feelings of national identity, the spreading usage of drugs, and the failure of the media to provide effective counter-narratives to radical groups as sources of support for violent extremism.[480] Thus, while Islamist radicalism can provide a strong pull factor for individuals its success may primarily be due to a dearth of other options and political alternatives.[481]

One of the clearest sources of discontent across Jordan is its high levels of unemployment, and this was illustrated when protests broke out in 2016 in Dhiban, a town 70km south of Amman, over the persistent lack of employment opportunities.[482] With World Bank Figures putting national unemployment rates at 16%, and closer to 40% for those under the age of thirty, it is little surprise that many in Dhiban, which is one of the country's poorest regions, felt frustrated.[483] The figure increased for the first quarter of 2017 with the national rate of unemployment at 18%.[484] Despite assertions by protesters that they wanted to protest about their economic situations 'peacefully', the paramilitary police carried out up to 22 arrests in Dhiban, indicating a strong state-centric security response.[485] But, it is important to note that there is no evidence of support for violent extremism in Dhiban. So, whilst unemployment levels are clearly heightening tensions between the state and civilians, the initial response from frustrated individuals is to attempt legitimate protest. When this is countered with punishment by the state services there is perhaps a chance that those individuals will look for opportunities to empower themselves elsewhere, and violent extremist organisations could provide such an option, but it does not appear to be the first or automatic choice of many people.

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[475]"Arab Human Development Report 2016: Youth and the Prospects for Human Development in a Changing Reality;" "From Jordan to Jihad," Mercy Corps.
[476] Yom and Sammour, "Counterterrorism and Youth Radicalisation in Jordan," 27.
[477] "Countering Violent Extremism in Jordan," British Embassy, September 2016.
[478] "Women and Violent Radicalisation in Jordan," UNWOMEN, 7.
[479] Confidential unpublished report titled "Countering Violent Extremism in Jordan."
[480] Al-Rawashdeh, "Ideological Extremism from the Perspective of Jordanian Youth (in Arabic)."
[481] Yom and Sammour, "Counterterrorism and Youth Radicalisation in Jordan," 25.
[482] Younes, "Jordan: Violent protests in Dhiban over unemployment."
[483] The World Bank, "Jordan Economic Monitor, Fall 2016: Reviving a Slowing Economy," 2016, accessed August 17, 2017, http://www.worldbank.org/en/country/jordan/publication/jordan-economic-monitor-fall-2016.
[484] "A 33% Increase in Women Unemployment Rate in Jordan (in Arabic)" AlGhad Daily, July 12, 2017, accessed August 22, 2017, http://www.alghad.com/articles/1714832-%D8%A7%D8%B1%D8%AA%D9%81%D8%A7%D8%B9-%D9%86%D8%B3%D8%A8%D8%A9-%D8%A8%D8%B7%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A5%D9%86%D8%A7%D8%AB-%D9%81%D9%8A-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A3%D8%B1%D8%AF%D9%86-%D8%A5%D9%84%D9%89-33-%D8%A8%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%85%D8%A6%D8%A9.
[485] Younes, "Jordan: Violent protests in Dhiban over unemployment."

The lack of correlation between unemployment and violent extremism is also supported in a report carried out in Jordan by Mercy Corps. The report found that none of the families of fighters who had gone to join Daesh or Jabat Al-Nusra had received monetary incentives.[486] Furthermore, the majority (19 out of 23) of the fighters they profiled were employed at the time of their recruitment, including doctors and engineers.[487] A soon to be published report on journey mapping of fighters from Ma'an has confirmed the same phenomenon, and found that fighters will in fact pay recruiters to facilitate their journey to Syria, opposed to being paid money themselves.[488] Thus, the argument that individuals joined radical groups in Syria because of economic matters loses weight. Therefore, it perhaps not unemployment as such which may drive some to join violent extremist groups, but underemployment, and relative depravation instead.

In the search for purpose and occupation, education does not necessarily hold any solutions for frustrated young people in Jordan, and can instead fuel feelings of relative depravation and unfilled potential. Unemployment rates are higher for those who hold undergraduate degrees than for those who hold just high school diplomas.[489] Jordan's Department of Statistics suggests 21% of Jordanian men with a bachelor's degree or higher are unemployed, and that number increases to 71% amongst women.[490] Yom and Sammour argue that "going to college penalizes young Jordanians because it reduces their likelihood of finding work commensurate with their skill level."[491]For many, this is connected to corruption and a lack of meritocracy.[492] This makes certain attempts by the government to tackle unemployment, such as the suggestion of replacing foreign migrant workers, who typically work in construction or food-services, with Jordanians, appear misguided and unsatisfactory to those looking for jobs.[493] A lack of opportunities can compound feelings of frustration and identity loss, which make individuals more susceptible to extremist groups and exacerbates a disconnection from everyday life. This can also manifest in desperate ways, for example, in 2016, a group of unemployed men were talked down from jumping off a building near the interior ministry in Amman.[494]

Along with failing to enable individuals to enter the world of work, education systems in Jordan have been criticised for actually nurturing extremism. The reinforcement of certain stereotypes, such as discriminatory attitudes towards Shia, Christians, and women, along with a lack of critical thinking has helped to make individuals susceptible to violent extremism.[495] Furthermore, "the suppression of critical thinking and learning in favour of memorisation by rote increases vulnerability to VE/VEO recruitment as students are ill-prepared to question extremist teaching."[496] A lack of enquiry helps to explain why those with higher levels of education appear to continue to be as susceptible to dogmatic and extreme Islamist rhetoric as those without it.

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[486] Mercy Corps, "From Jordan to Jihad: The Lure of Syria's Violent Extremist Groups," 3.
[487] Ibid.
[488] Neven Bondikji, "Journey Mapping of Jordanian Foreign Fighters" (Amman: The WANA Institute, forthcoming 2017).
[489] Yom and Sammour, "Counterterrorism and Youth Radicalisation in Jordan: Social and Political Drivers," 27.
[490]Areej Abuqudairi, "Jordan: 'We Are Tired of Living Like the Dead,'" Al Jazeera, July 30, 2016, accessed August 17, 2017, http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2016/07/jordan-tired-living-dead-160728105144182.html.
[491] Yom and Sammour, "Counterterrorism and Youth Radicalisation in Jordan: Social and Political Drivers," 27.
[492] Younes, "Jordan: Violent Protests in Dhiban over Unemployment."
[493] Abuqudairi, "Jordan: 'We are Tired of Living Like the Dead.'"
[494] Abuqudairi, "Jordan: 'We are Tired of Living Like the Dead;'" "Suicide Case Every Three Days in Jordan (in Arabic)," *AlGhad*, July 6, 2017, accessed August 17, 2017, http://alghad.com/articles/1433942-%D8%B9%D8%B1%D8%A8%D9%8A-%D8%A8%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A3%D8%B1%D9%82%D8%A7%D9%85-%D8%AD%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D9%86%D8%AA%D8%AD%D8%A7%D8%B1-%D9%83%D9%84-3-%D8%A3%D9%8A%D8%A7%D9%85-%D9%81%D9%8A-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A3%D8%B1%D8%AF%D9%86-(%D9%81%D9%8A%D8%AF%D9%8A%D9%88).
[495] Confidential unpublished report titled "Countering Violent Extremism in Jordan."
[496] Ibid,14.

A distrust of the government and broad lack of faith in state systems can not only compound feelings of frustration and disconnect but can also make CVE programming difficult. UNWomen's study has suggested that parents distrust the ability of the state to support them in helping to stop their children becoming radicalised.[497] Furthermore, they said they would be unwilling to turn to the state as the potential repercussions against those they reported could be extreme and CVE programs were sometimes seen as implementing a foreign agenda.[498] The strong state-security response to radicalisation and a general mistrust of the government and security forces amongst much of the population can reinforce some of the factors which make individuals more susceptible to extremist ideologies.

For many people, particularly the young, feeling disconnected from the state and as though they have little stake or say in its structures leaves them with little vested interest in its viewpoints or policies. Yom and Sammour argue that this is perhaps the most central element of Jordan's radicalisation drivers, they have written:

> "economic deprivation, substandard education, and the presence of radical Islamist discourse are part of the problem, but the fundamental concern is that Jordan's booming youth population has no emotive attachment to Jordanian identity and thus little stake in political order."[499]

The 2016 Arab Human Development Report, which focuses particularly on problems for young people in the WANA region, has commented on this problem throughout the region and the growing "frustration, marignalisation, and alienation from institutions" that many young people feel and how this can push them to seek other sources of purpose, and feelings of belonging.[500]

It is worth briefly noting the way in which the national context of Jordan alters how differing techniques and messages of particular violent extremist groups may gain popularity, or not. Whilst ISIS is seen as powerful and media-savvy by many Jordanians there is a widespread disgust at their tactics, particularly since the murder of the Jordanian pilot Moath Al-Kasasbeh.[501] Al-Qaeda is broadly discredited, having seemingly lost its influence and media presence. Jabat Al-Nusra is held in a certain esteem as a group attempting to rightly stand up to Assad. In general, support for violent extremist organizations appears to have declined in recent years. A 2014 poll by the Center for Strategic Studies found that only 62% of Jordanians considered ISIS to be a "terrorist group,"[502] whereas a 2015 poll by the International Republican Institute found that 89% of Jordanians considered ISIS to be a "terrorist organization."[503] The change in public opinion may be attributable to the death of Moath al-Kasasbeh in 2015.[504] Furthermore, criticisms are held across Jordan for any group which condones the killing of Muslims by other

[497] "Women and Violent Radicalisation in Jordan," UNWOMEN, 27.
[498] Ibid.
[499] Yom and Sammour, "Counterterrorism and Youth Radicalisation in Jordan: Social and Political Drivers," 25.
[500] "Arab Human Development Report 2016," 36.
[501] "Factors Impacting Propensity and Influence Pathways Toward Violent Extremism in Jordan," Madison Springfield Inc., 9.
[502] "Public Opinion Poll on Some of the Current National and Regional Issues," Center for Strategic Studies, September 2014, accessed August 17, 2017, http://www.jcss.org/Photos/635478413205219966.pdf.
[503] "IRI Poll: Jordanians Optimistic about Direction of the Country even as Concerns over Terrorism Emerge," International Republican Institute, May 2015, accessed August 17, 2017, http://www.iri.org/resource/iri-poll-jordanians-optimistic-about-direction-country-even-concerns-over-terrorism-emerge.
[504] Martin Chulov and Shiv Malik, "ISIS Video Shows Jordanian Hostage Being Burned to Death," *The Guardian*, February 4, 2015, accessed August 17, 2017, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/feb/03/isis-video-jordanian-hostage-burdning-death-muadh-al-kasabeh.

Muslims. The group which was noted specifically as receiving support across Jordan by the USAID report was Hamas.[505] Hamas, however, is seen as very different from a violent extremist group. It is perceived as a national resistance movement due to its concentration on Israeli targets and the lack of threat that it posed to Jordan itself.[506]

Feelings of frustration, disempowerment, and dissatisfaction are undoubtedly high in Jordan, particularly amongst the large number of young people, and levels of extremist ideology appear to be correspondingly high. Given the high levels of unemployment, and relative depravation it is perhaps not surprising that young people are attracted to the promises and rhetoric of violent extremist groups. Given the political and economic climate, it could almost be asked why more people are not going to join them?

6.4.2 Lebanon

The sectarian divides and political context of Lebanon is unlike any other country in this project, and the country's unique idiosyncrasies inevitably impact on the development of violent extremism in the country. Many of the economic and social problems in Lebanon are similar to those in Tunisia or Jordan, such as unemployment, lack of opportunities, and a large influx of Syrian refugees. However, the responses to, and rhetoric of, such problems are significantly altered due to Lebanon's proximity to Syria, the presence of Hezbullah in the country and the absence of a strong centralised power in the country. Thus, it is worth considering how some of these factors specifically impact upon the drivers of violent extremism in Lebanon.

The characteristics of the Lebanese state which have made it seem particularly accommodating and diverse in the past, namely the large number of religious and ethnic groups registered amongst its citizens, are now factors that help to increase its propensity to extremism. The very structure of Lebanon's confessional political system reinforces sectarian identities by dividing power along religious lines.[507] The system is also dated and no longer reflects some of the demographic realities on the ground but the political stagnation and tensions mean that little effort has been made to try and change it.[508] This system, compounded by the lack of a strong centralised government, means that there is an increasing tendency for different groups and neighbourhoods to informally organise and reinforce their own security, particularly those which feel abandoned or ignored by the government. This can extend to those they perceive as in their group, even if they are outside of the national boundaries. For example, Sally Nelson has argued, "Lebanese Sunnis who draw their sense of identity from the sect rather than the nation thus express a great deal of loyalty towards their Syrian co-religionists".[509] This has been illustrated by the instances of Lebanese Sunnis travelling across to Syria to fight alongside Sunni rebel forces.[510]

Sectarian differences across the country can often be mapped geographically, as can areas of high unemployment or poverty rates, and there appears to be a link between opportunities and

[505] Ibid.
[506] Ibid.
[507] Sally Nelson, "Is Lebanon's Confessional System Sustainable?" *Journal of Political and International Studies* 9 (2013): 332-387.
[508] Ibid.
[509] Ibid., 363.
[510] Nour Malas and Farnaz Fassihi, "Syria's Escalating War Bleeds into Lebanon," *The Wall Street Journal*, April 9,2013, accessed August 17, 2017, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424127887323361804578388410856381092.html?mod=WSJ_article_comments#articleTabs%3Darticle.

religious identity. In particular, there is a clear divide between the poorer, Sunni-dominated northern regions, such as the Akkar Governorate, and the south of Lebanon which has a strong Shia presence, traditionally represented politically by Hezbollah and the Amal movement. This can compound tensions along religious lines as poor Sunni populations can feel resentment towards others and increased feelings of relative depravation. Furthermore, perceptions of nepotism and a lack of transparency in local municipalities, which are often perceived as offering development projects and opportunities to those that have the right personal connections, can further fuel resentment and rivalry between groups.[511]

Historically poor and neglected governorates like Akkar have been particularly affected by the influx of Syrian refugees in the last five years, and it has been argued by Levant7 that, "the recent influx of refugees, the near collapse of the state, and exacerbated economic hardship caused by the closing of the border have all compounded the region's vulnerability to radicalization, particularly among the Sunni majority."[512] Levant7's study has placed a clear importance on how the presence of Syrian refugees has affected the Sunni population's susceptibility to radicalisation. However, Raphael Lefevre has argued that opposed to the growth of Sunni extremism in Lebanon being a spill over from Iraq and Syria, "the roots of Sunni radicalization are local and run deep."[513] He argues that the most prominent factors behind the rise of Sunni extremism in Lebanon are the growing resentment of Hezbollah and the lack of options for the Sunni community to support beyond the increasingly disconnected Future Movement.[514] This view is further explained by Almawla, who clarifies how Sunni Salafism in Lebanon has turned violent.[515] He has documented a series of allegations, media manipulations, and orchestrated attacks in Sunni areas which were carried out by Hezbollah in order to create tensions between the Lebanese army and Sunni population.[516] Since then, the decision of Hezbollah to side with the Syrian regime has intensified Sunni feelings of resentment and marginalisation.

In order to obtain a clearer understanding of the local level of distrust and resentment between Sunni and Shia groups in Lebanon, it is important to revisit the historical context. The Sunni marginalisation which took place in Lebanon throughout the decades in which Syria controlled Lebanon escalated into a sense of Sunni victimhood and political crisis with the assassination of Prime Minister Rafik al-Hariri in 2005[517] and the following assassination of key Sunni political figures.[518] Whilst the refugee presence has exacerbated problems in the country it cannot be blamed for creating them. Instead, for a country that places so much importance on religious identities and demographics the influx of Syrian refugees has changed the proportional populations of religious groups and thus, heightened already existing tensions and insecurities between Sunnis and Shias in the country.[519] Therefore, when Hezbollah announced that their involvement in Syria was their "*jihad* duty," Sunni groups responded that it was their *jihad* duty to

[511] "Drivers of Instability, Conflict and Radicalisation: A Snapshot from Akkar," Levant7, 15.
[512] Ibid.
[513] Raphael Lefevre, "Tackling Sunni Radicalization in Lebanon," Carnegie Middle East Center, December 24, 2014, accessed August 17, 2017, http://carnegie-mec.org/2014/12/24/tackling-sunni-radicalization-in-lebanon-pub-57592.
[514] Ibid.
[515] Saouad Al Mawla, *"Salafis in Lebanon: New Manifestations of a Movement*," Policy Analysis Series (Doha: Arab Center for Research and Policy Studies, January 2015), 1-4.
[516] Ibid.
[517] Nelson, "Is Lebanon's Confessional System Sustainable?"
[518] Bissane El Cheikh, "The Tension of the Sunni Environment in Lebanon Produces Individual Extremism not Organized Terrorism (in Arabic)," in *The Rise of Religious Radicalisation in the Arab World: Significance, Implications and Counter-Strategies* (Amman: Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, 2015), 47-49.
[519] Sally Nelson, "Is Lebanon's Confessional System Sustainable?"

fight Hezbollah.[520]

There are few alternatives for the Sunni community in Lebanon to support other than the Future Movement, which means that rising disenchantment with the party, which has its leadership living abroad, can result in a large number of people seeking other avenues through which to vent their political frustrations. Lefevre has written:

> "the situation is particularly worrying because the majority of Lebanon's Sunni community lives in areas that are socioeconomically marginalized from the rest of the country. The city of Tripoli has emerged as a symbol of these trends. Long considered the jewel in Lebanon's crown, Tripoli has recently lost much of its economic and political firepower and is now struggling with recurring violence, poverty, and pockets of Islamic radicalism."[521]

Close to the Akkar governorate, the city of Tripoli is a Sunni concentrated area that has many of the same conditions that Akkar does, and according to a UN-ESCWA report in 2011, 60 % of Tripoli's households are 'deprived', with almost half of them 'extremely deprived'.[522] Whilst ISIS does not command areas of land in Lebanon, as it does in Syria and Iraq, some have suggested that it has footholds in the North East of Lebanon, particularly along its border with Syria.[523] Both Levant7 and Leferve's studies report similar results for these northern areas of Lebanon: an increased propensity for extremist groups in the face of unemployment, underemployment, resentment for Hezbollah and disenchantment with the Future Movement.

Much of Lebanon, and particularly areas like Beirut, are battling to keep their reputation as moderate and open-minded. Images, including a widely circulated photo of a girl wearing a skimpy outfit while carrying an ISIS flag are being used as evidence by some that many Lebanese do not take seriously the ideology associated with such groups.[524] Furthermore, Lebanon was the birthplace of a social media trend in which locals posted pictures of themselves burning ISIS flags with the corresponding hashtag #burnISISflagchallenge.[525] Such efforts build a feeling inside and outside the country that Lebanon could have a particularly immunity to extremist groups. However, as it was noted by an article in the Washington Post "it only takes a minority of extremists to cause a lot of trouble."[526]

A lack of government legitimacy, high rates of both unemployment and underemployment, weakening social ties, widespread feelings of distrust and disenfranchisement, corruption, and a large refugee population, are all drivers of extremism which are by no means unique to Lebanon. However, there are particular caveats to the Lebanese situation which exacerbate such frustrations. The presence of Hezbollah and its involvement in the Syrian war, along with the

[520] El Cheikh, "The Tension of the Sunni Environment in Lebanon Produces Individual Extremism not Organized Terrorism (in Arabic)," p. 47.
[521] Lefevre, "Tackling Sunni Radicalization in Lebanon."
[522] "Lebanon Millennium Development Goals Report 2013-2014," UNDP, 2014, 25, accessed August 17, 2017, http://www.un.org.lb/Library/Assets/2013-2014-Millenium-Development-Goals-Lebanon-Report.pdf.
[523] Fady Dergham, "The Spread of ISIS Into Lebanon: A Strategic Response to Counter the Threat," *Defense Magazine* 96, April 2016, accessed August 17, 2017, https://www.lebarmy.gov.lb/en/content/spread-isis-lebanon-strategic-response-counter-threat
[524] Liz Sly, "Lebanon's Sunnis at Risk of Radicalisation," *The Washington Post*, October 31, 2012, accessed August 17, 2017, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/middle_east/lebanons-sunnis-at-risk-of-radicalization/2012/10/30/90a15816-229f-11e2-92f8-7f9c4daf276a_story.html?utm_term=.114d6ea33aa1.
[525] Ewan Palmer, "'Burn ISIS Flag Challenge' Goes Viral in Arab World," *International Business Times*, September 4, 2014, accessed August 17, 2017, http://www.ibtimes.co.uk/burn-isis-flag-challenge-goes-viral-arab-world-1464002.
[526] Sly, "Lebanon's Sunnis at Risk of Radicalisation."

lack of a strong Sunni political representation are reinforcing certain prejudices and cultivating a growing sense of vulnerability amongst Sunni communities. Extremist groups are more than happy to offer themselves as an alternative authority to fill the resulting vacuums.

6.4.3 Tunisia

Any discussion concerning Tunisia has to place the country clearly within its recent history of the 2011 Arab revolutions and subsequent events. Tunisia was seen as the shining light of the 2011 revolutions and this position makes in unique in this study, and the region. After the removal of the Ben Ali leadership, Tunisia was the first, and only, country in the region to make substantial steps towards democratic processes with relatively little bloodshed. However, nearly seven years after the start of the so-called Arab Spring there are a lot of questions still unanswered about what has been achieved. Post-revolution expectations have rarely been met and many in Tunisia, particularly the young, are still facing unemployment and barriers to civic involvement and political freedom. It is not surprising then that some have turned to other groups for "the finances, opportunities and the future prosperity Tunisians expected the post-Ben Ali, democratically-elected state to deliver."[527]

While it has been of low intensity at times, violent extremism in Tunisia has persistently spread since the overthrow of Ben Ali in 2011.[528] It has been reported that, as well as significant numbers of Tunisians leaving the country to join extremist groups abroad, "several sleeper cells, some of which are in contact with al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) and IS, reportedly exist throughout the country in both urban and suburban areas."[529] The reasons for this ongoing presence of violent extremism in Tunisia are multiple and have been cited by differing sources as including: an ongoing lack of civilian trust of political powers,[530] corruption,[531] unemployment[532], inequality and marginalization,[533] Tunisia's geographic position,[534] and inefficient and clumsy government responses to radical groups.[535]

Having sparked a wave of revolutions across the Arab world in 2011 and emerged as one of the region's sole democracies, it is darkly ironic that Tunisia is now thought to have supplied more

[527] International Republican Institute, "Understanding Local Drivers of Violent Extremism in Tunisia," 5.
[528] "Jihadist Violence in Tunisia: The Urgent Need for a National Strategy," The International Crisis Group, June 22, 2016, accessed August 17, 2017, https://www.crisisgroup.org/middle-east-north-africa/north-africa/tunisia/jihadist-violence-tunisia-urgent-need-national-strategy.
[529] Ibid.
[530] Christian Caryl, "Why Does Tunisia Produce So Many Terrorists?" *Foreign Policy*, July 15, 2016, accessed August 17, 2017, http://foreignpolicy.com/2016/07/15/why-does-tunisia-produce-so-many-terrorists-nice-france-truck-terrorist-attack/.
[531] "Understanding Local Drivers of Violent Extremism in Tunisia," International Republican Institute.
[532] Caryl, "Why Does Tunisia Produce so Many Terrorists;" George Packer, "Exporting Jihad," *The New Yorker,* March 28, 2016, accessed August 17, 2017, http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2016/03/28/tunisia-and-the-fall-after-the-arab-spring.
[533] Packer, "Exporting Jihad."
[534] Packer, "Exporting Jihad;" "Understanding Local Drivers of Violent Extremism in Tunisia," International Republican Institute,; Siham Drissi, "The Reality of the Terrorist Phenomenon in Tunisia's Nascent Democracy," *The Washington Institute*, 2015, August 17, 2017, http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/fikraforum/view/the-reality-of-the-terrorist-phenomenon-in-tunisias-nascent-democracy.
[535] Alice Su, "Look What Freedom Has Brought Us: Terrorism on the Beach," *The Atlantic*, June 29, 2015, accessed August 17, 2017, https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2015/06/tunisia-sousse-isis-democracy/397169/; Hugh Naylor, "Can Tunisia crack down on terror while preserving its democracy?" *The Washington Post*, June 30, 2015, accessed August 17, 2017, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/middle_east/can-tunisia-crack-down-on-terror-while-preserving-its-democracy/2015/06/30/70991772-1e62-11e5-a135-935065bc30d0_story.html?utm_term=.9d62ce52bac1.

foreign fighters to Syria, Libya, and Iraq than any other country.[536] As well as the export of fighters, there has also been ongoing low level disruption inside Tunisia itself, at times sparking into violent and attention-grabbing events. After an attack on the US embassy in September 2012, organized in part by Ansar Al-Sharia, the government adopted a more severe security approach to radical Islam. The assassination of two politicians in February and June 2013further pushed the government to declare Ansar Al-Sharia a terrorist organisation and ban it from the country.[537] As a result, operatives scattered; some across the border to train with Ansar al-Sharia in Libya and others went to join ISIS in Syria.[538]In 2015 the strengthened ties between ISIS and Tunisian cells was illustrated when more than 60 foreign tourists were killed in attacks at the Bardo museum in Tunisia and the Marhaba Hotel in el Kantaoui, and ISIS quickly took responsibility for both. These attacks have had a devastating effect on the reputation of Tunisia as a sea of calm in the region and caused its tourism industry to be almost obliterated. Furthermore, skirmishes have become regular along the border with Libya, and in March 2016 a group of Tunisian extremists tried to take control of the city of Ben Guerdane, which is 30km from the Libyan border. However, in what was seen as a success for the security forces the insurgents were, after much gunfire, defeated.[539]

The freedoms allowed to flourish after the overthrow of Ben Ali's regime and the emergence of democratic systems has provided a boost for Islamist groups who had been forced underground by the former secularist regime.[540] It has been suggested that cultural marginalisation of religious thought and actors during Ben Ali's rule have resulted in a shallow religious knowledge and the absence of a trustworthy and legitimate religious authority in Tunisia.[541] This created a hybrid situation whereby youth were ignorant about religion but at the same time thirsty for religious knowledge, without local religious authority capable of managing the threat of foreign religious ideas influencing Tunisian youth; this eventually left youth susceptible to extremist recruitment.[542]

Furthermore, since 2011, groups have been able to better organize, travel, and share information. This has led some to suggest that while many of the reforms introduced since 2011 have attempted to placate the demands of the revolution they have left some of the security apparatuses fatally weakened and incapable to respond to the threats of violent extremism. This concern may have been partially diluted by the efficient response to the attacks on Ben Guerdane but it seems clear there is still an ongoing lack of faith in the competency of official forces in tackling the problem.[543]

Raised expectations after the revolution in 2011 have also meant that many are perhaps more impatient and resentful of government failures than before. A study carried out by the International Republican Institute (IRI) at the end of 2016 reported that there is "a nexus between high expectations that have been disappointed by the post-revolution Tunisian government and continued grievances over issues such as the dearth of economic opportunity, corruption and harassment by security services."[544] After 2011, just when many Tunisians were

[536]"Understanding Local Drivers of Violent Extremism in Tunisia," International Republican Institute, 17.
[537] David Kilcullen, *Blood Year: Islamic State and The Failure of the War on Terror* (Carlton, Australia: Black Inc., 2016), 130.
[538] Ibid.
[539] Caryl, "Why Does Tunisia Produce so Many Terrorists?"
[540] Eric Reguly, "Tunisia: North Africa's New Hihadi Hotbed," *The Globe and Mail*, February 15, 2017, accessed August 17, 2017, https://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/world/tunisia-north-africas-new-jihadihotbed/article34041469/.
[541] Packer, "Exporting Jihad."
[542] Brahem, "Tunisia's Approach to Fighting Terrorism through the 'National Counter-Terrorism Strategy' (in Arabic)," 159.
[543] Caryl, "Why Does Tunisia Produce So Many Terrorists?"
[544] "Understanding Local Drivers of Violent Extremism in Tunisia," International Republican Institute, 4.

expecting their standard of living and wellbeing to improve it often began to fall. IRI suggest that this has been exacerbated by the government's inability to mitigate citizens expectations and the ongoing presence of "corruption, regionalism, and state harassment."[545]

As is typical for the region at large, the level of unemployment in Tunisia is above the global average and thought to be significantly higher for young people, at around 40%.[546] Furthermore, as can be found in Jordan, those who have higher levels of education are even more likely to be unemployed than those without education.[547] The frustration of this situation is one of the reasons so many people took to the street in 2011. However, despite initial hopes the economic situation has got worse for many since then. The main cause of this has been the catastrophic impact events in the last five years, particularly the 2015 attacks, has had on the tourism industry.[548] It is thought that "the already struggling economy has lost as much as $2 billion" between 2015 and 2016.[549] With few options in sight many unemployed youth, despite having experience and qualifications, now feel increasingly hopeless and can become susceptible to recruitment from extremist groups as a result. Compounding the problem of unemployment is the lack of entertainment for young people. For example, individuals interviewed in the poor area of Douar Hicher complained about having few outlets in which to have fun, and criticised the efforts that did exist for being run by 'wealthy kids' who did not understand the needs of locals.[550]

Many people in Tunisia also feel that the government structures in place will not support or provide for them. Thus, some look for support and provisions elsewhere. Similar to the other countries in this study, there is a widespread culture of nepotism and bribery in Tunisia, but respondents in Tunisia also mentioned the fact that officials and civil servants have little incentive to work hard or effectively, as they are paid regardless of their efforts.[551] Unsurprisingly, this means that public officials, along with security services, are often seen as corrupt and self-serving, and unwilling to listen to the concerns of civilians.[552] Unmet expectations, and a mistrust of the services and official channels of complaint available to them means that many Tunisians see themselves, or their community networks, as the primary providers of security and opportunity, as opposed to the state.

The final consideration for Tunisia's relationship to violent extremism is its geographic conditions. In particular, Tunisia's border with Libya is seen as an ongoing source of radical rhetoric and it is almost impossible to totally patrol, meaning that fighters can cross into Libya for training, and weapons can easily be smuggled back into the country. Within the country itself there are widespread notions, particularly among the young, about the economic discrepancies

[545] Ibid., 5.
[546] UN Radio,"Tunisia Youth Unemployment a 'Serious Problem,' says UN Chief," March 29, 2016, accessed August 17, 2017, http://www.unmultimedia.org/radio/english/2016/03/tunisia-youth-unemployment-a-serious-problem-says-un-chief/#.WW827xhh1mB.
[547] Packer, "Exporting Jihad"
[548] Karina Piser, "Tunisia's Democratic Reforms Overshadowed by the Threat of Returning Jihadis," *World Politics Review*, March 3, 2017, accessed August 17, 2017, http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/trend-lines/21419/tunisia-s-democratic-reforms-overshadowed-by-the-threat-of-returning-jihadis.
[549] Guy Taylor, "Arab Spring Star Tunisia Emerges as Islamic State's No. 1 Source for Foreign Fighters," *The Washington Times*, September 14, 2016, accessed August 17, 2017, http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2016/sep/14/tunisia-emerges-as-isiss-no-1-source-for-foreign-f/.
[550] Packer, "Exporting Jihad."
[551] "Understanding Local Drivers of Violent Extremism in Tunisia," International Republican Institute, 12.
[552] Ibid., 14.

which exist within the country, particularly between the coastal and inland areas.[553] The perceived difference in treatment by the government towards different regions of the country and the practical disparities in day to day living for those in the more prosperous coastal areas compared to those living inland, can build resentment and internal divides in the Tunisian population. This can contribute to a feeling of relative depravation and personal grievance which can push people towards other groups which appear to provide them with a clearer identity and purpose.

Attempts to respond to Tunisia's problems with violent extremism have been made. The public budget for security doubled between 2011 and 2016, from 10% to 20%.[554] However, up to this point there has been little strategy beyond traditional state-centric security policies involving defense, justice, and interior ministries, and there has been no clear response to an evaluation of what is needed in the field.[555] Furthermore, it appears that there is a lack of clear coordination between parts of the government and responses to radical groups tend to be repressive and ad-hoc.[556] Returnee fighters often cannot be successfully persecuted due a lack of external intelligence services and as a former director general of National Security said: "they are merely put under house arrest and monitored closely by the police"."[557] Considering drivers of radicalisation and recent events within the country, it seems clear that state-centric security measures are necessary, however human security measures also need to be adopted. The disillusionment amongst citizens, particularly young people, with the government and security services needs to be seriously addressed. It seems imperative that government, civil society and religious leaders attempt to work together, opposed to simply for their own interests, in an effort to increase trust and communication both between organisations and across different parts of the country.

6.5 Conclusion

This section has focused in particular on socio-economic and political drivers of violent extremism in the region, and in Lebanon, Tunisia, and Jordan in particular. While it is clear that the contexts of each country is different there are undoubtedly commonalities which make a comparison between the three helpful and interesting. Shared conditions across the three countries include high levels of unemployment, underemployment, and relative depravation. All three countries have high unemployment rates among young people, including, and often particularly, those who have been through higher education. This can fuel a feeling of discontent and uselessness, which can then push individuals to search for other channels through which to find purpose and structure in their lives. Such problems can be compounded by a distrust in state institutions and a widespread perception of the strong role corruption and cronyism play in society, including in career opportunities and political representation. A disconnection or marginalisation from the government can push communities to rely primarily on themselves, or informal support groups such as religious networks, for support and infrastructure. This can exacerbate social divides which run along sectarian, tribal, or ethnic lines, and weaken a sense of

[553] "Promoting Youth Engagement and Countering Violent Extremism in Libya and Tunisia," *United States Institute for Peace*, 2016, accessed August 17, 2017, https://www.usip.org/grants-fellowships/grants/promoting-youth-engagement-and-countering-violent-extremism-libya-and.
[554] "Jihadist Violence in Tunisia: The Urgent Need for a National Strategy," The International Crisis Group, June 22, 2016, accessed August 17, 2017, https://www.crisisgroup.org/middle-east-north-africa/north-africa/tunisia/jihadist-violence-tunisia-urgent-need-national-strategy.
[555] Ibid.
[556] Ibid.
[557] Ibid.

national identity or pride. Such conditions contribute to frustrations that are felt across a wide range of groups, and the breadth of those affected can make the appropriate recipients of CVE programming difficult to pinpoint.

However, conditions which can be found throughout the three countries, such as corruption and unemployment, are contributing but not sufficient factors for increasing support for violent extremist groups. Thus, an analysis of the particular contexts within each country can help to navigate how radicalisation pathways form in each of the countries in question.

It is clear within Jordan that levels of ideological extremism are high, but that this does not automatically map onto behavioural extremism. Research in Jordan has also illustrated that the assumed link between poverty and propensity for violent extremism is false. While unemployment can contribute to a feeling of frustration and purposelessness, such emotions can manifest in multiple forms, including public protests and high-profile suicide attempts. Individuals may be driven by economic frustrations but that does not necessarily equate to unemployment and poverty but instead may be the result of underemployment or relative depravation. For example, some of the individuals who have left the country to fight in Syria were employed before deciding to depart and came from from middle-income backgrounds. Significant events, such as the murder of the Jordanian pilot Moath Al-Kasasbeh by ISIS, have shaped the Jordanian public opinion towards particular violent extremist groups. Support or sympathy for groups appears to have dropped in recent years as a result of what are seen as impious fighting methods, and perhaps as a result of accounts coming back home from individuals who have gone to Syria and become disenchanted with the reality of *jihad*.

Lebanon's demographic situation is so particular and inevitably shapes the unique national context of the country. The vacuum created by the lack of a centralised governmental power means that an already weak national identity is further loosened and instead, identity is primarily structured along sectarian lines and in-group loyalties. In particular, Sunni groups in traditionally marginalised areas of northern Lebanon have few clear political representatives in Lebanon, and strong loyalties towards the Sunni groups in Syria. As a result, it may be easier for them to be influenced by events in Syria and the rhetoric of injustice that is peddled by violent extremist groups operating there. Furthermore, the presence and strength of Hezbullah in the country, and their loyalty to the Assad regime in Syria, can heighten already strong Shia-Sunni tensions. Such tensions, set against a back drop of economic and political uncertainty, weak infrastructure, high rates of unemployment and corruption can spark into violence when such conflict can appear to provide a purpose and meaning to individual's lives.

Tunisia provides a fascinating comparison due to its apparent paradox of being perceived as both the biggest success from the so-called Arab Spring and the largest exporter of foreign fighters per capita. Fundamental problems which were facing the population, and particular the youth, in 2011, are still prevalent today. These include unemployment, lack of opportunities, and barriers to civic engagement and political participation. Hopes were raised in 2011 about the changes that may take place in the country but the inevitable difficulties of achieving such changes, and disagreements about what a post-Ben Ali Tunisia might look like, has in fact often reinforced feelings of injustice and frustration. The freedoms which did develop in the wake of the revolution allowed groups, including Islamist organisations, to operate more openly and as other options increasingly appeared to achieve little, individuals may have become more susceptible to an extreme discourse. Economic problems in the country have been further compounded by terror attacks which have almost wiped out the tourist industry. In a somewhat similar way that Jordan and Lebanon have been affected by their border with Syria the security

situation in Tunisia is also shaped by its long and porous border with Libya. The ability for discourse, people, and weapons to cross from Libya into Tunisia, particularly to the traditionally marginalised inland areas of the country, can make it very difficult to monitor violent extremist organisations and their influence. The lack of cross-communication between religious leaders, civil society, and government bodies is also seen as a central element of the failure to combat violent extremism in Tunisia.

7. Conclusion

This report has aimed to give an overview of some of the central ways in which traditional state-centric security, human security, and violent extremism interact. In particular, it has illustrated how specific elements of human security, such as social justice and gender equality programming, can help to alleviate some of the drivers of violent extremism in Jordan, Lebanon, and Tunisia.

By beginning with an outline of the key concepts in this conversation, it is possible to better understand the way in which conceptualisations of security are directly linked to CVE programming and how this should shape our response to radicalisation drivers. State-centric security, which is traditionally focused on reactive measures to security threats, such as arrests, border reinforcements, and surveillance, have been the central element in most states' policies towards radicalisation and violent extremism.

However, there has been an encouraging shift in understanding and programming recently towards a broader, softer, human security approach. This includes a far larger range of activities that understands security as centred around the individual opposed to simply the state, and thus includes elements like personal and environmental security. It is clear from the literature on radicalisation drivers that factors which would come under the broader bracket of human security, such as employment opportunities, and a feeling of belonging and purpose, are often integral to why people may decide to join a violent extremist organisation. Thus, it is imperative that CVE programming includes human security and that further research and piloting is done to understand how effective human security and CVE programming can complement and reinforce one another.

In the discussion on state-centric security measures it was shown that although there has been a large amount of focus and spending in recent years on traditional security measures, there has been little increase in levels of governance or national sovereignty as a result. This gives a certain credence to the call for a more nuanced security approach in which it is not only citizen's physical safety that is taken into consideration. Instead, human needs such as those for community, opportunity, and political inclusion must also be addressed.

Due to their roles within human security, this report has particularly focused upon gender equality and social justice. All three of the countries that this project focuses on have ongoing problems concerning equal access to opportunities and freedoms. These are often determined by identity, whether it relates to gender, social standing, education level, or religion. Such problems are compounded by a pervasion of nepotism and corruption which can build a resentment towards what are seen as unfair governing powers. The literature suggests that encouraging a culture of social justice and gender equality can not only facilitate development but also lower levels of disenchantment and frustration – both drivers of radicalisation.

During the 2011 protests across the WANA region requests for a new social contract and an end to social injustice were repeatedly voiced, and such frustrations are still widespread. In Tunisia, which went through a revolution in 2011 with little bloodshed, the feeling that promises for change have not been met are fuelling some of the drivers which encourage individuals to turn against the government or to join fighting forces elsewhere. Lebanon, with its severe sectarian divides, has multiple internal disagreements between communities, and the Sunni-Shia divide has been particularly exacerbated by the conflict in neighbouring Syria. Often these divides are reinforced by a sense of injustice founded in the confessional political system and its divisions of power. Jordan's social injustices are reinforced by pervasive nepotism. The tensions between

communities have also been stretched by the massive influx of Syrian refugees which have placed even further pressure on an already struggling economic situation.

In all three countries the multiple manifestations of social injustice can push individuals towards extremist groups which appear to offer solutions. Thus, it is important to further consider how attempting to redress such problems can and should be done, both for their own sake and as part of a larger CVE project.

It is important to reiterate that women's empowerment should not be viewed as an issue that only pertains to women. Gender inequality affects both genders and improving opportunities for women can have multiple positive effects for their communities. The WANA region has some of the worst rates in the world for gender equality. Despite large improvements in certain areas, such as access to education, there are still massive societal and infrastructural barriers to women's involvement. Increased women's participation can not only help in terms of economic growth and development but can also be an integral part of successful CVE efforts.

Due to the unique position that women often hold within their families and communities, they can have an improved insight into the social dynamics taking place, and thus could be well placed to identify early signs of radicalisation. If suitably supported by the authorities, women can not only be an important reference point for understanding how radicalisation develops but also help in the CVE and de-radicalisation process. However, it is naïve to suggest that women are simply onlookers to the radicalisation process and another reason why it is so important to include them in discussions concerning CVE is the increasing evidence of their very active role in violent extremist groups as recruiters, fighters, administrators, and facilitators of varying forms. Thus, by improving the status of women within Jordan, Lebanon, and Tunisia it is extremely likely that CVE efforts may also be improved.

What makes the three countries of this study so interesting to consider in conjunction with one another is how broadly their political situations and governance structures range, and yet how much their problems with violent extremism overlap. All three are home to relative depravation, a lack of opportunities (particularly for young people), unemployment, frustrated political desires, corruption, and dangerously porous borders. Furthermore, all have a significant number of fighters in Iraq and Syria as a per capita of their countries. In each case it appears evident that differing radicalisation drivers are converging to create a rich environment for recruiters from violent extremist groups.

Despite the large amount of informative literature available (much of which has been surveyed for this report), gaining a nuanced understanding of that convergence is crucial for a clearer understanding of how radicalisation occurs and thus how to better combat it. The next stage of this project hopes to carry out research across 18 communities in the three countries chosen. Such research will provide an important insight into the complex relationship between state-centric security, human security, and violent extremism with the hope of illustrating how a better coordination between the three could improve CVE efforts in the future.

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