

# منتدی غرب آسیا و شمال إفریقیا West Asia - North Africa Forum



# PROCEEDINGS OF THE WEST ASIA – NORTH AFRICA FORUM 2012-2013

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# **Foreword**

Throughout my time in the public life of the West Asia – North Africa region, I have witnessed countless crises, wars, and repressions which have denied dignity, freedom, security and opportunity to millions of innocent people, squandering their potential and sowing the seeds of discord and strife. As the Arab Awakening, which began with such optimism in the heady January of 2011, continues to degenerate into civil strife, millions are facing an uncertain and insecure future in neighbouring lands.

With the generous support of The Nippon Foundation, the West Asia – North Africa Forum, now in its sixth year, has again brought together participants from the public, private and civil society sectors to discuss regional solutions to this troubled region's myriad problems.

Against a backdrop of what has been described as the worst refugee crisis in living memory, this year's annual forum discussed the involuntarily uprooted – the millions of the region's most vulnerable citizens who find themselves as refugees or internally displaced people, often for protracted periods.

Ineffective or short-sighted policies condemn the uprooted to living lives devoid of security, opportunity and dignity – forever remaining an untapped, marginalised and carelessly wasted resource. Indeed, throughout the region, there is scant appreciation of the role that the uprooted can play in furthering the equitable and balanced economic growth of their host societies, or in assisting in the reconstruction of their own conflict-torn homes. Our failure to acknowledge the deficiencies inherent in our current approach also risks damaging the very host communities who provide protection.

As the year progresses, I hope that the ideas expressed in the Forum will give added value to the region's authentic voice, and that we can begin to find solutions that truly work, thus unlocking the great untapped potential and talents of the much maligned people of West Asia and North Africa.

None of this work would have been possible without the generous sponsorship of The Nippon Foundation, and I commend the role that it has played in ameliorating conflict, poverty and marginalisation around the world.

El Hassan bin Talal Chairman of the West Asia – North Africa Forum



# **Executive Summary**

This year's West Asia – North Africa Forum, again generously sponsored by The Nippon Foundation, brought together over 100 regional delegates against a backdrop of the worst refugee crisis in a generation. As the civil conflict in Syria continues to displace millions internally and forces thousands to flee across its borders into Jordan, Lebanon, Turkey and Iraq, it is pertinent to identify the challenges presented by the region's involuntarily *uprooted* - its refugees and internally displaced people.

### **Protection Instruments, Norms and Mechanisms**

Protection lies at the heart of safeguarding the security and dignity of the displaced, but all too often current strategies, including humanitarian and development responses, are not fit for purpose, and exacerbate tensions between refugees and their hosts. To counter this, humanitarian and development responses must become more strongly correlated. Protection lies in the development of the host society's economic and social capacity to absorb displaced people. Without development, host societies will view displaced people as a threat, protection space will be reduced, and problems will be stored for the future.

# **Promotion of Civil, Social and Economic Rights**

The promotion of civil, social and economic rights for the uprooted is a key issue both in addressing the conditions leading to displacement and in managing its subsequent impacts. States in the West Asia – North Africa region have often denied full rights to those living within their borders, exacerbating marginalisation and driving conflict. Equally often, refugees are denied the civil, social and economic status that can enable them to integrate fully and to develop their potential within both host societies, and in the reconstruction of their wartorn homes.

### **Legal Instruments and Norms**

The establishment of effective humanitarian and developmental policy for refugees and the communities in which they are protected is dependent on effective institutions upheld by properly functioning domestic legal frameworks and processes, such as those related to property, rights, labour, employment and commercial laws. However, legal frameworks very often remain unimplemented in the region, due to a lack of capacity to do so.



## Micro & Macro Economic Development Approaches

Whilst uprooted people impose economic burdens on the host country, equally those who are displaced can make positive developmental contributions by bringing new skills and resources, as well as by increasing productive capacity and demand, which can stimulate the expansion of the host economy. This could be aided by an international, or regional, automaticity of response for both circumstantial and structural displacement, much of which is driven by the *rentier* political economies of the region which by its very nature excludes many people, promotes poor governance and drives conflict.

# The Challenge of Urban Displacement

Most humanitarian and developmental assistance for refugees is focused on camp populations, yet the great majority of refugees today live among their hosts in urban centres. This misplaced focus on refugee camps while neglecting the fact that increasing numbers of refugees settle in urban environments, means that the urban vulnerable often remain under-assisted and unprotected.

# Impacts and Consequences of the Uprooted for Water Resources

Comprising some 3% of the global population and 10% of the world's landmass, the West Asia – North Africa region has only 1.2% of the worldwide renewable water resources. As such, it is one the most water-stressed regions in the world. The region's scant water resources, many of which are trans-boundary, lack effective regional management, with consequences for quality and sustainability. Displacement clearly places even greater pressure on scarce resources, with consequent implications for future instability.

# **Economic Development and a Regional Financing Regime**

As mentioned above, the positive developmental contributions made by uprooted communities, inclusive of expansion in the hosting economy, could be increased exponentially with structured assistance. A regional fund for reconstruction and development could, amongst other things including poverty alleviation, help finance the developmental needs arising from displacement. It could be funded through a combination of banking components and a form of a regional *zakat*, enabling countries across West Asia – North Africa to ensure the stability of their region collectively by maximising the positive and sustainable economic impacts of the uprooted for their host communities, whilst simultaneously ensuring the provision of additional goods, services, resources and infrastructure required to minimise the negative impacts of an influx of large numbers of people.



# Other work undertaken during 2012/13

Alignment across its wider neighbourhood is vital to the success of the West Asia – North Africa region. As such, the Forum's wider work throughout 2012-13 focused on building partnerships with both the newly developed economic powers of China and India, and also, looking west, to fostering relationships with the European Union. Meetings were held with The Boao Forum in China and The Strategic Foresight Group in India, while a roundtable was convened with the Landau Network-Centro Volta in Italy to discuss economic reforms and social justice in the Arab region.

# Introduction

There is no sorrow above the loss of a native land

### **Euripides**

What is important... is to seek out opportunities to hear what the silenced majority have to say. The 'uprooted' may fall into tidy bureaucratic categories – refugees, displaced persons, internally displaced persons, stateless persons – but in reality they are all marginalised.

El Hassan bin Talal

# The uprooted

As the current conflict rages in Syria, displacing millions, and increasing numbers of refugees into Jordan, Lebanon, Turkey and Iraq with each passing week, the West Asia – North Africa Forum convened in Amman during June 2013 to identify the challenges presented by the region's involuntarily *uprooted* - its refugees and internally displaced people.

Uprootedness destroys livelihoods, fractures households, erodes cultural and social traditions, disempowers communities and increases vulnerabilities. As the very word implies, it involves being torn, whether forcibly or by need - and the distinction is not always clear cut - from land and habitat, and a loss of not only basic essentials including water, but of emotional attachments to place and identity, livelihood and dignity. The financial cost is significant, the human cost immeasurable.

With generous support from The Nippon Foundation, over 100 participants from civil society, government, academia, and international organisations were brought together to identify pertinent issues facing some of the world's most vulnerable people, as well as those of host communities, who face substantial burdens in providing shelter and protection, often for protracted lengths of time.

### **Drivers of crises**

The West Asia – North Africa region is characterised by rapid change, fast evolving political and social transitions and repeated periods of crisis and turmoil. It should therefore be of little surprise that over half of the world's refugees and displaced people, *the uprooted*, are found in this region. Displacement, driven by human rights violations, political instability, social and economic marginalisation, natural disasters, climate change, development projects and environmental degradation or hazard have created vast numbers of people who have been driven from their homes and livelihoods.

Additionally, to date the countries of the region have relied on a combination of oil revenues and foreign aid, resulting in *rentierism* and effectively curtailing real social and economic progress or deep modernisation. As a result, economies are consumption rather than production based, and populations are addicted to hand-outs and patronage, the corollary of which has been a growing inequality within and between the nations of the region, a widening income disparity and increasing marginalisation of those denied a fair chance.

Instability is not fuelled by poverty alone, but by the gap in access to knowledge, to opportunity, to social mobility, communications and resources – in brief, the human dignity divide, threatens the security of all and is a major factor in current conflicts and in the new humanitarian and displacement crises the region is witnessing today.

Despite decades of conflict and displacement in the region, the response to the many refugee crises West Asia – North Africa has witnessed remains inadequate. International humanitarian actions have failed to take into account the developmental needs of either refugee communities or the countries that have hosted them. Likewise, there has been no solid regional response. While resource-poor countries have taken most of the strain, there has been no coordinated Arab response to Arab problems.

### Forum's themes

In debating these issues, a number of themes ran strongly through the current of the Forum:

- Given the human dignity deficit which prevails throughout the WANA region, it is imperative that human dignity be placed at the centre of policy responses to the uprooted and be developed as the fundamental regional ethos in order to 'humanise' the politics of the region.
- Responses to displacement have failed to take into account the developmental needs of refugee communities and their hosts.
- While still noting the enormous strain, social and economic, placed on host countries taking in large numbers of displaced people, the uprooted can equally become an economic boon if policies are adopted to minimise negative economic impacts and to promote strategies that place the uprooted at the centre of socio-economic development policy.
- Without developmental assistance, the strain placed on scant goods, services, and resources will exacerbate social and economic pressures, and therefore increase the potential for conflict and marginalisation and future resistance to refugees.
- The lack of supranational structures has increased regional instability.



### **Towards solutions**

Now more than ever, as the current upheavals across West Asia and North Africa have driven millions from their homes, the region requires sustainable solutions that take into account carrying capacity, unemployment, scarce resources and already over-stretched public services. In seeking answers to these questions, participants essentially called for three interrelated policy developments:

- Better account must be taken of the developmental needs of displaced people and their host societies. Funding development will enable host societies to realise the benefits of taking in displaced people, thus increasing protection space and developing regional economies.
- A regional fund for reconstruction and development should be created. This
  would provide a mechanism for sharing the burden of displacement across
  the region, and enable more equitable economic development that could
  reduce marginalisation and conflict.
- Trans-boundary resources must be managed collectively to enable equitable distribution and strengthen resilience in times of crisis.

The fifth annual Forum essentially reflected a broad consensus for a new beginning in the region that moves away from accepting displacement as the *new normal*. This essentially means dealing more effectively with the fallout and legacy of conflict while addressing the root causes of displacement. For this, a new institutional architecture should be developed, including a process for security and cooperation and a regional bank for reconstruction and development. These are goals that the WANA Forum will continue to pursue.

# **Looking ahead**

As the year progresses, the Forum will be seeking to advance the *Guiding Principles* (Appendix I), which were developed following the Annual Forum. They set a regional standard for the uprooted and provide a blueprint for humanitarian and human rights actors in dealing with the issue; crucially they add a West Asia – North Africa voice to and perspective on the debate on development and migration for the first time. Already near breaking point, change, forward thinking and bold action in the way the world addresses displacement in West Asia and North Africa is now more necessary than ever. Above all, political support must be leveraged for a regional framework that addresses the human cost of displacement both to the displaced and the host community.

This year's focus on the uprooted has built on five preceding years' work bringing together government, business and civil society actors in a non-threatening forum to discuss supranational solutions to regional problems within the four main pillars of the WANA Forum: reconstruction and recovery;



social cohesion; environment; and, green economy. Previous annual forums have discussed: regional challenges and opportunities for regional cooperation (2009); supranational solutions for carrying capacity (2010); a region in transition (2011); and, the concept of identity in a region with an ever-changing socio-political landscape.

The Forum will also seek to gain momentum and build dialogue for the creation of a human-centred regional architecture that is able to address the underlying problems of West Asia – North Africa, and all its citizens, in a meaningful and equitable way at this critical juncture.

# PART I. The Uprooted - West Asia - North Africa Forum, 2013

# **Opening remarks**

## HRH Prince El Hassan bin Talal, Chairman of the WANA Forum

Ladies and Gentlemen, every day we see horrifying news of violence and suffering and before I start talking about the uprooted, I think it is only appropriate that I ask all of you to express your sincere feelings of respect for human life by standing for a minute's silence.

I would like to express my gratitude and to say that without the support of the Nippon Foundation over many years that WANA would not have been possible. I would like to say to Mr. Sasakawa how genuinely I feel that you have helped to put the West Asia-North Africa voice on the map, and how much I value our friendship. In partnership with you in East Asia I hope that these Asian countries, south Asian countries, can join forces in contributing to what we set out to do and that was to add another Southern voice to the difficult questions for redesigning the post-2015 Development Goals.

As you know relating sustainability with human dignity and developing the global south as a greater force in the world economy is a question we have to answer. Can we develop an authentic southern voice? In this case an authentic West Asian voice.

I would like to thank Dr Rima Khalaf and the Economic and Social Commission for West Asia, represented here today by Dr Denise Sumpf, for their vision for 2025. It is my hope that a moment will come where ESCWA becomes the ECOSOC of the West Asia-North Africa region.

The main lessons that have emerged from the struggle for a new international economic order in the 1970s was the fact that global institutions, particularly institutions governing the financial markets, were largely north-centred, thus much of the surplus generated in the south in during that decade was intermediated into a global economy by northern financial institutions. These institutions not only controlled the financial markets but were also willed to do so because of their competitiveness. Today, the south has to some extent been saved from such a process because the recent, and not yet concluded, global financial crisis has established that these same financial institutions are not as efficient or reliable as they once were reputed to be. Their weakness has been compounded by the ongoing failure of global policy makers to inspire significant economic recovery in their economies despite state policies that have reduced the cost of money to virtually zero.

I don't want to get into the whole issue of quantitative easing, but the level of loans and the aid that we are receiving in the south is another way of circulating money. The time has come when sovereign financial bank managers, whether in the state or the private sector, will need to think many times before they pass their funds through these same failed institutions, or for either guidance or intermediation. Fortunately, there are very strong financial institutions emerging in the south. Some of the world's strongest banks are now located in the People's Republic of China. The sovereign wealth funds in the south are also some of the largest in the world, and today are fully capable of managing their own finances.

An argument being made now is that China is appropriating the natural resources of Africa; Latin America is in a neo-colonial relationship that is emerging as the hegemonic power in Southeast and East Asia. The North argues for caution in strengthening ties with China and suggests that India should be recognized as its democratic rival. Some major world powers have been encouraged the regionalisation of the South, and thus to deal with each region separately.

Let me remind you that West Asia-North Africa is directly affected by developments in Europe. The question is 'can Europe develop a good neighbourhood policy without stability in west Asia, and can stability in west Asia be pursued without stability in south and east Asia?'

Reviewing some of the contributions of civil society organisations (CSOs) and non-governmental organizations (NGOs), let me remind you that the WANA Forum is essentially a tripartite conversation between politicians, socioeconomists and civil society.

We come here today to discuss the future of 26 million uprooted in the world, displaced persons, internally displaced persons, refugees, and stateless persons, each with a different matrix. We hear the request of the international community calling for US\$5 billion to be supervised by a High Commission for Refugees, but I ask myself whether the time has come to employ an aid approach that develops a carrying capacity for the West Asia-North Africa region; a carrying capacity for water resources, economic resources and physical resources.

Today, many continue to address the symptoms, rather than the causes of poverty. We need to improve health, education and reduce maternal mortality for the economically deprived. In its eleventh and twelfth five year plans the Indian Government has committed itself to using development to regulate investments in social reform programmes. However, investments in social protection are heavily underwritten by budgetary transfers and reallocation of public expenditure. Such a policy agenda demands that the state continue generating resources and commend the necessary political backing for redirecting expenditure towards social protection. The global development



economy has provisionally supported this symptomatic approach to poverty reduction, by enhancing and re-directing both the external aid and social provisioning components of the development process.

All of the agendas, inspired by the Washington Consensus, prioritised growth and continued to develop the macro-economic core of poverty alleviation. But I ask you ladies and gentlemen, as indeed I asked myself a few days ago, 'does a US\$4 billion project for rescuing the people of the Occupied Territories after decades of occupation act as an alternative from policy aimed at promoting human dignity for people?' I would like to suggest the following bullet points for your consideration:

- Firstly: Is there or is there not, in this region an inequitable distribution of assets?
- If the poor are recognised as major players in the economy can we enhance their capacity to generate income by giving them access to assets?
- We speak of enablement and empowerment, but what are we doing about it?
- Are we equal participants in markets? How do we operate in a marketdriven system to sustain the growth process? Will we recognise that markets are extremely inequitable institutions, where the poor remain poor because they participate on unequal terms.
- In access to education and healthcare, huge gaps prevail between elitedriven privately-owned education, and the increasingly large number of state-driven or even privately sustained schools that are the major sources of primary education for the poor. Similarly, inequitable access to healthcare has opened up a huge divide between the privileged elite who can afford private healthcare of quality and the masses who are struggling with state run health services or low quality private providers.

In our call for a new independent humanitarian order in 1988 we pointed to the problems: man against man, man against nature and manmade disasters. I think one of the greatest manmade disasters is the undemocratic process of governance. I do not speak of governments, but governance. The poor remain victims of an undemocratic process of governance where access to justice, access to public services, and particularly, capacity to participate in a democratic process remains highly inequitable.

So what are the agendas for addressing injustice? I would like to thank those of you who have worked with me over the past year and a half and have helped develop the idea of a regional bank for reconstruction and development. I remember when we met representatives of the G8, they said, "why do you need a



regional development bank?" I said, 'the Europeans have a development bank seething with SMEs'. The whole of Jordan is an SME.

As a region, is it not time that we are regarded as grown up enough to participate in formulating our own future accountably, transparently and responsibly? Is it not possible that bringing together zakat, with its clear and comprehensive references to refugees in all their categories to complement a regional development bank - in the region and for the region? I am delighted to see the National Bank of Abu Dhabi in London, but it is time that Islamic banking is recognised in the region not on national terms but on regional and universal terms.

I conclude with the question that has so ably been put by Peter Sutherland in his capacity as Commissioner for Migration Issues at the United Nations can we in WANA consider setting up 'migration development goals'?

We cannot keep migration issues at arms-length; we cannot solely throw international money at the problem. It is essential to do things differently.

I hope that this area, this vulnerable region of the world that all of us think we know so much about will be a region in which a knowledge base can bring us all to read from the same page so that the important triangle of civil society, socioeconomic leadership, farsighted policy and political leadership.

# Yohei Sasakawa, Chairman of The Nippon Foundation

Your Royal Highness Prince El Hassan bin Talal, distinguished guests, ladies and gentlemen; it is a great honour to participate in this fifth WANA Forum and to have the opportunity to address such a distinguished group.

I would like to begin by expressing my deepest admiration and gratitude to the host of this forum, Your Royal Highness Prince Hassan, and the members of the international Senior Advisory Board for elaborating the WANA vision with your wisdom and experience. And to the participants, I would like to express my appreciation for your efforts to tackle challenging issues of the region.

Five years have passed since His Royal Highness and I started the WANA Forum in 2009. In our long friendship, I have been moved many times by the genuine vision of His Royal Highness and his determination to develop the WANA region. I convey my deep respect to His Royal Highness for successfully organizing the WANA Forum for five consecutive years against the backdrop of a dramatic socio-political transition in the region.

There is no question that WANA is an important region to the world. The recent revolutionary wave that swept the region forced challenging issues to rise to the surface. These include poverty, human security and political instability. It is highly commendable that the WANA Forum has foreseen these issues prior to the transition and I have great respect for the amazing foresight of His Royal Highness.

In many years of humanitarian work, I have encountered countless numbers of people around the world who have been uprooted for reasons such as conflict, climate change, and economic and political instability. Currently in Myanmar, we are working to support close to half a million people who have been uprooted from their communities. Myanmar is a nation diverse in its culture, ethnicity, and religion. Taking this into account, we are listening closely to the demands of the different ethnic nationalities and trying to figure out ways I which we can help them rebuild their communities.

The WANA region is a finely woven tapestry of different culture, ethnicity and religion. As beautiful as it may be, various issues are also woven to form complex knots that are difficult to entangle. Against these complicated patterns, it is vital for the people of the WANA region to address these issues and search for homegrown solutions. I am confident that the WANA Forum shall continue to play an important role in this effort.

All of you are leaders representing various sectors of the region. You have gathered, not for your own benefit or the benefit of your country, but for a much greater purpose of attaining a prosperous future for the entire WANA region.



It is highly significant and meaningful to have such a platform where participants can openly discuss complex challenges.

In this time of uncertainty I hope that this WNAA Forum will help you to bring tangible change that will open a path to a brighter and more prosperous future for the people of WANA.

I wish for a very successful two day forum filled with lively and fruitful discussions.

# Peter Sutherland, Special Representative of UN Secretary General on Migration and Development

Twenty-five years ago, the Independent Commission on International Humanitarian Issues so-chaired by Hassan bin Talal and Sadruddin Aga Khan released its groundbreaking report on *Winning the human Race?* The 1988 report highlighted, among the many humanitarian challenges to be tackled, the plight of **the uprooted** and prefaced this chapter with a quote from Euripides:

There is no sorrow above the loss of a native land.

Today as the 5<sup>th</sup> WANA forum gathers in Amman under the stewardship of Prince Hassan, *uprootedness, statelessness, rightlessness* remain on the agenda requiring urgent attention as the drama of forced migration continues to unfold on Jordan's borders. 1,612,000 Syrians and 60,000 Palestinians have fled their country, a majority of women and children, and continue at a rate of 8,000 per day - up to 2,000/day to Jordan with already half a million finding shelter and care in this country with direct consequences stretching its hospitality to the limit. When briefing the Security Council on April 18 last, the UN High Commissioner for Refugees recognized that "by keeping their borders open to thousands of refugees fleeing day by day, Jordan, Lebanon, Turkey and others are doing an extraordinary service to the international community".

Hannah Arendt depicted forcefully in *The Origins of Totalitarianism* this state of the uprooted:

They have lost their "right to have rights... The calamity of the rightless is not that they are deprived of life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness but that they no longer belong to any community whatsoever... Only with a completely organized humanity could the loss of home and political status become identical with expulsion from humanity altogether". Those who are fundamentally rightless are deprived "of a place in the world which makes opinions significant and actions effective."

Forced displacement will necessarily continue to require our most urgent attention particularly in West Asia North Africa that represents more than half of the world's refugees.

But beyond the drama of unwilling displacement, the *movement of people* should not be catalogued as either "good or bad"; it is simply natural to the human condition to migrate and not be viewed solely as a "problem to be solved": it can become a *solution* to the problem for people seeking to escape poverty, mitigating risk and building elsewhere a better life. It generally benefits the country of destination. In this light, its economic impact is massive in today's increasingly interdependent world. The estimated 215 million international migrants, 3% of the world's population – expected to grow to 400 million by

2040 – help to lift entire communities: migrant remittances exceed today by three times the value of all overseas ODA combined! The impact on development concerns far more than the 215 million people directly involved. It positively impacts on more than one billion others.

The *positive* migration---development nexus is increasingly acknowledged – regulation of flows, integration of immigrants and impact of labour mobility on development – but requires additional and renewed thinking as the current governance of international migration is both insufficient and inefficient. This applies notably to the WANA Region where, as underlined in the Forum's *Concept Note*, "home-grown solutions to the challenges facing the uprooted are needed... as well as a multilateral, multi-stakeholder approach".

The Chairman of your WANA Forum stresses "what is important: to seek out opportunities to hear what the silenced majority have to say". This is the task undertaken over the last six years by the *Global Forum on Migration and Development* that listens to the uprooted favouring a frank and open discussion on these very intertwined issues of migration *and* development. The international community must focus increasingly on the needs of vulnerable migrants as witnessed in your Region. Priorities must be reshuffled and make room for a rights-based, and not only a security-based, approach to migration.

By responding to the three questions on the agenda of your Amman discussions - the commitment to *resolving* rather than financing the extension of displacement in the WANA region; the establishment of a *regional bank for reconstruction and development*; the *setting-up of a knowledge and sharing platform* – the WANA Forum can contribute to the thinking going into the preparation of the 2nd High-Level Dialogue on International Migration and Development scheduled on the occasion of the next UN General Assembly in September.

Together, we must insure that migration gets proper consideration in the post-2015 global development agenda to be defined in the autumn including on issues such as "brain drain" seen by many as negatively affecting developing countries (although the opposite is often true), or the challenge of climate change with its direct impact on migration, all issues that you will be addressing.

I submit to you that we need to focus on the *quality* of migration, not the quantity, ushering in an orderly and safe movement of people. Migration is one of the most powerful strategies for reducing poverty and has contributed meaningfully to progress on the original MDGs. We are now moving from an exclusive focus on what people *have* to a focus on what they can *do*.

I would look forward to receiving the results of your proceedings to carry to New York on this special occasion where the post-2015 global development agenda will be defined. The just-released Report on *A New Global Partnership* of the High-Level Panel Of Eminent Persons On the Post-2015 Development Agenda



underlines correctly the important role of international migration in eradicating extreme poverty by 2030:

Migrants make a positive economic contribution to their host countries, by building up their labour force. Sending countries benefit from getting foreign exchange in the form of remittances and from greater trade and financial flows with countries where they have a large diaspora. By 2030, as global population rises, there could be 30 million more international migrants, remitting an additional \$60 billion to their home countries through low cost channels.

Beyond The MDGs, We need to be ambitious and "think big" such as by setting up the "Migration Development Goals". With your help, and notably the WANA Region which has so much to contribute, this goal can be achieved of casting migration in a proactive light and no longer exclusively as a plight. Migrants in the 21st Century will no longer be "expulsed from humanity"; quite the contrary, through their courageous act of moving, they become the standard bearers of a better and just global partnership.

# Session 1: Protection instruments, norms and mechanisms

# 1.1. Summary

Protection lies at the heart of safeguarding the security and dignity of the displaced. But all too often current strategies, including humanitarian responses and instruments for protection, may be weak, restrictive, obsolete or inconsistent, having the unintended consequence of prolonging and promoting displacement, as well as exacerbating tension between with host communities.

This inevitably incubates future instability and exacerbates the perception of the displaced, in some host societies, as a security threat, rather than as a humanitarian or developmental issue. Many refugee communities will also be found in some of the poorest and already marginalised communities in their host countries, who can scarcely afford the resulting impacts on goods and services. Effective and coordinated action between humanitarian and development actors at an early stage is therefore needed in order to mitigate these effects, and as such is central to the protection of both refugees and of the communities hosting them.

The key points emerging from this session were that:

- Internationally or regionally accepted norms for the protection and treatment of displaced people can be seen as an intrusion on state sovereignty. As a result humanitarian and development initiatives may not always be consistently understood or applied within the region.
- The promotion of human dignity must be at the heart of any response to the uprooted. In this context it is worth recalling that care for the uprooted has a unique significance in Islam; a point which should be kept in mind when developing new regional policies.
- Traditional hospitality notwithstanding, in the absence of economic development - additional investment in the provision of healthcare, education, housing, water and sanitation facilities and employment opportunities, host societies will suffer unduly the negative impacts of influxes of the displaced, will ultimately come to resent, and even reject them, and become less willing to provide relief and protection in the future.

# 1.2. Key policy recommendations

Any regional policy must acknowledge that the security and protection of the uprooted is intrinsically linked to the various host societies' experience of large influxes of uprooted people, inclusive of economic impacts – on goods, services,



housing and jobs. Short-term humanitarian action must be complemented by both immediate developmental benefits and longer-term socio-economic development for both the displaced and their hosts. In the long run, protection of refugees will be aided by empowering displaced people to make positive economic and social contributions to their host societies. Both host communities and displaced communities must be involved in the design and implementation of any schemes designed to assist them, in a grassroots-up participatory approach.

There is currently no regional knowledge or data base which could enable an accurate assessment of the specific requirements of the various categories of the displaced or their host communities. Rather, host countries refer to the UNHCR for an evaluation of their success or otherwise in managing refugee situations.

. This inevitably causes delays and at times, ill-feeling. The WANA region clearly needs to develop its own authentic knowledge base enabling an assessment of every refugee or IDP in the region in terms of their basic human requirements in the context of practical information regarding the host environment and community; statistics on water resources for example, infrastructure resilience, demographic analyses, and other information that to date exists only in specialized reports. This would enable the region to stop looking at refugee crises as temporary and, without prejudicing the right of return, to plan for the long-term incorporation of displaced populations when necessary.

# 1.3. Defending protection space – a Jordanian example

### Andrew Harper, UNHCR Representative in Jordan

Human dignity for the uprooted can only be achieved through coordinated humanitarian and developmental action. Likewise, the space offered to the uprooted can only be protected if humanitarian and development actors also focus on host communities. Agencies in emergency situations often neglect both the immediate needs and the longer-term goals and aspirations of the people on the ground, host and refugee alike.

The region has witnessed countless examples of forcible displacement due to persecution or violence. This is clearly an important indicator of the widespread lack of respect for fundamental human rights. Syria is probably one of the worst barometers for this trend. Almost seven million Syrians have been internally displaced, and 1.6 million have become refugees. Indeed, about one million refugees have crossed the borders since January alone and the numbers are constantly rising.



# 1.3.1. The human dimension – a loss of dignity

Numbers, however, do not tell the real story, and in discussing policy the human side of displacement should not be forgotten. Unless one engages directly with the women and children who have been abused, it is impossible to truly comprehend what it means to be uprooted: the women who have been raped; the children whose fathers are missing; the families uncertain of their futures or how long they will be displaced. The Syrian crisis is now probably the worst refugee crisis the region has ever known. In numbers it surpasses even the crisis of 1948, with no positive indicators for resolution.

How can international support be galvanised in order to better protect populations who have been forced from their homes? Displacement is not only a question of loss, of home and of economic security, but is for many marked by gender-based crime, the deliberate victimisation of women and children, and a frightening array of assaults on human dignity. Rape and sexual violence are deployed as weapons of war to intimidate parties to the conflict by destroying identity, dignity, and the social fabric of both family and community.

Human dignity is central to the protection of the uprooted. People will suffer repeated assaults on their dignity during the process of displacement – during the initial violence driving them from their homes, as they cross borders, when they become refugees, and every time they go to the UNHCR or other humanitarian actors for help. In many instances, refugees only truly regain their dignity once they have been repatriated, a remote possibility for Syrians today.

Throughout the recent crisis in the West Asia – North Africa region, refugees have been granted safety by the people of Lebanon, Jordan, Turkey, Iraq, and Egypt. Their contribution has saved hundreds of thousands of lives, but comes at an increasingly heavy price to host countries. For such hospitality to continue, more international financial support and regional burden-sharing initiatives are required to mitigate the crushing impact on Syria's immediate neighbours, thereby ultimately defending protection space for refugees.

### 1.3.2. The Jordanian example

Despite not being a signatory to any of the primary protection instruments for refugees, such as the Geneva Convention of 1951 or the 1967 Protocol, Jordan has offered protection to repeated waves of displaced persons from neighbouring conflicts. The Jordanian example is proof positive that countries do not have to be fully integrated into an internationally recognised legal instrument or norm to offer protection space. Indeed, culture, tradition and values are often more important.

Humanitarian and development actors in Jordan must remember that, although engagement may be easiest in large, centralized camps like Zaatari, the vast majority of refugees are hosted within communities themselves; their protection space provided by the local populations. Yet despite the fact that some towns in the northern governorates have seen their populations double, their external funding has remained stagnant with huge consequences.

Hospital beds are scarce and doctors are overstretched; Jordanians who need hospital care may have to wait while injured Syrians receive urgent medical treatment. The delivery of water supplies, which used to be weekly, has been reduced to fortnightly. Rental prices have skyrocketed, increasing the financial burden on the already strained refugees, as well as on the host community.

The opinions of Jordanians experiencing these strains have a direct impact on Jordan's ability and willingness to continue to offer protective space and to open its borders to Syrian refugees. Individual communities need to see tangible and positive economic results from foreign aid – protection of their livelihoods, resources and public services –if they are to continue to welcome refugees as fellow human beings, rather than view them as an economic burden or a security threat.

On an optimistic note, the importance of the role being played by Syria's neighbours is beginning to be recognised. In a recent speech, the UN High Commissioner for Refugees, Antonio Gutteres, concluded that:

Helping Syria's neighbours deal with the fallout of this terrible conflict is crucial for preserving the stability of the entire region. This is not just another refugee crisis. What happens in Syria and in the neighbouring countries potentially has much wider, even global implications. By keeping their borders open to thousands of refugees fleeing day after day, Jordan, Lebanon, Turkey and others are doing an extraordinary service to the international community. The failure to give these countries the support they need to continue to keep providing help to so many ... in the region, it would be the world's blindness to its own best interests.<sup>1</sup>

Nevertheless, these same generous hosts are often taken for granted by the international community. As we invest in the protection of refugee communities, we must also invest in these host countries. Otherwise, we risk losing their confidence. Ultimately, the host states' interests lie in their own security; if they feel secure, they are more likely to continue to extend their considerable hospitality to the displaced community.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> UN High Commissioner for Refugees warns Security Council of "terrifying" humanitarian situation for Syria, Press Release, 18 April 2013



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# 1.4. Humanitarian Responses in the Middle East region: Ideas drawn from practice

The following written remarks were prepared by Hany El Banna, President, Humanitarian Forum

# 1.4.1 Islam and the status of Refugees

Guided in the work with refugees by Islamic humanitarian values, it is important to briefly outline the concept of asylum in Islam and the obligations incumbent upon Muslims in receiving refugees. Many scholars have pointed to the presence of humanitarian values within Islam (see An-Na'im 1990; Mirbagheri 2006). With regards to refugees in particular, the issue of forced migration has a particular resonance in Islam, especially in view of the fact that the Prophet Muhammad was himself a refugee who fled Mecca with his followers in order to escape persecution in 622. This event, known as the Hijra, actually marks the beginning of the Islamic calendar. The refugees who fled Mecca at that time are given an honoured place in the Qur'an and are known as Muhajirun. Furthermore, those people who gave them a good reception are also highly respected and are known as the *Ansar* or supporters of the Prophet and his followers (see Abu Sahlieh 1996). It should also be mentioned that Muslims fleeing religious persecution in Mecca were advised by the Prophet Muhammad to travel to Abyssinia where they sought and received sanctuary from the Christian ruler Negus. The story of the *Hijra* itself and its centrality in terms of the foundations of the faith indicates the importance given to the concept of the protection of refugees and the provision of asylum in Islam.

The Qur'an speaks explicitly about the issue of asylum seekers and refugees:

And if anyone of the disbelievers seeks your protection, then grant him protection so that he may hear the word of Allah, and then escort him to where he will be secure. (Surah 9:6)

Islamic law or *Shariah* affirms the practice of providing sanctuary to persecuted persons and the sacredness of some places, such as the Kaaba in Mecca. Anyone who sought refuge in a mosque or in the home of a companion of the Prophet Muhammad was safe and secure. However, asylum according to *Shariah* law is not confined only to sacred places – it is also granted in homes and designated communal places under the protection of Islam. Asylum should be provided without discriminating between free persons and those who are enslaved, rich and poor, men and women, or Muslims and non-Muslims.

In Islam, asylum is a right of anyone seeking protection. In his study of asylum in the Arab-Islamic tradition, Arnaout (1987: 49) argues that asylum 'is an integral part of the Islamic [sic] conception of human rights'.



## 1.4.2 The value of faith in refugee studies

Jean-Francois Mayer (2007: 6-10), in his introduction to a special issue of the *Journal of Refugee Studies*, points to the importance of religion in understanding the experiences of refugees and IDPs. Gozdziak laments the lack of analysis on the role of religion in the field of refugee studies:

Religious and spiritual beliefs and practices sustain many refugees and internally displaced in their process of uprooting, forced migration, and integration into the host society. And yet religion and spirituality are virtually absent in policy debates and programming for refugees and forced migrants (2002: 136).

As Gozdziak's study of Kosovar Albanian refugees demonstrates, for many refugees and asylum seekers, faith clearly does matter. Finding themselves in disorientating situations and trying to cope with extreme suffering, refugees can rely on religion and its rituals as a supportive framework which can then become a source of solidarity and personal strength.

Some have argued (see, for example, Shahrani 1995 and Zaat 2007) that the definition of a refugee in international law, does not acknowledge a refugee's own definition of his or her experiences within political or religious frameworks. Shahrani discusses the migration of Afghan refugees to Pakistan and Iran during the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan and argues that the tendency of the refugees to describe themselves with the term 'muhajirin', which is defined in the Qur'an as 'those who leave their home in the cause of Allah, after suffering oppression' (16:41), reveals the political and religious agency located in their decision to seek refuge. Refugees do not necessarily see themselves as victims, but tend to locate their suffering in a wider political or religious context.

Shahrani argues that being a refugee has meaning beyond that accorded to it by international organisations which recognise only a limited institutionalised definition as a way of legitimising humanitarian aid. This in turn informs policy and determines its exclusive emphasis on humanitarian needs only, as well as the perception of a 'true' refugee as passive and obedient and not politically motivated by his or her religion (1995: 187-202).

### 1.4.3. Struggle of the Middle East Refugees

Throughout history, the Middle East has been one of the major crossroads of humanity, where continents, cultures, and ideas intersect. People have always been on the move in this corner of the world, though not always voluntarily so. Like other troubled regions, the Middle East has produced, and hosted, millions of refugees over the past decades. Two years since the beginning of the Arab Spring, a long and difficult transition period now lies ahead for the region. Its old



and new refugee crises form part of the various challenges it must grapple with during this process. The Middle East's strong tradition of hospitality and generosity towards neighbours in need will continue to be one of its most powerful assets in this effort.

In Syria, for more and more people, becoming refugees is the only way to survive; over 1.3 million people have already fled across borders to seek safety abroad. Since the beginning of 2013, nearly 50,000 people have been fleeing Syria every week to Jordan, Lebanon, Turkey, and Iraq. Growing numbers go even farther, to North Africa and Europe. Children suffer the most, and more than half of Syria's refugees are under age eighteen. Many of them have lost parents, siblings, or friends, seen their houses and communities bombarded, and their schools destroyed.

At the height of the Iraqi crisis, an estimated 2 million people had become internally displaced, and nearly as many had fled abroad, most notably to Jordan and Syria, but also to Egypt, Lebanon, Turkey, and the Gulf states. Nearly 64,000 Iraqi refugees are registered with UNHCR in Syria, and some 30,000 in Jordan. Iraqis were, and still remain, one of the largest urban refugee populations in the world. As a result, humanitarians have had to review and adapt their response mechanisms. More efficient registration and reception systems helped reduce waiting times; community outreach mechanisms became more proactive, for example through the use of SMS messages; and cash assistance using ATM cards replaced earlier in-kind schemes. UNHCR has been running a large resettlement operation from the Middle East to help Iraqi refugees restart their lives in third countries, with more than 80,000 having been accepted by countries such as the United States, Canada, and Australia since the operation began in 2007. However, this solution is only open to a small fraction of the refugee population due to a limited number of places in receiving countries

By far the largest and most protracted of all refugee problems today, not only in the Middle East region but in the world, is that of the Palestinian refugees, whose ordeal dates back nearly 65 years. Today, more than five million Palestinian refugees are dispersed across the Middle East, with hundreds of thousands more scattered throughout the world. The Palestinians' continued refugee status leaves them fundamentally at risk, and each of the crises afflicting their host countries in recent years has further aggravated the difficult situation of Palestinian refugees in the region.

Additionally, in Yemen, nearly 400,000 Yemenis remain internally displaced as a result of fighting between government forces and Houthi rebels in the North, and of a separate conflict in the southern Abyan governorate which started in May 2011. Some 100,000 have returned to Abyan since mid-2012, with UNHCR providing transport, basic relief, and shelter items as well as legal assistance.



This year sees the country entering a crucial transition phase, with the government expected to introduce reforms that will facilitate more inclusive political processes and help stabilize the country. The future of Yemen's displaced populations will depend on the government's ability to ensure lasting success for this process. Yemen also receives thousands and thousands of refugees from neighbouring troubled Somalia and Eritrea.

### 1.4.4. Muslim faith-based organization strategy

The strategies used by Muslim faith based organisations can best be described as 'implementation-oriented rather than advocacy-oriented' (Sparre and Petersen, 2007: 32); strategies that do not attempt to change the often unjust and unequal underlying structures in society. Furthermore, Clarke (2007: 79) has noted that faith based development organisations in general are "ready to advocate the charitable obligations of the faithful but less willing to press for political and social change". It is apparent though, as we have already seen in section 2, that Islam obliges Muslims to continuously and fervently work for a more just and humane society. Furthermore, there are several verses in the Qur'an that encourage believers to also be the *voice* for the poor and marginalised: "This was he that would not believe in Allah most high, and would not encourage the feeding of the indigent" (69:33-34) "But you honour not the orphans! Nor do you encourage one another to feed the poor" (89:17-18).

The Qur'an states:

If the debtor is in difficulty, grant him time till it is easy for him to repay" (2:280)

and,

Have you seen him who rejects religion? That is the one who drives away the orphan, and urges not the feeding of the poor". (107:1-3)

The Prophet Muhammad said: "Whoever relieves his brother of a trial or a difficulty in this life; Allah will relieve him of a trial in the next life" (reported by Bukhari and Muslim) and along similar lines "When any one of you sees anything that is disapproved (of by Allah), let him change it with his hand. If he is not able to do so, then let him change it with his tongue. And if he is not able to do so, then let him change it with his heart, though that is the least of faith" (reported by Muslim).

Such commands go beyond asking believers to feed the poor and provide charity and clearly exhort true believers to encourage one another to help the poor. Islam compels Muslims to speak out on matters of social justice for the sake of the community. This can be understood as advocacy on behalf of the poor,



speaking for those who have no voice and working for the greater good of communities. There is clear support, therefore, for advocating for justice and on behalf of the poor and marginalised on a range of issues such as, for example, good governance, international debt, the regulations governing international trade and climate change.

# 1.5. The Somali Example

# Abdi Jama Ghedi, Manager, Daryeel Associates

Over the last twenty-two years, the situation in Somalia has been one of continuous conflict, natural disasters, and repeat displacement. Somalia's instability stems in part from its strategic location, which has made it a stage for competing regional and global powers. Despite being the only ethnically and culturally homogenous country in Africa, the country has now split into several distinct areas, and today Somali populations are found in Ethiopia, Djibouti and Kenya, as well as many other parts of the world. Resources have also played a part, with offshore oil and gas creating further problems.

Those Somali refugees who have survived in the region have done so largely through the existence of the extensive financial support of family and community. The potential of a regional support fund, combining banking components with the religious and traditional system of *zakat*, is considerable. Somalia itself has already developed a system of mobile banking, which is used even by the nomads and pastoralists and which has been of enormous benefit.

An additional form of support has come in the shape of remittances from the Somali diaspora. These have provided not only fairly reliable financial assistance, but have also taken the form of investment in infrastructure, in schools, universities, medical research and facilities, water, and electricity. Such investment might never be forthcoming from the international community and if it were, only after a delay of many years. The potential support of diaspora communities throughout the region should not be overlooked as a source of further financial assistance.

# Session 2: The promotion of social and economic rights for the uprooted

# 2.1 Summary

The promotion of civil, social and economic rights for the uprooted is a key issue both in addressing the conditions leading to displacement, and in managing its subsequent impacts. Rights are vital in providing a framework in which people can pursue their lives in dignity. A deficit of rights feeds into the complex causes and consequences of displacement in the region. This leads to an 'inclusion-exclusion' dichotomy and thus creates marginalisation-driven conflict and displacement. A lack of social and economic rights for displaced people within hosting countries compounds reliance on humanitarian aid and increases the burden of refugees and internally displaced people. Mitigating this process must be regarded as a crucial strategy in combating the humanitarian-development divide witnessed in current migration policy.

To address these problems, the region must create and implement policies that, without prejudicing the right of return, promote civil rights. This should include urgent reform of employment and property rights, and of rights associated with running businesses, granted to uprooted people in their hosting societies. The regional and international community has a duty to allay the short-term impact of refugees on hosting communities, many of which will already be poor and marginalised within their own countries.

Being able to work, hold property and run a business are key elements in providing displaced people with the tools for their own development. This has a potentially threefold benefit of first mitigating the material conditions of displacement, secondly reducing the medium-term burden on hosting societies, and finally of unlocking the developmental potential of migration for hosts, refugees and IDPs alike.

Key points emerging from the session were that:

- The Palestinian example shows that loss of citizenship has resulted in a total loss of social and economic rights.
- Civil, social and economic rights, if extended alongside the adequate support and financing of development, can enable displaced communities to be an economic and social boon for host countries.
- Social and economic normalization of displaced communities will eventually lessen impacts on host societies and aid reconstruction in home countries, which in turn can facilitate a lasting and durable solution for conflict torn states. Thus, when formulating programmes and policies



to address both displacement and reconstruction, 'diaspora engagement' should be added as a supplementary to the three conventional durable solutions.

 Accepted norms should be established which lay out how much time, or how many generations, should elapse before citizenship is granted – without prejudicing the right of return.

# 2.2 Key policy recommendation

Deprived of the ability to work, own property or run a business, refugees and internally displaced people do not have access to the tools for their own development and will be continuously dependent on humanitarian aid. They will therefore be a burden on their hosting societies, and their development potential will remain unlocked. The protracted nature of displacement in the region means that refugees and IDPs essentially suffer the loss of human dignity alongside their rights.

Hosting societies should develop mechanisms for progressively offering economic rights to refugees and, where pertinent, to IDPs. The regional and international community should ensure that the granting of such rights does not prejudice those of the hosting population in the short-term.

# 2.3 The Palestinian Example

### Abbas Shiblak, Research Associate, Oxford University Refugees Centre

The constraints on human and economic development resulting from a lack of social and economic rights can be illustrated through the Palestinian paradigm. During the 1948 *nakba*, Palestinian refugees lost not only their homeland, but also all rights associated with land and citizenship. This has resulted in constrained development.

The withdrawal of the right of nationality is primarily an attack on human dignity, especially in the developing countries of the West Asia – North Africa region. In Western liberal democracies, the entitlement to social and economic rights is bestowed by residency. The converse is true in the region, where such rights are premised entirely on nationality. Without citizenship, uprooted groups are unable to work, own property, access public services, or move freely within their countries of residence; a situation that frequently endures. in case of protracted periods of displacement.

In the absence of a Palestinian state in 1948, the majority of Palestinian refugees lost their nationality, representation, and consequentially, the protection of a state. This situation made it easier for Israel to ultimately constitute the whole of British mandated Palestine.



### 2.3.1 Current Palestinian citizenship structures

Palestinian residency/citizenship status now falls into four categories:

- 1. Holders of a 'Refugee Travel Document' (RTD) issued by host Arab states (such as Syria, Lebanon, Egypt and Iraq). This document falls far short of conferring proper economic and social rights.
- 2. Holders of a passport-of-convenience mainly temporary Jordanian passports given to some inhabitants of the West Bank, including East Jerusalem.
- 3. Holders of the Palestinian passport/travel document issued by the Palestinian Authority. This document is still considered solely a travel document in the absence of a fully-fledged Palestinian state. As such, all inhabitants of Gaza and the West Bank are essentially stateless.
- 4. Finally, there are hundreds of thousands of undocumented refugees in Lebanon, Syria, Iraq, Kuwait and other Gulf States whose documents were not renewed by the host countries that issued them.

#### 2.3.2 Palestinian status and Israel

Following the 1967 War, Israel changed the status of the Palestinians remaining in the Occupied Territories to that of residents rather than citizens, meaning they had to be naturalised to become Israeli citizens and enjoy the associated rights. Moreover, a census immediately initiated by Israel counted only the 950,000 Palestinians currently in the territories; an estimated 240,000 Palestinians who ordinarily resided in the Occupied Territories, but who happened to be outside at the time, immediately lost their residency rights. Most were refused entry visas when they tried to return to their homes.

#### 2.3.3 Palestinian status and Arab states

Many Palestinians fared little better in Arab countries, as Jordan alone offered them full nationality in 1948. The Arab League's 1965 Protocol on offering Palestinians full social and economic rights was never fully implemented, which meant that long-term refugees and their offspring suffer discrimination and strict regulation in most Arab host countries.

The status of the refugees was never recognised within national or international law, but has been defined by administrative regulations, which have been open to arbitrary change. This has resulted in discrimination and acts of violence towards Palestinian refugees in many Arab countries, such as forced expulsions, from Libya during 1995, and from elsewhere after the First Gulf War in 1991. Indeed, this stateless condition has been a 'push factor' for many Palestinians



from the wider WANA region, and many have sought resettlement in the West and other countries.

#### 2.3.4 Conclusion

On the human level, changing or withdrawing citizenship status, or threatening the security of residency status with little consideration to the rule of law, has generated insecurity among refugees and a sense of a loss of control. This has had a profound effect on the Palestinian people for generations.

The Palestinian plight has been compounded by the loss of their link to their traditional lands. Most of the current camp dwellers have their origins in farming communities who lost their livelihoods alongside their social and economic rights. Their situation contrasts unfavourably with that of Indian and Pakistani refugees after the Partition of the sub-continent in 1947 when many farmers were able to exchange their lands.

It must be noted that the creation of a Palestinian state will not in itself resolve all aspects of the Palestinian refugee issue. Repatriation, compensation, citizenship, residency rights, resettlement, and the right of return cannot be overlooked. Therefore, these questions must be examined, addressed, discussed and resolved at regional and international levels with due urgency.

# 2.4 Diaspora engagement as a durable solution for economic recovery and reconstruction

Nicholas van Hear, Deputy Director of the Centre on Migration, Policy and Society at Oxford University

Diaspora engagement has the potential to be a fourth durable solution in conflict settings alongside integration, resettlement in a third country and voluntary repatriation, and should be given greater consideration by humanitarian and development actors. Diasporas from conflict settings can constitute a transnational social security system, they have a potentially powerful role in both resolving conflicts, and in supporting reconstruction once conflicts have been resolved.

# **2.4.1. Rights**

Humanitarian and development actors should be wary of the concept of rights as bestowed by the state. If rights can be granted, they can also be removed or redefined. While it is the state that guarantees the rights it bestows, the state is also only too often the institution that causes many situations of marginalisation, displacement and conflict. A greater analysis of the rights or practices developed cumulatively, collectively and cooperatively by the activities and organisations of civil society is long overdue. Rights developed by civil society are more solid and



more durable than state-dispensed rights, which can be discretionary and are subject to redefinition; their use as the benchmark for development will better-facilitate the creation of "societies in which all peoples can live, work, and function in freedom and with dignity", as El Hassan bin Talal has described the ideal.

# 2.4.2 Diasporas as a source of reconstruction and recovery

Development agencies are increasingly appreciating the role of conflict in development planning. Crucially, it has been recognised that while conflict undermines development by destroying assets, as well as by killing and displacing people, displacement itself through the formation of diaspora groups can ultimately also constitute a resource for the recovery and reconstruction of societies in conflict.

There has been a continual shift in the perception of the role of diasporas in conflict settings. The negative image of refugees as war mongers or peace – wreckers who have supported conflicts and insurgencies in their home countries and simultaneously generated strife in their host societies was prevalent until relatively recently. The pendulum has now swung, perhaps too far, towards defining diasporas as composed of peace builders or promoters of recovery. In reality, the role is perhaps more ambivalent and a combination of the two.

A more useful analysis of the role of diasporas would provide development actors with indicators as to the extent to which and means whereby the engagement of diasporas could assist reconstruction and recovery in their home societies, thereby supporting the three well-established durable solutions for uprooted people of social integration in a host country, resettlement in a third country or voluntary repatriation to the country of origin.

Diaspora engagement is premised on a three-level framework: the private sphere; the community or public sphere; and, the more nebulous *imagined community sphere*. Together, they can be considered as a vast transnational social security system, and as such, the international community must take better account of them when attempting to address displacement and drive development following conflict.

### 2.4.3 Frameworks of diaspora engagement

The first, 'private sphere', is located within families and households, and is the most sustained form of engagement. Action is seen in, for example, in the remittances that are sent to assist extended family members who are still within conflict settings. In contrast, the second, 'community or public sphere' is a more nebulous concept, and is less sustained as a result. The civil society structures in which diasporas operated in their home countries can be considered as the locus for action in this sphere, which is established in the realm of associated life, such



as hometown associations, old school groups or local religious institutions. Engagement here, for example, can be in the form of donations to assist in rebuilding local hospitals or schools, or those given to local welfare organisations. The final, 'imagined community', sphere is more nebulous still, as it is woven in the bonds formed within ethnic groups, nations, or with coreligionists - essentially the links described by Benedict Anderson in his 1983 work Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism. Individuals have affinity to a wider community without actually knowing its members personally. As such, this is the most volatile of three spheres and requires a greater degree of social motivation for engagement. Likewise, it is also the most ambivalent, as it also has the potential to reignite conflict, as well as being a boon to reconstruction. This three tier framework essentially constitutes a transnational social welfare system comprising millions of financial transfers and engagements, including expertise, which can be a source of support for progressive developments in homeland, but can equally be a source of retrogressive ones and entrenched conflict.

#### 2.4.4 Conclusion

Finally, development and humanitarian actors should not concentrate exclusively on those who leave conflict settings. Flight is only one option for people in such circumstances. Conflict settings and the wider marginalisation which also drives involuntary displacement, present two polar alternatives: voice or exit and fight or flight. Both humanitarian and development actors must also focus on citizens who remain *in situ* and work towards establishing progressive change.

# **Session 3: Legal Instruments and Norms**

# 3.1. Summary

To establish effective humanitarian and developmental action for refugees and the communities in which they are protected, host countries depend on effective institutions upheld by properly functioning domestic legal frameworks and processes, such as those related to property, rights, labour, employment and commercial laws. Many states in the region, although they have such frameworks in theory, are often unable, or unwilling, to put them into practice. This results in less effective practical action for refugees and hosts alike. International, regional and civil society organisations should seek to bolster such frameworks and policy delivery mechanisms, or risk wasted effort.

Many countries also rely on the different agencies of the United Nations to address deficiencies in both their institutional capabilities and funding capacity. However, the organisation and its subsidiaries are often overly bureaucratic and therefore unable to respond to urgent situations in a timely manner. In some circumstances the inefficient elements of the UN response can be an obstacle to addressing displacement effectively; a situation that can be exacerbated by the lack of support provided by donor countries for the purpose of building the capacity of host states to develop the necessary legal frameworks.

Key points emerging from the session were that:

- Minority populations within the broader category of displaced persons face unique problems when seeking refuge in neighboring countries suspicious of their loyalties. Regional measures should be taken to address the issue of forced repatriation in particular.
- The existence of legal frameworks is meaningless in the absence of mechanisms to ensure proper implementation and aid distribution.
- The international community must realize that the situation of refugees in the WANA region has global consequences. A high-level dialogue should be held to help regional actors develop the necessary capacity to meet agreed-upon international standards.

# 3.2. Key policy recommendation

WANA countries must cooperate with the international community to develop a practical regional legal framework to address the issues of the uprooted. The legal categories for refugees and IDPs must be clearly defined so as to encompass all affected peoples, including minorities within the broader population. Measures must be set in place to protect refugees from forced repatriation into insecure situations.



The creation of legal frameworks must be accompanied by the establishment of mechanisms for implementation and the distribution of aid. The WANA region can take advantage of its common culture by creating a religious fund based on *zakat* that would serve the needs of the uprooted throughout the region.

# 3.3. Introduction

# Muchkund Dubey, President, Council for Social Development

In this session, regional case studies were used to examine the problems arising from the absence of a regional legal framework for addressing the crises of the uprooted. The experience in Mr. Dubey's native India, which is home to an internally displaced population of some 60 million, as well as a sizeable population of refugees, mirrored many of the issues facing the WANA region. In countries lacking a legal category for refugees, foreign migrants exist in limbo, at the whim of host governments, many of which increasingly perceive refugees as a security threat. Structurally, the amount of resources necessary to provide assistance to refugees and IDPs continues to grow, while an institutionalized, regional architecture remains woefully absent.

The case studies offered by the session's speakers illustrated the various problems resulting from absent or deficient legal frameworks in the WANA region. The Iraqi experience illuminated the unique problems faced by minorities within the broader displaced population. In Afghanistan, legal frameworks hypothetically exist, but the absence of practical mechanisms for implementation renders them useless. Finally, the Hague Process discussed the role the international community can play in guiding countries in the WANA region toward developing and implementing practical legal frameworks for addressing the plight of the uprooted.

# 3.4. The Iraqi experience

# Bakhtiar Amin, President, Foundation for the Future

Historically, regional insecurity has been the major driver of displacement in West Asia – North Africa. Following the First World War, the borders of the region were drawn in such a way as to structurally displace whole populations, which have subsequently experienced marginalization and repeated forced migration. These ethnic and religious minorities form a subset of the broader uprooted population that faces even worse treatment and heightened uncertainty, as they fall through the cracks left by legal frameworks that overlook them.

The Kurds in particular have faced a vicious cycle of political persecution and repeated migration. Millions of Kurds have been displaced in the century since Sykes-Picot divided their lands amongst Iraq, Iran, Turkey and Syria. In Saddam



Hussein's Iraq, over one million Kurds were incarcerated in concentration camps. Likewise, in 1991, millions died attempting to flee persecution as they crossed the mountains into Iran and Turkey. Saddam's era also saw around four million displaced internally within Iraq, while subsequent instability after his fall meant that millions more fled Iraq for the precarious safety of neighbouring countries.

Iraqi Kurdish refugees in the region faced legal frameworks ill-equipped to address their unique situation, with the result that some endured forced repatriation. Few of Iraq's neighbors are signatories to the 1951 Convention or the 1967 Protocol, and at times they violated the principle of *non-refoulement*. (Some of Iraq's neighbors treated the refugees with dignity, however; Jordan in particular has been a generous host, with the result that Iraqis are now the largest investors in the country, illustrating the positive potential of migration for host countries.) With the recent period of calm witnessed in Iraqi Kurdistan, many of Kurdish refugees have been returning. Nevertheless, host countries – especially in Europe – should be wary of sending refugees back into insecure situations. The violence in Syria has led to a huge influx of refugees into Iraqi Kurdistan, which now hosts around 195,000 Syrians, many of whom are Kurdish themselves. This situation could rapidly deteriorate without adequate assistance.

As a region, we must raise awareness about the marginalization of refugees and the unique obstacles faced by minority populations among the broader category of the uprooted. In addition to ethnic and religious minorities, particular attention should be paid to the specific needs of traditionally marginalized persons within the refugee population, such as women, children, and the elderly. While the media can do a lot in terms of raising awareness about the situation of refugees, we can all play a role in alerting the international community to the suffering of millions.

## 3.5. The Afghan experience

#### Najla Ayoubi, Country Director, Open Society Afghanistan

Recent displacement in Afghanistan dates back to the Soviet invasion of 1979, when five million Afghans fled to neighboring countries, chiefly Iran and Pakistan. This was compounded by the civil war from 1991 to 1996, with further displacements taking place during the post-war Taliban rule until 2001. While a calmer period was witnessed between 2001 and 2004, insecurity has since increased, with a corresponding growth in the number of refugees. Aside from poor security and armed conflict, displacement has also been driven by persecution, inter-tribal disputes, human rights violations, and land disputes.

Although millions of dollars have flowed into Afghanistan, poor legal frameworks often mean that aid does not reach its intended recipients. While the constitution



grants all Afghans the right to settle in any part of the country, it lacks further provisions to address the problems experienced by the country's many IDPs. In an attempt to rectify this problem, President Karzai issued two decrees in 2001 and in 2005. The first addressed the protection and promotion of Afghanistan's refugees, and the second established a special court for IDP land disputes. Although the decrees addressed important issues surrounding the IDP crisis, neither has been successfully implemented in practice. Furthermore, there is no institutional mechanism through which funds (e.g., *zakat*) may be collected and distributed to internally displaced individuals.

Compounding the failure of domestic government, the UN system has also proven unsuccessful in addressing the needs of Afghanistan's uprooted. Many donor countries channel their funds through the UN, whose system is so bureaucratic that it cannot respond sufficiently rapidly to critical situations. Indeed, after over a decade of international presence and investment in Afghanistan, national policy on IDPs remains inadequate (OR wanting). Furthermore, although the Afghan government has expressed its willingness to incorporate the UN's Guiding Principles into future national policy, its practical ability to do this is doubtful. A major obstacle to implementing international conventions and guidelines is their potential contradiction with *sharia* law. Often the Afghan government resists discussing difficult issues in order to avoid conflict with the country's fundamentalists. The government's reluctance to cross extremist groups has come at the cost of exacerbating the suffering of the internally displaced population.

Moreover, there is little regional cooperation. Afghanistan has poor relations with its neighbours Iran and Pakistan, and as a result these countries have been forcibly repatriating Afghan refugees owing to disagreements between governments. Refugees are being used as political tools, rather than being treated with the human dignity that is the right of all uprooted.

Looking ahead, Afghanistan must develop a practical, national policy in coordination with the international community. The internally displaced population should be consulted on the formulation of this legislation, as should civil society, which provides much of the existing support to the IDPs. Following the development of a workable policy, a regional mechanism for monitoring the allocation of resources to IDPs must be created. As the WANA Forum has discussed, a religious mechanism in particular has the potential to take advantage of the region's common culture to help the uprooted.

## 3.6. The role of the international community

## Frans Bouwen, Director of External Relations, The Hague Process on Refugees and Migration

The Hague Process on Refugees and Migration was established to address the problems arising from the lack of coordination between institutions, civil society stakeholders, governmental and non-governmental organizations, faith groups, and others when dealing with the ongoing issue of refugees and global migration. In 2005, the Hague Process convened with the Arab Thought Forum in Amman to discuss ways of advancing the refugee and migration agenda in the Middle East.

The participants overwhelmingly expressed impatience at the priority given to words, rather than generating actions, and a desire to follow a dual path combining principles and realism; of compliance with international law and of going beyond a list of over-idealistic demands to the hard work of burdensharing and implementation of policies that can produce meaningful results on the ground.

Since 2005, the Hague Process has grown and today represents a multidisciplinary global network of some 2,500 people. Together with the Global Commission on International Migration it continues to work towards a shift in the debate from policy alone to practice. Powerful instruments of human rights, international humanitarian law, and refugee law already exist to protect refugees and migrants, the priority for the future therefore must be to ensure compliance and effective implementation. Where difficulties arise in applying existing laws States must discuss these openly, while simultaneously committing themselves to developing the necessary capacity to meet agreed-upon international standards. Such an approach will enable a greater number of states to ratify existing treaties and to arrive at a consensus regarding areas of as yet unresolved concern.

The international community – and Europe in particular – must appreciate the global impact of the migration crisis in the WANA region. We can no longer turn a blind eye to these issues, ignoring the plight of uprooted peoples, categorizing them as "refugees" or "migrants" as though they are not human beings. We need to help the region grapple with the daily human suffering of the uprooted. Highlevel dialogue must take place that twins migration with development and emphasises the positive aspects of migration.

## Suggestions made during closing session of Day One

During first day's final session, participants were asked to draw together emerging themes and suggest ideas for bringing together developmental and humanitarian responses. The main ideas fell within three concepts:

- To ensure long term and effective solutions to displacement, vastly improved linkages are required between developmental and humanitarian responses, especially in view of the impacts on host societies.
- Given the right circumstances, displaced people can offer real economic benefits to host societies.
- A regional funding model should be created to support developmental and humanitarian responses to displacement.

### Impact on hosting societies

- Refugee policy must give greater weight to the impact of displacement on host countries, inclusive of a greater focus on addressing the needs of host societies arising from influxes of displaced people. Long term, a negative experience for host communities is likely to lead to a reduction of protection space, as well as further conflict and marginalization.
- Migration should increasingly be seen as being of benefit to both communities of origin and destination, and the image of the displaced as a purely negative force or problem to be solved must change to reflect the positive social and financial gains they can bring.
- Nonetheless, we cannot ignore the fact that large influxes of refugees can have a destabilising effect on societies (e.g. Lebanon).

### Migration and development

- A greater appreciation of the contribution that migration makes to development must be generated in terms of the next generation development agenda the post 2015 Millennium Development Goal's.
- The humanitarian-development divide should be tackled-and policy shifted from the realm of rhetoric into practical action. **Regional funds**
- A regional financial mechanism for addressing displacement and its root causes should be established as a potential model or prototype for further development. Such a mechanism could ultimately take the form of a regional development bank, which could ensure equity and justice in the distribution of wealth, assets, services and resources, as well as providing a source of immediate assistance in emergency situations.



- Priorities should be inclusive development and the inclusion of the economically deprived, including the displaced, enabling (OR empowering) the currently marginalized to realize their potential as an essential component of human capital.
- *Zakat* could be applied to such a scheme.

### **Grassroots and homegrown solutions**

- In view of the fact that each uprooted situation presents unique challenges and opportunities, consultation with the uprooted, and their involvement in the setting of priorities and the development of all migration initiatives, is vital.
- The solutions to refugee problems can only be found through a combination of regional and grassroots approaches. A regional approach is required to establish the necessary links between developmental, humanitarian and environmental programmes. Whilst homegrown or locally based community solutions could draw on the *Human Integrated Management Approach* (HIMA) to promote environmental health, social cohesion, reconstruction and recovery, and the development of a green economy.

#### Land

- A solution to the uprooted land ownership issue could be found in a framework land lease solution (e.g. land leased for 20/30/50 years). In *Sharia*, all land belongs to the *ummah*.
- The rights of the displaced to the commons that they have abandoned should be acknowledged.

#### Women

• The voices of displaced women are rarely heard; crucially therefore any a sustainable development model must take gender into consideration.

#### Legal frameworks

- Civil society role should exert pressure on their governments to sign relevant conventions and then monitoring implementation such as the Geneva 1951 and 1967 protocols.
- Pressure should be placed on countries that do not abide by international conventions to ensure they treat uprooted people within established norms.



### The young

- Efforts should be made to engage the younger generation in debates surrounding the issue of displacement, and to benefit from their energy and potential for offering innovative solutions.
- Additionally, the commitment and potential for youth volunteer assistance in terms of meeting the challenges of the uprooted should not be overlooked.

#### **Information**

• A greater emphasis should be place on improved data gathering at both the regional and national levels, in order to enable more effective allocation of resources.

# Session 4: Micro and macro-economic development strategies and approaches

## 4.1 Summary

Whilst uprooted people impose economic burdens on the host country, equally those who are displaced can make positive developmental contributions by bringing in new skills and resources, as well as by increasing productive capacity and demand, which can stimulate the expansion of the host economy. To enable this to happen effectively however, an international or regional automaticity of response is required for both circumstantial and structural displacement, much of which is driven by the *rentier* political economies of the region which exclude many people, promote poor governance and drive conflict.

Humanitarian and development actors must consider options for economic development strategies that maximise the positive and sustainable economic impacts of uprooted people for their host communities and minimise negative outcomes.

The following issues were raised during this session:

- There are two major forms of displacement circumstantial and structural. This first is often driven by conflict, while the second is stems frequently from a denial of rights. As has been seen repeatedly in the WANA region, where conflict-driven displacement is today widespread, the former can easily transition into the latter with long-term impacts on national and regional stability. Due consideration must also be given to environmentally and economically displaced refugees, who are often driven from their homes as a result of development projects which either disadvantage (OR damage) them, or worse still, destroy the homes and habitat on which they depend.
- As mentioned above, until relatively recently the fundamental cause of displacement in the region has been structural. To date, regional *economic* development has been exclusionary by nature, resulting in the marginalisation of large sections of the population. The situation is compounded by the *rentier* nature of many economies in the region whose governments are consequently virtually unaccountable to their citizens and in many cases unable or unwilling to meet their economic and social needs. As a result, poor governance and corruption have become the norm, compounding the problem of marginalization, increasing the numbers of economically excluded, thereby inevitably creating the potential for instability and conflict.
- The extent to which refugees can be integrated into local economies naturally depends on those economies capacity to absorb them. The absence



of such capacity heightens the need for careful calibration of humanitarian interventions with development initiatives. Such coordinated approaches have been shown to be more effective in the longer term than emergency humanitarian responses which whilst they will always be needed, must also focus on the development of host communities. Protection space of displaced people will only be assured if the concerns and needs of the host communities are also addressed.

- Displacement requires institutionalised economic responses. Short term and emergency needs could be addressed through a fund such as the IMF, while an organization, similar to the World Bank could focus on longer term developmental needs. Care must be taken however to ensure that such economic responses to displacement do not compound the patronage-based nature of the regional economic and social system. Rather, they must encourage economic self-sustainability, good governance, reduced corruption and accountability.
- Given the right conditions, effectively managed economic responses to displacement can enable refugees to contribute positively to the host country's economic development. To ensure and enhance the potential for positive social and economic impacts, agencies should ensure that adequate consideration is given to programmes targeting housing, education, heath, access to water, and the impact on infrastructure.
- Simultaneously, to ensure that economic development strategies deliver sustainable responses, they must also address the strain that displacement crises place on scant regional resources. For example, as the planet's most water scarce region, investments must be made to increase capacity, reduce consumption and mitigate pollution.
- To address the causes of regional displacement in the longer term, political interventions are required to promote the transformation of regional economies from the current rentier economic and political structures, where economies are consumption, rather than production based, and populations dependent on hand-outs and patronage, towards diversified, even and equitable forms of economic development. Political approaches that support good governance, accountability and end corruption are also required.

## 4.2 Policy recommendation

There has been an ultimately untenable divide between the humanitarian and developmental responses to displaced people. While refugee crises demand an immediate humanitarian response to alleviate suffering and protect the human dignity of the uprooted, this must be more strongly correlated with development plans. It is now acknowledged that migration is a key driver of economic development, and, despite its associated human tragedy, forced migration also



offers the same developmental opportunities as its less nefarious voluntary forms.

In order to ensure that responses to alleviating the problems of forced migration do not get caught up in solely in the immediacy of humanitarian responses, an automaticity of regional and international responses to displacement crises should be implemented. Funding would thereby be made available automatically to help hosting countries and civil society actors to alleviate suffering while sowing the seeds of economic development to prevent circumstantial displacement transitioning into further structural exclusion.

## 4.3 Displacement - an automaticity of response

### Rehman Sobhan, Chairman, Centre for Policy Dialogue

In the historical discourse, there has been a tendency to treat displacement as a micro issue, where each episode becomes specific to time, place and circumstance. As a consequence, there has been less effort to conceptualise the problem so that universal lessons and responses can emerge out of wide and tragic experience.

For example, there have been a variety of experiences in the West Asia - South Asia region, ranging from the specificity of the displacement of the Palestinians from their ancestral homelands after the emergence of Israel, to the displacement arising from the partition of the sub-continent following decolonisation. Today we are witnessing a range of displacements, in Afghanistan, in Syria, and among the Rohingya of Myanmar. These are often considered peculiar to their own particular circumstances. Conversely, structural displacements originate in the denial of the rights of specific groups of people who as a consequence are compelled to leave their places of habitation either internally within their own country or across borders.

#### 4.3.1. The structural dynamics of displacement

A number of issues can be identified from the structural dynamics of the displacement process. It should be recognised that *circumstantial displacement* can transform into *structural displacement* quite easily. The best example of this is seen in the case of the Palestinians, whose displacement originated in the circumstances of the 1948 but became a structural displacement due to the ideological and ethnic construct of the Israeli state. This policy automatically and permanently excluded those who had left their homes and turned them into refugees in the region around them.

In examining other instances of displacement, one sees various forms of expulsion in countries where minorities became specifically excluded groups, either by social pressure or by political dynamics. In the case of Myanmar,



Bengalis, who over millennia settled south of the Indian boundaries in Burma and who then became permanent inhabitants of Rakhine state (the Rohingya), were treated as a perpetual minority and kept under-privileged throughout the region. This was followed by a concerted campaign to forcibly drive them out their homelands, which eventually turned into a structural displacement.

Other refugees can find themselves environmentally displaced for a variety of reasons. Some situations are temporary, such as when displacement occurs as a result of for example, earthquakes or other natural disasters. Others are more permanent, such as in Bangladesh, where one of the biggest causes of internal displacement and migration across into India stems from river erosion.

An additional form of structural displacement occurs when people are displaced by development projects carried out in the name of modernisation. Such schemes often mean people have to be resettled, often inadequately. In north-eastern Bangladesh for example, a dam was constructed across the River Karnaphuli in the 1950s. As a result, the lands of many tribal communities were inundated, meaning many people became permanent refugees. Some were driven into India, and have not been able to return homes in spite of a half-century of promises.

Amongst developmental processes, the privatisation agenda cannot be ignored, and especially the privatisation of the commons, or historically shared lands. For example, across rural Mexico, there had been a long-established right to the use of community land. Under the pressure of market-driven privatisation, a perception grew that this was a wasteful way to use commons. As a result, these lands have been progressively privatised and appropriated by various corporate interests, with a corresponding increase in landless people. This historical process can be traced back to the enclosure movement of eighteenth century Britain, where the commons were enclosed into private property during industrialisation.

Finally, there are economically displaced people. The dynamics of the market displace and marginalise large numbers of people and expose them to a variety of vulnerabilities. The pressure of such circumstances drives them from their occupations and habitations. Many of the involuntarily displaced around the world are economic refugees and victims of economic degradation in their own countries.

#### 4.3.2. Responses to displacement

We must address the critical issue of how to respond to the different forms of displacement. Here, one of the failures of the global community lies in its tendency to treat each crisis as *sui generis* in its response. There is constant fire-



fighting of different crises, whereas historical experience tells us these are in fact on-going phenomena that should, with conceptual vision, have generated an automaticity of responses, which do not currently seem to exist.

Essentially, there is a need for a macro-perspective that can be universalised in terms of responses to the particular crises which lead to the whole spectrum of displacement. This macro-response may be usefully based on the rights of people who are involuntarily displaced, from either the pressures of the market, the pressures of politics, or the shamefully human instinct to marginalise others.

A variety of macro-responses can be initiated depending on the nature of the displacement. For instance, where there are circumstantially displaced people as a result of short-term phenomena, such as in the current case of Syrians in Jordan, there should be an institutionalised international response. Here, we might consider an equivalent or counterpart to the IMF's response to particular short-term economic crises. Similarly, if one is dealing with historically specific displacement, there should be a permanent fund for countries dealing with a sudden, but temporary influx of refugees, perhaps as special facility of the IMF or as an independent facility. In either case, there should be automatic access to funding, rather than the current situation, where UNHCR goes around with a begging bowl.

As regards structural displacement, again, there are a variety of institutionalised interventions which could be implemented. Wherever there are structurally displaced persons, the initial measure must be to address the problem at its source. If political conditions are driving people away from their roots, as with the Rohingya in Myanmar, the international community must develop a standard protocol of responses. The UN, for instance, could set out certain codifications on the treatment of minorities or other vulnerable groups, so when they are exposed to displacement there is an automatic resolution from the international community. The offending country should be taken to task and held to account through some form of sanctions.

The second response should be more permanent. This could be seen in the creation of a counterpart to the World Bank. The blueprint could be based on Bretton Woods, at which the IMF and the World Bank were first established, the first for temporary financing against shocks, and the second for dealing with structural problems. Indeed, the original name of the World Bank was the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development. Its basic purpose was to govern monetary relations and avoid a recurrence of the Great Depression, as well as to support the reconstruction of Europe after the Second World War. This concept of rehabilitation could underpin a permanent institutionalised global arrangement. Again, the World Bank could rediscover its old *raison d'etre* of

being an IBRD, with a special function to deal with displacement. Alternatively, an independent or autonomous entity could be founded to finance resettlement.

Finally, to address the conditions driving economic displacement, we must deal with the sources of vulnerability and exclusion, such as lack of access to assets driven by an unequal participation in the marketplace and inequitable access to healthcare and education. Likewise, we must address the inequitable government processes and the undemocratic natures of many countries which purport to practice democracy. Such processes result in the marginalisation of the vulnerable and should be addressed institutionally.

## 4.4 The macro and micro-economic challenges presented by the uprooted

### Ziad El-Sayegh, Chief of Staff to the Labour Minister of Lebanon,

While there are many fundamental reasons for displacement, the socio-economic challenges for host communities, and for the refugees themselves once they have arrived in those communities, remain almost the same across the board. Increasing poverty, driven by displacement situations, can fuel social tension and sow the seeds of crime and, especially in the WANA region, extremism.

There is, therefore, an urgent need to develop national, regional and international strategies to secure the basic needs of refugee communities and their host societies. In this endeavour, the provision of relief services must be based on a coherent vision within the host country. Efficiency and transparency are essential. It is also imperative to address public opinion on the quality and limitations of state, international community and civil society interventions. Refugees and their hosts should be reassured that a practical vision will be adopted that balances the need for a humanitarian response with the developmental.

On fleeing their countries, it is clear that refugees have lost their ability to lead a decent and dignified life. It must be remembered, however, that they will not have lost their ambitions. Likewise, we must also remember that the duration of a host community's willingness to offer support is limited, especially in already strained economic conditions. Overpopulation, competition in the labour market, and pressures on public services all curtail the duration and size of the protection space offered to refugees.

To address the natural aspirations and demands of refugee communities, and to ameliorate the impacts on hosting communities, a more coordinated relationship between humanitarian and developmental actors is vital. A symbiotic relationship will serve to protect societal stability and uphold the economic growth of host countries and thereby ensure protection space for refugees. In

essence, greater attention must be given to the stability of hosting societies at a much earlier stage in the planning cycle during each refugee crisis.

## 4.5 Structural issues underlying displacement in the WANA region

## Mohammed Pournik, Independent Expert on Development Issues in West Asia and North Africa

In the West Asia – North Africa region, uprootedness has become the rule, rather than the exception. A chief driver for this displacement, and of which there are countless examples in the region, has been the process of economic development, which has been exclusionary by nature, and has marginalised increasing numbers of citizens from economic and social opportunity. In Southern Sudan, failed and exclusionary development caused the Southern Sudanese to take up arms and fight for many years against what was effectively, institutionalized marginalization.

Such exclusionary processes have also forced people to leave their countries. In Morocco under King Hassan II, the policy of *le maroc utile et le maroc non utile* meant that large parts of the country were essentially excluded. Many Moroccans were willing to risk their lives crossing the Mediterranean Sea into Europe simply because they had no life in their own country. These examples are not exceptional. While the issue is structural, such cases of regional uprootedness are also protracted. As a result, there is no short-term solution; the only answer lies in reversing the process.

#### 4.5.1. The structural dynamics of displacement

The underlying reason for the exclusionary nature of the development process in the WANA region lies in the fact that the political economy of the region is characterized by *rentier* states. As a result, the typical WANA state is largely independent of its citizens and relies on the politics of patronage through the distribution of political or economic rents in order to ensure its governmental powerbase. Unlike much of the world, where governments must give some consideration to the welfare of their citizens in order to ensure at least a modicum of support, if only to enable them to continue to collect taxes, these governments can afford to starve their populations because they don't need them. Indeed, their very existence reduces the resources available for wholesale appropriation by local elites.

The average citizen in WANA has only a tenuous bond with the state. Additionally, over time, the traditional mechanisms for mediating social conflict have been undermined. In Egypt, for example, the labour unions, lawyers' guilds, and professional associations that existed in the past were steadily corrupted by

state infiltration; whilst those NGOs which focused on social justice were likewise systematically infiltrated or closed. Only those NGOs with wholly charitable purposes – an alternative form of patronage, were allowed to remain. The existing dynamics must change to give citizens a voice.

In view of the fact that the underlying problem is structural, it requires structural solutions. The current shake up of the region could provide an opportunity to create a meaningful constituency for social justice and to promote human rights and state accountability, the current lack of which has driven uprootedness. Unaccountability sadly results in a complete disregard for the rights and needs of minorities and the marginalized. Nobody cares if a disabled person has problems gaining access to a building, if a religious minority's rights are violated, or if a refugee is maltreated.

Meaningful change will only be achieved through a social movement. There is a critical role for the media here. Responsible investigative journalism is sadly lacking in the region. Likewise, there is the question of legal activism, and the legal empowerment to which HRH Prince Hassan referred, whereby those whose rights are continuously violated can be both informed of their rights and access the necessary assistance to ensure them, be they the rights of garbage pickers, refugees, or any other group excluded from political power.

#### 4.5.2 Conclusion

When addressing uprootedness, due attention must be devoted to the developmental and humanitarian divide. Most importantly, in the disbursement of aid, huge care must be taken to ensure that that a humanitarian intervention does not become the norm and create further dependency in a region already dominated by patronage. There is a real risk that unless interventions are clearly calibrated, humanitarian action can become yet another kind of patronage network, excluding certain groups, manipulated to promote particular agendas or diverted to finance further conflict. In the absence of well thought-through, accountable strategies, humanitarian action can even unwittingly prolong both conflict situations and displacement.

## 4.6 Developmental responses to forced migration: reframing humanitarian crises as developmental opportunities

Roger Zetter, Emeritus Professor of Refugee Studies, University of Oxford

#### 4.6.1 Introduction

When addressing refugee and internal displacement situations, it is increasingly necessary to transcend the humanitarian - development divide, and place development policy at the heart of responses to forced displacement. The development impacts of humanitarian responses to forced migration are



receiving growing attention by international actors, and yet there is still a persistent gulf between the two, which does not enable the restoration of the dignity, wellbeing and livelihoods of refugees and internally displaced persons. Indeed, there has been no sustainable response for refugee crises which unlock the protracted displacement which has become such a marked characteristic of refugee situations around the world.

There are four things to consider initially. First, in 2011 almost 70% of the 10.4 million refugees, and more than 13 million IDPs, were living in protracted displacement. There is little prospect of resolution in unlocking the protracted situations in DRC, Somalia and Iraq and Syria, without substantive change. The three durable solutions are not working and a positive way to address this is to promote developmental responses which are both more economically sustainable and better protect the dignity and integrity of refugees and IDPs.

Secondly, the cost of OECD international humanitarian assistance to forced migrants and communities hosting them was about US\$8.4 billion in 2010. This represents about half the total ODA humanitarian assistance (the balance was expended on natural disasters) and about 6% of total ODA (excluding debt relief) from the OECD. Host country expenditure, NGO expenditure from private sources and developmental expenditure allocated to 'humanitarian' projects, add substantially to this figure.

The humanitarian funding regime has a complex array of instruments at its disposal, for example, the Central Emergency Response Fund (CERF), country-based Common Humanitarian Funds (CHFs) and Emergency Response Funds (ERFs). All are short-term emergency tools where disbursement is strictly controlled. This expenditure is largely devoted to the emergency consequences of forced migration, sidelining what should be a mainstream concern for the developmental and *economic* impacts and opportunities for forcibly displaced populations, their hosts and for humanitarian actors and international donors.

Thirdly, thirty years ago, ICARA<sup>2</sup> 1 (1981) and ICARA 2 (1984) highlighted the refugee and IDP 'burden' on hosts. These were essentially the additional costs on already hard-pressed public and social welfare budgets; arresting economic growth; distorting markets; environmental degradation; and, further political strains on fragile and conflict-affected countries. For example the recent donor call from the Jordanian Government for the Syrian crisis amounted to about \$450 million to cover additional fiscal stresses.

However, while governments emphasise negative impacts, refugees and IDPs can make positive economic contributions and, by increasing demand, can stimulate expansion of the national and local economy. Effects like these are often ignored

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup> International Conference on Assistance to Refugees in Africa



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and rarely promoted by current practice; the evidence-base is very scattered and the analytical tools to evaluate outcomes have not been readily available. A recent, largely micro economic, study of Dadaab refugee camps showed the positive economic impact of the camps for the host community was US\$ 14 million, about 25% of the per capita income of the province. Income benefits to the host community from the sale of livestock and milk alone were US\$ 3 million while over 1,200 local people benefited from refugee camp related employment or trade related work.

The Cypriot Government used the disaster of the forced displacement of 40% of its population in 1974 as economic opportunity, and refugees were essentially applied as a development resource. Within 10 years, three multi-sectorial Emergency Economic Action Plans (1975-86) had restored the GDP to its pre-1974 annual 6% growth rate, recovered the 70% of GDP estimated to have originated in the now-occupied north of the island and eliminated a 30% unemployment rate.

Indeed, a longitudinal micro-economic study of refugees in Kagera, Tanzania from 1991 to 2004, found an aggregate economic benefit. On average the refugee presence had a positive impact on the host population's living standards, measured by household real consumption per adult, and increased the probability of getting out of poverty by about 11%. Using cheaper refugee labour, local farmers were reported in some cases to have doubled local agricultural production. Business flourished in the refugee-hosting areas for both locals and refugees, whilst the US\$ 15 million infrastructure investment by international organizations significantly improved road, air and telecommunications access.

Finally, it is initially important to consider that the situation is changing. The World Bank is working actively in this field. The *Transitional Solutions Initiative*, which it runs with UHCR and UNDP, has also begun to think through these challenges. Likewise, the 2011 'Urban Strategy' of the Inter-Agency Standing Committee focused on the strategic objectives of restoring livelihoods and economic opportunities. The European Commission's regional programme has looked at how to use development as a tool in the Syrian crisis. Finally, the UN High-Level Dialogue on Migration, which is to be held later this year, will recognise migration as an enabling factor for development.

#### 4.6.2 Development and humanitarian tools and approaches

We need to establish what development-led solutions look like, alongside the most appropriate development and humanitarian tools and approaches. First of all, we must examine the potential micro- and macro-economic stimuli and the ways that refugees and hosts can be encouraged to develop livelihood strategies and contribute to the productive capacity of the countries in which they are



hosted. Cash-based assistance is vital, as are the promotion of livelihood strategies, ensuring better coordination of needs assessments, and enhancing community-based responses. All these demonstrate the ways in which refugees can contribute to their hosting economies rather than being perpetually kept on humanitarian assistance programmes which do not best enable their livelihoods to be enhanced and developed.

Cash-based assistance and vouchers are particularly pertinent because they encourage capital rather than consumption expenditure, and thus have the potential to kick-start local markets and increase demand-led development opportunities for locals and refugees alike - especially in urban settings where economies are cash-based. They also reduce supply-side pressures on the local economy which undermine the livelihoods and income of host communities, such as the selling of food rations and selling labour below market wages.

The promotion of livelihood strategies and sustainability can also stimulate demand and consumption by promoting and diversifying micro-enterprises with micro-credit. Strategies must prioritise the gender dimensions of economic recovery, while the longer term developmental impacts must also be given due attention because forced displacement severely disrupts gender roles, responsibilities and dynamics. Likewise, there must be greater effort towards better coordination of needs assessments such as that promoted by the IASC's Needs Assessment Task Force (NATF) multi-cluster rapid assessment approach.

Housing, land and property are very important development resources. They are the leading sector of most economies, and have important multiplier effects, with upstream linkages to building materials, and downstream ones to land markets, construction and employment. For this reason, not least because refugees need housing, developing ways of enhancing the housing, land and property sector of the host economy is a vital tool. In the same vein, more support for self-build construction should be given.

Development and humanitarian actors should also maximise developmental potential by 'localising' production, supply and purchase of all the materials and commodities that they use for their programmes (the same applies to medical supplies, food, water supply systems, tools and manufacturing equipment for micro-enterprises).

It is also important to maximise development potential by localising, where possible, the production, supply and purchase of materials used in programmes. This also should apply to medical supplies, food, water supply systems, tools and manufacturing equipment for micro-enterprises. The more that this principle can be applied, the greater productive capacity there will be in the economy.



Enhancing community-based responses to displacement is as much a developmental as a humanitarian priority. Communities usually initiate responses in crises, using their knowledge, organizational resources, trust and skills to alleviate displacement impacts, afford protection, maintain their resilience and restore livelihoods. Displaced communities often share resources and work together buying materials and using unpaid labour to build facilities collectively; they may lend to each other through locally acceptable credit mechanisms or offer job opportunities to each other. Likewise, community development initiatives demonstrate the self-sufficiency of refugees to their hosts and, that they can survive and develop with minimal external support: these outcomes may help to diminish tensions between them.

Humanitarian and development actors should also promote and support investment in technologies and services that restore remittance flows, since these are an effective and speedy way of supporting livelihoods recovery, and of offering developmental potential.

Another critical aspect of refugee crises is the impact on the public sector. As capital formation is a significant multiplier, it is vital that plans for capital expenditure, for hosts and refugees alike, are coordinated effectively. This requires a major change in the lending policies of international donors. There also need to be better strategies to tackle externalities - such as environmental costs and the depletion of water resources. Likewise the public sector must monitor, and then respond, to impacts of refugee crises on, for example, wage rates, property rental levels, and the impacts on subsidies on bread, water, and power. The public sector can also find ways to stimulate the productive capacity of the economy, especially where there is a very large new demand. Fiscal and taxation policies can expand investment and productive capacity to respond to meet such demand.

## 4.6.3. Development led strategies need planning, strategy making and institutional reform

Development led strategies need planning, strategy-making and institutional reform, always with a view to benefiting both refugees and hosts through enabling refugees to be better incorporated into the productive sectors of the economy. A preliminary requirement for this is an analysis of the economic costs and impacts. The World Bank's Guidelines on costs and impacts offer a potential tool to establish a baseline, indicate the potential pressures on the host economy, and propose development priorities that might be adopted to maximise the economic returns and minimise the negative impacts.

To build on such analyses, there are a range of economic policymaking instruments and tools that provide the familiar basis for development planning,



but need to be expanded to take account of the developmental opportunities and impacts created by refugees. First, comprehensive strategies and policies should be formulated and integrated into the national planning machinery and national development plans. Macro and micro- economic growth targets should be matched to operational programmes and investment strategies to stimulate the national and local economy and maximise the integration of refugees into the economy.

Secondly, fiscal planning and budgeting of line ministry budgets should coordinate public expenditure, while thirdly, in the context of national development planning, World Bank/IMF Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSP) are an important strategic vehicle which could also be used to address the development impacts of refugees.

This range and combination of tools offers the potential to address typical socioeconomic impacts and to create developmental responses to the long-term presence of refugees and IDPs in receiving areas as follows:

- Addressing provision of public sector goods and services identifying fiscal stress, revenue and capital investment in response to refugee impacts and maximising benefits new health centres, schools, etc. provided by donors.
- Managing the macro- and micro-performance of the economy in response to refugee impacts.
  - Macro capital formation, agriculture, productive capacity, construction.
  - Micro labour markets, wages, rent.
- Minimising externalities (un-priced or spillover effects) e.g. environment, depleting water reserves, refugees benefit from subsidies e.g. water and bread.

It is also important to use taxation and fiscal policies and to stimulate investment to take account of short and long run effects. Micro effects tend to be negative and short run, such as depletion in quality of public services for hosts and depressed wage levels. Conversely, macro effects tend to be long run and positive, such as improved infrastructure, greater employment, a more highly skilled workforce, and increased demand

Unlike the public sector, which is often a net loser, the redistributive impact on the economy as a whole following refugee crises, creates winners and losers amongst the host population and sectors of the economy. Impacts in rural areas are often far more pronounced than in urban areas because of their weaker absorptive capacity. Therefore, a key policy issue, if an experience of 'refugee burden' is to be avoided, is managing equilibrium and redistributive effects.

There must also be procedural and regulatory reform to unlock and enhance the positive economic impacts and developmental potential of forced displacement situations and to place obligations on host governments to ease restrictions which limit the economic competition of refugees, such as access to labour markets, wage rates and entrepreneurial activity (e.g. market stalls).

## 4.6.4 Protracted displacement and implications for developmental approaches

Protracted displacement also has implications for humanitarian, developmental and political approaches. There must be a focus on improved protection against threats of removal, *refoulement*, detention and harassment. Relaxing the restrictive regulatory regimes on their economic activities and enhancing refugees' right to work will open wider prospects for developing and consolidating livelihoods, especially in the urban context. Likewise, more flexible policies towards mobility and the subsequent migration strategies for refugees could assist supporting development opportunities. Refugees should be allowed more freedom of movement within their countries of refuge -- for example, from camps to cities -- without the fear of detention or return to camps. This should be coupled with more flexible attitudes to cross-border movements, which could be a valuable means of supporting livelihoods in exile whilst offering tentative steps to promoting peace building at home.

Host countries should consider revisiting their policies on citizenship and integration, possibly on a regional basis. For any migrant population, local integration is inevitable in long-term situations, and forcibly displaced people are no exception. There is, however, resistance. Countries hosting refugees could consider how conditional, contingent or progressive forms of citizenship might work. These could, for example, offer more secure residency for those with skills or resources in short supply and a more progressive form of citizenship where the economic gain for the host country is less clear. Examples from other regions are helpful here. The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) is experimenting with such an approach enabling Sierra Leonean and Liberian refugees to remain in their host communities and to take advantage of existing agreements that provide West African citizens with regional employment and residency rights. Likewise, Brazil has granted five year residency and work visas to Haitian earthquake survivors. The challenge here for the WANA region lies in overcoming the political resistance that most governments have towards refugees beyond immediate humanitarian obligations and commitments.

#### 4.6.5. Conclusion

Although there are plenty of opportunities to better integrate developmental and humanitarian approaches, many challenges remain. One such hurdle is the political resistance of host governments in creating development strategies for refugees. Overcoming this obstacle will require recognising the legitimate needs, legal rights and aspirations of displaced people, and applying flexible policies towards settlement, mobility (both internal and cross-border) and, where relevant, citizenship to refugees and IDPs. It also means enhancing the planning and operational capacity of governments in the region to address humanitarian and development dimensions of forced displacement. Host governments must take the lead in development planning, but how might international humanitarian and development actors best collaborate in, and support, this process? How can the main international humanitarian and development actors - such as IASC/OCHA, World Bank - better integrate their strategies and approaches? How can international donors innovate emergency and developmental funding strategies? Ultimately, more flexible funding of humanitarian interventions is needed that encourages and enables humanitarian agencies to design and implement more sustainable and developmentally oriented programmes.

## **Session 5: The Challenge of Urban Displacement**

## 5.1. Summary

To date most humanitarian and developmental assistance for refugees has been focused on camp populations, yet today the great majority of refugees live among their hosts in urban centres. Many of the tools used to address the needs of refugees and displaced people in camps are inappropriate to urban settings, and fail to adequately address the challenges facing refugees and hosts alike. Refugees in urban spaces are subject to particular vulnerabilities that are endemic to their location. Young men, for example, are particularly susceptible to recruitment into gangs, while refugee children are faced with closer integration into the community than would be the case in camp environments. Refugees in towns and cities also require different kinds of humanitarian assistance from that which is needed in more concentrated camp situations. In an urban setting for example, cash assistance could be more appropriate than direct food aid.

In many cases, refugees in urban settings will find themselves living among already deprived and marginalised communities. Refugees will often be reliant on already over-stretched and poor services compared to those available to the wider community. As such, development actors should ensure that appropriate capacity building of public services in health and education takes place, alongside increases in funding.

With situations of displacement now lasting an average of 17 years, host countries and wider development actors must come to terms with the permanence of these urban refugee populations and find ways to incorporate them into their economies, or risk creating additional marginalised and disenfranchised groups that will generate future conflict situations and thus further displacement.

Development actors should also be aware that poor host communities will also feel the economic strain of hosting refugees as a result of, for example, increased competition in the labour market which will drive down wages across the board, and increased competition over access to housing, food and other material goods, which will drive up prices for those who can little afford increases in the cost of living. Unsurprisingly therefore, speakers in this session unanimously concluded that in order to address the needs of urban refugees living in communities that have already provided them with the material assets which should come under the purview of humanitarian agencies, the focus must shift from a purely assistance to a developmental approach. Key points emerging from this session were that:

- In view of the fact that the average length of displacement is now some twenty years, host countries must plan ahead to incorporate refugees fully into their societies, particularly economically.
- The children born to today's refugees are likely to reach adulthood whilst still residing in their host countries. It is incumbent upon these countries to provide services to address the needs of this new generation of refugees who will make up a sizeable portion of the general population in the future.
- The regional model used a decade ago to deal with Iraqi refugees through "institutional support programs" can be applied to today's Syrian refugee crisis. The international community should focus on building new and improving existing infrastructure for the benefit of both refugees and local populations.

## 5.2. Key policy recommendations

Humanitarian and developmental tools associated with aiding refugees in campbased situations are inappropriate for refugees in urban environments, who are harder to assist than refugees in more concentrated environments. Urban strategies could include:

- Providing cash assistance or vouchers, rather than food aid;
- Capacity building urban public services;
- Risk assessment of particularly vulnerable, but often overlooked refugee groups in urban environments, such as young men at risk of recruitment into gangs; and,
- Undertaking labour-market analysis to establish where refugee skills can best complement those of local host populations.

## 5.3. Adopting a developmental approach to urban displacement

## Sara Pantuliano – Head of the Humanitarian Policy Group, Overseas Development Institute

Even before the Syrian crisis began, half of the world's refugees were thought to be IDPs in urban areas - a population numbering at least 29 million. As a result of the conflict in Syria, the number of refugees in urban settings has also swelled considerably, with large numbers being found in neighbouring Lebanon and Jordan. Considering the trend towards decades-long displacement, and the likelihood that urban refugees will remain in their host countries long after original crises that drove them from their homes have ended, planning for protracted displacement from the outset is essential.



#### 5.3.1. Protracted displacement

In examining the challenges of urban displacement particular attention must be paid to the refugees likely to remain in their host countries for extended periods of time. Currently, the UNHCR defines a group in "protracted displacement" as a community of at least 25,000 refugees who have remained in exile for more than five years. In the 1990s, the average length of protracted displacement was nine years; today, it is more than twenty. The children of refugees often grow up in host countries, far from their ancestral homes. Moreover, many uprooted peoples do not return to their country of origin even when the opportunity presents itself, particularly those living in urban areas.

#### **5.3.2.** Developmental versus humanitarian approaches

In view of the fact that refugees fall into an internationally protected category, the mandate of their protection lies by default with the humanitarian sector. Indeed, we continue to see relief-focused responses to displaced populations, although these are known to be inadequate. Protection and expansion of the safety and dignity of the displaced require long-term intervention, not just in the humanitarian sector, but also in the development sector.

Progress has been made towards recognising the unique challenges of urban displacement and bringing together humanitarian and development factors in response efforts. In 2009 the UNHCR's policy officially recognized urban areas as legitimate places for refugee settlement and called for organizations to provide assistance to address this trend. The Interagency Standing Committee – the task force charged with meeting humanitarian challenges in urban areas – released its strategy in 2010, linking their role to that of development. The British Red Cross and Médecins Sans Frontières have also expanded their roles in urban areas. The reality remains, however, that no priority has yet been given to funding an institutional commitment to deal with urban displacement. Instead, the burden of support falls to the host states, which often feel abandoned by the international community.

The persistent focus of humanitarian organizations on camp populations causes a number of problems. First, in camps, humanitarian agencies usually act in isolation rather than cooperating with host governments. Indeed, they often take on the role of a surrogate state, one that cannot be an adequate substitute for the host state itself. Second, the humanitarian sector's obsession with is at times prejudicial towards urban refugees, not least the many who do not want to be identified as such, especially if they are living in neighbourhoods that are already noting the cost of supporting them. Being categorized as a displaced person only furthers the sense of segregation from the local community. Third, the modalities used to assess vulnerability are ill-suited to urban contexts. Women and children

are traditionally considered the most vulnerable, but in cities young men are at risk as well, facing the threat of recruitment by gangs and armed actors.

As the focus of humanitarian and development actors alike shifts to the urban displaced, however, a new skillset is required to address the needs of the uprooted in urban environments. Humanitarian organizations are ill-equipped and should perhaps not be expected to undertake urban market analysis, to stimulate job creation, to support livelihoods or offer other relevant assistance in these situations. (For example, rather than the material assistance: food, water, shelter, necessary in camps, urban refugees need cash and vouchers to access such basics.) Development actors and organizations must be brought in to rectify the situation, to network and advocate on behalf of IDPs and refugees. Until they are, we must continue to push this agenda.

Finally, it is important to give serious consideration to the language used in the context of urban displacement. Terms such as displacement "vulnerability" and "victimhood" serve only to emphasise negative perceptions surrounding refugees, portraying them as a burden to the host community, rather than as presenting an opportunity. A more appropriate terminology would be one which gives more credit to the resilience, ingenuity, and fortitude that uprooted populations display; acknowledges the opportunity for safety and self-sufficiency that cities offer, and highlights the contributions that the displaced can make to the societies in which they live.

## 5.4. International responsibility to child refugees in the Syrian crisis

#### Dominique Hyde - UNICEF Representative in Jordan

The conflict in Syria is one of the gravest crises facing children in the world today. It has destroyed more than 2,500 schools and killed at least 110 teachers. Less than half of all public hospitals in Syria are fully functioning, and only twenty per cent of children have been vaccinated. Much of the water and sanitation infrastructure has been destroyed. Most shockingly, over 100,000 people have been killed, among whom are thousands of children. An entire generation is at risk.

There are close to half a million Syrian refugees living in Jordan, seventy per cent of them in urban environments across the country. Close to ninety per cent are living in the four northern governorates, putting enormous pressure on those areas. Overwhelmingly, these families feel a sense of relief and gratitude toward countries like Jordan who accept them into their society and allow them access to their civil services.



The Jordanian government has been generous in welcoming Syrian refugees, to be sure, but the influx has been massive. Refugee children are competing with local children for scarce health care, education, water and sanitation, and protective services. Every day in Jordan, approximately fifty Syrian women give birth. For those children, Jordan will be home. That in itself will change the country.

A Syrian mother living in Jordan right now faces myriad problems. Where does she get the money for rent, for food, for health services? Culturally, it is difficult for her to work; she must stay at home with her children. She could send her young sons to work instead, as indeed many do. She could marry off her fifteen-year-old daughter for the bride price – even though the legal age for marriage in Jordan is eighteen and the potential suitor is a stranger. To address the needs of urban refugees and their host communities, humanitarian aid and development support must be balanced.

The UN and UNICEF are monitoring all parties in the conflict on the six violations of children's rights: (1) killing or maiming of children; (2) recruitment or use of children by armed forces or groups; (3) attacks on schools, health facilities, or hospitals; (4) rape or sexual violence against children; (5) abduction of children; and (6) denial of humanitarian access to children. All of these horrific crimes have been perpetrated against the children of Syria, causing massive psychological damage. Without a doubt, there will be long-term consequences for host countries if rehabilitation services for these children are not provided.

Nevertheless, there is hope. Continuing education is crucial in providing a sense of normalcy to child refugees. Schools can provide friendship, trust, and physical protection for children. Although UNICEF pays the tuition costs, teachers' salaries, and costs of rehabilitation, the incredible example of the Jordanian government's generosity should be followed throughout the region. Still, of the 180,000 Syrian children in Jordan, only 42,000 right now are in school. Families are not aware of the services, or are convinced their time in Jordan is only temporary. What would it mean for the future of Syria if its refugee population returns uneducated?

We all have a responsibility to ensure that these children are given the chance to realize their dreams, that they can go home educated and become productive citizens in their countries. The international community needs to provide more direct cash support to refugees living in urban areas so that displaced mothers can support their families. Currently, the UNHCR provides cash only to the most vulnerable and in very small amounts. This aid should be augmented by a regional support fund. In particular, the concept of using *zakat* to aid the displaced population warrants further discussion.

## 5.5. Emulating positive regional examples of responses to refugees

Shaden Khallaf – Adjunct Professor, Centre for Migration and Refugee Studies, American University of Cairo

Over half of the world's population currently resides in urban areas. This number is expected to reach approximately five billion by 2030. It should come as no surprise, then, that there is also a growing urban refugee population.

In light of this trend, we must re-examine the traditional focus on refugees living in camps. The 2009 UNHCR policy revision attempted to address the challenge of this growing urban refugee population. To a large extent, however, responses tend to be emergency-based. Long-term planning and inclusion of refugees in development projects still have not taken root, even though the average length of displacement is now twenty years. Mobility has become the norm. We must recognize displacement as a reality, reconstruct our understanding of uprootedness and human mobility, and try to move forward on this basis.

Refugees in urban areas face familiar issues: limited access to services, lack of documentation and resources, fear of forced repatriation, and a general desire to remain invisible in order to avoid confrontation with host societies. Karen Jacobsen, an expert on urban refugees, describes them as existing in annexes between two populations – the local urban poor and foreign-born migrants. This in-between existence highlights the need for a more holistic, community-based approach to addressing this population's needs.

#### 5.5.1. Towards finding solutions for urban refugees

In finding ways to deal positively with urban refugees, we can look to regional examples. During the influx of Iraqi refugees into Syria, Jordan, and Lebanon between 2003 and 2006, the UNHCR employed "institutional support programs." These programs were geared toward ensuring that the host governments, communities, and institutions were receiving sufficient support to accept refugees. Schools and clinics were built or renovated in areas with high refugee populations, thereby both addressing the needs of the displaced and benefiting the local communities. Female refugee volunteers were recruited to spread awareness of programs available to all of the displaced. Ideas were floated about investing further in local infrastructure and working with local partners and NGOs.

These strategies can be applied to the WANA region today. The Arab Spring set off a cycle of expansion and contraction of the space available in which to work to protect human rights. On the one hand, we have the amazing generosity demonstrated by Jordan, Lebanon, Egypt, Turkey, Iraq, and other countries



receiving Syrian refugees. On the other, there has been a huge backlash against the refugees who were living in Libya or Egypt before the revolutions took place, attributed to a heightened sense of nationalism and an attendant fear of external intervention.

As a result of these developments, the WANA region as a whole is developing its own understanding of human rights standards and refugee protection. In forming our policy, we must work more with local structures and capitalize on the incredible resourcefulness, resilience, and strength of these refugee communities and of the institutions working with them.

We must take advantage of the region's evolving view of its refugee population to change the way the displaced are seen by their host societies. As opposed to the persistent perception of refugees competing with the local population, why not encourage a complementary relationship as refugees as a driver of economic growth for the host communities? Labour market analysis should be conducted in urban areas hosting large numbers of refugees to identify niche employment opportunities, as well as to see where they can complement the existing market dynamic. In Egypt, for example, some Syrian refugees are working with local Egyptian businessmen to set up restaurants and shops. This model should be expanded and replicated.

We must also make use of technological advances to avoid the traditional image of refugees queuing up to receive hand-outs. Allowing them to receive assistance privately, either at home or through ATM cards, rather than having to be corralled like cattle, would preserve the human dignity that is the right of all the displaced. International actors and institutions should be more forthcoming in reaching out to the uprooted to preserve their self-respect and discourage local communities from segregating them further.

# Session 6: Consequences of the Uprooted for Water Resources

## 6.1 Summary

Home to 3% of the global population and comprising 10% of the world's landmass, the West Asia – North Africa region has only 1.2% of the worldwide renewable water resources. As such, it is one the most water-stressed regions in the world. States in the region are characterized by a high level of environmental dependency upon each other, yet regional governments have failed to find supranational solutions to water management problems. As a result, water has become a source of great friction, and could potentially drive conflicts in the future. Likewise, increasing desertification has the potential to exacerbate environmental displacement, especially as climate change further limits the amount of available freshwater, and as aquifers, many of which are not replenishable, are drained.

Further stresses on the regional states' carrying capacity are engendered by increasing numbers of refugees and internally displaced people. This should be borne in mind when implementing humanitarian or development programmes for the uprooted and their host communities.

States across the region should seek greater cooperation in the management of their shared water commons. Countries in far less developed parts of the world have put aside their sovereignty rights over shared water resources in order to better protect and manage precious environmental commons. Such cooperation can also improve relations between states and therefore reduce the likelihood of future conflict and the concomitant crises of displacement. The WANA Forum has already highlighted the need for better integrated management of water in the region and the benefits such management would bring in its 2012 report *Regional Solutions for Water Scarcity in West Asia – North Africa*. El Hassan bin Talal himself has long called for a visionary community of water and energy – something akin to the European Coal and Steel Community which was a forerunner of today's European Union.

Authorities should also seek to involve stakeholders in water management to ensure that end users of water feel engaged and part of the management of their environmental commons. Such involvement will serve to reduce wasteful usage and generate a sense of greater responsibility for collective resources.

States and their citizens also need to improve the management of their own water resources. Using culturally relevant solutions within the region will serve to encourage greater implementation and wider participation. The Islamic concept of *al-hima*, or protected spaces, which comes from the heart of Bedouin

culture, is one such homegrown solution, and has successfully defended environmental commons in many places across the region.

## **6.2** Policy recommendations

Governments in the region should seek to work together to establish how they can collectively manage their shared water resources. Collaborative management will serve to protect scarce water resources, and could also help to lessen political tensions within the region. Water authorities in the region could benefit from developing methodologies to engage stakeholders in water management and allocation. Bringing end-users into the planning and management systems can help ensure buy-in for allocation plans and thus support water conservation. The use of home grown, culturally attuned concepts such as *al-hima* will also reinforce local understanding of the need to protect scarce environmental commons.

## 6.3 Issues in regional water management

### Yaşar Yakış, former Foreign Minister of Turkey, President of STRATIM

In the WANA region, as elsewhere, the most seemingly logical policies are often politically difficult and thus rarely implemented. No area bears this out more than the management of the region's scarce water resources, where the need for supranational solutions is glaring, but remains unimplemented.

#### **6.3.1** Collective management

Effective regional water management naturally requires solid and accurate knowledge of multiple factors such as: the quantity of available water; alternative water sources; the increasing and changing impact of climate change; the speed of water depletion; the increase in demand due to population growth; higher water usage per capita as standards of living rise together with mechanisms to ensure balanced utilisation of water between irrigation, power generation and domestic consumption. Likewise, the impact on the environment, pricing, and the inclusion of stakeholders in formulating policies must all be taken into consideration when trying to manage water at a regional level.

In view of the fact that water basins throughout the region are shared amongst a number of countries, regional water management, and cooperation among riparian countries is crucial. The rejection of such a cooperative approach by any one country naturally impacts negatively on effective regional resource management. By contrast, cooperation extending to other neighbouring countries beyond the direct basin system, though complicated, and potentially requiring mutual concessions and the requisite, sophisticated negotiations, can yield optimum results. Research and best-practice should be shared, and techniques for regional water management in regions where water is less scarce should be studied and adopted where relevant.

#### 6.3.1 Cooperation on environmental commons

Unfortunately, despite the urgent need for cooperation and the collective management of water in the region, the present international landscape in WANA is not conducive to collaboration. Even before the Arab Spring and its related turmoil a culture of regional dialogue, let alone one of regional cooperation, was notable only by its absence. Public authorities often erroneously believe that the involvement of stakeholders will impede the smooth implementation of their ideas on water management when in fact effective management can never be achieved without establishing end-users as a central part of the planning process. Such dialogue must also be continuous so that plans adapt to changing situations on the ground. Dialogue and inclusion in the planning process will also instil in stakeholders a sense of ownership, and therefore will serve to increase efficiency.

Collective water policy development among riparian countries should coordinate on areas as varied as water allocation for irrigation, power and domestic use, to the promotion of less water-intensive crops. Likewise, decisions on water management methods, such as water saving irrigation and treatment techniques, and the use of desalination must all be considered within a culture of regional dialogue.

## 6.4 Al-Hima in Beqaa Valley – a home-grown technique for water management

## Dalia Al-Jawhary, Hima Programs Director, Society for the Protection of Nature in Lebanon

The region desperately needs home-grown solutions to protect its environmental commons from overuse and degradation. The regional concept of *al-hima* has provided just that. It is based on man's obligation to protect the environment through his obligation to practice *khilafa*, or stewardship, over nature.

Al-hima refers to an area set aside for the conservation and management of natural capital, such as fields, wildlife, forests and water reserves. The concept itself was transformed by the Prophet Muhammad (PBUH) and came to be one of the essential instruments of conservation in Islamic Law. Indeed, the UN Commissioner for Refugees, António Guterres, has even called specifically for the adaptation of and for learning from al-Habasha and Medina in international refugee law. Elinor Ostrom's ideas on managing commons, which won her a Nobel Prize actually contains many principles of al-hima.

#### 6.4.1. The Begaa Valley example

The concept of *al hima* has been effectively applied to community-based water management in Lebanon's Beqaa Valley, which is inhabited by the descendants of



the Armenian diaspora and is an important habitat for a number of endangered species, such as African-Eurasian migratory water birds, the Syrian serin, and local otter species. The area also contains a number of important cultural and historical sites.

The land in Anjar was originally awarded to Armenian families by the French administration following the First World War, who then set about creating an urban and agricultural plan for the valley. By 1941, potable water was provided to the houses through setting a pipe system from a canal system. This was so effective that the traditional gravity canal irrigation system implemented by the original Armenian community has been retained until today. This has enabled the area to retain productive, but sustainable, agriculture. Indeed, Anjar's economy still relies on agriculture, which employs 70% of its inhabitants.

The water system is collectively managed by a board of nine members, who are elected on a yearly basis from candidates within the farming community. Four members are selected as permanent employees annually. They are complemented by seasonal staff who undertake daily canal cleaning from April to September. There are also four guards to prevent water theft. Communal laws govern the interaction between the farmers and the water committee. Fees are set objectively by the board based on market price.

Further work is undertaken with farmers to improve the efficiency of the canal system. Alternative field irrigation approaches are also promoted, alongside improved monitoring. *Al-hima* also seeks to increase appreciation of the water ecosystems in the valley. The Lebanese example of the Beqaa Valley provides a positive model for incorporating refugees and their innovations into stewardship of natural resources.

## 6.5 Regional water management and promoting peace

## Sundeep Waslekar, President of the Strategic Foresight Group

While it is obvious that refugees place stresses on the water system of host countries, the real link between the uprooted and water can be found in conflict reduction. Empirical evidence shows that when countries learn to cooperate and share water resources, their overall relationship improves and a culture of peace and confidence is created.

This can be seen in both developing and developed countries. For example, Africa, Guinea, Senegal, Mali, and Mauritania have all agreed to manage the Senegal River collaboratively and to give up their individual sovereignty over its constituent parts. The Senegal River basin is now overseen in the collective interests of all four countries, which is possible despite a minimal average per capita income and some of the lowest levels of economic development globally.



Elsewhere in Africa, Lesotho has agreed to share its water resources with neighbouring South Africa. Likewise, in South America, Peru and Bolivia collectively manage Lake Titicaca. India and Bangladesh also share the water resources of the River Ganges, and are now negotiating how to share and manage the Titas River.

Unfortunately, for political reasons, such collective management in the West Asia – North Africa region has not been possible. Looking ahead, , the encouragement of regional cooperation on water issues can both serve to bolster water resources available to displaced populations, as well as to diminish the environments of conflict which engender displacement in the first place.

# Session 7: Economic Development and a Regional Financing Regime

## 7.1 **Summary**

Whilst uprooted communities place short-term economic burdens on their host countries, they can equally make positive developmental contributions by bringing new skills and resources, as well as by increasing productive capacity and demand. This can serve to stimulate expansion in the hosting economy.

The regional and international community has a duty to help countries bear the short-term economic burdens of hosting refugees. Likewise, low- and middle-income countries may require support to unlock the potential that refugees have for economic development. A regional fund for reconstruction and development could serve both these needs, and ensure more equitable and sustainable economic growth which could minimise marginalisation and reduce potential conflict situations in the future.

In this session, the following issues were raised:

- Looking to the future, a regional bank for reconstruction and development should be established whose remit would include providing both immediate and developmental assistance to displaced people and to host societies. This could help address the direct development needs resulting from displacement, and promote policies designed to foster social cohesion, social justice, inclusion, empowerment and greater equality of opportunity, the lack of which have all been identified as major factors causing conflict and displacement in the region.
- Displaced people can make solid economic contributions to host societies in terms of the provision of new skills, high productivity, and greater economies of scale, thereby stimulating economic growth. However, shortterm and long-term assistance is needed to translate this potential into a reality and to ensure equitable development opportunities for both the uprooted and host societies.
- A new financing regime, in the form of a supranational regional cohesion fund or a regional bank for reconstruction and development, combining banking components with some form of regional *zakat*, could provide a useful facilitating mechanism, although prohibitions on the supranational use of *zakat* would have to be suspended in some countries.
- As discussed throughout the conference, such a fund could also mitigate some of the negative effects of displacement, assist in the realisation of the potential benefits of refugees to host countries, and furthermore, could



- directly help the uprooted though grants and soft loans to drive entrepreneurship and enterprise.
- Perhaps because of a lack of regional cohesion, progress towards the Millennium Development Goals in West Asia - North Africa has stalled. While some indicators, such as education and health, have improved numerically, quality has suffered. A new development agenda post-2015, incorporating the totality of the issues surrounding migration is required.
- In order to better facilitate development, regional burden-sharing mechanisms should be created to ensure that funded frameworks that share costs equitably are in place for episodes of displacement.
- Forms of funding and support from the region do exist. The Islamic emphasis
  on social ethics, justice, empowerment and protection of the poor and
  vulnerable is crucial in this context, while a form of institutionalized regional
  zakat could offer an important source of support for those who find
  themselves in situations of displacement or refugee situations as and when
  they occur.

## 7.2 Policy recommendation

A supranational regional cohesion fund or regional bank for reconstruction and development, combining banking components with regional *zakat*, based around the concept of human dignity, would offer a much needed mechanism for developing home-grown solutions to displacement and for maximising the positive and sustainable economic impacts of the uprooted for their host communities.

The fund or regional bank would have a dual purpose – to alleviate human suffering in the immediate and to support human-centric socio-development in the longer term. Additionally, it could provide a power house of ideas for developing home grown solutions to pressing problems, including the WANA countries' legacy of political and economic rentierism.

## 7.3 The Arab Development Finance System and the Fiscal Gap to attain the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs)

The following written remarks were prepared by Denise Sumpf, representing Abdallah Al Dardari, Director, Economic Development & Globalisation Division, ESCWA

Large populations in precarious political, economic and social circumstances have a serious impact on regional stability and economic development. Economic growth, equity and human development are all intrinsically linked in the reduction of inequity and the promotion of broad-based participation. However, while growth is necessary, it is not on its own sufficient. Growth can only be



sustained when all parts of society are able to contribute to, participate in, and benefit from growth. However, the ideas of "contributing to", "participating in" and "benefitting from" are not as straightforward as they sound. All three require a certain degree of stability and predictability in the context in which people live. Unfortunately, the WANA region is more and more prone to instability, as the growing number of the uprooted indicates.

While there are many dimensions to the problem, the impact of development financing, and the state of Arab human development - specifically the current state of the Arab Development Finance System and the *fiscal gap* pertaining to the attainment of internationally agreed development goals, such as the MDGs, are key.

Placing the uprooted at the centre of a development approach requires leveraging and reforming existing institutions along with new ideas for a regional development financing approach. Being uprooted is usually preceded by some form of conflict or natural disaster. Geographically, that can mean internal displacement within one's own country - or internationally, becoming a refugee in another country. Our region has suffered from both for decades and we have often dealt with protracted displacement: Palestine, Iraq and now, potentially, Syria.

### 7.3.1 Impact of displacement on livelihoods

Even though little is currently known about the causality of displacement and its impact on livelihoods, a recent study on households and communities in Uganda reveals some eye-opening data:

- Firstly, the immediate economic impact of displacement results in a 28 to 35 per cent reduction in consumption as well as a decrease in the value of assets compared to non-displaced households. Measuring the impact two years after return – if return is possible at all – displaced households still lag behind non-displaced households by 20 per cent in terms of consumption, and in terms of lesser asset value (1/5 standard deviation).
- Secondly, and particularly relevant in the context of MDG attainment, displaced households which were in the top three quartiles of predisplacement assets appear to have recovered a portion of their consumption, though with significantly reduced education and wealth levels.
- Households in the bottom quartile of pre-displacement assets a
  population group that was already vulnerable recovered neither their
  consumption ability nor the pre-displacement level of their financial and
  non-financial assets.
- Beyond the reestablishment of individual and household livelihoods, the humanitarian duty of receiving refugees and providing for internally



displaced persons places a tremendous strain on the economy and the social fabric of the host country.

# 7.3.2 Economic migration

In the Arab region we also have to consider a different, more elusive form of uprootedness, namely the movement of people in search of employment opportunities. Intra-Arab migration has increased significantly over the last ten years due to shifting urbanization patterns that accompany changes from traditional farming activities to manufacturing and service sector employment. Cities such as Amman, Baghdad, Cairo, Damascus, Jeddah and Riyadh underwent rapid urban growth, which challenges existing infrastructure and the delivery of (basic) services.

Moreover, there have been substantial outflows of migrants to Europe, large inflows to the countries of the Gulf Cooperation Council, as well as movements of irregular migrants transiting the region on their way to Europe.

# 7.3.4 Regional progress towards achieving the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs)

The following "Ten-Point overview" identifies existing and emerging development financing priorities:

- 1. Significant gains have been made towards universal access to education, especially for girls: Primary school enrolment and literacy rates in the region have increased due to comparatively high investments in education over the last decades (standing currently at 5 per cent of GDP in 2010).
- 2. Achievements towards the reduction of child and infant mortality (MDG 4) as well as in improving maternal health (MDG 5) in all three Arab subregions are visible. Nonetheless and compared to other regions, the Arab countries' progress is relatively slow. In particular, the Arab LDCs lag behind, achieving a decrease of only 15 per cent in child mortality and 17 per cent in maternal mortality.
- 3. Relatively strong progress towards universal access to reproductive health care in most of the Arab world is hampered by persistent geographical and economic disparities. While on average the Arab region has improved access to health care, the LDCs stagnate at a low level (antenatal coverage increased from 39 per cent in 1990s to only 40 per cent in the 2010s). Analysis at the household level reveals glaring disparities: the richest quintile benefits from almost universal access to health care, while the poorest quintile suffers from widespread lack of access to services.
- 4. Millions more Arab people have access to safe drinking water and basic sanitation, even though the rural-urban divide has deepened. Traditionally, LDCs and rural areas in other Arab sub-regions lag behind, and declining



- public investment into quantitative as well as qualitative improvements, combined in some cases with the destruction of infrastructure due to conflict, prevents sufficient progress towards the targets of MDG 7 (ensure environmental sustainability). The issue is compounded by a high concentration of urban slum dwellers (the uprooted) in Arab LDCs.
- 5. The Arab region has a mixed record in adopting new technologies. While mobile/cellular subscriptions are above the global average, mobile broadband and fixed telecommunications lag behind.
- 6. Despite a period of regional poverty reduction between 1990 and 2010, poverty swelled to 7.4 per cent in 2012. Traditional poverty measures yielded a reduction of extreme poverty to 4.1 per cent in 2010, down from 5.5 per cent in 1990, but people are precariously close to the poverty line and vulnerable to shocks. The dynamics of recent political events ("Arab Spring") translate not only into additional short-terms costs of regional instability, but also into more medium- to long-term economic and social consequences.
- 7. Conflict affects an already vicious relationship between poverty, labour markets and hunger. The achievements concerning unemployment were reversed in 2012, reaching 11.6 per cent (which is close to the 1990 level), which means that the policy challenge "decent work for all" is urgent and manifold, especially that of improving on the low participation of women (26 per cent) and of the youth. Despite a relatively low and almost stagnant GINI index (34.3), the estimated increases in poverty and unemployment are expected to cause even more people to suffer from hunger (one out of five in the near future, up from 15 (14) per cent in 2011 (1991).
- 8. A window of opportunity to empower women opened with the political transitions in the region, but it may have already closed. Over the period from 2000 to 2012 the representation of women in parliament significantly increased, yet it is not close or commensurate with the global average. The political transitions in the region have not empowered women to the extent that was initially anticipated and desired. In many Arab countries, men and women stood together during the initial phases of political change, however women are now far less visible in transition processes, and there are even signs of backtracking on gender equality achievements.
- 9. Untapped potentials remain in terms of regional and global partnerships for development. Official development assistance (ODA) has not increased commensurate with regional population growth, thus per capita levels were significantly lower in 2011 than in 1990. The decline of bilateral aid is particularly alarming for the LDCs (e.g. Yemen with only 18 USD per capita). Fiscal space for development expenditure is increasingly constrained in both

- middle income and in the LDCs, and the role of regional donors should be reviewed and enhanced. Despite a decline of ODA from Arab donor countries, they provided the majority (65 per cent) of non-DAC ODA in 2011.
- 10. A shift of focus in development policy-making is needed, since current quantitative MDG achievements have come at the expense of quality. For example, enrolment figures have increased, but the quality of education has not, which in turn affects opportunities for employment. The same holds true for health services and access to safe water: The quantity of health care service providers has increased, however the costs and lack of quality of services are still impediments to sustainably improved health care conditions. Improved access to better and safer water sources is only one side of the story, since the available water must also be clean and unpolluted.

In sum, a challenging political environment in the Arab region – ranging from ongoing transition processes to open conflict – negatively affects MDG achievements and threatens further progress. Thus, both sides of the coin require attention:

- On the one side, a new Arab Development Agenda post-2015 must address not only the limitations of MDGs, but also focus on emerging priorities including governance reform, improved quality of MDG progress on quantitative measures and the regional customisation of global indicators.
- And on the other side, a new Arab Development Finance System, that is responsive to the needs of the uprooted as well as sensitive towards the achievement of internationally agreed development goals, must cover financing for the reestablishment of livelihoods including responding to land, housing and property issues, as well as financing for delivery of services within a framework of good governance and effective institutions. Existing institutions are an important basis for rethinking the Arab development finance system.

# 7.3.5 Fiscal space

To support the achievement of existing and emerging development objectives in the Arab region, fiscal policy at the national and the regional levels must be sustainable: it must not rely on external sources of funding such as ODA. From the outset, each Arab country – has a different fiscal space (for example, oil-exporters compared to non-oil exporters) – or a different ability to raise sufficient current revenue to cover current expenditures, which encompasses all available resources as a percentage of GDP.

The basis for defining a country's fiscal space is a combination of domestic resource mobilization (such as reforms towards progressive income tax), ODA, the chosen deficit financing approach and the efficiency of expenditures. Now,



the "Arab Spring effect" must also be taken into account in the assessment of scale and flexibility of fiscal space.

As fiscal space in the ESCWA region is heterogeneous, ESCWA proposes a dynamic typology that classifies Arab countries along the dimensions of the fiscal challenges and the human development challenges they face. The matrix contains the intervention points and serves as a prioritization tool for investment through a nascent Arab Development Finance System.

Countries hosting large populations of the uprooted – such as Lebanon and Jordan – are subject to limitations of existing fiscal space. The typology also highlights Arab countries that have relative flexibility due to sufficient fiscal space and due to successfully resolving human development challenges. These (mainly GCC) countries can play an important role in supporting a human-centered, sustainable and inclusive socio-economic development approach.




Figure 1. Dynamic topography of fiscal space in Arab region

# 7.3.6 Development finance architecture

Based on the regional challenges discussed and with a strong emphasis on good governance at all levels, combined with the (re)building of effective and trustworthy institutions, a development finance system architecture should be built on both non-financial capabilities and financial resources in order to reap the following benefits:

• An Arab Development Bank would be a culturally aware institution with built-in credibility (knowledge of the societies and economies) for

- programme-design that responds to the needs of the Arab Development Agenda pre- and post-2015.
- An Arab Development Bank would complement national development efforts and resources. At the same time, it would supplement additional resources for areas that are not identified as immediate national priorities, but that are of regional importance.
- An Arab Development Bank would be a partner institution within an existing global network contributing to and benefiting from an exchange with other regional development banks (e.g. Asian Development, Inter-American Development Bank and so on). In terms of resource mobilization tools and institutional set-up, the region has expertise which can be augmented with lessons learned from the example of other development finance systems (for example the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) and the German Kreditanstalt fuer Wiederaufbau (KfW)).

Despite burning short-term challenges, the Arab region needs to look beyond 2015 and bring into focus inclusive development goals that have to be - and can be - achieved with a sustainable Arab Development Finance System architecture.




Figure 2. Proposal for Arab Development Finance Architecture

# 7.4 Economic opportunities and challenges presented by refugee population, and the role of a regional fund

# Tarek El Sherbini, International Development Finance Expert

The extent to which uprooted people contribute to the economy, relative to the amount they take from it, is one of the most contested issues surrounding

government policies in this area. It is commonly thought that uprooted people are of little economic value and represent a significant burden on their host countries at the economic expense of the host population. Determining the economic effects of resettlement for uprooted people is complex and depends on a wide range of issues and circumstances.

# 7.4.1. Burdens placed by uprooted people

The immediate burdens of a large influx of uprooted people are obvious. Their presence and the demands they place on strained economies, services and infrastructure can add to the hardship experienced by the local population. From the moment of arrival, uprooted people complete with local citizens for scarce resources, such as land, water, housing, food and medical services. Over time, their presence leads to more substantial demands on natural resources, education and health services, energy, transportation, and social services. In some instances they can significantly alter the flow of goods and services within a sociality as a whole.

The presence of a large refugee population in rural areas inevitably causes strain on the local administration. Host country national and regional authorities divert considerable resources and manpower from the pressing demands of their own development, to the urgent task of keeping the uprooted people alive, alleviating their suffering and ensuring the security of the whole community.

The burdens of the uprooted may be felt long after displacement problems are resolved. Environmental damage for example, is not reversed by the voluntary repatriation, integration or settlement or any of the other solutions to uprootedness. While international emergency aid and responses to sudden influxes of uprooted people may have some positive impact on the host society, it rarely compensates for the negative consequence of hosting large concentrations of uprooted people, at least in the short term.

### 7.4.2. Benefits for host societies of uprooted people

In many cases however, the short term costs of absorbing the uprooted are outweighed by long term benefits. It is important to keep this in mind when assessing the contribution of uprooted people. There may be short term costs as uprooted people are resettled and adjust to their new surroundings, but once successful resettlement has occurred, uprooted people can quickly make permanent cultural, social and economic contribution, and infuse vitality and multiculturalism to their host societies. Although uprooted people can bring short-term costs, they can also bring long-term benefits to a new country or region. An influx of people means an influx of new minds, new working hands, new consumers, and new investors. Each new arrival in a country or region brings a new set of skills and experience with them, and each needs to live by buying food, paying for accommodation, thereby potentially stimulating demand.

Through increasing the size of the population, the uprooted increase demand for various goods and services. This can lead to economies of scale where products are produced more cheaply in bulk. Migration in general and the intake of uprooted people in particular can diversify and enhance the skills of the population and increase innovation and flexibility.

Uprooted people are often entrepreneurial, as they face the need to set up and establish themselves in a new environment. They arrive with individual and collective skills, experiences and motivations, and can create new business and employment opportunities that lead to positive direct and indirect economic effects. For example, people from refugee communities represent a good proportion of the richest and most successful entrepreneurs in Australia, while the business vigour of Hong Kong's residents, many of whom were originally refugees from mainland China, is often said to be the reason for the city's position as an economic powerhouse.

In addition to diversifying and extending the skills and networks available to the host country's industrial and business sectors, the uprooted can also help increase trade and investment to other markets, both regionally and globally. Characteristics of the uprooted – be it age, skills or qualifications - will significantly influence their economic activity upon arrival and will drive and define the extent of their economic impact. Often the offspring of refugees, or those who arrive young enough to adjust well to their host societies, are extremely motivated and successful as they as adjust and settle quickly.

The circumstances in which different groups of uprooted people arrive can greatly affect how they settle in a new society. For example, highly educated people migrating during an economically buoyant time will face a different reception and settlement process, to unskilled workers arriving in a host society during a time of depression.

# 7.4.3. A regional fund - moving towards solutions for the uprooted and their hosts

Host governments expect at the very least that the international community will help compensate for the costs incurred in providing for uprooted people, and help the uprooted to become financially self-sufficient. No government of a relatively low income country is prepared to take loans or reallocate its development funds to programmes designed for - or required because of - large numbers of uprooted people on their land.

A regional fund focussed on economic support for the uprooted, and on providing them with the tools and resources to become self-sufficient financially, could play an important role in dealing with efficiently utilising the capacities of the uprooted. Such a fund focussed on the uprooted should have the know-how, experience and resources to support financial self-sufficiency and help empower



people to be less reliant on humanitarian aid by improving people's skills and creating opportunities for income generation.

It would need to draw on and cooperate with those international, regional and local development and relief organisations that have long experience in humanitarian and development work with the uprooted. Likewise, to coordinate and cooperate with the development banks in order to make sure that its activities are efficient and complementary to the activities and experiences of other organisations that are well-established in the region.

A regional fund's activities could be split into two main areas: equity and debt financing for SMEs, specifically from uprooted communities; and grants.

Matching its activities, its capital could come from three main sources:

- Equity capital contributed by regional and international governments, whether directly or indirectly through other development banks and relief agencies;
- soft loans from government or financial development organisations; and
- *zakat* and other charitable contributions.

Zakat contributions to any such fund could be focussed on the grant element of the fund's activities. In that respect, zakat could be utilised more efficiently and go beyond immediate and emergency relief, in providing food, clothes and medical treatment for the needy, its traditional remit, to tackle structural societal injustices. Poverty alleviation would of course, remain an important and critical part of the use of zakat, but other, more long-term and sustainable uses could be introduced to support the uprooted.

The fund's activities could therefore be split into focussing on the immediate and short-term needs of the uprooted, and focussing on longer-term needs by supporting the uprooted to become financially independent. Immediate need could be covered in coordination with specialised relief agencies and organisations through the pooling of funds received from *zakat*, with other charitable contributions to which the fund might have access.

It is important to emphasise nonetheless that the key focus of a regional fund would be to enable the uprooted to become financially self-sufficient and to integrate economically with their host counties, whether on a temporary or permanent basis depending on the circumstance.

Advisory services and training could also be provided by such a fund to help the uprooted with vocational and business training, business mentoring, and income support, thereby enabling them to turn initiatives into viable business activities and become self-employed. Meanwhile, advisory services could link the uprooted into the value chains of different industries and sectors of their host economies.



Additionally, a regional fund could create a network of volunteers and professionals, who would be ready to utilise their expertise and know-how to help the uprooted to integrate and possibly to create feasible commercial businesses. These business experts, as well as paid consultants, could help entrepreneurs to open up markets for their products and services both within their host counties and regions, and internationally. Grants could be used to fund the advisory services and training.

SMEs form the backbone of a dynamic economy, and a regional fund could support entrepreneurship specifically in the communities of the uprooted, not only through business expertise as detailed above, but also through capital funding, such as low interest loans and investment in equity. To ensure its long term viability, investments would have to focus on the developmental, as well as the sustainable, ensuring that, on average, investments and financing operations cover costs and even generate sufficient return to enable the fund expand its operations. It could also offer legal advisory and assistance services to host countries regarding the development of a legal framework for the economic integration of the uprooted in their countries.

To conclude, great initiatives and ideas come often from small beginnings. A regional fund or regional bank for reconstruction and development is certainly one such worthy of serious consideration. Its successful implementation could be hugely beneficial not only to the uprooted and to the region overall but to us all, to our communities, our values, and to future generations.

# 8. Ways Forward: Developing a Framework for Response

# 8.1. Summary

The conference's final session focused on developing a regional response to the issue of the uprooted. Broadly speaking, it was agreed that the concepts of human dignity and equality are the crucial elements on which new regional policies on displacement are the crucial underpinnings for any new regional policies. A traditional distrust of the strange and unfamiliar must be replaced by a celebration of diversity as a means of ending marginalization and achieving lasting stability.

The key points emerging from this session were that:

- WANA Forum can contribute to the formation of a regional policy by identifying the underlying causes of uprootedness marginalisation.
- Fostering a culture of respect for the uprooted must go hand in hand with a newfound respect for nature and its resources.
- Whilst partnership with the international community is greatly appreciated, challenges facing the region such as the issue of the uprooted should not be outsourced. Rather all policy should be formulated regionally and based on traditional regional values.

# 8.2. Human dignity and equality as bases for guiding principles Walid Salem, Director, Centre for Democracy & Community Development

Looking ahead, there are four objectives that WANA Forum could pursue.

First, it should examine the deep, underlying reasons for uprootedness.

In many ways, the plight of the region lies in its lack of recognition of 'the other'. It has witnessed countless civil wars, conflicts and massacres throughout its history, and if the root causes of these remain unresolved, it will witness more and more situations of displacement in the years to come. Indeed, Amin Maalouf, in writing about identity and conflicts in the region, discussed the way in which rejection of 'the other' creates closed identities that fight against each other, driving denominationalism, internal conflicts and conflicts between nations, as well as ethnic and religious strife.

The second objective should be to build the cultural and organisational frameworks and mechanisms to prevent these phenomena occurring again in the future, while the third is to discuss ways of ending those atrocities that cause uprootedness. The fundamental aim must be to create an ethical concept of peace for this region, a region in which many people are fundamentally suspicious of peace.



The fourth and final objective should be to discuss how to develop the countries of the region so as to make them sufficiently attractive for the uprooted people to wish to return, thereby reversing the current trend of protracted displacement. Gaza, for example, holds no charm for the 200,000 Gazans residing in Jordan today.

The guiding principles of WANA Forum should also be developed further. The 1986 report entitled *Winning the Human Race?*, prepared for the Independent Commission on International Humanitarian Issues, remains relevant to this endeavour. The report's key principle is that of the equality of humanity, without which the issue of uprootedness cannot be solved.

Furthermore, the Forum's guiding principles must be based on a commitment to international values and citizenship based on a celebration of diversity. Here we will find the tools for the peaceful resolution of conflicts. Finally, WANA Forum's guiding principles should emphasise the agency of the uprooted who should be free to choose their own destiny.

# 8.3. Respect for nature as a building block for respect for the uprooted

# James Quilligan, Director, Global Commons Trust

Any solution to the crisis of displacement must take into account the carrying capacity of the West Asia–North Africa region as a whole. For the past several decades, most of the region's states have treated oil as the most precious resource, to the exclusion of all others. Rampant pursuit of capitalist profit has created a deeply ingrained inequality in the region, in which the charitable concept of *zakat* has been forgone in favour of usurious and exploitative financial policies, to the great detriment of the region's marginalised populations.

At the root of the region's ill treatment of the displaced is a general disregard for nature itself. Nature is rapidly being commodified to feed the consumptive greed of the region's elites. The crisis of capitalism arises from our hubristic refusal to live fulfilling lives within the boundaries set by nature. The perceived limit is money, but in truth the real limit is energy.

As the region's natural resources are increasingly depleted to fend off short-term crises, communities living near the emptying lakes and reservoirs must migrate to more promising environs – usually urban economic centres – driving up the internally displaced population. This root cause can be combated by creating new economic and environmental policies based on ethical consumption and provisioning, based on an understanding of a limited biosphere.

A sustainable economy must by rights be an equal economy. Marginalisation of the displaced as contributors to the marketplace not only destroys social solidarity, but also increases the burden on host societies. Fostering a new



conception of treating both natural and human resources with respect can lead to more equitable treatment of refugees and IDPs throughout the region.

One specific initiative that could be pursued in the region is the creation of a regional body overseeing the use of shared natural resources. This body could then decide what portion of the resource may be leased to the private sector and collect a percentage of the profits to be put toward a regional support fund. This is *zakat* from a surprising angle; the profits and sales of common resources would be taxed by this regional trust, to later be distributed to governments in need of aid to support refugees and IDPs. The leasing fees for resources could then be used by the trust to manage and restore depleted commons. This would help alleviate the costs of supporting the region's uprooted while contributing to regional cooperation on shared resources.

# 8.4. Solutions in harmony with regional traditions and values

# Abdelmajid Layadi, Secretary General, Euro-Mediterranean Association for Cooperation and Development

In reviewing the proceedings of this conference, the concept of human dignity has been mentioned throughout. Indeed, the desire to preserve dignity is often the main reason people leave their homeland during war and is central to the psyche of the region's population in general.

Given its prevalence, the issue of the uprooted should be given priority in every national agenda throughout West Asia–North Africa. This is not solely a humanitarian issue. Many countries suffer economic and social problems when receiving refugees due to their lack of resources, or the absence of international or regional funding. Any solutions must ensure that host countries can receive refugees without disadvantaging their own citizens. Thus, protecting the rights of local populations should be as important as promoting the rights of refugees. Ignoring this aspect can damage the whole process and threaten the social security of the country.

Development projects /additional infrastructure should be established to absorb refugees within their new countries: schools, factories, universities. This, however, should not be the responsibility of the host country's government alone. We should focus on finding solutions that harmonize with regional traditions and interests. Establishing a unified regional strategy to deal with refugees will help the region to influence international organizations' policy. Involving average citizens in the decision-making process should be a priority; they are the basis on which to create a solid and confident community.

# Part II: Consultation - The Uprooted

Prior to this year's annual conference, a consultation on the uprooted was held in Amman on 28 February. The discussion was placed in the broader context of global displacement, introduced via a presentation by Roger Zetter, Emeritus Professor of Refugee Studies at the University of Oxford, on the 2012 *World Disasters Report*<sup>3</sup>. The key points raised in the presentation are outlined below:

# Summary of the Presentation on the 2012 World Disasters Report

- Background context of 73 million forced migrants globally: 43 million due to conflict and violence,
   15 million due to natural disasters, and 15 million due to (failed) development.
- Unpredictable causes and outcomes of forced displacement, e.g. the Arab Spring.
- Multiple drivers of displacement, e.g. interplay between conflict and climate factors (such as drought, floods, desertification, and spiralling food prices).
- Development is often the cause of forced migration and must be addressed.
- 20 million are in prolonged displacement globally.
- There is a growing resistance to refugees and an externalisation of the issue of displacement by powerful states and organisations.
- The humanitarian-development nexus: there is a need to move towards a developmental framework, focusing on human resilience and capacity rather than a response exclusively based on protection of rights.
  - Displacement can be a development opportunity: policies should be taken which seek to minimise negative economic impact and maximise opportunities of displacement.
- Policies should be adopted which aim to minimise the disequilibrium of the impact of displacement – e.g. where challenges and benefits are experienced unequally.
   Such approaches could feature policies such as the right to work, freedom of cross-border movement, and mainstreaming refugee healthcare in host countries' services.

It was noted that uprootedness, as a phenomenon in the WANA region, constitutes a key challenge to stability and development, with 26 million migrants in the region and a sizeable additional minority without full rights. Three broad causes of uprootedness were identified: violence and armed conflict (man vs. man), environmental disasters (nature vs. man) and man-made disasters.

It was agreed that human dignity needs to be placed at the centre of policy responses to uprootedness. In this regard, the importance of the word

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>3</sup> World Disasters Report, 2012, International Federation of the Red Cross



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'uprooted' was emphasised in terms of the necessity of focusing on the human dimension of displacement. The distinction was made between 'uprooted' on the one hand, which emphasises the place of origin of the displaced and highlights the responsibilities of those who cause displacement, and 'refugee' on the other, which approaches the displaced from the perspective of the host country.

It was noted that there is a need to address the issue of the uprooted as a supranational policy issue, building from the ground up through revived multilateralism and a focus on the regional 'commons' meeting global commons. Additionally, the importance was emphasised of developing in-region, cross-boundary solutions to displacement in order to allow the development of genuine local ownership and the promotion of regional social cohesion. In this regard, the Kampala Convention on IDPs was invoked as a prominent example of a regional initiative dealing specifically with the issue of uprootedness, and as a possible model of aspiration for the WANA region.<sup>4</sup>

The participants agreed that the WANA Forum should aim not to present a concrete policy agenda but rather to develop a framework of guiding principles designed to facilitate a roadmap towards a multilateral, regional architecture built around a Social & Economic Charter, building on the existing Social Charter created by the WANA Forum in 2011.<sup>5</sup>

Both the protracted and emergency nature of uprootedness was discussed, with long-standing uprooted populations being joined by new waves of peoples displaced as a consequence of the socio-political shifts in the context of the 'Arab Awakening' since December 2010. Thus, it was agreed that an effective policy response to uprootedness must include both humanitarian and developmental policies. The participants noted the inadequacies of humanitarian response mechanisms, including the fact that humanitarian, rights-based models often inadvertently entrench displacement and serve to finance the extension of suffering even as they alleviate it. In addition, the effectiveness of international organisations' responses to displacement is constrained by their specific mandates which tend to exist in isolation of the broader context. Thus, the participants agreed on the need for a reassessment of humanitarian responses to uprootedness, including the development of more effective protection mechanisms, the promotion of civil rights, and legal reforms enabling better governance of issues affecting the uprooted.

In addition to the need for humanitarian innovation, the participants agreed that such policies must be complemented by policies that approach uprootedness from within the region's broader social and economic developmental context, acknowledging the developmental opportunity which it brings, rather than


<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>5</sup> WANA Social Charter, 2011



<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>4</sup> Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre, The Kampala Convention in Brief, 2012

merely viewing it as a domestic challenge. It was highlighted that not only should such approaches seek to minimise the negative developmental impacts of displacement, but also maximise, as well as capitalise on, developmental opportunities. The participants discussed the need for complementary developmental solutions to displacement at both micro and macro levels, and the need for a particular focus on addressing urban displacement. It was agreed that a regional mechanism for fostering development, cohesion, and recovery should be established, in the form of a regional fund, combining both contemporary (banking) and traditional (zakat) components.

The figure below depicts the above mentioned policy framework, while the following text describes the framework's individual components in greater detail:



Framework for achieving human dignity of the uprooted

### Humanitarian policies

### 1. Protection Mechanisms

It was noted that a holistic framework for addressing uprootedness must contain strategies to improve existing protection mechanisms for refugees and other displaced peoples. In particular, it was noted that poorly designed protection policies can serve to prolong and promote rather than solve displacement.

### 2. Promoting Civil Rights



Civil rights constitute a central issue in relation to displacement. It was noted that a deficit of civil rights feeds into the complex causes of displacement in the region, leading to an 'inclusion-exclusion' dichotomy. Therefore, policies of promoting civil rights were identified as part of the solution to displacement, such as granting individuals citizenship in one state while simultaneously being granted residency in another, and granting uprooted people the right to work.

# 3. Legal Reform

As societies work through the effectiveness and framework of their institutions, the lack of domestic legal mechanisms within host countries was discussed as an obstacle to effectively addressing displacement (such as labour, social services, education, and commercial laws). A particular problem identified was the lack of support provided by donor countries for the purpose of building the capacity of host states to develop such legal frameworks, including garnering funding and investing in training. However, it was also emphasised that the key challenge is to reform law on a supranational basis rather than at the domestic level. Moreover, while reforming law is key, what is most crucial on a regional level is carrying capacity

## **Development policies**

# 1. Addressing displacement at both micro and macro levels of development

It was noted that it is critical to develop policies that address the uprooted at the micro level, through programmes that not only protect but also empower, educate, and employ the uprooted, thus countering a background of destroyed livelihoods, increased vulnerabilities, lost histories, fractured households, eroded values, and disempowered communities.

Development at the local level must be complemented by macro-economic development strategies, a policy area which is missing from much of the existing analysis on displacement. Having largely missed out on the major changes to the global industrial economy in the last quarter-century, it is essential that the next phase of industrial development does not similarly pass the WANA region by. Thus, it is crucial that the region identifies long-term policies for the region's uprooted, whilst 'leap-frogging' into a third industrial revolution.

Important areas identified on the macro level include protecting water and energy resources, as well as a building a sustainable green economy which incorporates both the physical and human environments.

While noting the necessity of a developmental approach, uprootedness should not be promoted as a solution to the region's socio-political problems. In this regard, there is a need to consider the relationship between a developmental,



normative framework for dealing with displacement that has built-in norms (such as the right to work), with long-standing principles (such as the right of return).

# 2. Regional financing regime

The participants agreed that the best mechanism for developing home-grown solutions to displacement would be a supranational, regional cohesion fund, combining banking components with regional *zakat*, based around the concept of human dignity. Such a fund would take the form of an Arab Bank for Reconstruction and Development (ABRD), stressing the importance of mobilising resources from within the region to stave off further foreign intervention, as well as considering finance in the context of human capital. Resources of oil-rich countries in the WANA region would need to be complemented with those of their hinterlands.

It was emphasised that the ABRD would aim to promote human dignity by investing in and mobilising human capital, with the ultimate objective of building social cohesion within the region, rather than adopting a one-dimensional focus on small and medium sized enterprises (SMEs) as practiced by the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD). While SMEs are equally important, regional social cohesion must be developed from within the region and focus on bridging the human dignity deficit, in order to capitalise on human capital and not only financial capital. This would promote the common benefits of the WANA region, rather than the singular benefit of each country.

In order to move forward with the vision for a cohesion fund, three challenges must be addressed:

- Identifying the Partners
- Addressing its Challenges
- Determining the Sustainability of such a Fund

Although *zakat* is a prominent issue in the Middle East region and has the potential to deliver significant levels of financing, the effectiveness of *zakat* has been constrained by national and local policies of the regimes in the region. It was noted that the establishment of a more effective form of *zakat* would require stronger civil society organisation, in order to foster a rebuilding of trust between state and society.

Core values that were identified included building mutual respect and trust and dealing with education as an investment, rather than simply as a part of the national budget. A couple of participants stressed the importance of investing in education as part of looking at uprootedness in a more holistic manner. Not only would investing in the education of the uprooted assist in creating a professional



labour force for the host country, but as generations grow up within displaced communities, questions of identity will need to be addressed and new identities embraced, while the process of awareness would need to be promoted within the region, focusing on the concepts of human dignity and human suffering.

# 3. Addressing the Urban Uprooted

A further key theme identified was the need to address developmental challenges concerning rampant urbanisation and the swelling of numbers of the urban poor deprived of adequate shelter and protection. This is particularly crucial given that the majority of the displaced are located and settle in urban areas.

# PART III. Workshops and meetings

# Moving towards cooperation across regions

Alignment across its wider neighbourhood is vital to the success of the West Asia – North Africa region. As such, the Forum's wider work throughout 2012-13 focused on building partnerships with the newly developed economic powers of China and India, and also looked west to relationships with the European Union.

# 1. Cooperation across Asia

# 1.1 Meetings in China

During November 2012, HRH Prince al-Hassan, Chairman of the West Asia – North Africa Forum, undertook a number of meetings in China on behalf of the Forum. He met with Secretary-General of the Boao Forum for Asia, Ambassador Zhou Wenzhong, in Beijing. The Boao Forum for Asia is a non-profit organization that hosts high-level forums to identify areas of cooperation. Its main mission is to define needs and priorities of the most pressing issues that face the Asia-Pacific region. In the meeting, Ambassador Wenzhong noted that the Boao Forum is focused on promoting regional and economic integration amongst the Asian countries, and expressed hopes that West Asia will actively participate in their upcoming Forums.

Prince Hassan emphasised the importance of correlating between human security and sustainability. He maintained that the WANA Forum was created, precisely to address the 'human dignity deficit,' and to foster the necessary balance between overall human welfare and development. HRH elaborated further by suggesting that the best way to harness the often complex dynamics that the West Asia and North Africa region encounter would be to develop a supranational entity. In addition, HRH identified some tools such as a Social Cohesion Fund, a Citizen's Charter and a Code of Rights and Responsibilities that would not only consolidate regional cooperation, but would contribute mightily in addressing the 'human dignity deficit.'

In further meetings with Chinese officials, the Chinese Institute of Contemporary International Relations (CICIR), the Nuclear Threat Initiative Board members meeting and the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace in Beijing, HRH promoted WANA Forum's mission and consistently highlighted the unique challenges that face the region. He also emphasised that this strategically vital region merits better attention, and put forward the idea of advancing a conference on security and a regional process, similar to the Helsinki Process.

HRH stressed that global prosperity and stability will come about if more emphasis is placed on shaping a human-centred approach and building cohesive societies.

# 1.2 Meetings in India

During late October and early November, HRH also undertook missions to India, where Forum issues were discussed.

On 26 October 2012, HRH met with Indian Prime Minister Dr. Manmohan Singh. The main focus of this meeting centred on the on-going events taking place in the Middle East region. HRH offered his thoughts on the matter and emphasised the need for regional cooperation, as well as the promotion of a regional and Asian identity.

In Mumbai, 3 November 2012, HRH met with the Strategic Foresight Group. The deliberations of this meeting concentrated on the latest report issued by the SFG entitled *The Blue Peace; Rethinking Middle East Water*. HRH conferred that when debating economic development, the environmental dimension and sustainable water and resource management must be addressed in a compelling manner.

# 2. Workshop on Economic Reforms and Social Justice in the Arab Region, 16-17 November 2012, Italy

# 2.1 Background

The stability of the West Asia – North Africa region is vital to the European Union. Likewise, the region also relies on effective partnership with the European neighbourhood as political, social and economic partners in development and security. Such stability will be built and defended through a proactive and inclusive approach centered on demands of the Arab street for dignity, bread and social justice under a free political system. This approach should reach out to the younger generation and women, and build bridges between them and the older generation who have valuable knowledge and expertise that can facilitate human development.

To discuss these issues, participants from Tunisia, Egypt and Jordan, as three Arab transition countries, attended together with a number of experts associated with the Forum WANA and Landau networks and UNDP met together in November 2012.

Popular concern over socio-economic inclusion, which was central to the Arab uprisings, has been pushed aside in the intense post-revolution focus on political issues by politicians, civil society and the international community. At the same time the destabilization of economic systems across countries in political transition has increased the urgency of dealing with economic challenges



(notably social justice) in order to sustain progress on democratic transition. This has further created a situation where the conflicting requirements of restoring stability to economic activities while dealing with urgent demands for measures to increase social justice have to be mediated in a transparent manner.

In this context it is important to create mechanisms that facilitate dialogue on systemic economic reforms of general public interest. Well prepared and technically sound deliberations can bring antagonistic factions together around a few commonly accepted economic reform measures, thus bolstering democracy and avoiding unhelpful impositions of political conditionality.

In order to create a win-win situation and ensure full support of better established enterprises, the event discussed ways of improving the timeline for the award of public contracts and payment for services rendered under these contracts. In addition on the access to finance front, the issue of access to long term finance in general was also tackled.

The objective was to support the move away from ad-hoc decision making based on political expediency to evidence based policy making that can provide objective validation of alternative strategic directions by forecasting and analyzing the likely impact of different policy options.

Traditionally most bank lending in the Arab region has benefited a few politically well-connected businesses, who have typically been engaged in real estate or trading activities, as opposed to industrial or agricultural activities. Economic agents, both large and small, stand to profit from reform of the banking system that facilitates access of productive enterprises to long-term and running capital. Reform of the banking system is a strategic area where international actors can provide both technical and financial support.

The reform of the business environment is critically dependent upon the state assuming responsibility for creating a level playing field for economic activities. This can be done by the state providing a transparent regulatory framework that ensures access to economic opportunities for small and medium enterprises and a minimal level of social protection for workers in both the formal and informal sectors. This requires providing space for an engaged civil society to monitor state performance and ensure that the state delivers on its promises. It also requires a functioning mechanism for social dialogue amongst employers, workers and the State and an independent and effective judiciary.

### 2.2. Event proceedings

The first day of the conference was devoted to the theme of changing the way the financial system is organized and operated to ensure greater access of small and medium enterprises to both operating and investment funds. The session tackled



the issue of the general difficulty faced by all businesses, whether big or small, in accessing long-term finance. We know that currently the bulk of financial resources in most Arab countries are captured by a few major private entities and in addition tend to favour trading, short term credit over longer term finance.

The session's objective was to share practical experiences of how the financial sector can be encouraged to change the composition of its lending operations in favour of longer term funds needed for productive investments. The session further aimed to share innovative schemes that facilitate access of small and medium enterprises to finance for investment purposes as well as for working capital. It also drew on good practices from other developing regions, notably Latin America and India.

The second day focused on access of local and small enterprises to government contracts and public procurement, including for food subsidy schemes. The complexity of public procurement rules and procedures tends to exclude smaller producers from effective participation in public procurement. In addition, in many countries companies with public contracts find it difficult to get paid for goods or services provided. In the Arab region food subsidy systems, including public distribution schemes, have tended to benefit foreign providers of major food staples. They have typically been procuring items that are not locally produced to the scale needed and do not provide for a varied diet.

The twin objectives of the session were to share best experiences with a) improving the ability of audit authorities to ensure transparency and accountability of use of public resources in countries undergoing democratic transitions, and b) use of public procurement to enable small local producers to join the mainstream of economic activities from other developing regions, including notably Latin America.

Given the important role that transparent mediation mechanisms play in making sure that access to public resources is granted to different social groups in an equitable manner, this issue was addressed in both sessions as a common thread. Without having in place such mediation mechanisms it is difficult to unify the private sector, with a cloud of mistrust affecting relations between small and big businesses. Under these conditions, removal of unnecessary red tape and improving the business environment is likely to proceed slowly.

The Indonesian experience with creating councils that bring together diverse interests and animate discussions through provision of think pieces on different issues was cited as an example that the workshop could build on.



# 2.3. Themes drawn out by the event

- **Economic Recovery** as a requirement for continued democratization in the region.
- Building a Regional Identity and Thought Leadership: consider innovative mechanisms to achieve this goal. Important highlights included an Arab Bank for Reconstruction and Development, intellectual hub/think tank, etc. (the idea to include other countries that might have lessons to offer, like Qatar and Morocco).
- **Human Security**: future activities should draw on the essential themes of human security and concrete steps to achieve this in the region (including suggestions from the UNDP such as specific job creation efforts, investments in high tech innovations, branding the MENA region as a manufacturing hub that prioritizes sound sustainability and human rights practices).
- Vulnerable Populations: in this region more than most, particular care and
  planning will need to go into creating mechanisms for engaging women, the
  poor/unemployed and youth in the dialogues about reform (economic, social
  and political).
- **Technology**: create platform for continuing the dialogue from the meeting (intranet) and prioritize the use of technology more generally in future strategic efforts in the region. Best practices to consider learning from include mobile banking in Kenya and elsewhere, and citizen grievance mechanisms like Ushahidi (also in Kenya). Technology offers new and costeffective ways to achieve several of the meeting's top themes: increased learning amongst countries and increased transparency.
- **Increase citizen engagement**: the goal is to increase transparency and government accountability by increasing civic engagement. The key here is to bring in additional experts on successful approaches for increasing public engagement in the concept of democracy.

# Appendix I – Guiding Principles to meet the challenges of the uprooted in the West Asia – North Africa (WANA) Region

### **Preamble**

Population displacement is one of the most significant challenges facing the global community and nowhere more so than in our West Asia – North Africa region.

The WANA region has long experience of handling mass displacement with at least five major episodes - 1948, 1967, 1990 (Gulf war), Iraq in the 2000s, and now Syria. Moreover, the WANA region is characterised by states at the crossroads of refugee displacement, regional labour movements and transit migration. Thus today, the WANA region is home to millions of uprooted people displaced, sometimes for generations, by conflict, human rights violations, political instability, social and economic marginalisation, natural disasters, climate change, development projects and environmental degradation or hazard.

Uprootedness destroys livelihoods, fractures households, erodes cultural and social traditions, disempowers communities, increases unplanned urbanisation and accentuates physical and social vulnerabilities. As the very word implies, it involves being torn, whether forcibly or by need - and the distinction is not always clear cut - from land and habitat, and a loss of not only basic essentials including water, but of emotional and cultural attachments to place and identity, livelihood and dignity. The financial cost is significant, the human cost immeasurable.

Governments in the region, together with their political representatives, local authorities, civil society and the private sector confront enormous challenges in seeking ways to address the impacts of uprooting on the displaced communities themselves and on the countries and communities that host them.

Domestic, international, and regional responses are required because, across the WANA region as in other parts of the world, uprooted people may be displaced both within their own countries but also across international borders often affecting more than one country. The experience of the region over the past 70 years has demonstrated the protracted nature of uprootedness and the fact that durable solutions to displacement are increasingly difficult to find.

In terms of knowledge and experience of handling uprootedness, the WANA region has much to offer other regions. Yet, despite this long experience, to date the response has been reactive rather than planned, focusing on numbers rather than quality of action, driven by piecemeal emergency responses rather than long-term developmental strategies and has suffered from a lack of coordinated national and regional approaches.

In line with the recent growth of Regional Consultative Processes (RCPs), a radical, new regional supranational approach is required for the WANA region to enable it to address human needs, to ensure the human dignity of the uprooted,



and to provide effective protection of their rights whilst mediating the impacts both on the displaced peoples themselves and the communities where they seek refuge.

Crucial to the success of a new regional approach to the uprooted, particularly in terms of demography and the region's porous borders will be: the establishment of a regional database and data informatics, incorporating a knowledge base of physical, human and economic resources, to enable an informed assessment of regional, national and local carrying capacity.

# The framework of Guiding Principles for the WANA region

To meet the complex challenges posed by the uprooted, a collaborative governance strategy is required across the region. To this end the WANA Forum has drawn up a set of Guiding Principles, framed within human rights precepts, with two main *aims* to:

- alleviate human suffering whilst ensuring and sustaining the dignity and well-being of both the uprooted people and host communities; and
- establish a framework of regional cooperation and mutually assured human security supported by a social charter for West Asia and North Africa, and a Regional Economic and Social Council (RECOSOC).

The *objectives* of the Guiding Principles are to:

- respect, protect and advance the rights and the human needs of uprooted people as indivisible and universal <sup>6</sup>;
- facilitate the participation of the uprooted in the development and implementation of strategies and policies for their well-being;
- deploy the creative energy of uprooted people to enable them to be economically self-sufficient and to contribute to the development and well-being of their host countries and communities;
- promote national and regional developmental strategies that prioritise durable and just solutions; and
- promote social cohesion amongst the uprooted and between them and the host communities.

None of these principles prejudice the right of return.

Recognising the sovereignty of states in the region, the Guiding Principles do not constitute a binding instrument on states and other parties and duty bearers <sup>7</sup>. Instead, they remind states and other parties of their obligations and duties and encourage their commitment to observe, share, uphold, apply and reinforce standards and practices found in international human rights and humanitarian law, norms and principles, as well as other principles such as the 1988 Guiding

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>7</sup> E.g. International, national and local authorities, groups and organisations.



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<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>6</sup> I.e., whether they are citizens, refugees or migrants, male or female, adult or children.

Principles on Internal Displacement, and crucially, Islamic precepts of mutual respect and the dignity of the individual.

These Guiding Principles form a part of the vision which the WANA Forum has for the promotion of regional stability founded on principles of human rights and human dignity.

# The Guiding Principles for the WANA region

# 1. Protection and the Promotion of Civil, Social and Economic Rights

Uprooted people - whether internally displaced or crossing an international border - have a right to request, expect and enjoy protection from national authorities and regional actors, in the first instance, as well as from the international community where necessary.

Whether displaced within their own country or in a host country, uprooted people should come to enjoy, within an appropriate timeframe, the full range of civil, social and economic rights and freedoms that are available to host populations.

In order to meet internationally agreed standards for addressing the needs of displaced people, national and regional authorities should mobilise collaborative programmes and actions to adapt, develop and enhance such standards. Where appropriate, the international community should assist countries concerned to develop these standards. For example, the concept of the *responsibility to protect* (R2P) could be adapted to help support the agency which refugees have to safeguard their own human security.

Establishing competent institutions and implementing effectively functioning national and regional legal frameworks, norms and processes are key to promoting rights, preventing conflict and uprooting, and to addressing the consequences of displacement. Where appropriate, the international community should assist countries in the region to build their national and collective regional resilience.

A free and independent civil society should support and encourage the building of collaborative regional governance capacity and the development of regional and national frameworks and institutions that address the causes and consequences of displacement.

Civil society institutions have an essential role to play in advocating the rights of uprooted people, promoting their protection at regional and national levels. Accordingly, civil society actors should encourage governments to sign and ratify the principal international conventions, covenants and norms dealing with refugees, other displaced populations and migration. Where necessary, these instruments should be adapted to the regional context.



For these, amongst other reasons, Governments have a duty to promote the foundation of independent civil society.

The protection needs of women, children and other vulnerable groups are a particular concern and must be safeguarded and promoted by appropriate policies, norms and agencies.

### 2. Developmental, Urban and Resource Strategies

Governments, regional and international donors, development agencies and humanitarian actors should bridge the humanitarian-development 'divide' by reframing humanitarian crises as 'development challenges and opportunities', acknowledging the right of uprooted people to development, empowerment and co-ordinated responses. The protracted displacement of the majority of uprooted peoples in the WANA region reinforces the imperative of developmental approaches.

Promoting the economic and livelihood needs of both uprooted people *and* the host populations affected by their presence – for example through economic and physical planning policies and through poverty reduction programmes – must be an essential strategic objective for governments, regional agencies and international and non-governmental actors.

Better coordination between emergency and development responses is essential in order to minimise the economic and development burdens which the uprooted may impose on the host country and to maximise the positive and sustainable contributions that they, and their hosts, may collectively make to the local and national economy.

The corporate and business sectors should be encouraged to play a proactive role in addressing the developmental challenges of uprootedness and migration. Corporate responsibility represents positive and not competing agency.

Constructive engagement with diaspora communities should be promoted as agents of change rather than as uprooted people fleeing fear. They provide both resources that can be mobilised for channeling aid and national development investment, and they can encourage the search for durable political solutions to uprootedness.

The majority of the uprooted in the region now live in urban or peri-urban areas, often for protracted periods. Humanitarian and development agencies should work more closely with urban administrations, the private sector and civil society organisations to promote sustainable responses to the needs of both uprooted and existing urban dwellers.

The nexus of 'migrants-cities-urban institutions and actors' can generate a positive approach to migration-related challenges and opportunities particularly in the WANA Region. Accordingly, urgent action is required to promote urban policies and strategies that tackle the needs of the uprooted and their urban



hosts in the fields of: socio-economic development; citizenship; housing, land and property; environmental services; health; education; urban violence and protection; risk and vulnerability management and livelihoods.

Water scarcity is a particularly pressing issue in the WANA region and one which climate change is set to accentuate. Promoting regional multilateral water management and resource cooperation, as well as local resource management systems, is key to mitigating conflict, preventing uprooting and responding to the impacts of displacement. These objectives can be secured by enhancing regional and national policies for resource conservation, adaptation, resilience and governance through the development of culturally adaptable regional concepts such as 'Hima'<sup>8</sup>, the establishment of a regional information and knowledge base, alongside the mobilisation of the will and capacity of local communities.

# 3. Managing regional responses - modalities, burden sharing and regional development funds

Addressing the causes and consequences of uprootedness in the region in the longer term requires four supranational structural initiatives:

- Multilateral, home-grown political and governance initiatives to provide the framework for developing legal and normative instruments for protecting the uprooted;
- regional collaborative strategies that establish strong links, and better coordination amongst development, humanitarian and environmental priorities and targets, and, where appropriate, innovatively including the role of the private sector;
- a regional bank for reconstruction and development. Combining traditional banking components with *Zakat*, would allow individuals and communities to take part in a home-grown, burden-sharing mechanism. This approach would assist countries of the region to address development needs resulting from displacement while investing in the wider economy, and tackling other underlying causes of migration and conflict. Such a financing mechanism should both be responsive to regionally agreed development objectives and sensitive to the needs of the uprooted and host populations with, for example, support for purpose built small and medium enterprises (SMEs) that would increase the scope for self-sufficiency amongst the uprooted while supporting the overall development of the host country.
- the collection and sharing of better qualitative and quantitative information on displaced people, on a regional basis, in order to allow more effective strategically planned responses and improved allocation of resources that recognises their capacities as well as their vulnerabilities.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>8</sup> Hima is an Arabic word and Islamic concept meaning 'protected space' and in the present context implies a framework of environmental protection.



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# 4. Establishing a framework of regional cooperation and human security based on a shared appreciation of a regional social charter

Regional cooperation and human security can be best promoted by establishing framework agreements. Two initiatives encompass WANA's vision for sustainable regional development and stability. In 2011, a Social Charter was created by the WANA Forum and the Arab Thought Forum which could constitute the basis for a regional Social Charter. In addition, The WANA Forum has adopted a Human Integrated Management Approach (HIMA) framed within the WANA Forum's four pillars of post-conflict reconstruction and recovery, social cohesion, the environment, and green economy: which together provide a blueprint for a Regional RECOSOC Charter.

Together, these two initiatives provide the necessary foundations of universal principles, rights and appropriate standards for humanitarian and developmental policies, strategies, programmes and actions to address the needs and aspirations of the uprooted people in the region, to indicate the collective responsibilities of duty bearers, and above all to restore a sense of security, dignity and hope.

# 5. Uprootedness, migration and development

To date, uprootedness has been dominated by approaches that examine the issue through a largely humanitarian lens. However, uprootedness should be regarded within a migration and developmental discourse, with the potential for value-added experiences to both receiving and sending communities. Challenging the dominant image of the uprooted as a negative force, the contribution that responses to displacement can make to enhancing development and stability must be more effectively understood and promoted within the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) post-2015.

Moreover, responses to uprootedness and migration must be tethered in rights-based principles and in the agency of the uprooted themselves, not only the security-based priorities of receiving states. The vantage point of a *holistic* approach is a prerequisite for better understanding of the phenomena and for proposing new avenues for the post-2015 MDGs that can encompass *Migration* Development Goals.

Beyond WANA, the Region must look outward and in particular to its closest Mediterranean neighbour, Europe. The EU and WANA countries, particularly in North Africa, should commence dialogue for a 'Roadmap to Mobility' as the basis for partnership between two prosperous and peaceful civilisations that would benefit current and future generations.

In proposing these Guiding Principles, the WANA Region can contribute positively to the High Level Dialogue on Migration and Development and the creation of post-2015 Millennium Development Goals, through the establishment of regional initiatives and a practical, incremental agenda for solutions to uprootedness and migration.





# **Appendix II - Annual Forum Participant list**

El Hassan bin Talal Yohei Sasakawa Babah Sidi Abdella Mohamed Abdel Raouf Rogaia Mustafa Abusharaf

M.J. Akbar

Zeenat Shaukat Ali

Najla Ayubi Bakhtiar Amin Essmail Al Sharif Ahmed A. Al-Atrash Hany El-Banna Nafisa Barot

Frans Bouwen Mustafa Cerić Fredrick Chien Chen Yonglong Dima de Clerck

Abdallah Al Dardari Antonia Dimou

Dindar Najman Doski Muchkund Dubey Amira Elfadil Samir Elhawary Bashir Fadlallah Essam Farag

Caroline Faraj Abdi Jama Ghedi Hüseyin Gün Clara Gruitrooy Lily Habash

Fadi Hakura Harry Hall

Habiba Hamid Masuma Hasan

Mukhtar Hashemi Ashraf Md Hashim

Nicholas Van Hear Nava Hinrichs Jan Inglis

Hesham Issa Dalia Al-jawhary Edilberto de Jesús Kari Kahiluoto Mohamad Khalaf Shaden Khallaf Abdelmajid Layadi Mona Makram-Ebeid

Asghar Al-Musawi

K.S. Nathan Melek Nimer

Mutsuyoshi Nishimura

Leena Al Olaimy
Sara Pantuliano
Mohammad Pournik
Chloé de Préneuf
James Quilligan
Ilari Rantakari
Paul Révay
Walid Saleh
Walid Salem
Alaa El-Sadek
Yoshiaki Sasaki
Zaid El Sayegh
Mey Sayegh

Barbara Schwepcke
Ibrahim Sharqieh
Nadim Shehadi
Tarek El Sherbini
Abbas Shiblak
Haseeb Siddiqui
Moctar Sidi Yahia
Rehman Sobhan
Denise Sumpf
Yuji Takagi
Tatsuva Tanami

Mohammad Said Al-Touraihi

Gary Vachicouras Michael Vatikiotis Kristian Ulrichsen Sundeep Waslekar

Maha Yahya Yaşar Yakiş Steven Zyck



# Appendix III - Programme

MONDAY, JUNE 10<sup>TH</sup>, 2013

#### 09.00-09.05

### **Welcoming Remarks and Introductions**

 Sultan Barakat, Director, Post-War Reconstruction and Development Unit, University of York

#### 09.05-10.30

### **Opening Remarks**

- El Hassan bin Talal, Chairman of the WANA Forum
- Yohei Sasakawa, Chairman of The Nippon Foundation

### Message

 Peter Sutherland, UN Secretary General's Special Representative for Migration and Development (read by Paul Révay, European Director, The Trilateral Commission)

Uprootedness is a highly significant phenomenon in the West Asia - North Africa (WANA) region affecting some 20 million people. In certain contexts uprootedness constitutes an emergency humanitarian challenge, whilst in others protracted displacement poses an acute challenge to the WANA Forum's vision of sustainable regional development and stability.

The opening session will present the theme of the 5<sup>th</sup> WANA Forum, 'Achieving the Human Dignity of the Uprooted', and, taking into consideration the goal of the WANA Forum in terms of a regional vision of both stability and development, will examine the ways in which uprootedness challenges this vision.

Additionally, it will present the objective of the meeting to:

• Establish a framework of 'Guiding Principles'\* based on Corporate Governance Social Responsibility (CGSR), through which to facilitate a roadmap towards a multilateral, regional architecture underpinned by a Social & Economic Charter (building on the existing Social Charter created by the WANA Forum in 2011) and by the Human Integrated Management Approach (HIMA) governance system of 2012.

### And to:

 Explore practical policy options that place the uprooted at the centre of developmental policy, including leveraging regional financial and humanitarian institutions to establish a Regional Bank for Reconstruction and Development (RBRD) equipped to address factors causing Uprootedness (environmental degradation, food & water insecurity, unemployment and unsuitable employment opportunities).

# POLICY RESPONSES TO THE UPROOTED

HUMANITARIAN RESPONSES: A critical examination of current approaches and mechanisms within the regional realities context

### 11.00-12.30

# **Session 1: Protection Instruments, Norms and Mechanisms**

Protection lies at the heart of safeguarding the security and dignity of the displaced. But all too often current strategies, including humanitarian responses, and instruments for protection, may be weak, restrictive, obsolete or inconsistent, having the unintended consequence of prolonging and promoting



displacement. Participants are asked to consider how these can be modified, strengthened or replaced to ensure an holistic framework for addressing uprootedness.

**Facilitator:** Nadim Shehadi, Associate Fellow, MENA Programme, Chatham House

#### Speakers:

- Andrew Harper, UNHCR Representative in Jordan
- Hany El Banna, President, Humanitarian Forum
- Abdi Jama Ghedi, Manager, Daryeel Associates

#### 13.30-15.00 Session 2: Promotion of Civil, Social and Economic Rights

Civil, social and economic rights are a central issue in tackling the conditions which lead to uprooting and the subsequent impacts. A deficit of any one of these feeds into the complex causes and consequences of displacement in the region leading to an 'inclusion-exclusion' dichotomy. Moreover, the lack of rights and participation disempowers those who are displaced.

Participants are asked to consider options for policies which, without prejudicing the right of return, can promote civil rights: such as granting individuals citizenship in one state while simultaneously granting residency in another; likewise labour and property rights as elements in the solution to displacement.

**Facilitator:** KS Nathan, Principal Fellow, Institute of Ethnic Studies, National University of Malaysia

#### Speakers:

- Abbas Shiblak, Research Associate, Refugee Studies Centre, University of Oxford
- Nicholas Van Hear, Deputy Director & Senior Researcher, Centre on Migration, Policy and Society, University of Oxford

### 15.30-17.00 Session 3: Legal Instruments and Norms

Insofar as societies depend on effective institutions, the lack of properly functioning domestic legal frameworks and processes (e.g. in relation to property, rights, labour, employment and commercial laws) within host countries is an obstacle to effectively addressing displacement, an obstacle that is exacerbated by the lack of support provided by donor countries for the purpose of building the capacity of host states to develop such legal frameworks (e.g. garnering funding and investing in training).

Drawing on the Forum's extension of *hima* to a Human Integrated Management Approach governance system and a blueprint for a home-grown approach to R2P, participants are asked to consider the role that the development of more effective domestic legal frameworks might play in promoting such rights in addition to the key challenge of reforming legal and normative instruments on a supranational basis, rather than at the domestic level and taking into account the crucial issue of regional carrying capacity.

Facilitator: Muchkund Dubey, President, Council for Social Development

### Speakers:

- Bakhtiar Amin, President, Foundation for the Future
- Najla Ayubi, Country Director, Open Society Afghanistan
- Frans Bouwen, Director of External Relations, The Hague Process on



# 17.30-18.30 Discussion and summary of issues towards the formulation of 'Guiding Principles' Emerging from Day One

**Group work session:** In this session, tables will be asked to appoint a rapporteur and all participants will be asked to reflect and draw upon the day's discussions to consider policy priorities and avenues towards the achievement of a policy framework focused around a Social and Economic Charter. This should build on the existing Social Charter created by the WANA Forum in 2011 and the Forum's extension of *hima* to a Human Integrated Management Approach governance system as a blueprint for a home-grown approach to not only conservation and environmental best practice, but for conflict resolution, the promotion of social justice, equality, social responsibility, the rule of law and social cohesion.

**Plenary session:** Rapporteurs will be asked to report back to the Forum from their tables in a discussion which will review progress towards the formulation of a set of 'Guiding Principles'.

#### **Facilitators:**

- Fadi Hakura, Associate Fellow, Chatham House
- Sultan Barakat, Director, Post-War Reconstruction and Development Unit, University of York

#### **Tuesday, June 11<sup>th</sup>, 2013**

# POLICY RESPONSES TO THE UPROOTED

DEVELOPMENTAL RESPONSES: Exploring alternative policy responses within the WANA framework

### 09.00-10.30

# Session 4: Micro and Macro Economic Development Strategies and Approaches

Whilst uprooted people impose economic burdens on the host country, equally those who are displaced can make positive developmental contributions by bringing new skills and resources, as well as by increasing productive capacity and demand which can stimulate the expansion of the host economy.

Participants are asked to consider options for economic development strategies that maximise the positive and sustainable economic impacts of uprooted people for their host communities and minimise the negative outcomes.

Facilitator: Rehman Sobhan, Chairman, Centre for Policy Dialogue

#### **Speakers:**

- Roger Zetter, Emeritus Professor of Refugee Studies, University of Oxford (via DVD)
- Ziad El Sayegh, Chief of Staff for the Labour Minister of Lebanon
- Mohammed Pournik, Independent Expert on Development Issues in West Asia and North Africa

# 11.00-12.30 Session 5: The Challenge of Urban Displacement – *Developing appropriate* strategies and policies

Under already rampant conditions of urbanisation, the majority of the displaced are located and settle in urban areas swelling the escalating numbers of urban poor and compounding their vulnerability.

Participants are asked to consider strategies to address the humanitarian and



developmental challenges concerning urban displacement and the consequences for the urban poor who are deprived of adequate shelter and protection. Additionally, to discuss the concept of 'durable solutions' for the urban displaced and to consider the positive implications and challenges involved.

Facilitator: Ibrahim Sharqieh, Foreign Policy Fellow, Brookings Institute

#### **Speakers:**

- Sara Pantuliano, Head of the Humanitarian Policy Group, Overseas Development Institute
- Dominique Hyde, UNICEF Representative in Jordan
- Shaden Khallaf, Adjunct Professor, Centre for Migration and Refugee Studies, American University of Cairo

#### 13.30-15.00

Session 6: Impacts and Consequences of the Uprooted for Water Resources – A critical examination of regional water management, including the value of resource cooperation, water as a source of conflict resolution and traditional systems of resource management

Migration is as an intrinsic factor in water resource management, participants are asked to consider the nexus of climate change, water and migration and the environmental impact of displacement in the context of an integrated approach to water, energy and the human environment to enable each and every person in the WANA region to live in dignity and fulfil their human potential. Amongst issues for consideration are: the management of water (in)-security, water variability, land use and methods to optimise resilience through a regional knowledge base, policy & governance, skills enhancement (including water conservation) that reaches down to grassroots level as well as investment for adaptation. Rooted in the traditions and cultural heritage of WANA, *hima* is a particularly relevant concept in this regard.

Additionally, to examine methods to enhance the positive impacts of migration on water resource management, land use & human settlement policy.

Facilitator: Mutsuyoshi Nishimura, Former Chief Climate Negotiator of Japan

### Speakers:

- Sundeep Waslekar, President, Strategic Foresight Group
- Yaşar Yakış, President, Centre for Strategic Communication (STRATIM)
- Dalia Al-jawhary, Hima Programs Director, Society for the Protection of Nature in Lebanon

#### 15.30-17.00

### Session 7: Economic Development and a Regional Financing Regime

Whilst the uprooted may impose economic burdens on the host country, they can equally make positive developmental contributions by bringing new skills and resources, as well as by increasing productive capacity and demand, stimulating the expansion of the host economy.

A supranational regional cohesion fund or Regional Bank for Reconstruction & Development, combining banking components with regional *zakat*, based around the concept of human dignity, would offer a much needed mechanism for developing home-grown solutions to displacement and for maximising the positive and sustainable economic impacts of the uprooted for their host communities.

The fund or regional bank would have a dual purpose — to alleviate human suffering in the immediate and to support human-centric socio-development in the longer term. Additionally, it could provide a power house of ideas for developing home grown solutions to pressing problems, including the WANA countries legacy of political and economic rentierism, by furthering WANA concepts of leapfrogging to the third industrial revolution of digital manufacturing and a low- or post-carbon economy.

Participants are asked to consider the benefits and challenges of establishing such a fund, including issues of sustainability and the rebuilding of trust between state and society to ensure a more effective form of *zakat*.

**Facilitator:** Bashir Fadlallah, Director, Islamic Solidarity Fund for Development Department, Islamic Development Bank

#### Speakers:

- Abdallah Al Dardari, Director, Economic Development & Globalisation Division, ESCWA
- Tarek El Sherbini, International Development Finance Expert

# 17.30-18.30 *Final Session*

### Session 8: Ways Forward – Developing a Framework for Response

In this session participants are asked to reflect on the discussions of the two days and to formulate 'Guiding Principles'\* for a policy framework underpinned by a Social & Economic Charter, building on the existing Social Charter created by the WANA Forum in 2011 and the Forum's extension of *hima* to a Human Integrated Management Approach governance system as a blueprint for a home-grown approach to not only conservation and environmental best practice, but for conflict resolution, the promotion of social justice, equality, social responsibility, the rule of law and social cohesion.

Facilitator: El Hassan bin Talal, Chairman of the WANA Forum

### **Speakers:**

- Walid Salem, Director, Centre for Democracy & Community Development
- James Quilligan, Director, Global Commons Trust
- Abdelmajid Layadi, Secretary General, Euro-Mediterranean Association for Cooperation and Development

**18.30-19.00** Closing remarks: El Hassan bin Talal, Chairman of the WANA Forum



# Appendix IV - Participants at workshop on Economic Reforms and Social Justice in the Arab Region, 16-17 November 2012, Italy

His Royal Highness Prince EL HASSAN BIN TALAL, Jordan

ALY Hassan, Special Advisor to the Minister of Planning, Cairo, Egypt and Professor of Economics at Ohio State University, US

AL MASHAT Rania, Sub - Governor of Central Bank of Egypt, Cairo, Egypt

AL TALHOUNI Bassam Sameer, General Controller of the Companies at the Ministry of Industry and Trade, Amman, Jordan

AMOROSO Licia, Sales Development, Villa Erba, Como, Italy

BALLABIO Roberta, Programme Officer, Landau Network-Centro Volta, Como, Italy

BATAINEH Mohammed, Chairman of AgriJordan and Chairman of the Jordanian-American Association of Businessmen, Amman, Jordan

BEN HAMIDA Essma, Regional Social Entrepreneur of the Year, Middle East and North Africa, 2010, Tunis, Tunisia

BEN ROMDHANE Saoussen, Economist Consultant at African Development Bank, Tunis, Tunisia

CASTELLI Giuseppe, President, Landau Network-Centro Volta, Como, Italy

COLANGELO Giuseppe, Professor, Vice Rector, and President of Insubria Center on International Security (ICIS), University of Insubria, Como, Italy

CONETTI Giorgio, Professor and Former President of Insubria Center on International Security (ICIS), University of Insubria, Como, Italy

CONSOLAZIO Fanny, Programme Officer, Landau Network-Centro Volta, Como, Italy

DARWISH Ahmed M., Former Minister of State for Administration Development, Cairo, Egypt

DROULERS Jean Marc, President of Villa Erba, HCCE-Historic Conference Centres of Europe, Cernobbio, Italy

EL KHATIB Abdel Rahman, Former Chairman of the Executive Privatization Commission, Amman, Jordan

EL NAJJAR Ahmed El Sayed, Head of the Economic Unit at Centre for Political and Strategic Studies and editor-in-chief of the al-Ahram Centre Annual Strategic Economic Trends Report, Cairo, Egypt

GDOURA Ahmed, Independent Consultant, Tunis, Tunisia



KABARITI Samia, Acting Director, WANA, Amman, Jordan

KASSEM Ihab, Assistant Sub-Governor, Banking Operations, Central Bank of Egypt, Cairo, Egypt

LANE Kelly, Personal Assistant to HRH Prince El Hassan bin Talal, Amman, Jordan

LEMBO Paolo, UNDP

MAKAHLEH Ibrahim, Protocol Officer to HRH Prince El Hassan bin Talal, Amman, Jordan

MANGO Ahmad, Advisor to the HRH Prince El Hassan bin Talal, Amman, Jordan

MANGO Dorothy, Jordan Delegation, Amman, Jordan

MARTELLINI Maurizio, Secretary General, Landau Network-Centro Volta and Director of Insubria Center on International Security (ICIS), University of Insubria, Como, Italy

MARTELLINI Niccolò, ETH Zurich, Switzerland

NIEPOLD Mil, Senior Mediator, Boston, US

PARSI Vittorio E., Professor of International Relations, ASERI, Catholic University of Milan, Italy

PIATTI Alberto, Secretary General, AVSI, Milan, Italy

POURNIK Mohammad, Poverty and MDGs Practice Leader of the UNDP Regional Center in Cairo, Cairo, Egypt

PROIETTI Lara, Project Assistant, Landau Network-Centro Volta, Como, Italy

REDAELLI Riccardo, Associate Senior Fellow, Landau Network – Centro Volta (LNCV), and Professor of Geopolitics, Catholic University of Milan, Italy

SHARAF Faris, Chairman of the Islamic International Arab Bank, Vice-Chairman of the Board of Directors of Royal Jordanian Airlines, Amman, Jordan

SHTIEH Rami, Director of the office of HRH Prince El Hassan bin Talal, Amman, Jordan

TAWFIK Hisham, Chairman of Arabia Online Brokerage Co., Cairo, Egypt

ZALLIO Franco, Consultant, Landau Network-Centro Volta, Como, Italy

