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The Battle of Ben Guerdane: Between Savagery and Resilience



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The Epic Battle of Ben Guerdane: Between Savagery and Resilience

Let history take note of the day of the raid, by the treacherous ones... at Ben Guerdane, seeking to establish an emirate.

At dawn, traitors attacked the country... assaulting the military barracks.

They came from everywhere with weapons... directing heavy fire against our security forces.

But they came against men who long for martyrdom... and defend their motherland with fervor.

Lotfi Jemal

1 Introduction

Ben Guerdane is a commune in the governorate of Medenine, located in south eastern Tunisia, close to the border with Libya. It has a population of 79,912, with an average age of 30.30 years old. The illiteracy rate is about 19 percent and the unemployment rate is 18.85 percent.¹

The economic situation in Ben Guerdane is fragile, relying mainly on cross-border parallel trade. Employment in other sectors is in sharp decline, with 5.12 percent in manufacturing and 7.47 percent in the agriculture and fishing sector.²

In addition to the fragile economic situation, Ben Guerdane has suffered the onslaught of violent extremism in one of its most extreme forms, when, in March 2016, a number of armed groups attempted to occupy the city and declare it an emirate affiliated with ISIS. The incident became known as the “Epic Battle of Ben Guerdane”.³

This report is based on field work findings and highlights the absence of human security, which manifested primarily in a lack of economic security, employment, political participation, and social justice.⁴ The authors consider the effect of this deficiency on the emergence of violent extremism, while taking into account the specificity of Ben Guerdane as a border region.

This paper is part of the wider project "Towards More Effective Human Security Approaches in Jordan, Lebanon and Tunisia". The project seeks to explore how effective human security programming can continue to preventing violent extremism (PVE). It also explores how state security polices (that aim to prevent violent extremism) can undermine human security levels in eighteen target communities. The Netherlands Organization for Scientific Research funded the project, which is coordinated by the WANA Institute in collaboration with Jasmine Foundation

¹ We relied on available official statistics on the governorate of Medenine in the General Population and Housing Census of 2014, available on: http://www.ins.tn/sites/default/files/publication/pdf/20_MEDNINE.pdf?fbclid=IwAR11Lir09wgAs6VVBGz5N5CySqnNSBIXeaUAG4poIDSlw8effnkQwnKzwKOs

² Ibid.

³ Walid Mejri, “Al-irheb fi Tounes: kharitat Atasalsol Azzamani lel ah’deth ba’d 14 Janfi [Terrorism in Tunisia: A map of the chronology of events after January 14],” *Inkyfada*, April 08, 2015, <https://inkyfada.com/ar/2014/06/14/drh/>

⁴ Ben Guerdane workshops, November 15th and 16th, 2018.

(Tunisia), the Lebanese Centre for Studies, Mercy Corps, and the Arab Institute for Security Studies.

Field research took place in 18 regions in the three countries. In Tunisia, six regions were chosen for the implementation of the study: Carthage, Menzel Bourguiba, Douar Hicher, Teboursouk, Djerba and Ben Guerdane.

The field research in Ben Guerdane spanned a period of five months (between August 2018 and January 2019) and included 104 participants (54 female and 50 male). Participants spanned local and regional government, international and civil society organizations, as well as imams and individuals from marginalized communities most at risk of being recruited by radical groups. The findings in this report reflect the views and opinions of participants, as collected through a number of qualitative research methods, including 12 individual interviews and focus groups and two workshops.

The project seeks to explore the views and attitudes of local communities regarding, first, the effectiveness of human security programs in preventing violent extremism in their respective regions; and second, the impact of security policies on the implementation of human security programs and efforts to prevent extremism. The project aims to develop a theory of change on how to improve the three-way relationship between human security, hard security policies, and PVE efforts.⁵ It should be noted that the analysis in this paper is specific to Ben Guerdane, and to how these perceptions manifest in the ground. This paper does not offer a comprehensive assessment of the situation in Ben Guerdane.

2 The Deterioration of Human Security Approaches and Its Role in Fueling Social Tensions

The results of the field study revealed a clear decline in human security approaches in the region. The participants in the various activities emphasized a perceived discrimination between regions, in reference to the duality between the centre and the periphery, rooted in large disparities in access to human security. Participants gave numerous examples of this, with a focus on economic security, employment, political participation, and social justice. The participants in the focus group discussions described them as follows:⁶

2.1 Economic Security and Employment

The high unemployment rate especially among university graduates in the area of Ben Guerdane indicates the weakness and decline of employment indicators in the region. In the words of one focus group participant, this “leads young people to doubt the value of pursuing their education”.⁷ The failure of education to serve as a means of upward social mobility, in conjunction with the oversaturation of public institutions and the state’s inability to provide

⁵ For more information about the project, see <http://wanainstitute.org/en/project/towards-more-effective-human-security-approaches-context-emerging-threat-violent-extremism>

⁶ These problems were frequently identified in Ben Guerdane Focus Group Discussion, September 11th, 2018.

⁷ Ben Guerdane Focus Group Discussion, September 11th, 2018.

employment opportunities for graduates and those with less education, draws a grim portrait of the dynamics of socio-economic empowerment in the region.

On the other hand, while acknowledging that the private sector can achieve economic recovery in Ben Guerdane,⁸ an employee in a local civil society organisation said that the investment climate "lacks the most basic facilities that will attract foreign and domestic investors to the region".⁹ This explains the situation better than the stereotype that attributes young people's reluctance to set up their own businesses to their passivity and dependence on government jobs and to the absence of a spirit of entrepreneurship among youth.¹⁰

In fact, the people from Ben Guerdane run successful big businesses in the capital Tunis, regardless of the social stigmas related to money laundering.¹¹ Indeed, unemployment has pushed a significant part of the population to seek job opportunities as part of smuggling networks, which they recognize as precarious and dangerous, taking advantage of Ben Guerdane's location at the border. The region's economic situation leaves young people with two choices – unemployment or smuggling.¹² Many have chosen smuggling, or else leaving altogether to move to the capital or illegally migrate overseas to European countries. Regardless of whether or not these choices are legal or effective, they are definitely risky and brave.

2.2 Social Justice

According to the participants, the weak application of employment and economic security approaches cannot be isolated from the decline in a social justice approach since "social justice requires providing the basic necessities of life that every citizen is entitled to, including medicine and food, which are often in short supply in the region".¹³

This can be easily observed in the degree of marginalisation and regional disparities, which are the result of excessively centralised policies often highlighted by participants and associated with economic and social degradation. "The state is unable to provide basic needs for the citizens such as foodstuffs because of the distance from the centre".¹⁴ This further deepens the regional disparities that the 2014 constitution has attempted to eliminate through the principle of positive discrimination.¹⁵ Despite these measures, we can still clearly see "the absence of serious programmes to improve the social situation in the region, and the few existing program's neglect

⁸ Interview with an employee in the civil society sector, Ben Guerdane, 6 September 6th, 2018. He stated: "To me, the best type of job is in the private sector. You can develop yourself and work without waiting around for the government and the state to do something."

⁹ Participant in Ben Guerdane Focus Group Discussion, September 11th, 2018.

¹⁰ Interview with an employee in the civil society sector, Ben Guerdane, 6 September 6th, 2018 when he mentioned: "I want a government job", as long as this mentality doesn't change into another one that keeps with the economic changes, we can't talk about entrepreneurship".

¹¹ A group of young men from Ben Guerdane succeeded in accumulating wealth and in forming a network of investors that penetrated and almost monopolized the sector of cafes and lavish restaurants in the Lac 2 Area

¹² Participant in Ben Guerdane Focus Group Discussion, September 11th, 2018.

¹³ Participant in Ben Guerdane Focus Group Discussion, September 11th, 2018.

¹⁴ Participant in Ben Guerdane workshop, September 11th, 2018.

¹⁵ Article 12 of the Tunisian constitution: "The state shall seek to achieve social justice, sustainable development and balance between regions based on development indicators and the principle of positive discrimination. The state shall seek to exploit natural resources in the most efficient way."

of the border area's specificities and the issues it suffers from at all levels".¹⁶ This translates into the scarcity of basic items and, to secure the bare necessities, people face extortion and inflated prices.

2.3 Political Participation

Social justice is linked to political security, since an effective political participation can channel the demands of the population in Ben Guerdane up to the decision makers. The significant changes that occurred at the political level after the Tunisian revolution—elections and the rise active political parties and civil society organisations—have resulted in both positive and negative outcomes. Indeed, opening the doors to the political arena has had limited effects after the former regime solidified citizen withdrawal and detachment from the public sphere. According to an employee in the civil society sector, Tunisian citizens “did not learn to participate in political life”.¹⁷

The municipal elections' model in Tunisia in general, and in Ben Guerdane in particular, reveals a great reluctance to vote.¹⁸ However, youth lists represented four to five lists out of nine total, with an average candidate age range of 28-35 years old. This is a good indicator, according to an employee in a civil society organisation who believes that the active political participation of young people is needed to consolidate the set of values that advance the state towards democracy.¹⁹

However, others believe that turnout among young voters was low in the 2014 elections due to the sense of despair they feel,²⁰ which stems from three factors: First, young people have been shocked by the bad political behaviour that the media has consistently highlighted. This has greatly contributed to shaping a negative perception of politics.

Second, the sense of despair young people feel is also due to the repeated experience of unfulfilled electoral promises. These have resulted in a loss of trust among residents in representatives of political parties and their ability to bring about change in the region in the face of the many problems and difficulties. This reinforces the perception that political participation is pointless.

Thirdly, there is a growing sense that the different political actors are prejudiced against the people of the region and that they deliberately discriminate against them. According to participants, this can be seen in the uneven distribution of political appointments, especially when it comes to senior positions.²¹ This growing feeling of being discriminated against breeds a

¹⁶ Participant in Ben Guerdane workshop, September 11th, 2018.

¹⁷ Interview with an employee in the civil society sector, Ben Guerdane, September 3rd, 2018.

¹⁸ Interview with an employee in the civil society sector, Ben GUerdane, September 6th, 2018. He stated: “I was a campaign manager and I've seen this happen, we talked to people day and night and they kept saying ‘No’, they wouldn't understand that these are local, different from the parliamentary and presidential elections, complete reluctance”.

¹⁹ Interview with an employee in the civil society sector, Ben Guerdane, September 6th, 2018.

²⁰ Interview with a worker in a CSO, Ben Guerdane, September 6th, 2018.

²¹ Ben Guerdane workshops, November 15th and 16th, 2018.

desire for withdrawal and a rejection of participation in response to repeated practices, which has led to widespread calls for a boycott of political action.

2.4 Implemented Human Security Programs and Their Effectiveness in Preventing Violent Extremism

Considering the deficiencies mentioned by the participants in relation to human security approaches and the risk that these represent in terms of violent separatist tendencies, it follows that the participants do not see real programs aimed at overcoming the critical situation in the region. According to them, the few programs available are of very limited impact, and this was confirmed by the results of the workshops,²² and can be summarized in the following examples:

At the economic level, with the rising unemployment, the lack of job opportunities and the increased bribery and favoritism, national programmes are implemented such as Forsati, Al-Karama and voluntary work contracts and other microcredit programmes for small projects. At the regional and local levels, we find programmes such as the Rural Girl Programme and other live-stock related programmes that provide job opportunities for the region. However, participants rated the effectiveness of these programmes at 15 percent. There was a significant absence of development and treatment programmes. The "I Watch" organization and the Anti-Corruption Commission were given 10 percent (Table 1).

In terms of political participation, the national programmes implemented by various stakeholders include the youth representation system on electoral lists. At the regional level, the participants mentioned party coalitions that favour the region and the involvement of young people in political parties. Local programmes consisted of the local consensus on fighting terrorism, the Municipal Council and the Local Youth Council. These programs address political disputes between parties, political corruption and the representation of young people in political life. (Table 2).

With regard to social justice, again we noted the implementation of national, local and regional programmes. The evaluation of their effectiveness ranged from 5 percent to 60 percent. The social justice programmes are thus more effective than the programmes related to political participation and economic security. They are also more acceptable to the citizens and received higher satisfaction rates. On one hand, these programmes show that the national government is avoiding its obligations to develop and implement mechanisms that create employment opportunities for the population of Ben Guerdane. It has failed to hold competitive public examinations and develop a new development vision through the recruitment of workers in construction companies. On the other hand, the government is also accepting and examining petitions from victims of human rights violations with the aim of bringing the offenders to justice and compensating the victims as part of achieving transitional justice. And since social justice entails ensuring equality of opportunity at the social and economic levels, the government implements developmental, financial and training programmes and others that help to activate the role of youth, such as Generations for Peace (Table 3).

²² Ibid.

According to the participants, the combination of a deterioration in human security approaches and the absence of a strong political will to bring about change has led to the following:²³

- The chronic unemployment that affects youngest higher education graduates in the region can lead in certain circumstances to crime, deviation, and extremism;
- The various failures in implementing human security programs, especially the approach to social justice, lead to a deepening sense of injustice and resentment towards the state, which may generate a desire to resort to violence as a reaction;
- The poor performance of state institutions and the spread of administrative bureaucracy contribute to the proliferation of parallel and illegal economic activities, which may in turn contribute to radicalism and crime;
- The flawed implementation of human security programs limits the effectiveness of civil society projects in the region. The absence of state support for associations negatively affects the effectiveness of their activities and their impact on the social environment.
- The spread of poverty, unemployment, and corruption creates an environment conducive to the emergence of extremism and contributes to people's susceptibility to violent ideas.
- Deliberately overlooking human security programs places the individual at the margins of state policies. This is seen in the reliance on hard security policies, which creates a sense of marginalisation, as well as in the state's absence and inability to improve the social situation in the region, all while being ubiquitous through its security apparatus.

3 Ben Guerdane Between Savagery and Resilience: An Analytical Attempt

3.1 Ben Guerdane: A Favorable Environment for Violent Extremism

The most obvious flaw in the modern nation-state's implementation of its supposed national project is the failure of its economic models, its civil institutions, and its social control mechanisms to encompass the entire social field. The city of Ben Guerdane is one of the clear examples of this failure, especially in view of the deficient implementation of human security approaches ensuring the basics of decent life. In the absence of any real vision for economic development in the region, Ben Guerdane was a “godsend for parallel economy,” which is thriving thanks to the city's location near the border with Libya.²⁴

²³ Ben Guerdane Focus Group Discussion, September 11th, 2018.

²⁴ Kamel Laroussi, *Parallel Trade and Smuggling at the Tunisian- Libyan Border Space (1988-2012) Status Quo and Prospects within a concealed Globalization*, (Beirut: Arab Center for Research and Policy Studies, 2018). available at: <https://www.dohainstitute.org/ar/BooksAndJournals/Pages/Parallel-Trade-and-Smuggling-at-the-Tunisian-Libyan-Border-Space-1988-2012.aspx>

It is worth noting, however, that the notion of “parallel” is not limited to the economy. It is rather a phenomenon that extends to all spheres of life, resulting in the emergence of a traditional-type, community-based order governed by shared social norms. It is an order that is specific to social groups that lie outside the scope of the modern nation-state's projects. Consequently, as researcher Zuhair Ismail puts it, they are referred to as “margins” parallel to the “national” order which covers the space lying within the reach of state authority and included in its projects.²⁵

A statement, in 2014, by Mr. Mohsen Marzouq, campaign manager for President Beji Caid Essebsi who declares that he stands for the national project of the modern nation-state, clearly illustrates this division: “I ask the Tunisian South to rectify their choices and not to leave the national fold”,²⁶ he said, because the south gave its votes to former president Moncef Marzouki.

This traditional-type order— which is “independent / excluded”, from the national project— represents a suitable environment for mobilization and rallying. It meets all the conditions of the favourable local environment envisioned by strategists of violent extremism. The region is deprived of most of the basics of human security, which opens it to what strategists of violent extremism call “savagery”.²⁷ These favourable conditions are as follows:

- A border area where the control over the borders was weakened during the “revolution”, which facilitated the flow of weapons;
- Proximity to a war situation in Libya;
- A region with a traditional social order and strong religious leanings;
- An area where establishment religious institutions have lost their appeal due to policies of religious containment during previous political periods;
- An area where economic security is absent and where life is built around the parallel economy. This is in line with the extremist strategy of “vexation and exhaustion”,²⁸ which means, among other things, weakening the vital joints of the state by creating parallel paths.

²⁵ Zuhair Ismail is a researcher at the Center for Economic and Social Research in Tunis. He was the first to work on an explanatory model that separates civil society from domestic society in Tunisia and used it in interpreting the events of Ben Guerdane, and presented an internal paper at the Center for Economic and Social Research of the Ministry of Higher Education and Scientific Research entitled “The incident of Ben Guerdane and the Tunisian model in countering terrorism ”, on 20 April 2016 at the headquarters of the Center in Tunisia.

²⁶ In the TV program “Thanks for Coming”, National Channel 1, November 24th, 2014.

²⁷ Abu Baker Naji, *Management of Savagery: The Most Critical Stage Through Which the Islamic Nation Will Pass* (no place: Center for Islamic Studies and Research, no date).

²⁸ Ibid.

- An area where some locals are affiliated with extremist groups, providing them with a foothold.²⁹

The National Counter-Terrorism Strategy of 2014³⁰ has demonstrated a certain degree of popular support for the phenomenon of violent extremism in economically disadvantaged regions—including the Ben Guerdane region and the belt of marginalized communities surrounding the capital—making them potential incubators for terrorism.

3.2 Ben Guerdane: A Hostile Environment for Violent Extremism

All these objective factors led violent extremists to bet on the region of Ben Guerdane as a favourable social environment and a “region of savagery” easy to manage through occupation and its transformation into an Islamic emirate. That is exactly what a number of armed groups from Tunisia and Libya—among their ranks some natives of the region—undertook to do in March 2016, based on claims to social and religious legitimacy.

Both forms of legitimacy were ultimately refuted in a way that the violent extremists never expected. They did not foresee that the city’s inhabitants would rise up against them, regarding them as treacherous invaders. This was a clear manifestation of social resilience and resistance in the face of the most extreme form of violent extremism.

We may say that what was considered a sudden shift from an environment that attracts violent extremism to one that repels it was, in fact, not so sudden. The reason is that the social resilience that made it possible to stand firm against the most dangerous forms of violent extremism is the result of the same factors that attract the phenomenon of violent extremism in the first place:

- The community-based / traditional order considers rogues and traitors those who rebel against it.
- Popular forms of religious commitment reject external religious views.
- Smuggling is merely a means to earn a living. It is not a way to amass wealth, as in the case of so-called "macro-smuggling" which involves money laundering and human trafficking.

What is more important from the standpoint of this analysis is that what happened in Ben Guerdane represents the first signs of resilience and proof of the possibility of repairing the rift between the "community-based" and the "national". This is the condition for the rise of a new national state that encompasses the entire social space based on the principle of decentralization and local government.

²⁹ According to the National Strategy for Combating Terrorism of 2014, the city of Ben Guerdane-Medenine ranks seventh in terms of the number of offenders incarcerated for terrorism-related offences.

³⁰ An internal, un-published, study prepared by the Tunisian Presidency entitled “The National Strategy for Combating Terrorism: Towards Curbing the Phenomenon of Terrorism and Heightening the Capacity for Preventing, Confronting and Resisting Terrorist Acts.”

4 Recommendations

- Encourage investment in the region and setup a social and solidarity economic pole through:
 - Encourage startups working in the field of social and solidarity economy.
 - Accelerate the ratification of the law on social and solidarity economy organizations. Help local communities to carry out feasibility and viability studies and provide legal aid and expertise necessary for the success of such projects.
 - Promote local products, especially local original handicrafts, by establishing a quality label specific to the region. Create centers aimed at preserving popular knowledge of traditional work methods.
- Encourage the establishment of development banks and regional development funds and facilitate access to the loan system by easing administrative obstacles and reviewing interest rates on loans.
- Organize training courses about employment and investment mechanisms on a regular basis. The objective is mainly to raise awareness about the advantages offered by the 2016 Investment Law and all the necessary procedures for starting and managing new projects. The courses should be aimed at all groups, with a focus on women and higher education graduates.
- Set up a coalition of associations aimed at attracting investments, promoting the region, and preparing it to be an investment incubator, capitalizing on its important geographical location.
- Elaborate a strategic plan for the development of the city of Ben Guerdane for the year 2050 based on human security approaches. The long-term plan should be implemented gradually, taking into account the region's specific characteristics as well as the needs of the residents. The plan should be drawn in a participatory manner with the help of experts to ensure maximum effectiveness and efficiency.
- Work towards curbing the parallel economy by integrating it into the official economy through reduced customs duties and activating free trade zones, taking into account the present economic and social condition of the region.
- Establish a special system for mediation and conflict resolution adapted to the cultural and social characteristics of the region. To this end, set up specialized committees composed of local community leaders who are provided with training and the necessary tools for mediation and conflict resolution.
- Develop the religious space in the region by giving imams greater freedom to exercise their role in the intellectual, economic, and social development of the individual and society. Emphasize the right to freedom of expression on the pulpit away from political

instrumentalisation. Offer imams training on matters relating to religious and legal issues as well as questions of rule of law and democracy and public and individual rights and freedoms. Enforce the role of the Imam as guarantor of social peace and mediator in the resolution of disputes.

5 Appendix of tables

Table 1: Evaluation of the employment programmes

Employment Approach			
Factors	Programs Implemented		Evaluation (%)
The rising unemployment and the lack of job opportunities create psychological problems that lead to delinquency and extremism	Nationally	– Forsati program; Al-Karama contract; voluntary work contract – Encouraging microenterprise development through loans	15
	Regionally	– Rural Girl program – Agricultural programs (livestock breeding)	15
	Locally	– Rural Girl program – Agricultural programs (livestock breeding)	15
The absence of a genuine development model capable of reducing unemployment	Nationally	– A development model that discriminates between the regions	0
	Regionally	– Lack of programs	0
	Locally	– Lack of programs	0
The adoption of ineffective employment approaches such as the Al-Karama contract	Nationally	– Providing women with interest-free loans	0
	Regionally	– Lack of programs	0
	Locally	– Lack of programs	N.A.
Bribery and favoritism	Nationally	– Anti-Corruption Committee – The organization “I Watch”	10
	Regionally	– Lack of programs	0
	Locally	– Lack of programs	0

Table 2: Evaluation of the political participation programmes

Political Participation			
Factors	Programs Implemented		Evaluation (%)
Partisan political conflict	Nationally	– Building national consensus – National coalition government	0
	Regionally	– Party coalitions in favor of the region	40
	Locally	– Local consensus on fighting terrorism – The development plan in the region	30
Contingent party activities and fake programs	Nationally	– Unrealistic programs	8
	Regionally	– Lack of programs	0
	Locally	– Lack of programs	0
The absence of a clear and effective development vision for the region	Nationally	– Loan policy	2
	Regionally	– Lack of programs	0
	Locally	– Slow or inactive programs	0
Low youth representation	Nationally	– Youth representation system on electoral lists	10
	Regionally	– Youth Party Activity	10
	Locally	– Municipal Council – Local Youth Council	30
Regional and international programs lacking local rooting	Nationally	– Lack of programs	0
	Regionally	– Lack of programs	0
	Locally	– Lack of programs	0
Political corruption	Nationally	– Programs of the Anti-Corruption Commission – Programs of the Truth and Dignity Commission	10
	Regionally	– Lack of programs	0
	Locally	– Lack of programs	0

Table 3: Evaluation of the social justice programmes

Approach to Social Justice			
Factors	Programs Implemented		Evaluation (%)
The combination of external and internal pressure to disrupt the course of social justice	Nationally	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> – The classification of some internal regions (14 states) as a priority – The recognition of the principle of positive discrimination in the Constitution 	0
	Regionally	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> – Agricultural Pastoral Development Program – Setting a number of municipalities as priority for intervention 	0
	Locally	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> – The commitment of the Municipal Council to fulfill its obligations and implement the planned projects 	10
Governments renege on their commitment to settle employment mechanisms.	Nationally	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> – Some entry exams; mafuzin amniyan (the case of those wrongly flagged as security threats under the Ben Ali regime); hadhaiyor construction workers;³¹ Aliya 16 or mechanism 16;³² Aliya 20 or mechanism 20;³³ volunteer work; Al-Karama contract; SIVP³⁴ contracts 	30
	Regionally	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> – A number of entry exams in the category of workers, guards, and drivers 	20
	Locally	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> – Recruitment of workers in construction companies 	50
A number of obstacles facing transitional justice	Nationally	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> – Accepting the applications of the victims of human rights violations – Examining the applications and interviewing the victims – Difficulties in bringing offenders to justice and compensating 	20

³¹ A category of precarious employment. The case of the recipients of an employment program destined for unskilled laborers. They are offered temporary work for low wages and no social security

³² A category of precarious employment. The case of the recipients of an employment program destined for unemployed graduates

³³ A program designed to promote the recruitment of higher education graduates in associations

³⁴ Stage d'initiation à la vie professionnelle: a program aimed at assisting beneficiaries to acquire the professional skills necessary to actively participate in the labor market.)

		victims	
	Regionally	– The hearings and the acceptance of the applications were done at the regional level (regional office)	40
	Locally	– Information and awareness day	10
Marginalization of the youth	Nationally	– Generations of Peace programs	60
	Regionally	– Lack of programs	0
	Locally	– Local Youth Council	0
Unequal opportunities at the social and economic levels	Nationally	– Encouraging investment in interior regions	5
	Regionally	– Rural development programs	10
	Locally	– Microcredit programs	20



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