


Jordanian Young Analysts:
**"Refugees and Forced Migrants:
Jordanian Youth Policy Perspectives"**



Foreword by HRH Princess Sumaya bint El Hassan

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"Refugees and Forced Migrants: Jordanian
Youth Policy Perspectives"**

These policy papers are part of the project entitled «Jordan-EU Dialogue on Human Security Issues» implemented jointly by the West Asia-North Africa Institute (WANA) and the Konrad-Adenauer- Stiftung (KAS) – Jordan Office. The aim of the project is to raise awareness on the issues of importance and priority that Jordan must address in 2021 from a non-governmental perspective, cementing the culture of informing and enhancing exchange of knowledge that is able to influence public policies in Jordan.

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Introductory Chapter (Foreword by Her Royal Highness Princess Sumaya bint El Hassan)

‘Science for Peace’ is a philosophy that offers hope to us all, even in this most testing age. As we face collectively a myriad of challenges to climate, environment, health, and security, we must do all we can to reenforce the fact that science speaks to our shared human ability to understand, to innovate and to overcome. Science creates a space for dialogue that is both constructive and non-discriminatory. Indeed, through science, we may speak a common language of inquiry and understanding, and with it, we may set in motion those urgently required processes of creative compassion that give hope to us all.

The issues surrounding forced migration and refugees have multiplied in recent years, while little has been done to improve our collective understanding of the causes and the crises, or the impact of a shattered life that underlies each human experience. It is therefore essential that researchers drawn from a variety of disciplines, and working in novel ways, should be supported so that their efforts may help to document, define, and ease the issues around migration. Perhaps most importantly in the immediate term, scientists must help to counter biased news reporting, and inaccurate and incendiary statements. Scientists must assert the rational and the humane over hyperbole and misinformation.

If we truly wish to support the notion of ‘Science for Peace’ in relation to forced migration, then we must commit to documenting accurately its flows, causes and effects. We must collect and understand data on each unfolding tragedy of displaced humanity. And we must allow our committed researchers to offer short and long-term solutions, to inform policymaking, and to place each crisis and challenge into its correct context – past, present, and future.

In recent years, we have seen in our region and elsewhere, that history has a habit of being rewritten in very short periods: ‘Cause and effect’ are put aside in favour of gut reaction and swift reporting. Such irresponsible and harmful reflexes must not be allowed to define our world’s responses to the drastic predicament of vulnerable people caught up in the complexities of national and regional crises beyond their control.

It is vital that we empower the role of highly trained, independent social scientists to gather accurate and reliable data. This must be the basis for policy responses to any crisis and its multiple impacts. We must know who our refugees and forced migrants are, what it is that they are fleeing and what can be done to assist them and relieve the pressures on host states and agencies.

Science must operate in an unfettered way to document and understand goals and motives behind high-risk irregular migration, to identify potential gaps in reception structures and to assess the effects of migration on receiving communities. Crucially, we must empower science to speak the truth, so that we may move away from a language of both victimisation and criminalisation.

I am therefore delighted to witness and support the publication of this report. This timely collaboration between KAS and WANA represents a focused effort to bring rational science into play, in a situation where humanity is so often neglected. This is a shining example of how researchers, using the tools of evidence, observation, reason, and analysis may reassert the essential humanity of forced migration.



HRH Princess Sumaya bint El Hassan

President of the Royal Scientific Society

Preface

As Jordan celebrates 100 years of the founding of the Emirate of Transjordan and 75 years of its independence, the world is in a difficult and decisive period. The global Covid-19 pandemic has exacerbated many existing problems and is a strain on health systems and economies worldwide. One lesson should be clear to everybody by now: In our times, no state and no people can tackle the challenges that we are facing alone.

It is in this spirit the Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung (KAS) has established an office in Amman in 1982. Founded after the Second World War to promote civic and political education of citizens and elites in Germany, our Foundation remains deeply committed to international understanding and cooperation. We proudly bear the name of the first Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany, Konrad Adenauer, who led our young democracy back into the international community and on the path of European integration.

We are honored to work in Jordan with esteemed partners, such as the West Asia - North Africa Institute (WANA), to promote mutual understanding and develop fresh policy expertise. In our common project "Jordan-EU Dialogue on Human Security Issues" WANA and KAS engaged with a group of young experts to work on specific areas, including sustainable water supply, mobility and energy. The result of their commitment and talent is displayed in this publication. We firmly believe that the new generation has its word to say about how policies and politics should look like in the future!

The destinies of the Middle East and Europe are forcefully intertwined – by geographical proximity, by a shared history of both cooperation and conflict, by a vibrant culture that has emerged around the Mediterranean Sea, by the mobility of their populations, and first and foremost by the aspirations of their youth. I hope that this publication offers insights not only for Jordanian policy-makers, but for their European counterparts as well and can thus contribute to further Jordan-European collaboration.

Dr. Edmund Ratka

Resident Representative of the Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung to Jordan





Human Security, Refugees, and Forced Migrants

Towards appreciating the need for these kinds of policy papers, it is important to unpack the concept of human security as well as refugee and forced migrant issues. The Human Security paradigm has sought to place the individual rather than the state at the centre of security concerns. The term was first introduced by the United Nations Development Program's 1994 Human Development Report, when a post- Cold War order meant that a security narrative dominated by nuclear containment could yield a more nuanced one that prioritised individual needs. Rather than protection from outright military threats, human security thus focuses on protecting people from the kinds of vulnerabilities that lead, in the long term, to armed conflict. These vulnerabilities include food insecurity, the lack of livelihood opportunities, and poor education. When policymakers work towards improving the myriad issues that come under these broad categories, societies build resilience against armed conflict. WANA has looked at how improved access to livelihood opportunities – among other human security factors – can prevent violent extremism.¹

The state of human security becomes even more precarious for refugees and forced migrants, who have to build lives outside of their familiar environments. Forced migrants are people who have migrated owing to coercive elements, such as threats to their lives and basic human securities such as livelihoods.² Refugees are people who have left their country to escape from the effects of armed conflicts.³ While refugees are a subset of forced migrants, the project uses them both to highlight that refugees are forced migrants who are outside of their countries.

¹ Dr Neven Bondokji and Barik Mhadeen, "Theory of Change: Towards More Effective Human Security Approaches in the Context of the Emerging Threat of Violent Radicalisation in Jordan, Lebanon, and Tunisia | WANA INSTITUTE," WANA Institute - West Asia, North Africa Forum, December 14, 2019, <http://wanainstitute.org/en/publication/theory-change-towards-more-effective-human-security-approaches-context-emerging-threat>.

² European Commission, "Definition of 'Forced Migrant,'" [ec.europa.eu](https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/pages/glossary/forced-migrant_en), accessed October 18, 2021, https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/pages/glossary/forced-migrant_en.

³ European Commission, "Definition of '(Civil) War Refugee,'" [ec.europa.eu](https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/pages/glossary/civil-war-refugee_en), accessed October 18, 2021, https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/pages/glossary/civil-war-refugee_en.

In our globalised world, conflict – even within borders – tends to have far-reaching effects on human settlement. Since 1948, the WANA region has known this reality well. Of the world's approximately 60 million displaced people worldwide, about 40 per cent of them originate from this region.⁴ Most of the approximately 9 million refugees and 15 million internally displaced people have settled in the region's various host countries.⁵ While the overwhelming cause of their displacement has been armed conflict, it is important to note that many of these conflicts were precipitated by human security vulnerabilities in times of peace. This is evident, for example, in the leadup to the Syria conflict. A spate of droughts in eastern Syria beginning in 2006 led to massive migration to urban centres, several of which became hotspots for government protests in 2011.⁶ Thus, farmers and others who had lost their livelihoods came to these centres as forced migrants, and many of them left Syria for Jordan.

Their ordeal is further proof that it is often too late to contain armed conflict once it has broken out, and that it is wisest to tackle root causes – such as the lack of livelihood opportunities – as the first means of preventing conflict.

In an era in which one's primary bearing is a nationality linked to a territory, refugees and forced migrants can pose massive challenges for host states. Having served as the historical destination for refugees from the WANA region and beyond, Jordan has long grappled with these challenges and the need to respond to them effectively and equitably, especially in terms of economic integration. Just across the Mediterranean, the European community is also heavily invested in developing responses to refugee and forced migrant issues. As the 2016 Jordan Compact showed, it has become axiomatic in European policy circles that the resilience of WANA host states is intimately linked to the manageability of Europe's refugee inflow.⁷ The European community has thus made it a regional priority to ensure host states have sustainable mechanisms for integrating refugees into their economies and public services.

⁴ Maha Yahya, Marwan Muasher, and Maha Yahya, Marwan Muasher. "Refugee Crises in the Arab World." Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2014.

<https://carnegieendowment.org/201818/10/refugee-crises-in-arab-world-pub-77522>.

⁵ "Situation Report on International Migration 2019: The Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration in the Context of the Arab Region." UNESCWA, 2020.

<https://www.unescwa.org/sites/www.unescwa.org/files/uploads/situation-report-international-migration-2019-summary-english.pdf>.

⁶ Henry Fountain, "Researchers Link Syrian Conflict to a Drought Made Worse by Climate Change," The New York Times, March 2, 2015, <https://www.nytimes.com/201503/03/science/earth/study-links-syria-conflict-to-drought-caused-by-climate-change.html>.

⁷ Luigi Achilli, "Syrian Refugees in Jordan: A Reality Check." Migration Policy Centre, February 2015. https://www.academia.edu/11486227/Syrian_Refugees_in_Jordan_a_Reality_Check

Project Details

Towards the goal of producing policy papers, the authors participated in a training programme featuring a range of hard and soft skills. For this programme, WANA had sent out a call for youth professionals interested in refugee and forced migrant issues. By March 2020, 42 applicants had applied for the programme, of which 15 were shortlisted for interviews. Of the eight who were accepted, only three committed to the programme for its entire duration, in what might be a testament to its demands.

The programme featured several activities, all towards developing the papers in this book. The trainees participated in two sets of workshops over the course of four days in April and June. These workshops covered: 1) background to human security, refugees, and forced migrants; 2) research methods; 3) policymaking; 4) policy argumentation. Upon completion of these workshops, trainees then began an intensive research and writing process in close consultation with the trainer. Upon completion of their first drafts, participants then had the opportunity to showcase their drafts at a validation workshop in July. There, subject specialists critically engaged participants over their findings and recommendations. Feedback provided by specialists and other readers were reflected in these published policy papers. In October the trainees presented these findings at a roundtable event featuring experts and government stakeholders who are in positions to contemplate these policy recommendations in their own implementing capacities. It is hoped that these papers – as published, openly accessible resources – remain in conversation long beyond the October 2021 project end date. In this spirit, it was quite heartening to see Mustafa Hashem – an alumnus of the project’s first iteration – present his policy paper, “Liberalisation of the Electricity Market in Jordan: the Human Security Perspective”, in an online seminar supported by Germany’s Federal Ministry of Economic Affairs and Energy in September 2021.⁸

⁸ Hala Hamawi et al., *Young Voices: Jordanian Youth in Public Policy-Making 2020* (Amman: Konrad Adenauer Stiftung Jordan / West Asia-North Africa Institute, 2021), 48, http://wanainstitute.org/sites/default/files/publications/Young%20Voices%20Jordanian%20Youth%20in%20Public%20Policy%20Making%202020_%20resized.pdf.

Policy Paper Overview

The three papers touch on the fields of access to energy, education, and accurate information. Their authors coupled the training they received in the programme with their professional experience and academic backgrounds, all towards producing original policy recommendations.

Diana Ishaqat, a development practitioner who holds an MA in Media, Campaigning and Social Change from the University of Westminster, wrote a policy paper on mis- and disinformation in social media as it surrounds COVID vaccines, refugees, and foreign aid. For educating the public, Diana recommends using interactive dashboards and learning platforms to combat false narratives. She also recommends that capacity-building trainings should be held for those representing marginalised communities, engage volunteer organisations, and provide opportunities for communities to engage in dialogue to dispel their fears and stop the spread of mis- and disinformation.

Sarah Halawani, a project coordinator in the humanitarian sector who holds MA degrees in both International Relations and Women's Studies, wrote a policy paper on improving the Syrian education-to-employment pipeline. She introduces a plan for a resettlement system in which Syrian refugees in Jordan can seek tertiary education in Europe, where they can then apply their talents in EU member states struggling with labour shortages. She recommends specific mechanisms for Jordanian and European cooperation in the refugee selection, training, and placement processes.

Lastly, Rafat Al Naddaf, an electrical engineer who has combined his specialisation in renewable energy generation with years of experience working in the Azraq and Zaatari camps, wrote a policy paper on the potential for solar power to be a main source of energy for Syrian refugee camps in Jordan. To identify exact energy issues, he conducted a survey with over 1,600 heads of households in both camps. Rafat stresses the fact that using solar energy in the camps would not only be eco-friendlier for Jordan, but it would also be more cost-effective, sustainable, safe, and better for livelihoods. He recommends to stakeholders the specific types of energy systems needed in the camps, and an operation scheme that would boost refugee employment.

Highly interrelated, the subjects of the three policy papers are critical to refugee and host communities alike: Electricity is necessary for improving people's lives, especially in an online learning environment; education is critical not only for helping refugees realise their innate potential, but it is also key to securing livelihoods as well as post-conflict rebuilding and revitalisation; finally, access to accurate, scientific information is the bedrock of any critically thinking society that aims to reduce friction between refugees and host communities. Stakeholders working in these fields could truly stand to benefit from engaging with the research and policies put forth by these youth professionals. For their part, these writers represent a new wave of pioneers finding their voices on the issues they care about, as well as the means of conveying them to those in positions of power to implement.



Renewable (Solar) Energy for Syrian Refugees in Azraq and Zaatari Camps

Rafat Alnaddaf

Abstract

This paper aims to shed light on the energy consumption problem in Jordan before and after the Syrian Crisis, which constitutes a serious threat to Syrian refugees' human security in the Azraq and Zaatari camps. This paper details Syrian refugees' daily challenges concerning protection, health, education, livelihood, and environmental preservation as they relate to electricity connectivity. Moreover, this paper highlights the importance of the proposed project in terms of generating job opportunities for Syrian refugees living inside the camps, in addition to reducing the pollution caused by burning fossil fuels during the traditional electricity generation process. The paper will then argue for a new energy modality to guarantee a sustainable power source using renewable solar energy.

المخلص

تهدف هذه الورقة إلى تسليط الضوء على مشكلة استهلاك الطاقة في الأردن قبل وبعد الأزمة السورية، والتي أدت إلى تحديات خطيرة للأمن الإنساني للاجئين السوريين في مخيمي الأزرق والزعتري فيما يتعلق بتوصيل الكهرباء إلى منازلهم (الكرفانات). ويركز على التحديات اليومية مثل الحماية والصحة والتعليم وسبل العيش والحفاظ على البيئة، بالإضافة إلى شرح الربط بين توصيل الكهرباء وجميع هذه التحديات. وتناقش الورقة أهمية المشروع المقترح من ناحية خلق فرص عمل داخل المخيمات للاجئين السوريين بالإضافة إلى تخفيف التلوث الناتج من احتراق الوقود الأحفوري أثناء عملية توليد الكهرباء التقليدية، كما تناقش الورقة بعد ذلك مقترح لضمان مصدر طاقة مستدام باستخدام الطاقة المتجددة (الشمسية) للتغلب على هذه التحديات.

Background

The outbreak of the Syrian war has led to a rapid population rise in some Jordanian governorates, especially Amman, Mafrqa, Irbid, and Zarqa.¹ Over the course of three years, the population increase in these governorates surpassed 30 per cent. This, in turn, increased the demand for energy, water, and other public services which put a strain on Jordan's overloaded infrastructure. The sudden increase in resource demand from low-income households in an already resource-constrained country both poses a challenge for energy planners – particularly for the power and water sectors – and presumably adds to the government's subsidy bill. For vulnerable refugee families who rely on monthly vouchers for basic necessities, energy is a vital element of protection. Syrian refugee households in towns and cities are estimated to use around 25 per cent less energy than the general population with some suffering from extreme temperatures in winter and summer.²

Jordan has been advocating for renewable energy (RE) growth within the country over the past decade. Jordan issued the Renewable Energy and Energy Efficiency Law (2012), which focused on diversifying its energy mix and promoting renewable technologies. Jordan has also committed itself to reduce greenhouse gas emissions (GHGs). During the Paris 2015 UN Climate Change Conference, the Jordanian Minister of Environment noted that Jordan was the first country in the region to produce a National Climate Change Policy, under which the Kingdom aims to reduce GHG emissions 14 per cent below the 'Business as Usual' (BAU) scenario by 2030. The country plans to meet its commitment by implementing 70 projects, mainly in the energy and transportation sectors.³

¹ UNHCR. "Operational Data Portal." Situation Syria Regional Refugee Response. Accessed October 12, 2021. <https://data2.unhcr.org/en/situations/syria/location/36>.

² NATO: Euro-Atlantic Disaster Response Coordination Centre, "EADRCC Situation Report No13 SYRIAN REFUGEES in JORDAN," NATO, 2013, <http://www.nato.int/eadrcc/2012/09-syrian-refugees/OPS-EADRCC-2013-0202.pdf>.

³ Hana Namrouqa, "Paris Deal to Give Momentum to Jordan's Efforts to Address Climate Change," Jordan Times, December 16, 2015, <https://www.jordantimes.com/news/local/paris-deal-give-momentum-jordans-efforts-address-climate-change>.

While King Abdullah tends to emphasise the eco-friendly and sustainability aspects of renewables in his speeches at climate change summits, the Jordanian interest in RE might extend further to include political and economic interests. Specifically, RE could be used to improve the condition of some of Jordan's most vulnerable residents, Syrians in the Zaatari and Azraq camps.

The energy situation in both UNHCR-run camps is unique. Zaatari's electrical network was developed from a basic grid designed for street lighting and is connected to the national grid. Following problems with safety, overloading, and expensive electricity bills, informal connections to households and businesses were cut in 2015, with ongoing changes to increase refugee access to power and electricity. Nowadays, Zaatari camp has a 12.9 MW solar energy plant which supplies shelters and market shops, yet it is not enough to supply the shelters for more than nine hours per day.

Azraq camp currently has a 5 MW solar energy plant to supply the shelters with limited connections to the national grid. Electricity is provided to the base camp and diesel generation is used to power facilities and non-governmental organisations' (NGO) offices. However, 5 MW is not enough to cover the whole camp's consumption as it needs at least 10MW, and its low wattage is the main reason for unstable electrical connectivity to the shelters.

Energy demand per capita is higher at Zaatari compared to Azraq. Zaatari camp is a much more mature camp with active businesses. Moreover, the camp has access to local markets and appliances and higher income levels. On the other hand, Azraq camp has a more controlled environment with little economic activity and lower income levels, despite the demand for camp management plans. UNHCR and NGOs have learned from Azraq and Zaatari's past experiences and new approaches are being deployed to reduce the burden on the national electricity grid.

For Syrian refugees' case, operating two camp households with solar energy will reduce a significant amount of GHG and will contribute to achieving the National Plan's target of a 14 per cent reduction in greenhouse gas emissions much before 2030. In addition to that, it will provide more opportunities for the Syrian youth and experts that reside in the camps during the design and the implementation phases of the project. The author will elaborate on the former case further in this paper.

Methodology

Survey

The author conducted a survey targeting 1642 heads of households in both the Zaatari and Azraq camps from 25 April to 29 April, 2021. The survey was conducted remotely through the data collection tool “Kobo” and the outcomes of the survey showed the current situation regarding electricity in refugees’ life during daytime, focusing on education, health, protection, and energy development sectors.

After analysing the data, the author placed them in charts to help visualise the necessity of having a sustainable renewable energy source for the camps’ residents. With both camp residents living in similar conditions, the author combined their responses into the same data sets.

General

Is electricity supplied to the caravans on a daily and regular basis?




Fig. 1: 886 out of 1642 respondents from both camps said that their caravans were not connected to electricity on a regular basis, with some refugees complaining about electricity cuts for days.




Fig. 2: The highest rate of respondents answered that they were receiving nine hours of continuous energy per day in their caravans, with Zaatari camp’s respondents receiving more consistent energy than in Azraq.

Do you think that the need for electricity is more and greater due to the COVID-19 pandemic?




Fig. 3: 1577 out of 1642 respondents think that the need for electricity during COVID-19 pandemic was greater. They think that this could be due to the sudden shift to distance learning and remote working.

Health

Are there health conditions in your family that need electricity constantly (skin problems, oxygen concentrators)?




Fig. 4: 1134 out of 1642 respondents have someone in their immediate family who needs constant energy because of an illness. These include chronic illnesses like skin allergies/irritations from the heat; shortness of breath, which requires oxygen concentrators; and insulin doses for diabetics that need to be kept in a refrigerator with temperature below 20 °C.

Do you know of respiratory conditions that require electric heaters rather than gas heaters due to its effect on breathing?




Fig. 5: 995 out of 1642 respondents answered that they know of a case that requires electrical rather than gas or kerosene heating because of allergic asthma.

Safety

Do you know of caravans that caught fire due to the use of gas heaters during winter rather than electric heating (air conditioners)?




Fig. 6: During the last 10 months September 2020 to July 2021, the author witnessed four caravans burning in Azraq camp, and no official reports were announced regarding the the burning caravans. The local community said that two of the caravans burnt were because of the gas heater when children were alone in the caravans.

Do you think that permanent street lighting makes you and your family feel safer?




Fig. 7: 1573 out of 1642 respondents think that having a constant source of light will provide more safety and security for both genders, knowing that the toilets are still communal and outside the caravans in Azraq camp. This can make going to the toilet at night daunting, especially for females.

Education

Do you believe that electric blackouts affect children and university students' education?




Fig. 8: 1610 respondents stated students were going through a tough time throughout the pandemic mainly due to distance learning. The lack of fixed internet connection to wireless portable computers made the learning process harder.

Do you think installing solar power system in your caravan will solve all your electric issues?




Fig. 9: 1304 out of 1642 respondents answered that installing a solar panel system in their caravan would solve all of the problems related to electricity. They consider living in tough circumstances and camp settings as requiring suitable electricity. They also think that having electricity for the whole day is one of the human security principles that should be taken in consideration for refugees' context.

The figures show how electricity is essential in a refugee's daily life, and they illustrate (yes/no) inputs and the number of hours for electricity access to caravans, which provides substantial information about the situation in both camps, taking into consideration that the sample of respondents (1642 respondents) and covers both Azraq and Zaatari camps. Furthermore, the author conducted structured interviews with the parents of the ill refugees (Annex 1).

Job Creation and Economic Growth

The issue of refugee rights in host communities and legal permits – including the permission to work – is sensitive if the author considers the principles of human security and the economic status of the Kingdom. This is particularly so when the unemployment rate amongst young Jordanians has been constantly rising. Workshop participants' opinions varied regarding the extent to which Syrians should be incorporated into the workforce. However, Jordanian authorities and economists recognised that the current situation was unsustainable and detrimental to the Jordanian economy.⁴

Since late 2015, the government of Jordan has taken steps to address employment rights. In December 2015, Jordan's Minister of Planning and International Cooperation, Imad Fakhoury, spoke of a holistic approach that "gets [Jordan] out of this crisis to reach a win-win situation that would help the kingdom economically, create job opportunities and – at the same time – alleviate the refugee burden on the international community."⁵

⁴ Glada Lahn, Owen Grafham, and Adel Elsayed Sparr, "Refugees and Energy Resilience in Jordan Refugees and Energy Resilience in Jordan" (Chatham House, April 2016), <https://www.alnap.org/system/files/content/resource/files/main/refugees-energy-jordan-lahn-grafham-sparr.pdf>

⁵ Khetam Malkawi, "Integration of Syrian Refugees in Workforce 'Hinges on New Investments,'" Jordan Times, December 21, 2015, <http://www.jordantimes.com/news/local/integration-syrian-refugees-workforce-hinges-new-investments%E299%80>.

While providing energy security to refugees is a humanitarian imperative, building energy resilience by investing in durable and efficient infrastructure can likewise be an effective way of creating jobs and livelihood opportunities for refugees and nationals alike. For example, launching a 2 MW solar power plant takes eight weeks from the time permits have been obtained. It would employ three highly skilled people onsite (in the case of Azraq, these would be Jordanians), and potentially 20 Syrians (12 people for the duration of construction and others as needed).⁶

Employing Syrians and providing livelihood opportunities would have several long-term benefits. Jordan would expand its clean energy use and increase its own energy production, becoming less dependent on energy imports. Employment opportunities for Syrians would open up, making a dignified life possible. Social cohesion between Syrians and Jordanians would improve as they work side by side. Scaling up the solar energy sector by this model could hence have significantly positive effects on Jordan nation-wide.

Renewable Energy and Air Pollution

With the growing environmental concerns over climate change globally, clean energy attracted the attention of researchers and policy makers. Traditional fossil fuel consumption is responsible for 56.6 per cent of GHGs emissions, widely believed to be the major contributor to global warming.⁷ About 28 billion tons of CO₂ are released into the atmosphere annually from burning traditional fossil fuels worldwide.⁸

⁶ Glada Lahn, Owen Grafham, and Adel Elsayed Sparr, "Refugees and Energy Resilience in Jordan Refugees and Energy Resilience in Jordan" (Chatham House, April 2016), <https://www.alnap.org/system/files/content/resource/files/main/refugees-energy-jordan-lahn-grafham-sparr.pdf>

⁷ Ed Houghton, Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, and Groupe d'experts intergouvernemental sur l'évolution du climat Working group 2, Climate Change 1995: The Science of Climate Change: Contribution of Working Group I to the Second Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, Google Books (Cambridge University Press, 1996), https://books.google.jo/books?hl=en&lr=&id=k9n8v_7foQk-C&oi=fnd&pg=PP9&dq=International+panel+on+climate+change.+Cambridge.

⁸ Matthew Wright and Patrick Hearps, "Australian Sustainable Energy Zero Carbon Australia Stationary Energy Plan" (Melbourne: The University of Melbourne, June 2010).

The United Nations (UN) organised Rio de Janeiro's Earth Summit in 1992 to address GHG emissions. A few years later, the UN framework Convention on Climate Change was held in Kyoto. The 1997 Kyoto Protocol quantitatively and qualitatively detailed GHG reduction targets, which serve as the current basis for international efforts currently focus on GHG reduction.⁹

Being part of this global orientation, Jordan – as a refugee host country – will contribute to the global plan for GHG reduction. This can be done by replacing renewable energy into fossil fuel during the energy production process.

Conclusion

Syrian refugees are struggling because of the camps' tough conditions. While some of their important requests have been effectively addressed – such as increasing water supplies to caravans, granting university students permits to leave the camp, and signing up on employment waiting lists – other issues like securing a more consistent electricity supply have not.

Installing a solar system for each household would reduce the enormous amount of money paid in bills to electrical companies. On the other hand, this will help the companies control the usual overload and become more stable, especially during summer, knowing that electrical companies were suffering from the overload even before the Syrian crisis. While installing solar systems for shelters, electrical companies will keep supplying camps by putting them on the grid to supply NGOs' offices and shops, which would still benefit the electrical companies financially. Installation would reduce energy and consumption, which would benefit Jordan's host community as well as its international GHG reduction commitments.

⁹ UN Framework Convention on Climate Change Unfccc, "Kyoto Protocol Reference Manual on Accounting of Emissions and Assigned Amount," RePEc – Econpapers, November 1, 2009, https://econpapers.repec.org/paper/esswpaper/id_3a2296.htm.

Renewable (Solar) Energy for Syrian Refugees in Azraq and Zaatari Camps

Generally, a 2 kilowatt (kW) quality solar power system with a quality inverter generates between around 1.7 and 1.8 kW per hour in sunny bright conditions, which will power essential home appliances. This system can power air-conditioners, washing machines, televisions, refrigerators, food mixers, mobile phones, computer, laptop and phone chargers, lighting, and microwave ovens (see the load calculation table in Annex 1). Good consumption management is needed in order to avoid the overload, as well as to keep a good amount of energy stored in the batteries for night time and the cloudy weather.

Installing these solar power systems for each caravan in both camps will provide 50 to 100 job opportunities for Syrian refugees in the camps, which will help them become financially independent. This could lead to more long-term social changes in terms of refugee resilience.

Recommendations

1. Installing a 2 kW solar system for each caravan in the Zaatari and Azraq camps with the following system specifications:

Table 1: Individual Solar System Specifications ¹⁰		
Item	Description	Price
Solar Panel	1m*2m	€105
Battery	100 A (Gel)	€175
Charge Controller	MPPT 100/30 & 100/50 12/24 Volt	€30
Inverter	2000 watt	€50
Total		€360

¹⁰ Market self-assessment

For more details about the solar system, please see the system model in Annex I.

1. **Safety:** considering that bathrooms are outside the caravans and are communal, providing camps' streets with solar lighting cells maintains protection for both genders.
2. **Health:** the cases that need electricity for health devices should be given the highest priority for instalment. Next, school and university students should be given priority. Thirdly, instalment should be for protection cases like widows and unaccompanied children. Eventually, other households should be covered. The project implementation period should be three years for both camps.
3. **Legal:** an agreement between the camps' management and the National Electric Power Company to provide camps with electricity. This would likely ease the process of permit issuance for solar panels to enter camps and thus increase the amount of electricity wattages needed to power critical facilities in both camps like hospitals, bread distribution centres, NGOs offices, and malls.
4. **Livelihood:** in the Azraq camp, there is a dearth of Syrian professionals, and thus a need for human resource to be partly covered by Jordanians. However, all the human resources needed for the Zaatari project can be Syrian technicians and engineers from inside the camp, which will create a good number of job opportunities for Syrian youth and professionals.

Annex 1

In-person interview:

Name: M.K.A

Age: 12 years

Description of the condition: Muscular Dystrophy disease

Date of diagnosis of the condition: 19 January 2017



His parents were asked the following questions, and their answers are found below:

1. What are the main challenges he faces because of his illness?


Shortness of breath, especially while sleeping. In September 2020, he lost the ability to walk and hold things.

2. Why does he need electricity in his daily life?

He needs electricity for the breathing machine that doctors prescribed him to use, especially at night while sleeping. Otherwise, his lungs will fail to provide his body with enough oxygen to keep functioning, and his heart will fail to circulate the blood, which leads to coma.

3. How will having electricity constantly help keep him healthy?

Having a sustainable power source will keep the breathing machine operating and will provide his body with enough oxygen to stay alive.



Solar System Model¹¹

¹¹ 26 Solar Ideas | Solar, Solar Power System, Solar Panels," Pinterest, accessed October 5, 2021, <https://www.pinterest.com/wookie03/solar/>.

Table: Home Appliances and Their Power Consumption ¹²		
Home Appliance	Wattage	Number of Hours for One Unit Consumption
Zero Watt Bulb	15 Watt	66.40 Hours
CFL Bulb	15 Watt	66.40 Hours
Bulb	60 Watt	16.14 Hours
Tube Light	40 Watt	18.11 Hours
Ceiling Fan	60 Watt	16.40 Hours
Fridge 165 Litre	100 Watt	10 Hours
Mixie	450 Watt	2.13 Hours
Washing Machine	325 Watt	3 Hours
Iron Box	750 Watt	1.25 Hours
Water Pump	750 Watt	1.25 Hours
Vacuum Cleaner	750 Watt	1.25 Hours
Television	100 Watt	10 Hours
Tape Recorder	20 Watt	50 Hours
Video Player	40 Watt	25 Hours
Mobile Charger	5 Watt	200 Hours
Computer	80 Watt	12.50 Hours
Air Conditioner	1500 Watt	40 minute

¹² A. O. Khan, "Power Consumption of Home Appliances (Wattage of Appliances)," Education News, August 29, 2016, <https://educatebox.com/power-consumption-of-home-appliances-wattage-of-appliances/>.



Examining Anti-Vaccination Narratives Among Host Communities and Refugees in Jordan

Diana Ishaqat

Introduction

The Coronavirus pandemic has been viewed as a human security concern by many voices within the research community and civil society because of its political, economic, and health bearings on humanity.¹ Some analysts believe that the pandemic has been used to justify increased surveillance,² violence by authorities, and violations of human rights around the world.³

There is an overwhelming amount of information surrounding the COVID-19 virus, its origins, and the medical options available to fight it. A good percentage of the information is not accurate and is known as misinformation (false information, regardless of intent to mislead), disinformation (false information with the intent to mislead), and other types of false content.⁴ Regardless of the type, false narratives are more than words: they are found to have profound negative impacts on individuals and communities by opposing the recovery processes; through discrediting public health authorities and vaccine providers, and demonising refugees and ethnic minorities and preventing them from participation in public spaces and workplaces.⁵

¹ Fukushima, Akiko. 2020. "COVID-19 Is A Human Security Crisis | Research | The Tokyo Foundation For Policy Research". The Tokyo Foundation For Policy Research. <https://www.tkfd.or.jp/en/research/detail.php?id=735.v>

² Sharifah, Sekalala, Dagron Stephanie, Forman Lisa, and Meier Benjamin Mason. 2020. "Analyzing The Human Rights Impact Of Increased Digital Public Health Surveillance During The COVID-19 Crisis". Pubmed. <https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/33390688/>.

³ Gordon, Neve, and Penny Green. 2021. "State Crime, Structural Violence And COVID-19". https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.13169/statecrime.10.1.0004#metadata_info_tab_contents.

⁴ The City University of New York. 2021. "CSI Library: Misinformation And Disinformation: Thinking Critically About Information Sources: Definitions Of Terms". Library.Csi.Cuny.Edu. <https://library.csi.cuny.edu/misinfor- mation>.

⁵ International Organisation for Migration. 2021. "Countering Xenophobia And Stigma To Foster Social Cohesion In The Covid 19 Response And Recovery". Iom.Int. https://www.iom.int/sites/default/files/documents/countering_xenophobia_and_stigma_130720.pdf.

Voices from the non-profit and research communities are concluding that there is a connection between the organised exposure of a society to disinformation and misinformation, and its receptiveness to extremist narratives whose narrators exploit the general state of emergency for political interests.⁶⁷ This destructive potential becomes even more critical in conflict-prone regions and fragile economies.

Interregional partnerships are key solutions for creating guidance for individuals and societies exposed to the uncertainty and false narratives surrounding the pandemic. In Jordan, the European Union (EU) is a strategic partner and a leading enabler of the national vaccination campaign, providing technical and financial support for the navigation of new public health realities among Jordan's diverse communities.⁸

This analytical paper will explore the anti-vaccination narratives that appeared on local social media networks, with Facebook – Jordan's top platform – selected as a base. The paper aims to further promote the EU-Jordan partnership within research and policy circles, as follows:

1. Develop better-informed decision-making in unprecedented times among European and Jordanian stakeholders working together towards a safe, inclusive recovery from the pandemic.
2. Ensure that communication, partnership and vaccination efforts reach their maximum potential and are not hindered by preventable conflicts with and within the local communities.

The findings – sourced from public conversation threads – were found to underpin deeper grievances related to identity negotiations, and perceptions of the human relationship to authority and aid under COVID-19, in both local and regional contexts. The paper concludes by making recommendations as to what both European and local partners can reflect to create context-sensitive communication material and civic engagement programmes, bearing in mind the dynamics of citizenship, migration, and COVID-19.

⁶ Commission for Countering Extremism. 2021. "COVID-19, Disinformation And Hateful Extremism: Literature Review Report". Assets.Publishing.Service.Gov.Uk. https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/906724/CCE_Briefing_Note_001.pdf.

⁷ Janin, Maygane, and Flora Deverell. 2020. "Covid-19: Far Right Violent Extremism And Tech Platforms' Response". Fondapol.Org. <https://www.fondapol.org/app/uploads/2020/12/180-maygane-ultradroite-gb-2020-11-03-w.pdf>.

⁸ Jordan Times. 2021. "EU Supports WHO To Develop Jordan's Primary Health Care Services Under COVID-19". Jordan Times. <https://www.jordantimes.com/news/local/eu-supports-who-develop-jordans-primary-health-care-services-under-covid-19>.

المقدمة

تعد الشراكات الإقليمية من الحلول الرئيسية لتوجيه الأفراد والمجتمعات المعرضة لمخاطر المفاهيم الكاذبة المحيطة بوباء كورونا. في الأردن، يعتبر الاتحاد الأوروبي (EU) شريكا استراتيجيا داعما لجهود مواجهة آثار الوباء وتقديم المطعوم، حيث يوفر الدعم الفني والمالي للمجتمعات المحلية المتنوعة. لدعم الحوار حول هذه الشراكة، سوف تستكشف هذه الورقة السرديات المناهضة للتطعيم التي ظهرت على شبكات التواصل الاجتماعي المحلية، مع اختيار Facebook - أكثر موقع تواصل مستخدم في الأردن- كمنصة لهذا البحث لأهداف:

1. دعم عملية صنع قرارات مدروسة بشكل أفضل في أوقات غير مسبقة بين صانعي القرار والمؤثرين في صناعة القرار في المؤسسات الأوروبية والأردنية التي تعمل معا من أجل التعافي الآمن والشامل من الوباء.
2. ضمان وصول جهود التطعيم إلى أقصى إمكاناتها وعدم إعاقته بسبب نزاعات من الممكن الوقاية منها عن طريق الفهم المبكر لعلامات التوتر داخل المجتمع.

تم استخلاص النتائج عن طريق تحليل سلاسل المحادثات العامة على موقع Facebook، وكشفت عن وجود علاقة بين السرديات الخاطئة وبعض جوانب علاقة المجتمعات المحلية (متضمنة اللاجئين) ببعضها البعض وتلك التي تربطها بالمؤسسات المحلية والمساعدات الإنسانية الخارجية في ظل الوباء. تختتم الورقة بتقديم توصيات بشأن ما يمكن أن يعكسه كل من الشركاء الأوروبيين والمحليين في محتوى التواصل الإعلامي والعام التي يبتكرونها لخلق مواد اتصال حساسة للسياق وبرامج مشاركة مدنية قادرة على التفاعل مع عمق الوضع الحالي، مع مراعاة ديناميات المواطنة والهجرة والوباء العالمي.

Contextual Background

COVID-19 has been the cause of death for over four million people around the world, with the case-fatality ratio being the highest in Mexico, Myanmar, Tunisia, Indonesia, and South Africa.⁹ Health systems of entire countries such as Brazil and India are on the verge of collapse,¹⁰ and the situation for countries like Yemen is turning dire as the virus progresses for the second year.¹¹

The “state of emergency” is said to be used by certain groups, such as those tied to the so-called Islamic State and extreme right-wing movements, for purposes including fuelling sentiment against other religious groups,¹² refugees and migrants. The rise of misinformation and disinformation in society causes damage to human relations,¹³ public spaces,¹⁴ the progress of vaccination campaigns,¹⁵ and is increasingly linked to making ethnic and religious minorities a target for hate crime.¹⁶

⁹ Johns Hopkins Coronavirus Resource Center. 2021. “Mortality Analyses – Johns Hopkins Coronavirus Resource Center”. Johns Hopkins Coronavirus Resource Center. <https://coronavirus.jhu.edu/data/mortality>.

¹⁰ Center for Infectious Disease Research and Policy. 2021. “India, Brazil Grapple With Massive COVID-19 Surges”. CIDRAP. <https://www.cidrap.umn.edu/news-perspective/2021/04/india-brazil-grapple-massive-covid-19-surges>.

¹¹ MSF. 2021. “Coronavirus COVID-19 Has Made Yemen’s Health System Collapse Complete | MSF”. Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) International. <https://www.msf.org/covid-19-has-made-yemen-health-system-collapse-complete>.

¹² UNICRI. 2020. “Stop The Virus Of Disinformation: The Risk Of Malicious Use Of Social Media During COVID-19 And The Technology Options To Fight It”. Unicri.It. <http://www.unicri.it/sites/default/files/2020-11/SM%20misuse.pdf>.

¹³ Andreou, Aggelos. 2020. “Europe’s Far-Right Exploits COVID-19 For Anti-Refugee Propaganda”. Balkan Insight. <https://balkaninsight.com/2020/06/04/europes-far-right-exploits-covid-19-for-anti-refugee-propaganda/>.

¹⁴ Crawley, Heaven. 2021. “The Politics of Refugee Protection in a (Post)COVID-19 World” Soc. Sci. 10, no. 3: 81. <https://doi.org/10.3390/socsci10030081>

¹⁵ Warzel, Charlie. 2020. “Opinion | How To Talk To Friends And Family Who Share Conspiracy Theories”. Nytimes.Com. <https://www.nytimes.com/2020/10/25/opinion/qanon-conspiracy-theories-family.html>.

¹⁶ Spring, Marianna. 2020. “Coronavirus: The Human Cost Of Virus Misinformation”. BBC News. <https://www.bbc.com/news/stories-52731624>.

¹⁷ The Associated Press. 2021. “Anti-Vaccine Protesters Temporarily Shut Down Vaccine Site”. ABC News. <https://abcnews.go.com/Health/wireStory/anti-vaccine-protesters-temporarily-shut-vaccine-site-75586520>.

¹⁸ Human Rights Watch. 2020. “Covid-19 Fuelling Anti-Asian Racism And Xenophobia Worldwide”. Human Rights Watch. <https://www.hrw.org/news/2020/05/12/covid-19-fueling-anti-asian-racism-and-xenophobia-worldwide>.

Jordan – home to millions of refugees whose home of origin is affected by some of the most long-standing conflicts in the world – has been coping with the pandemic's added pressure on its developing economy, domestic political scene, and the healthcare system. Aside from its own resources, it has received assistance from partners with whom the Kingdom shares close ties. The EU has been among the top and most proactive international bodies in bringing relief to Jordan's diverse communities.

The EU's Role in COVID Relief for Jordan

The EU's support to Jordan has taken on several forms, including over 700 million euros in soft loans¹⁹ for economic relief and governance support. This comes in addition to a broader range of financial, human capital, and technical types of assistance. In the first quarter of 2021 alone – and together with the World Health Organisation as an implementing arm – more than 150,000 EU-funded vaccine doses were purchased under the COVAX consortium, and imported for the service of Jordan's population.²⁰

The above-mentioned funding comes in addition to the eight million euros from the EU²¹ to purchase more vaccines and facilitate their arrival to local communities, based on the Jordanian Ministry of Health and United Nations agencies. Other contributions have included supplying Jordan with ultra-cold freezers to store vaccines. The equipment was delivered by the International Labour Organisation under the Health Emergency Project, funded by the EU. With investments and exchanges of resources of this size, it is only rational to pay closer attention to the potential threats and impacts of false narratives on these efforts, including the attempts to discredit them.

¹⁹ European Commission. 2021. "Jordan – European Civil Protection And Humanitarian Aid Operations – Eu- ropean Commission". European Civil Protection And Humanitarian Aid Operations – European Commission. https://ec.europa.eu/echo/where/middle-east/jordan_en.

²⁰ Ministry of Planning and International Cooperation, 2021. "Jordan, EU Sign 700M-Euro Soft Loan Agree- ment – Ministry of Planning and International Cooperation". Mop.Gov.Jo. https://mop.gov.jo/EN/NewsDe- tails/Jordan_EU_sign_700meuro_soft_loan_agreement.

²¹ EU in Jordan. 2021a. "EU In Jordan". Facebook.Com. <https://www.facebook.com/EUinJordan/photos/a.396097137195466/1978408898964274/?type=3&theater>.

²² UNICEF, 2021. "First Shipment Of EU-Funded COVID-19 Vaccines From COVAX Facility Arrived In Jordan". Unicef.Org. <https://www.unicef.org/mena/press-releases/first-shipment-european-union-funded-covid-19-vaccines-covax-facility-arrived-jordan>.

²³ EU in Jordan. 2021a. "EU In Jordan". Facebook.Com. <https://www.facebook.com/EUinJordan/photos/a.396097137195466/1978408898964274/?type=3&theater>.

Refugee Vaccination in Jordan

The EU continues to serve Jordan's diverse communities under multiple programmes including "Jordan Health Programme for Syrian Refugees and Vulnerable Jordanians," in close cooperation with the World Health Organisation (WHO) and the Madad Fund.²⁴ Locally, Jordan's refugee population has had several ways of accessing vaccines, depending on where they reside. Urban refugees received and continue to receive the vaccines at local health clinics across the Kingdom – free of charge – in the same manner as Jordanians. After registering on the Jordanian vaccine platform, they receive an appointment via text message to come to the nearest clinic at the closest date available.

Efforts to provide vaccines for in-camp refugees in Jordan began in January 2021 at the Zaatari refugee camp. The process involved moving the refugees to specialised nearby clinics, under the supervision of the Jordanian Ministry of Health. In March 2021, the United Nations Higher Council for Refugees (UNHCR), the agency in charge of refugee affairs (excluding Palestinians as they are under UNRWA's mandate), confirmed in a published report that the process changed to providing vaccination in-camp.²⁵ At present, two vaccination centres were established at Zaatari camp, and another one at Al Azraq camp.

The UNHCR requested Jordan's inclusion of refugees in the national vaccination plan from the start of the response to the pandemic.²⁶ In the same online publication, the agency reported that more than 1,200 refugees inside camps had received "at least the first dose of the vaccine as of March 16". In late May 2021, UNHCR reported that a third of camp-residing refugees, considered eligible for vaccination, had been vaccinated (13,455 individuals). To put these numbers into perspective, the Zaatari refugee camp hosts over 79,000 Syrian refugees.²⁷

²⁴ Salameh, Dima, and Juliette Touma. 2021. "First Shipment Of EU-Funded COVID-19 Vaccines From COVAX Facility Arrived In Jordan [EN/AR] – Jordan". Reliefweb. <https://reliefweb.int/report/jordan/first-shipment-eu-uropean-union-funded-covid-19-vaccines-covax-facility-arrived-jordan>.

²⁵ UNHCR. 2021a. "First Refugee COVID-19 Vaccinations Commence In Jordan – UNHCR Jordan". UNHCR Jordan. <https://www.unhcr.org/jo/14487-first-refugee-covid-19-vaccinations-commence-in-jordan.html>.

²⁶ UNHCR. 2021. "Situation Syria Regional Refugee Response". Data2.Unhcr.Org. <https://data2.unhcr.org/en/situations/syria/location/53>.

²⁷ 2021c. "UNHCR Jordan COVID-19 Response (17 March 2021) – Jordan". Reliefweb. <https://reliefweb.int/report/jordan/unhcr-jordan-covid-19-response-17-march-2021>.

Objectives and Methodology

This paper's concept was developed to help prevent false narratives from being unchecked by civil society actors, which thus causes damage to an already vulnerable social fabric. To produce the results of this paper, I manually followed public conversation threads on Facebook by looking for a combination of keywords such as Jordan, Refugees, Corona, COVID-19, Vaccin(ation)(e)s, and Syrians (the majority refugee group in Jordan) in Arabic. I reviewed 40 posts that came out as results made by Jordanian news agencies, refugee news portals, and diasporic media channels. I then selected 14 for a deeper examination for reasons including the length and quantity of comments left on these posts, as well as their relevance to the post's topic because the comments below some of the posts found were advertisements or prayers, and some others had no user interactions to them.

I also used research and journalistic work documenting fake news, conspiracy theories, disinformation, and misinformation around COVID-19 among English-speaking social media users in order to understand the previous work with similar objectives. One study concluded that the largest category of misinformation consisted of claims and accusations made about organisations in positions of power, such as governmental agencies and international organisations and non-profits, whom users typically accused of concealing true intentions and manipulating the public with what is perceived as false facts about the nature of the vaccines and their impacts. ²⁸

Primary research, for the purposes of this paper, generally led to similar findings. The most repetitive claims on Facebook challenge the local authorities, vaccine-founding companies, and the development agencies implementing the vaccinations in Jordan. They were especially concerned with the foreign role and intentions behind the vaccine production, distribution, and impacts on populations.

²⁸ Brennan, J. S, F. H Simon, P. N Howard, and R. K Neilsen. 2020. "Types, Sources, And Claims Of COVID-19 Misinformation". Primaonline.It. http://www.primaonline.it/wp-content/uploads/2020/04/COVID-19_reuters.pdf.

Analysis and Results

The topics over which host communities were most concerned appeared to revolve around family, children, and the return to schools. On the other hand, the topics dominating commentary on refugee-related posts delved into more specific subjects, such as the ethics of vaccine trade and implementation, and the eligibility criteria to receive vaccines, perhaps due to the (perceived) vulnerability of such a population. In the examples below, social media users expressed disbelief in the quality of vaccines in Jordan, and said that they were being tested on local populations including on refugees and children.

The timeline of the content examined was from January to June 2021:

Themes and Keywords	Examples of Direct Quotes	Locations
Children, family, vaccines.	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• “Our children are not testing tools”.• “Our children are a red line you are not allowed to cross”.• “We will not put our children at the same risk we took by taking the vaccines”.	Status updates by news agencies: <ul style="list-style-type: none">• “The Minister of Health: We are studying the vaccination of children in schools and we have reserved vaccines for this purpose, and studies have proven that vaccines are safe for children”.²⁹• “The Minister of Health, Firas Al-Hawari, announced that there is a study of the process of vaccinating children in schools with vaccines to protect against the Coronavirus.”³⁰

²⁹ Jordan Today. 2021. “Jordan Today On Facebook”. Facebook. <https://www.facebook.com/571467359606815/posts/4157934847626697/?d=n>.

³⁰ Al Arabiya Jordan. 2021. “Al Arabiya Jordan Facebook”. Facebook. <https://www.facebook.com/103344798098816/posts/318243416608952/?d=n>.

Examining Anti-Vaccination Narratives Among Host Communities and Refugees in Jordan

Themes and Keywords	Examples of Direct Quotes	Locations
World Health Organisation, Human DNA, Medical Research.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • "You should provide us with legitimate, recognised vaccines". • "Did you know that some vaccines cause changes to the DNA; which is forbidden in every country's law? How can you play with people's DNAs?" • "The WHO rejected the vaccines because they are all new and every vaccine needs at least 3-5 years to get approved". 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • "The Ministry of Health denied that there will be an open day to receive the Coronavirus vaccine, stressing the need to register on the vaccination platform."³¹ • "Types of vaccines and their side effects".³²
Masks, Corona Mutation.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • "There's still a segment of our nation who believe in wearing the mask of slavery. You do really deserve this vaccine and what it will do to you". • "Mutated Corona is a new scenario in this plan". • "Life abroad continues at a normal pace; don't think we don't know." • "No one in the world wants to take the vaccine, that's why you are trying to get us to take it- it was already made and purchased. You are looking for a way out". • "Vaccines were distributed among the elders to end their lives. It is a dirty game". 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • " 55 cases carrying mutated Corona were detected".³³ • "Are you a resident of Jordan? You are eligible to take the vaccine. Register now".³⁴ • "COVAX-AstraZeneca first shipment arrives".³⁵

³¹ Ministry of Health. 2021. "Ministry Of Health On Facebook". Facebook. <https://ar-ar.facebook.com/mohgovjordan/posts/1450198932010981/>.

³² Ministry of Health 2021b. "Ministry Of Health On Facebook". Facebook.Com. <https://www.facebook.com/mohgovjordan/photos/a.265907937106759/1454683381562536/?type=3>.

³³ Hayat FM. 2021. "Log In To Facebook | Facebook". Hayat FM On Facebook. <https://www.facebook.com/hayatfmofficial/photos/a.479786205381868/4910321988994912/?type=3&theater>.

³⁴ 2021c. "Ministry Of Health On Facebook". Facebook. <https://www.facebook.com/mohgovjordan/photos/a.265907937106759/1359479347749607/?type=3>.

³⁵ 2021d. "Ministry Of Health On Facebook". Facebook. <https://www.facebook.com/268455863267291/posts/4054461578000015/?d=n>.

Examining Anti-Vaccination Narratives Among Host Communities and Refugees in Jordan

Themes and Keywords	Examples of Direct Quotes	Locations
Refugees, foreign funding.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> “Syrians received the vaccine before our elders and patients - based on what?” “I registered a long time ago on the platform to receive the vaccine. It hasn't reached me yet, on what basis did it reach Syrians?” “Money is everything. Refugees were prioritised because the government was receiving money for their vaccination campaign.” “Why don't you prioritise teachers instead, so our children can go back to school?” 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> “Towards a coronavirus-free Jordan: the vaccination of refugees begins in Jordan”.³⁶ “Vaccines to be rolled out in two days at the Zaatari Syrian refugee camp”.³⁷
Vaccine testing, Refugees.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> “Vaccines are being tested on refugees.” “Syrians were forced to take the vaccine. If they knew the truth, they wouldn't have.” 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> “The UNHCR recognised Jordan as the first country to vaccinate refugees”.³⁸ “The UNHCR thanks Jordan for making the vaccine available for Syrian refugees”.³⁹
Vaccines, the West, Refugees.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> “The West is protesting and won't take the vaccines, that's why they're being shipped to us.” “Vaccines are lethal, they're being given to the weakest in society first because nobody cares about them.” 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> “Jordan: the start of refugee vaccination against Coronavirus” the same headline was shared on Radio Mangofold Norg⁴⁰ and Al Sharq Syria.⁴¹ “More than 2,000 Syrian refugees in Jordan receive the first dose of the Coronavirus vaccines”.⁴²

³⁶ Roya News. 2021. “Roya News On Facebook”. Facebook. https://www.facebook.com/RoyaNews/posts/5154583927947450?comment_id=5154599801279196.

³⁷ Ministry of Health 2021b. “Ministry Of Health On Facebook”. Facebook.Com. <https://www.facebook.com/mohgovjordan/photos/a.265907937106759/1454683381562536/?type=3>.

³⁸ Amman TV. 2021. “Amman TV On Facebook”. Facebook. <https://www.facebook.com/AmmanTVOfficial/posts/1889623891196995/>.

³⁹ Souria Post. 2021. “Souria Post On Facebook”. Facebook.Com. <https://www.facebook.com/103253664825946/posts/194858908998754/?d=n>.

⁴⁰ 2021d. “Ministry Of Health On Facebook”. Facebook. <https://www.facebook.com/268455863267291/posts/4054461578000015/?d=n>.

⁴¹ Al Sharq Syria. 2021a. “Al Sharq Syria On Facebook”. Facebook. <https://pt-br.facebook.com/asqsyria/posts/238635371058871/>.

⁴² 2021b. “Al Sharq Syria On Facebook”. Facebook. <https://www.facebook.com/102204844701925/posts/289442392644835/?d=n>.

Conclusion

Profiles who wrote the comments illustrated in the tables of the previous section did not appear to be social media influencers or public figures, but this does not mean that their owners are not well-connected or influential offline. Despite comments generally forming thought and belief patterns, no specific messages were copy-pasted or carried any special hashtags. Furthermore, most comments appeared to be made with profiles which appeared to be real or at least included photos of people, engagements from others users, and personal/contact information. The most common false, wrongful claims made can be summarised as below:

- *Children are being used to test the vaccines in Jordan.*
- *Vaccines are being tested on refugees in Jordan.*
- *The government knows the vaccines are not safe, but have already paid / was paid to vaccinate the population.*
- *The vaccines being delivered to Jordan are not legitimate or safe.*
- *The vaccines (generally) change human DNA and have other illegal impacts.*
- *Refugee vaccination is being prioritised over the long waiting lists of Jordanians.*
- *There's a "masterplan" behind vaccination and it is a tool for eliminating populations.*
- *Vaccines are lethal and they are used on refugees for silent ethnic cleansing.*

Identifying statements stemming from the lack of trust in institutions and power structures on the one hand, and organised disinformation campaigns on the other hand, is a challenge that would require cross-sector collaboration between fact-checkers, media platforms, and government organisations, since harmful and false narratives can travel through regular, everyday social media accounts.

Almost all narratives identified appear to have a connection with underlying issues connected to national and ethnic identity, and the sense of (in)justice and (lack of) security in society. The narratives voicing disbelief in *real* help from authorities and entities in power, as well as the perceptions of the prioritisation of certain groups based on ethnic identity – are not unheard of in Jordan in light of practices such as nepotism.⁴³ This is the case whether they are voiced among refugees, migrants, or host communities. After all, Jordan is a country with an increasingly struggling population with critical challenges such as water scarcity and unemployment.⁴⁴

⁴³ Momani, Bessma. 2020. "Jordan, International Financial Institutions And Social Justice". Library.Fes.De. <http://library.fes.de/pdf-files/bueros/amman/16643.pdf>.

⁴⁴ ACTED. 2021. "Jordan – ACTED". ACTED. <https://www.acted.org/en/countries/jordan/>.

Harsh socioeconomic conditions and political uncertainty create a fertile ground for conflict in society, and therefore it is essential that such narratives do not turn into the public demonisation of less protected groups in Jordanian society – or worse – escalate to hate crimes. Historical and current geopolitical tensions in the Arab States already make it challenging to sustain a common ground for dialogue – and the gaps in crisis response might only add to them.

Based on general observations and research findings – and with the aim of optimising the diverse aspects of the friendship and partnership between European and Jordanian stakeholders – I recommend the following policies to Jordanian and EU stakeholders:

Localised, tech-based solutions:

Creating publicly-accessible dashboards with visualised, real-time data showing vaccination figures in different demographics and geographical areas can help create evidence-based resources which can put the false and true claims social media users make or discuss into perspective. At present, there are dashboards that show the capacity of hospitals and the COVID-19 toll, but the insights gathered from the societal landscape reflected in online conversations is suggesting that further data access will be required to adequately engage the public with new realities. This step can be taken up by the Jordanian Ministry of Health, or humanitarian consortiums working in the public health arena.

Interactive learning:

Following the example of researchers in some parts of the world, simple online games and quizzes that prompt the public to understand fake news and the spread of misinformation and disinformation and their role in such processes by including localised scenarios from everyday life in Jordan, such as the impact a single text with misinformation or disinformation sent on a WhatsApp family or study group can have on individuals and society. This recommendation is directed towards fact-checkers such as the Jordanian e-government's *Haggak Te'raf* platform.

Adjusting programme design processes:

Adding components related to combating misinformation and disinformation along the lines of recovery and support programs and funding resources, utilising behavioural sciences to develop clearly-defined theories of change-based interventions that prevent and uproot potential conflict in society resulting from exposure to false content. Examples of outputs can include national campaigns, toolkits for bloggers and journalists, and short films produced by the EU in Jordan.

Training:

Building the capacity of foreign and domestic staff who work under EU-supported programmes to understand domestic local false narratives surrounding the conversation on COVID and vaccination, and how to respond to them if faced with them in practice or in the field. This would prepare the personnel of international organisations working in refugee camps in Jordan, such as UN Agencies, to diffuse the conflict on the ground before it grows on social media and other platforms and public spaces.

Collaborating with grassroots organisations:

Fact-checking platforms and groups – both formal and informal – can assist EU and Jordanian media specialists and their local partners in creating evidence-based responses that address the concerns of local populations and turn the evidence into multi-media social media posts (memes, mini blogs, crash courses, one-minute videos). Examples of potential partners can include the Fatabayyanu collective, a volunteer-based organisation which aims to fact-check the viral content Arabic-language speakers are exposed to.

Background analysis:

Sometimes the position towards vaccines is a political statement. Analyses completed by international relations and trade experts from think tanks and Jordanian universities on how the national branding of certain regions can affect their perception or resistance to medical solutions stemming from these parts of the world can help develop supporting actions. Historical, ongoing, or undocumented tensions must be recognised so that insights from such findings can be used to transform the existing mental associations, understandings, and values.

Monitoring populist and nationalist trends:

and constructing opportunities for critical public conversations such as virtual debates and youth parliaments to ensure that the “state of emergency” and the public’s fear of losing status in society, jobs, and protection, does not translate to extremist behaviours and attitudes - such as anti-healthcare workers, refugee, minority and migrant actions. Bodies essential in the success of this type of action include media and press capacity-building organisations, and formal institutions such as the Jordan Media Commission.



Educate to Integrate: Enabling Syrian Refugees' Access to Higher Education in Europe

Sarah Alhalawani

Abstract

This policy paper analyses the challenges and gaps the EU higher education strategy for Syrian refugees in Jordan. Syrian Youth in Jordan face financial, institutional, and legislative barriers to higher education opportunities. Their most pressing issue, however, comes after higher education, when they struggle to apply their educational skills and talents in the Jordanian labour market.

This policy paper promotes the concept of 'educate to integrate' to address these hurdles. The concept involves restructuring the EU's humanitarian response to Syrian refugees in Jordan and their access to tertiary education. By establishing a higher education resettlement system, Syrian youth will be able to better leverage their practical and academic skills. Specifically, the EU can offer Syrian refugees education in an EU country, where they can later use their skills in EU member states where labour shortages exist. As the largest contributor of higher education to Syrian refugees, the EU has contributed over 2.1 billion euros to Jordan in response to the Syrian crisis.¹

By shifting the structure of the higher education response, the EU can overcome its own occupational shortages while committing to its humanitarian obligation to Syrian refugees in Jordan in terms of higher education.

¹"RESPONDING TO THE SYRIAN CRISIS EU SUPPORT IN JORDAN". 2019. Reliefweb.Int. https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/eu_support_in_jordan_factsheet.pdf.

المخلص

تحلل ورقة السياسات هذه التحديات والثغرات في استراتيجية الاتحاد الأوروبي للتعليم العالي للاجئين السوريين في الأردن. استخدمت الباحثة الدراسات السابقة والتقارير المنشورة من المانحين من الدول الأوروبية في بناء البحث، بالإضافة الى خبرة الباحثة في مجال التعليم العالي للاجئين السوريين في الاردن.

يواجه الشباب السوري في الأردن العديد من الحواجز المالية والمؤسسية والتشريعية أمام فرص التعليم العالي لكن القضية الأكثر إلحاحًا تأتي عندما يكافحون لتطبيق مهاراتهم ومواهبهم التعليمية في سوق العمل الأردني بعد الانتهاء من التعليم العالي. تقدم هذه الورقة مفهوم "التعلم للاندماج" لمعالجة هذه العقبات.

توصي هذه الورقة بإعادة هيكلة الاستجابة الإنسانية للاتحاد الأوروبي للاجئين السوريين في الأردن وحصولهم على التعليم العالي من خلال إنشاء نظام إعادة توطين، حيث سيتمكن الشباب السوري في الاردن من الاستفادة بشكل أفضل من مهاراتهم العملية والأكاديمية.

على وجه التحديد، يمكن للاتحاد الأوروبي أن يقدم للاجئين السوريين التعليم في إحدى دول الاتحاد الأوروبي بحيث يمكنهم لاحقًا من استخدام مهاراتهم في الدول الأعضاء في الاتحاد الأوروبي التي يوجد بها نقص في اليد العاملة. بصفته أكبر مساهم في التعليم العالي للاجئين السوريين، ساهم الاتحاد الأوروبي بأكثر من 2.1 مليار يورو للأردن استجابة للأزمة السورية (صحيفة وقائع المفوضية الأوروبية في الأردن).

من خلال تغيير هيكل الاستجابة لدعم التعليم العالي، يمكن للاتحاد الأوروبي التغلب على النقص المهني الخاص به في الدول الاعضاء مع الالتزام بالتزاماته الإنسانية تجاه اللاجئين السوريين في الأردن فيما يتعلق بالتعليم العالي.

Contextual Background

The conflict in Syria has been raging since the first spark in 2011. In the 11 years since, families have suffered a cruel armed conflict that has killed hundreds of thousands of people, ripping the country apart, and pushing the country's living standard back by decades. Syria continues to be home to the world's worst refugee problem. Since 2011, about 6.6 million Syrians have been compelled to flee their country. The great majority of the refugees – about 5.5 million – live in neighbouring countries, particularly Turkey, Lebanon, Jordan, Iraq, and Egypt.²

Jordan is hosting 658,000 registered Syrian refugees and roughly the same number of unregistered Syrian refugees. Jordan's budget deficits have worsened, and public debt has increased.³ Before the Syrian conflict, Jordan's GDP had grown at an average annual rate of 15.2 per cent from 2006 to 2010. Since the conflict, it has fallen by approximately 69 per cent. Furthermore, in 2019, the public debt accounts for 94.4 per cent of GDP, up from 60.24 per cent in 2008. This unexpected increase in population has strained services, utilities, and infrastructure, adding pressure to Jordan's already overburdened institutional, social, and economic systems, as well as natural resources.

Problem Statement

With the ongoing Syrian crisis, the future of the Syrian youth in higher education still hangs in the balance. Prior to the war, 26 per cent of Syrian youth were enrolled in college or university in Syria.⁴ Now, only 4.5 per cent of Syrian youth aged 18 to 24 are enrolled in college or university in Jordan. When we compare the latter to the 26 per cent ratio in pre-war Syria, it is apparent that Syrian youth are lacking access to higher education.⁵

² "Situation Syria Regional Refugee Response." Operational Data Portal. UNHCR, September 23, 2021. <https://data2.unhcr.org/en/situations/syria>.

³ "Syrian Refugees," ACAPS (ACAPS, 2021), <https://www.acaps.org/country/jordan/crisis/syrian-refugees>.

⁴ "Jordan Response Plan for the Syria Crisis 2020-2022" (Ministry of Planning and International Cooperation, n.d.), <http://www.jrp.gov.jo/Files/JRP%202020-2022%20web.pdf>.

⁵ Watenpugh, Keith, Adrienne Fricke, and James King. "The War Follows Them Syrian University Students & Scholars in Lebanon." scholarrescuefund.org. Institute of International Education, June 2014. <https://daleel-madani.org/ar/resources/war-follows-them-syrian-university-students-scholars-lebanon>.

⁶ "The Regional Conference on Higher Education in Crisis Situations." lawdocbox.com. UNESCO, March 2017. <https://lawdocbox.com/Immigration/83098199-The-regional-conference-on-higher-education-in-crisis-situations.html>.

With Jordan's strained economic situation – especially after COVID-19 – affecting Syrian refugees' quality of life, access to higher education is becoming more out of reach. However, higher education is an urgent matter for Syrian youth on an individual, national, and international level. Higher education motivates the recovery of Syria by cultivating the knowledge and skills Syrians need to rebuild their shattered economy and infrastructure. Through education, they would also restore the governance system and foster social cohesion.⁷ Additionally, education especially serves as a safeguard for the Syrian youth who are vulnerable to radical group recruitment, as it equips them with professional critical thinking skills needed for peace-building.⁸

Academic Education

Following strong international advocacy, the prioritisation of Syrian refugee enrolment in secondary education was included in Jordan's 2015 Response Plan. Still, Syrians face several hurdles both accessing and optimising access to Jordanian higher education. National regulations, admission policies, funding constraints, mismatches between educational outputs and labour market needs, and obsolete teaching techniques are just some (Jordan response plan, 2020). Yet, the biggest hurdle is that Jordanian universities treat Syrian refugees as international students, charging them three times the amount of Jordanian students' tuition fees, and in US dollars. Many of the students are their families' primary breadwinners, and many reported having had to balance their academic obligations with the need to work and support their families.⁹ This adds to the difficulty of enrolling in education, especially funding it.

⁷ "Jessica Magaziner, "The Importance of Higher Education for Syrian Refugees," WENR, December 7, 2015, <https://wenr.wes.org/2015/12/the-importance-of-higher-education-for-syrian-refugees>.

⁸ "The Regional Conference on Higher Education in Crisis Situations." lawdocbox.com. UNESCO, March 2017. <https://lawdocbox.com/Immigration/83098199-The-regional-conference-on-higher-education-in-crisis-situations.html>.

⁹ Ibid

Access to education via distance learning mechanisms should aid in the realisation of socioeconomic development and poverty alleviation in developing countries. However, in Jordan, the E-learning process is still fraught with difficulties. Regulations and Infrastructure are the two most significant barriers to accessing E-learning for Syrians and Jordanians alike. Regulations govern the entire process, a problem considering that online degrees are neither officially permitted nor recognised by the Ministry of Higher Education.¹⁰ Infrastructure is an obstacle due to the lack of equipment needed for ICT development (e.g., high-speed internet, extranet, intranet, and LAN networks), and the students' low level of IT skills and access.¹¹

Even after overcoming these educational hurdles, Jordan's professional job market is largely inaccessible to Syrian youth. As a result, most Syrian university graduates' chances of obtaining work permits are slim. Even if they were granted permission, the Jordanian economy would need to expand to meet the demands of Syrian job seekers. The total unemployment rate among Jordanians before the Syrian conflict was just above 14 per cent. Despite the measures taken by the Jordanian government, the unemployment rate reached 19.1 per cent during the third quarter of 2019, which resembles 0.5 per cent rise compared with the same period of 2018.¹²

Jordan, according to a UN Assessment,¹³ needs to take numerous steps to restore its economy and integrate refugees into the Jordanian workforce, particularly in the aftermath of the COVID-19 pandemic. Financial inclusion and access to microfinance, for example, are important for the most vulnerable groups, such as women and refugees. Jordan must legislate rules and policies that facilitate microfinance access in order to help recover the economy. Furthermore, at the national, sectoral, and organisational levels, conversations between groups representing workers and employers are necessary. Jordan must also improve digital literacy through newly updated policies to provide better access to vulnerable groups. New measures are also needed to safeguard migrant workers' rights, including the right to safe and dignified repatriation.¹⁴

¹⁰ Al-Jaghoub, Saheer, Hussein Al-Yaseen, Mouath Hourani, and Ramzi Al-Haddadeh. "E-Learning Adoption in Higher Education in Jordan: Vision, Reality and Change," n.d. https://www.researchgate.net/publication/49402556_Elearning_adoption_in_higher_education_in_Jordan_vision_reality_and_change.

¹¹ Ibid

¹² "Jordan Response Plan for the Syria Crisis 2020-2022" (Ministry of Planning and International Cooperation, n.d.), <http://www.jrp.gov.jo/Files/JRP%202020-2022%20web.pdf>.

¹³ "Socio-Economic Framework for COVID-19 Response" (Jordan: United Nations, July 2020), https://unsdg.un.org/sites/default/files/2020-08/JOR_Socioeconomic-Response-Plan_2020.pdf.

¹⁴ Ibid

Vocational Education and Training

The field of vocational education and training is also fragmented. It is in severe need of better teaching, learning methods, rehabilitation of existing centres, and the construction of new vocational secondary schools. Similar to Jordanian students, Syrian refugees' main hurdles to accessing vocational education revolve around the limited vocational higher education institutes in Jordan, the high tuition fees, and the legal restrictions which prohibit refugees from working in the Jordanian market.¹⁵

Even with vocation skills, Syrian refugees struggle to be formally incorporated into the job market. Under the 2016 Jordan Compact, the Jordanian government decided to grant up to 200,000 Syrian refugees work permits in fields such as agriculture, construction, food and beverage services, manufacturing, wholesale and retail trade, and wholesale and retail commerce. However, there is also a long processing time for permits, which require annual renewals. There are also employment conditions that include a quota system for the number of refugees that can be hired for specific occupations.¹⁶

To take advantage of the improved trade arrangements associated with the Jordan Compact, Jordanian businesses must hire Syrians and ensure that they make up 15 per cent of their total workforce. At the same time, businesses must abide by pre-existing national regulations aimed at "*Jordanising*" the workforce, which involved excluding non-Jordanians from specific fields and professions.¹⁷

¹⁵ "Jordan Response Plan for the Syria Crisis 2020-2022" (Ministry of Planning and International Cooperation, n.d.), <http://www.jrp.gov.jo/Files/JRP%202020-2022%20web.pdf>.

¹⁶ "I Want to Continue to Study," Human Rights Watch, June 26, 2020, <https://www.hrw.org/report/2020/06/26/i-want-continue-study/barriers-secondary-education-syrian-refugee-children-jordan>.

¹⁷ "Jordan Response Plan for the Syria Crisis 2020-2022" (Ministry of Planning and International Cooperation, n.d.), <http://www.jrp.gov.jo/Files/JRP%202020-2022%20web.pdf>.

¹⁸ "Employment Trends, Challenges and Opportunities for Refugees in Jordan," AGFE, July 24, 2019, <https://alghurairfoundation.org/employment-trends-challenges-and-opportunities-for-refugees-in-jordan/>.

As a result, the majority of Syrians have little choice but to work informally, which gives more job opportunities to low-skilled individuals, and with less bureaucratic and expensive procedures.¹⁹ Consequently, they compete for low-paying occupations in the informal sector, such as construction, trading, food services, and informal agriculture, alongside some of Jordan's poorest inhabitants.²⁰ Because of the informal sector's flexibility, several tax-paying services have slowed down. As a result, government tax revenues fall, resulting in lower government spending on public goods and services.²¹

General Remarks on Tertiary Education

In general, both educational and vocational institutions suffer from limited infrastructure capacities. Data from the National Higher Education Accreditation Commission shows that overcrowding in high-density areas, teacher shortages, and concerns about deteriorating quality, are all putting strains on the education system. According to a 2014 study, public tertiary higher education institutions face a shortfall of approximately 50,000 places.²²

Overall, the path for higher education for Syrian refugees in Jordan is a vicious cycle. They cannot pursue higher education because of lack of funding; they cannot formally work to support themselves during their tertiary education; if they manage to graduate, they have limited opportunities in working with their university degree to generate income.

¹⁹Katharina Lenner, "The Impact of Syrian Refugees on the Jordanian Economy," FutureLearn, accessed September 29, 2021, <https://www.futurelearn.com/info/courses/migration-facts/0/steps/34218>.

²⁰"Jordan Response Plan 2015 for the Syria Crisis", Ministry of Planning and International Cooperation, December 17, 2014.

²¹Ahmad AlShwawra, "Syrian Refugees' Integration Policies in Jordanian Labor Market," Sustainability 13, no. 13 (June 28, 2021): 7234, <https://doi.org/10.3390/su13137234>.

²²"Jordan Response Plan 2015 for the Syria Crisis", Ministry of Planning and International Cooperation, December 17, 2014.

The EU's Contribution

In tackling Syrian refugees' obstacles to higher education, the EU's contribution was determined by several international frameworks. Chief among them was the 2016 New York Declaration, which was adopted by 193 Member States in the United Nations General Assembly. The Declaration committed to global responsibility-sharing for Refugees and Migrants.²³ And as per the 2016 London Conference priorities, the EU is the leading donor in the international response to the Syrian crisis, having collectively mobilised €20 billion in aid from the EU and its Member States since 2011.²⁴ Since 2011, the EU has thus provided more than €160 million in basic education support, including €138 million in budget support for Jordan's Ministry of Education and an extra €22 million for higher education and scholarships for Syrians and Jordanians.²⁵

Yet, the demand for scholarships is still far higher than what the EU is currently providing. Only about 2,000 EU scholarships are available in Jordan for Syrian refugees to pursue higher education, for which thousands more have applied. EU scholarship providers in Jordan have acknowledged financing shortages and over the years having had to reduce the number of declared scholarships and beneficiaries for each scholarship.²⁶

²³ "Resettlement.eu. n.d. About", European Resettlement Network. <http://resettlement.eu/page/about-complementary-pathways>

²⁴ "EU Regional Trust Fund In Response To The Syrian Crisis". 2021. European Commission. Accessed October 3. https://ec.europa.eu/trustfund-syria-region/our-mission_en.

²⁵ Ibid

²⁶ "The Regional Conference on Higher Education in Crisis Situations." lawdocbox.com. UNESCO, March 2017. <https://lawdocbox.com/Immigration/83098199-The-regional-conference-on-higher-education-in-crisis-situations.html>.

²⁷ Ibid

Current Challenges

Language Barrier

Despite international scholarships, Syrian youth still encounter obstacles when applying to such programmes. Providers usually award scholarships based on merit, in addition to second-language proficiency. This can be a great barrier since most Syrian youth refugees in Jordan come from modest agricultural regions and have little to no training in the English language. In Jordan, they are enrolled in government schools with weak and simple English curricula. Most external scholarships demand an IELTS or TOEFL certificate of language proficiency. Even if a student can communicate in English and has access to preparation classes, most of the Syrian youth do not have the financial means to take the exam.

Age Barrier

Another major difficulty with scholarships in Jordan is that most providers only announce them for graduate programmes rather than undergraduate ones, limiting options for those who have never enrolled in tertiary education.²⁸ Scholarship providers also limit candidates' ages to 24. By doing so, they exclude older graduates, which may be inconsiderate of the many Syrian youth who had to stop their tertiary education to flee Syria, and could not continue in Jordan.

Jordan's Current Economy

Given Jordan's current economic situation, chances are minimal for Jordan to both support equal access to higher education for Syrian refugees by lowering tuition fees and generate more work opportunities. With Jordan's limited job opportunities and work permit policies, it is expected that Syrian youth would return empty-handed from their tertiary journey as they cannot put their academic expertise to work in their host country.

Regardless of the challenges already explored in current scholarships programmes, the restricted spaces available through EU scholarship providers are one of the primary ways for Syrian refugees to continue their studies. By promoting higher education for Syrians, the capabilities of refugees who are expected to take part in post-crisis Syria would be improved, and the socioeconomic burden on hosting nations reduced.

²⁸ Ibid

Alternative Solution

Every student should be able to fulfil their intellectual potential without being limited by political, legislative, or financial challenges. By investing in Syrian youth in Jordan in both academic and vocational fields by providing them with the training/ education in an EU country, they can later put their skills to use as a part of the EU labour force. This paper thus proposes the concept of 'educate to integrate' immigration as a solution to improving Syrian youth refugees' skills and enrolling them in vocational or higher education, all the while reducing the infrastructural burden on Jordan as host country. The policy works by recruiting students based on a certain criteria and educating them on how to become the highest skilled workers in occupations where there is a significant labour shortage in EU member states. This would maximise the impact of the EU's Jordan allocated budget for Syrian higher education, all the while enriching the EU member state economies.

As the European Commission 2020 findings concluded in its "Analysis of Shortage and Surplus Occupations" report, its occupational shortages are persistent and severe. According to the report, the potential for fixing these shortages through cross-border movement is limited, so the EU must find other ways to fill the labour market shortfall. There are shortages in certified fields that require an undergraduate degree or higher such as healthcare workers, software engineers, accountants, engineers, and mechanics. Moreover, there are vocational shortages of plumbers and pipe-fitters, cooks, carpenters, joiners, and hospitality sector workers.

A skilled immigration process can close the gaps in the EU's labour market. Skills-based immigration has been shown to respond to economic requirements and to have better labour market prospects than other types of immigration. In the labour market, high-skilled immigrants will improve wages for low-skilled native workers who are facing declining job prospects.²⁹

Many countries have introduced or enhanced skill-based admissions policies in response to poor labour market outcomes as a desire to attract highly talented immigrants. Denmark, France, Germany, Ireland, and the Netherlands, for example, changed their immigration policies to attract high-skilled migrants. These changes came in addition to the EU issuing green cards, which allowed cardholders to apply for permanent residency in Eastern European countries after three years.³⁰

²⁹Abdurrahman Aydemir, "Skill-Based Immigration, Economic Integration, and Economic Performance," IZA World of Labor, 2014, <https://doi.org/10.15185/izawol.41>.

³⁰Ibid

Recommendations

This policy paper recommends three stages under the concept of 'educate to integrate' to realise better higher education possibilities that also generate income:

Identification and preparation stage:

- To include sufficient funding to cover the full cost of the scholarship from pre-departure, travel, direct and indirect study costs, as well as cost of living during the full study period in the scholarship programme.
- Establish an EU 'educate to integrate' employment office to receive refugee graduates and connect them with employers. The office should also support the graduates in applying for opportunities, CV writing, and interview preparation.
- Applicants should be recognised as refugees by the UNHCR of the host country. To increase the age limit to 35. The pool of candidates will probably have stronger professional experience and capabilities to use in the EU host countries.
- To secure a balanced mix of vocational and academic fields within the pool of selected candidates.
- To take community service as a selection criterion to ensure the social responsibility and motivation of the applicants.
- While recognising that academic qualification and perceived ability to complete the programme should be a primary consideration, this process should prioritise refugees in socio-economically disadvantaged situations, providing income details of each household and the family situation is needed.
- To set aside a minimum quota for Syrian refugees in camps, as they have fewer prospects for higher education than those in host communities.
- To strongly lobby for this alternative approach by the policymakers among Syrian communities. Students in ninth grade and up should get school counselling sessions to help them align their educational goals and motivations with the goals of the 'educate to integrate' programme. An information package should be made available to assist applicants in making an informed decision with topics such as legal status of the scholarship holder in the country of scholarship, and the rights attached to this status; scholarship coverage; academic and career guidance on the required majors; the right to return.
- To provide job counselling sessions to familiarise the students with the major and the work that they will pursue in the EU host state.

- To disseminate the call for applications in a manner that ensures the information is spread geographically. We recommend distributing through texts, social media, email, letters, flyers, posters, and/or in-person by UNHCR and partner staff where appropriate. The application should be in a language that potential applicants can be reasonably expected to understand.
- For the selection process, a committee should be formed comprising of representatives from the universities, foreign scholarship organisations, and an NGO dealing with refugee and asylum issues in the scholarship country. UNHCR may also be involved, preferably as well as a Syrian youth from the targeted audience to provide a contextual perspective.
- Upon short-listing candidates, students will have to pass the security and pre-departure health assessments normally required of resettled refugees.

For the implementation stage:

In coordination with implementing partners, NGOs, and UNHCR, and to help Jordan by creating jobs, this policy paper proposes the following preparation step before departure:

- Establish a Jordanian facility that encourages international higher education providers to submit proposals that address the target group's higher education needs. These partners can provide the target group with financial and regulatory skills and competencies, learning options, and methods of using the gained skills and knowledge in the country of settlement.
- Provide intensive English and/or host country language training via online platforms or in the previously mentioned facility. Providing one language year in Jordan will ease the transition on the target group.
- Briefings to be held before departure could be covered by the receiving country's ministry or visa office.
- Provide the scholarship recipients with accommodation, in addition to information sessions on housing and living style in the host country.
- Provide the target group with pre-departure follow-up, permits, travel documents, and visas.

For the integration stage:

- Provide the target group with on-campus support to be available as needed over the first weeks to assist with the initial settlement process.
- Provide access to healthcare and psycho-social support upon arrival and throughout the programme.

Limitations

While the author is confident that these recommendations will help to improve the EU's higher education policy for Syrian refugees, she acknowledges the security and domestic issues surrounding migration in the EU. Furthermore, empirical studies have yet to quantify the extent to which skill-based admissions have been able to meet employers' short-term needs as proof of immigrants' long-term contribution.

Because there is no comprehensive precedent or agreed-upon set of principles, the design of such a programme can be challenging. Each EU scholarship should have selection policies that reflect the labour market and application pool features of the nation.

Conclusion

The purpose of this policy paper is to address the fundamental obstacle of higher education for Syrian refugees in Jordan: their inability to find jobs in the Jordanian labour market. Based on the European Commission's 2020 Analysis of Shortage and Surplus Occupations report, Syrian refugees in Jordan could present an opportunity in the EU economy. By investing in Syrian youth, the EU member states will fill their labour shortage, hence empowering their economies while keeping their humanitarian promise for Syrian refugees. Through its three comprehensive steps, the 'educate to integrate' approach presents the EU with a compelling investment opportunity.



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