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TOWARDS A UNIFIED HUMAN SECURITY AND P/CVE METHOD IN JORDAN:
Challenges and Changes

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Executive Summary

The threat of violent extremism facing the West Asia-North Africa (WANA) region and beyond has signalled the need for broader and more holistic conceptualisations of the key notions underpinning the phenomenon. To date, governments, donors and practitioners have approached Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism (P/CVE) as an isolated exercise, largely removed from longer-term human security and development interventions. As the scholarship has evolved, however, it is increasingly clear that P/CVE must be understood through the lens, and as a pillar, of human security.

To address this deficit, this research investigates the relationship between human security programming in Jordan and P/CVE efforts, and the extent to which this relationship is reinforcing and symbiotic, or disobliging and encumbering. We focus on the four pillars of human security deemed more relevant to P/CVE efforts: economic security, political security, personal security and communal security. The role, relevance and engagement of youth in each of these pillars, features in a cross-cutting manner.

From this analysis, a Theory of Change (ToC) is presented. This ToC bridges current programming challenges and mid-term goals, in a way that may facilitate a better integration of P/CVE efforts into human security programming. We identify three thematic and four actor-based challenges to achieving this integrated approach. First, donor attention towards Syrian refugees has fuelled a perception of relative deprivation, which has eroded social cohesion. Second, the short-term and selective nature of donor-funded programming renders youth as an increasingly vulnerable demographic. Third, sluggish progress in women's empowerment has restricted their ability to counter radicalisation and extremism within their communities. Actor-based challenges include: beneficiaries' increasing reluctance to participate in programming without financial remuneration, de-contextualised programme design, and the inherent weakness of the civil society sector vis-à-vis the bureaucratic requirements imposed upon them.

The key takeaway of the research is that **P/CVE efforts should be perceived and funded as long-term development and human security goals.** To enable this, donor and government perceptions of P/CVE programming must be realigned and placed *within* the human security paradigm, rather than existing alongside it. To achieve this, mechanisms must be developed to bring together government stakeholders with representatives of CBOs, UN agencies, INGOs, and the donor community, to develop a shared vision of what human security programming entails in the current context of the violent extremism threat.

The findings presented, draw upon 15 semi-structured interviews and a focus group discussion with practitioners from the international and local community, as well as a regional experts meeting held in July 2017. The report is part of a two-year project on countering radicalisation and violent extremism in Jordan that is generously funded by the Embassy of the Netherlands in Jordan.

1.   Introduction

The paradigm bridging state-security and human security has been examined across several different contexts. Less discussed, however, is the relationship between human security programming and the drivers of radicalisation — arguably the security sector's central challenge. Indeed, the human security approach, in the global context, has fared poorly against the rise of violent extremism. Many states have reverted to state-centric security approaches[1] which has tightened the space within which human security programming is conceptualised and rolled-out.[2] Such trends can be observed both in the Middle East and established democracies.[3]

In the case of Jordan, a heavy-handed approach to the threats posed by radicalisation has been taken.[4] An anti-terror law was passed in 2006, following the bombing of three hotels in Amman in 2005.[5] This law was widened in 2014 to introduce "penalties for terrorist acts range from 10 years in prison to the death penalty."[6] Moreover, the definition of terrorism was expanded to include any act meant to create sedition, harm property, or jeopardise international relations, or to use the internet or media outlets to promote 'terrorist' thinking. The law was met with broad criticism from members of the international community and human rights groups, principally due to concerns that it curtailed important civic rights.[7]

Given that the security-centric approach has dominated for over a decade, any discussion on how the human security space has been impacted by the threat of violent extremism will be limited, perhaps with the exception of increasing restrictions on financial transfers introduced to

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[1] For example see "UK: Emergency Surveillance Law A Blow To Privacy", *Human Rights Watch*, 2014, available at https://www.hrw.org/news/2014/07/14/uk-emergency-surveillance-law-blow-privacy. See also "France: Prolonged Emergency State Threatens Rights", *Human Rights Watch*, 2016, available at https://www.hrw.org/news/2016/07/22/france-prolonged-emergency-state-threatens-rights.

[2] Mohammed Nuruzzaman, "Human Security And The Arab Spring" (2013), 55.

[3] The United States is currently a prime example for the infringement of citizen rights to further security concerns. Ken Klukowski, "Court Criticizes Obama Admin For Illegal Spying On U.S. Citizens - Breitbart", *Breitbart*, 2017, http://www.breitbart.com/big-government/2017/05/29/court-criticizes-obama-admin-for-illegal-spying-on-u-s-citizens/. See also, "The Civil Liberties Implications Of Counterterrorism Policies: Full Chapter", *Freedom House*, 2017, available at https://freedomhouse.org/report/todays-american-how-free/civil-liberties-implications-counterterrorism-policies-full-chapter. On the UK and France see,"UK: Emergency Surveillance Law A Blow To Privacy", *Human Rights Watch*, 2014, available at https://www.hrw.org/news/2014/07/14/uk-emergency-surveillance-law-blow-privacy and "France: Prolonged Emergency State Threatens Rights", *Human Rights Watch*, 2016, available at https://www.hrw.org/news/2016/07/22/france-prolonged-emergency-state-threatens-rights.

[4] Dr Heballah Taha, Research Associate, IISS Middle East, Expert Meeting for the Research on Challenges to an Integrated CVE and Human Security Approach in Jordan, organised by the WANA Institute, 30th July 2017, Amman.

[5] See Hassan Fattah and Michael Slackman, "3 Hotels Bombed In Jordan; At Least 57 Die", *The New York Times*, 2005, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2005/11/10/world/middleeast/3-hotels-bombed-in-jordan-at-least-57-die.html?_r=0. See also Mohammed Nuruzzaman, "Human Security And The Arab Spring" (2013), 55.

[6] Areej Abuqudairi, "Jordan Anti-Terrorism Law Sparks Concern", *Al Jazeera*, 2014, available at http://www.aljazeera.com/news/middleeast/2014/04/jordan-anti-terrorism-law-sparks-concern-201442510452221775.html.

[7] "Jordan: Terrorism Amendments Threaten Rights", *Human Rights Watch*, 2014, available at https://www.hrw.org/news/2014/05/17/jordan-terrorism-amendments-threaten-rights. The government has, under the guise of national security, detained civilians and journalists en-masse since the expansion of the anti-terror law. See for example "Jordan Anti-Terrorism Law Translates Into Prosecution Of Journalists", *The Arab Weekly*, 2015, available at http://www.thearabweekly.com/Mena-Now/1159/Jordan-anti-terrorism-law-translates-into-prosecution-of-journalists. See also, Abuqudairi, "Jordan Anti-Terrorism Law Sparks Concern".

guard against funding directed to violent extremist groups.[8] Indeed, most research participants reported that state-security policies had not impacted their on-going work, and highlighted the importance of policies geared towards countering violent extremism.[9] As one interviewee put it, security policies must be seen as a double-edged sword; they are needed to confront legitimate threats, but risk overshadowing other important approaches to security. Interviewees highlighted how non-contextualised security policies can sometimes be counterproductive, for example when prison environments propagate or spread violent ideologies.[10] Here, we use the example of Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, who was in detention for theft when he was introduced to and indoctrinated into violent extremism through al-Maqdisi. Zarqawi later established al-Qaeda in Iraq, the group that would eventually morph into Daesh.[11]

While there is no direct link between human security programming and radicalisation drivers, it is widely accepted that a lack of human security provision and/or a curtailment of human rights (intentional or otherwise) may fuel radicalisation. This is consistent with previous WANA Institute research,[12] as well as other investigations into the 'push' and 'pull' factors leading vulnerable groups to join radical organisations.[13] Thus insofar as human security programmes target unemployment, civic rights, access to basic resources and protection from violence, it can be surmised that effective programming may deter radicalisation, while its absence (or poorly conceived programmes) might exacerbate drivers. It can likewise be inferred that insofar as state security policy impairs human security provision, radicalisation may be affected. For example, the one-year state of emergency imposed throughout the Ma'an governorate (geared towards the arrest of one individual) resulted in multiple investigations and arrests, many of which were deemed unjustified. This led to tensions between locals and security forces, as well as economic decline.[14]

It is against such trends that this research seeks to understand how barriers to and failures of human security programming affect the drivers of radicalisation in Jordan. Specifically, it examines the extent to which human security programming and P/CVE efforts are mutually reinforcing, and the influence of this nexus in reducing the vulnerability of populations to security risks, including those associated with violent extremism. The research draws upon

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[8] State-centric security policies have been implemented in Jordan for over a decade due to the growing terrorist threat. As such, majority of research participants have not seen the shift in policies and cannot measure the change. However, respondents have cited that the government has not intervened counter-productively. This could, once again, indicate fear of the security apparatus and the state.

[9] Aysha Khilfa, Director at Khawla Bint al-Azwar, interview conducted by Barik Mhadeen and Nadine Sayegh, Zarqa, Jordan (April 19, 2017); Dr Amer Bani Amer, General Director at Rased, Al Hayat Center, interview conducted by Nadine Sayegh, Amman, Jordan (4 June, 2017).

[10] Hussam Tarawneh, Director of Karak Creativity Club, interview conducted by Barik Mhadeen, Amman, Jordan (5 June, 2017).

[11] Ḥasan Abū Hanīya and Muḥammad Abū-Rummān, *The "Islamic State" Organization,* 30-4 (Amman: Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung Jordan & Iraq, 2015). See also, Joby Warrick, *Black Flags*, 58-97 (Doubleday, 2015).

[12] Neven Bondokji, Kim Wilkinson and Leen Aghabi, *Understanding Radicalisation: A Literature Review Of Models And Drivers* (Amman: WANA Institute, 2016), available at http://wanainstitute.org/en/publication/understanding-radicalisation-literature-review-models-and-drivers.

[13] Neven Bondokji, Kim Wilkinson, Leen Aghabi, *Trapped Between Destructive Choices: Radicalisation Drivers Affecting Youth in Jordan,* (Amman: The WANA Institute, 2017), available at http://wanainstitute.org/en/publication/trapped-between-destructive-choices-radicalisation-drivers-affecting-youth-jordan.

[14] Lana Kreishan, Director at Annwar Charitable Association, interview conducted by Neven Bondokji and Nadine Sayegh, Amman, Jordan (12 April, 2017).

fieldwork including 15 semi-structured interviews with representatives from UN agencies, International NGOs and community-based organisations (CBOs) and one focus group discussion with 10 CBOs and INGOs (see Annex I and Annex II). This data collection was conducted in Arabic and English between April – June 2017. The recommendations benefited from input from regional and international experts convened to discuss a draft version of this report in July 2017. Research participants were categorised according to relevant human security pillars i.e. economic security, political security, personal security and communal security. Those human security pillars not addressed in this research — namely environmental, food, and health security — should be the subject of future research. Research limitations included the sample size and geographic breath of representation, as well as the reluctance of participants to speak freely due to the sensitivity of the subject matter. A significant number of practitioners appeared compelled to uphold an official narrative, either connected to their agency or perhaps emanating from the government.

2. Thematic Challenges Affecting Human Security Provision in Jordan

The thematic challenges presented below serve as a synthesis of the most pertinent issues affecting human security, according to field data. As participants are drawn from a variety of specialisations, the challenges here are of prime importance as they have been noted by multiple research participants. The main challenges relate to social cohesion as well as concerns of women and youth.

2.1 Refugee and Host Communities

There have been a number of concerns aired by research participants concerning the relationship between the local and refugee population. This specifically affects host communities, bearing the brunt of the mismanagement of the refugee crisis.

To highlight these real-time concerns, theoretical concepts such as relative deprivation may help to make sense of the situation. Relative deprivation principally concerns the gap between the living conditions that one feels entitled to and the status quo. In certain cases, however, the sociological framework also involves a retaliatory aspect; one in which an individual engages in deviant behaviour in an attempt to obtain what they consider themselves to be deprived of.[15]

In Jordan, relative deprivation is growing increasingly visible.[16] Of particular concern is those populations who feel marginalised when they compare themselves to refugees in their local communities. Although programming has shifted to address the needs of both refugees and hosts in the last two years,[17] disparities in aid has strained relations with their host populations, who already face harsh economic, food,[18] and water insecurity.[19]

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[15] Iain Walker and Thomas F. Pettigrew, "Relative Deprivation Theory: An Overview And Conceptual Critique", *British Journal Of Social Psychology* 23, no. 4 (1984): 301-310, doi:10.1111/j.2044-8309.1984.tb00645.x.

[16] Bondokji et al., *Understanding Radicalisation* (Amman: WANA Institute, 2016), 17, available at http://wanainstitute.org/en/publication/understanding-radicalisation-literature-review-models-and-drivers.

[17] Dr Amer Bani Amer, General Director at Rased, Al Hayat Center, interview conducted by Nadine Sayegh, Amman, Jordan (4 June, 2017).

[18] "Jordan | World Food Programme", *WFP*, 2017, available at http://www1.wfp.org/countries/jordan.

[19] "Water: Saving Every Drop", *Al Jazeera*, 2017, available a t http://www.aljazeera.com/programmes/earthrise/2017/05/water-save-drop-170516072259788.html.
This claim is best explained through an overview of economic insecurity in Jordan. The local population is concerned with the government incrementally raising taxes, along with the high unemployment levels. In addition, a number of geopolitical factors has affected the country's trade. Tariff-free trade routes have been shut down due to the neighbouring civil war as well as the effects on trade from the recent diplomatic rift between the Gulf States. This has left the Jordanian economy in an even more precarious state relying on foreign aid to keep the country afloat. See, "Increase In Female Unemployment To 33 Percent", *Al Ghad Newspaper (In Arabic)*, 2017, available at http://alghad.com/m/articles/1714832-18-2-%D9%86%D8%B3%D8%A8%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A8%D8%B7%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A9-%D9%81%D9%8A-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A3%D8%B1%D8%AF%D9%86. See also, "Syria Border Closure Cuts Off Key Jordan Trade Route", *The National*, 2015, http://www.thenational.ae/world/middle-east/syria-border-closure-cuts-off-key-jordan-trade-route. See also, John Reed, "Closure Of Syria'S Last Border Crossing Hits Jordan Economy", *Financial Times*, 2016, https://www.ft.com/content/c0df376a-dd27-11e4-a772-00144feab7de?mhq5j=e2., and, Osama al-Sharif, "Jordan In An Uneasy Place Over Gulf Spat", *Al-Monitor*, 2017, http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2017/06/jordan-qatar-gulf-crisis-relations.html.

Low income Jordanians feel both disenfranchised and discriminated against. Moreover, insofar as local CBOs are perceived as enforcers of these policies, the strategic relationship between communities and community organisations for P/CVE is eroded. Even outside of host communities, there is a perception that refugees have driven overcrowding, inflation and competition for employment opportunities.[20] Indeed, there is strong evidence that Syrians are prepared to work for longer hours and lower wages vis-à-vis nationals, with the perception that this has placed downwards pressure on wages.[21] And even though refugees are more likely to have displaced previous waves of migrant labour, the perception remains virulent. The local population, potentially due to the way information is being presented to the general public, understands the refugee crisis as a severe disruption and have an unsophisticated understanding of the implications and realities on the ground.

How CBOs viewed this problem compared to International NGOs and UN agencies differed markedly. This is likely due to the direct and contextualised relationship that CBOs have with both refugee and host communities. Drawing on his experience working in Irbid and Mafraq, a project coordinator from UN Industrial Development Organisation (UNIDO) reported a level harmony between the two groups,[22] noting in particular blood ties that span the Jordan-Syrian border. A participant from the Norwegian Refugee Council concurred, noting that he had not observed any perceived competition between refugee and host communities.[23]

In contrast, a CBO director from Zarqa noted that her Jordanian beneficiaries attribute many of their current difficulties to the refugee population, including unemployment, inflation and increased rent. She remarked that distrust and disdain can be seen in children from a young age, and that local school children frequently clash with their Syrian counterparts.[24] An interviewee from Ma'an shared a similar view, noting that donors had shifted their funds towards refugees, largely at the expense of programmes geared towards local livelihoods and female empowerment.[25]

In terms of radicalisation, the dangers are twofold. First, those concerned do not understand this phenomenon as an economic issue, but instead a political one — transforming it into a recognised driver of radicalisation.[26] This is supported by Taha, who argues that poverty, in this

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[20] Aysha Khilfa, Director at Khawla Bint al-Azwar, interview conducted by Barik Mhadeen and Nadine Sayegh, Zarqa, Jordan (April 19, 2017), Safiyyeh Abdurahim Mohammed, Project Manager, Family Development Association, interview conducted by Barik Mhadeen and Nadine Sayegh, Amman, Jordan (15 June, 2017), Khalid Qubajah, National Project Coordinator at UN Industrial Development Organization, interview conducted by Nadine Sayegh, Amman, Jordan (6 June, 2017). See also Abdullah Obeidat, "Why Inequality Hampers Economic Growth", *Jordan Times*, 2015, http://ftp.jordantimes.com/opinion/abdullah-obeidat/why-inequality-hampers-economic-growth.

[21] Aysha Khilfa, Director at Khawla Bint al-Azwar, interview conducted by Barik Mhadeen and Nadine Sayegh, Zarqa, Jordan (April 19, 2017), Multiple Participants at Focus Group Discussion, Amman, 24th May 2017.

[22] Khalid Qubajah, National Project Coordinator at UN Industrial Development Organization, interview conducted by Nadine Sayegh, Amman, Jordan (6 June, 2017).

[23] Paul Fean, Youth Project Manager at Norwegian Refugee Council, interview conducted by Nadine Sayegh, Amman, Jordan (27 April, 2017).

[24] Aysha Khilfa, Director at Khawla Bint al-Azwar, interview conducted by Barik Mhadeen and Nadine Sayegh, Zarqa, Jordan (April 19, 2017).

[25] Lana Kreishan, Director at Annwar Charitable Association, interview conducted by Neven Bondokji and Nadine Sayegh, Amman, Jordan (12 April, 2017).

[26] Dr Heballah Taha, Research Associate, IISS Middle East, Expert Meeting for the Research on Challenges to an Integrated CVE and Human Security Approach in Jordan, organised by the WANA Institute, 30th July 2017, Amman.

context, cannot be separated from its political dimensions and an associated fuelling of frustration and marginalisation.[27] Such dynamics have been well-reported in the literature,[28] including how such feelings are exploited in the process of recruitment into violent extremist groups.[29] A second issue is that Jordanians are not battling for water or housing or employment with their fellow countrymen, but rather against the 'other.' As one participant put it, the different groups in the Kingdom (for example, Jordanian, Syrian, and Jordanians of Palestinian origin) are fighting the same fight, just separately, with little hope of uniting.[30] 'Otherisation', particularly when coupled with marginalisation, is a recognised driver of radicalisation.[31]

2.2 Youth Engagement

Youth in Jordan are understood, primarily, as a sector rather than a demographic, and as a 'ticking time-bomb' rather than a vector for positive change.[32] These dichotomies result in clashing views on how youth should be categorised and defined.[33] This is then followed by implications in terms of programming gaps of certain age groups. **Particularly from the perspective of radicalisation, interventions are required throughout the youth lifecycle,[34] but different youth segments have different needs, thus support must be carefully nuanced.** Despite this need, there is some reluctance on the part of agencies to incorporate P/CVE efforts into projects involving youth. This is both to avoid security sector attention and due to the risk of framing youth as hostile and at-risk group. In addition, research indicates that there is a palpable programming gap for youth aged 10-15.[35] This is particularly problematic as this age group is highly impressionable, and it is at this age that idleness can lead them to engage with social media for entertainment, a prime recruitment setting for violent extremist groups.[36]

The research interviews elucidated the extent of these vacuums. One participant working on youth employment opportunities in impoverished areas of East Amman noted how the majority of her beneficiaries attended sessions intoxicated, and appeared only to collect their 5 JD transportation stipend. They opt to finance themselves on a daily basis over working manual labour for 12 hours per day for a general salary of 250 JD per month prior to deductions; jobs

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[27] Ibid.

[28] Bondokji et al., *Trapped Between Destructive Choices* (Amman: The WANA Institute, 2017), 11-3, available at http://wanainstitute.org/en/publication/trapped-between-destructive-choices-radicalisation-drivers-affecting-youth-jordan.

[29] Ibid.

[30] Morad al-Qadi, Consultant Leading Youth Empowerment and Civic Engagement Programme at Anonymous International NGO, interview conducted by Nadine Sayegh, Amman, Jordan (31 May, 2017).

[31] See Bondokji et al., *Trapped Between Destructive Choices* (Amman: The WANA Institute, 2017), 11-7, available at http://wanainstitute.org/en/publication/trapped-between-destructive-choices-radicalisation-drivers-affecting-youth-jordan. See also, "From Jordan to Jihad: The Lure of Syria's Violent Extremist Groups", *Mercycorps*, 2015, available at https://www.mercycorps.org/sites/default/files/From%20Jordan%20to%20Jihad_0.pdf., and USAID, *Factors Impacting Propensity And Influence Pathways Toward Violent Extremism In Jordan* (Amman: USAID, 2016), available at https://jordankmportal.com/organizations/2?resources_page=5.

[32] Paul Fean, Youth Project Manager at Norwegian Refugee Council, interview conducted by Nadine Sayegh, Amman, Jordan (27 April, 2017).

[33] Ibid., Morad al-Qadi, Consultant Leading Youth Empowerment and Civic Engagement Programme at Anonymous International NGO, interview conducted by Nadine Sayegh, Amman, Jordan (31 May, 2017).

[34] Dr Valentina Mejia, First Economic Officer, ESCWA, Expert Meeting for the Research on Challenges to an Integrated CVE and Human Security Approach in Jordan, organised by the WANA Institute, 30th July, 2017.

[35] Participant at Focus Group Discussion, Amman, 24th May 2017.

[36] Participant at Focus Group Discussion, Amman, 24th May 2017

are generally related to manual labour.[37] Unemployed, university-educated youth are equally frustrated. They are characteristically disinterested, citing what they believe to be the ultimate outcome — continuing unemployment.[38]

Why youth are increasingly turning to drugs is related to the alternate forms of entertainment on offer. While the Ministry of Youth has opened 180 youth centres across the country, only 12 are active and they are generally quite uninviting.[39] One participant noted that centres are underequipped and some are staffed by only one employee.[40]

The increase in drug use was referenced by several participants — principally *hashish* and a synthetic derivative known as 'joker'.[41] A youth worker from Zarqa explained that, although it may be denied by the government, the crisis has reached proportions where young children are involved in drug sales.[42] Other CBOs believed that drugs were being sold in schools, including in all-girl schools.[43] One participant reflected on a government lecture given to students in Zarqa where one female student corrected the facilitator on the names of available recreational drugs, and freely admitted that she and her some members of her family were drug users. It was subsequently determined that of the class of year 11 students, 18 were drug users.[44]

Some argued that drug prevention should out-prioritise P/CVE programming in particular locales.[45] But the linkages must be highlighted. Drug use encourages deviant behaviour, lowers the threshold of reluctance to engage in criminal activity, and leaves users more vulnerable to manipulation by radical recruiters. Investing in programmes countering the proliferation of drugs in Jordan may thus indirectly serve P/CVE efforts.[46] Such interventions should be designed with the knowledge that local needs are often best understood by community-based organisations;[47]

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[37] Safiyyeh Abdurahim Mohammed, Project Manager, Family Development Association, interview conducted by Barik Mhadeen and Nadine Sayegh, Amman, Jordan (15 June, 2017).

[38] Ibid.

[39] Morad al-Qadi, Consultant Leading Youth Empowerment and Civic Engagement Programme at Anonymous International NGO, interview conducted by Nadine Sayegh, Amman, Jordan (31 May, 2017).

[40] Hussam Tarawneh, Director of Karak Creativity Club, interview conducted by Barik Mhadeen, Amman, Jordan (5 June, 2017).

[41] Safiyyeh Abdurahim Mohammed, Project Manager, Family Development Association, interview conducted by Barik Mhadeen and Nadine Sayegh, Amman, Jordan (15 June, 2017).

[42] Aysha Khilfa, Director at Khawla Bint al-Azwar, interview conducted by Barik Mhadeen and Nadine Sayegh, Zarqa, Jordan (April 19, 2017).

[43] Ibid; also supported by statements made by participants at the Focus Group Discussion, Amman, 24th May 2017.

[44] Participant at Focus Group Discussion, Amman, 24th May 2017.

[45] Ibid. See Suzanna Goussous, "Drug Abuse Among University Students 'On The Rise'", *Jordan Times*, 2016, available at http://www.jordantimes.com/news/local/drug-abuse-among-university-students-rise%E2%80%99. See also "'3,126 Suspects In Drug Cases Arrested This Year'", *Jordan Times*, 2016, http://www.jordantimes.com/news/local/3126-suspects-drug-cases-arrested-year%E2%80%99.

[46] See Anne Barker , "Captagon: The Arab amphetamine fuelling Islamic State." ABC News, November 25, 2015., available at http://www.abc.net.au/news/2015-11-24/captagon-the-drug-that-kept-the-paris-attackers-calm/6970464. See also, Agence France-Presse, "Orly airport attack: drugs and alcohol found in gunman's blood," The Guardian, March 19, 2017, available at, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/mar/20/orly-airport-shooting-drugs-and-alcohol-found-in-gunmans-blood., and "Changes in modus operandi of Islamic State terrorist attacks," Europol Public Information, January 18, 2016, 6, available at https://www.google.jo/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=3&cad=rja&uact=8&ved=0ahUKEwjct_G5pffVAhUErRoKHUQRDT8QFggwMAI&url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.europol.europa.eu%2Fsites%2Fdefault%2Ffiles%2Fdocuments%2Fchanges_in_modus_operandi_of_is_in_terrorist_attacks.pdf&usg=AFQjCNHc9ALliuXMaNcbYtiO_SUgvtRxcg.

[47] Patrick Stahl and Julia Wilton, "The Future Of Countering Violent Extremism: An Analysis Of Current Programming In Jordan," 20-1, (MSc, New York University, 2017).

currently, anti-drug programmes are the domain of the Public Security Directorate, which limits 'softer' and more integrated approaches that may have higher impact.

Unemployment, idleness and substance abuse have contributed to an overall culture of aggressive individualism. A founder of the education initiative iLearn JO highlighted that youth, especially in impoverished areas, decreasingly contribute to the improvement of their communities.[48] This may also be symptomatic of youth feeling marginalised and excluded from their society, and betrayed by the government and other actors. For those who are interested in social and political participation, many believe this is either unattainable or that engagement is superficial.[49] Indeed, interviewees from the National Democratic Institute noted high citizen distrust of state bodies, particularly youth, whose efforts to launch political activities through NGOs are often thwarted.[50] Participants at a 2015 ActionAid conference held in Amman, summarised this clearly:

> the youth remained excluded from the political process in Jordan due to legislative restrictions, the unfair electoral system, unemployment, poverty, undemocratic culture and practices among a section of citizens and political parties that instil fear in youth and citizens alike keeping them out of politics.[51]

Again, the link with radicalisation is tangible, as set out in the literature[52] and in the opinions of locally engaged practitioners.[53] In short, without fulfilling alternatives to structural issues such as unemployment, young people look for alternatives. In searching for alternatives, those who feel marginalised will be more vulnerable to radicalisation.

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[48] Saddam Sayyaleh, Fellow at International Youth Foundation (founder at iLearn JO), interview conducted by Nadine Sayegh, Amman, Jordan (23 April, 2017).

[49] Ibid. Morad al-Qadi, Consultant Leading Youth Empowerment and Civic Engagement Program at Anonymous International NGO, interview conducted by Nadine Sayegh, Amman, Jordan (31 May, 2017).

[50] Nasser Mardini, Program Officer and Ahmad Obeid, Senior Program Officer at National Democratic Institute, interview conducted by Nadine Sayegh, Amman, Jordan (27 April, 2017).

[51] Janet Asiimwe, "Actionaid ARI Seeks Jordan Guarantee On Youth Participation In Political Development | Actionaid", *Action Aid*, 2015, available at http://www.actionaid.org/arab-region/2015/09/actionaid-ari-seeks-jordan-guarantee-youth-participation-political-development.

[52] Bondokji et al., *Trapped Between Destructive Choices: Radicalisation Drivers Affecting Youth in Jordan,* (Amman: The WANA Institute, 2017), 11-7, available at http://wanainstitute.org/en/publication/trapped-between-destructive-choices-radicalisation-drivers-affecting-youth-jordan. See also, "From Jordan to Jihad: The Lure of Syria's Violent Extremist Groups", *Mercycorps*, 2015, available at https://www.mercycorps.org/sites/default/files/From%20Jordan%20to%20Jihad_0.pdf, and USAID, *Factors Impacting Propensity And Influence Pathways Toward Violent Extremism In Jordan* (Amman: USAID, 2016), available at https://jordankmportal.com/organizations/2?resources_page=5.

[53] Paul Fean, Youth Project Manager at Norwegian Refugee Council, interview conducted by Nadine Sayegh, Amman, Jordan (27 April, 2017)

2.3 Gender

Women's exclusion from political participation, limited economic power and exposure to violence — including domestic and sexual violence, and honour crimes — are well discussed in the literature.[54] There are recorded cases of indecent exposure, rape, physical violence,[55] honour killings, child molestation,[56] and more.[57]

In some population groups, gender-biases and violating norms have been internalised. One research participant noted how, during awareness raising sessions, women would agree that husbands had the right to hit their wives if they antagonised them.[58] A participant from Ma'an explained that most women resisted economic participation, even if programmes were available to them, and that there had been few successes. She attributed this to an acceptance of cultural norms that women's engagement should be limited to the private sphere.[59]

Other research participants felt that women were enthusiastic to participate through the channels available to them, including human security programmes.[60] The interest holds true particularly for economic empowerment programmes that encourage sustainable independence through small business development.[61] One project coordinator noted that 60 per cent of 500 farmers participating in a UNIDO project building capacity, life skills and technical skills, were women.[62] A CBO manager in Zarqa, by contrast, noted that the outcome of a female beauty-therapy training course followed by a micro-fund of 700 JD was largely unsuccessful and the funds were

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[54] Diab M. Al-Badayneh, "Violence Against Women In Jordan", *Journal Of Family Violence* 27, no. 5 (2012): 369-379, doi:10.1007/s10896-012-9429-1., and, "Gender Equality and Women's Empowerment in Public Administration: Jordan Case Study", *United Nations Development Programme*, 2012, available at
http://www.undp.org/content/dam/undp/library/Democratic%20Governance/Women-s%20Empowerment/JordanFinal%20-%20HiRes.pdf. Also see, "Gender Equality And Female Empowerment | Jordan", *U.S. Agency For International Development*, 2017, available at https://www.usaid.gov/jordan/gender-equality-womens-empowerment. Safiyyeh Abdurahim Mohammed, Project Manager, Family Development Association, interview conducted by Barik Mhadeen and Nadine Sayegh, Amman, Jordan (15 June, 2017).
For details on male and female dynamics and intimate partner violence, see Diab M. Al-Badayneh, "Violence Against Women In Jordan", *Journal Of Family Violence* 27, no. 5 (2012): 369-379, doi:10.1007/s10896-012-9429-1. For further detail see, Rana Husseini, "Only 3% Of Gender-Based Violence Victims Would Seek Police Help — Study", *Jordan Times*, 2016, available at http://www.jordantimes.com/news/local/only-3-gender-based-violence-victims-would-seek-police-help-%E2%80%94-study.
[55] Safiyyeh Abdurahim Mohammed, Project Manager, Family Development Association, interview conducted by Barik Mhadeen and Nadine Sayegh, Amman, Jordan (15 June, 2017).
[56] For detail on crimes against children, see "Overview | Children | Jordan River Foundation", *Jordan River Foundation*, 2012, http://jordanriver.jo/?q=content/jrcsp/overview.
[57] For details on male and female dynamics and intimate partner violence, see Diab M. Al-Badayneh, "Violence Against Women In Jordan", *Journal Of Family Violence* 27, no. 5 (2012): 369-379, doi:10.1007/s10896-012-9429-1. For further detail see, Rana Husseini, "Only 3% Of Gender-Based Violence Victims Would Seek Police Help — Study", *Jordan Times*, 2016, available at http://www.jordantimes.com/news/local/only-3-gender-based-violence-victims-would-seek-police-help-%E2%80%94-study.
[58] Safiyyeh Abdurahim Mohammed, Project Manager, Family Development Association, interview conducted by Barik Mhadeen and Nadine Sayegh, Amman, Jordan (15 June, 2017).
[59] Lana Kreishan, Director at Annwar Charitable Association, interview conducted by Neven Bondokji and Nadine Sayegh, Amman, Jordan (12 April, 2017).
[60] Khalid Qubajah, National Project Coordinator at UN Industrial Development Organization, interview conducted by Nadine Sayegh, Amman, Jordan (6 June, 2017), Farah Mesmar, MENA Regional Advocacy Advisor, Kvinna till Kvinna, interview conducted by Nadine Sayegh, Amman, Jordan (8 June, 2017), Sylvia Rognvik, Women, Peace and Security Specialist at UNWomen, interview conducted by Nadine Sayegh, Amman, Jordan (27 April, 2017).
[61] Ibid.
[62] Ibid.

spent outside their intended use. She emphasised, however, that this outcome was the result of the short duration of the training, and thus a failure in project design rather than the potential of the participants.[63]

The conclusion many draw, is that while programmes supporting the economic and social empowerment of women have been prioritised in Jordan for several decades, gender roles and internalised misogyny continue to impact their reach and efficiency.[64] The implication for women's P/CVE programming are immense. It is now broadly accepted that women play a crucial role in radicalisation and de-radicalisation processes.[65] This was echoed by focus group participants,[66] as well as UN-Women and Kvinna-till-Kvinna representatives, who noted that women's capacity to by detect early warning signs, counter radicalisation, and engage in de-radicalisation is proving crucial to P/CVE efforts.[67] Research conducted by the WANA Institute also highlighted the role of women in dissuading children from travelling to Syria or Iraq,[68] as well as that of female preachers, who often have a more intricate understanding of the radicalisation process compared to their male counterparts.

Another important nuance is that P/CVE programming is not designed to empower women and there are legitimate arguments against modifying empowerment programmes to contain PVE elements. One solution might lie in gendered P/CVE programmes that build the capacity of women to detect radicalisation signals and deter potential radicals in their families. A more sustainable approach, however, is enjoining women's human security programs with a P/CVE element. This provides an opportunity to empower women in different social spaces, not solely restricted to P/CVE efforts. To date, social and political taboos, have prevented the potential of such programming from being adequately tested.[69]

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[63] Aysha Khilfa, Director at Khawla Bint al-Azwar, interview conducted by Barik Mhadeen and Nadine Sayegh, Zarqa, Jordan (April 19, 2017).

[64] Farah Mesmar, MENA Regional Advocacy Advisor, Kvinna till Kvinna, interview conducted by Nadine Sayegh, Amman, Jordan (8 June, 2017).

[65] Sylvia Rognvik, Women, Peace and Security Specialist at UNWomen, interview conducted by Nadine Sayegh, Amman, Jordan (27 April, 2017), and Participant at Focus Group Discussion, Amman, 24th May 2017. See also in-depth investigations published by Hedayah and The Global Center on Cooperative Security that has found this to be true in Afghanistan, Nigeria, and the UK; Naureen Fink, Sara Zeiger and Rafia Bhulai, "A Man'S World? Exploring The Roles Of Women In Countering Terrorism And Violent Extremism", *Global Center On Cooperative Security*, 2016, http://www.globalcenter.org/publications/a-mans-world-exploring-the-roles-of-women-in-countering-terrorism-and-violent-extremism/.

[66] Number of participants at Participant at Focus Group Discussion, Amman, 24th May 2017.

[67] Sylvia Rognvik, Women, Peace and Security Specialist, UN Women, interview conducted by Nadine Sayegh, Amman, Jordan (27 April, 2017), Farah Mesmar, MENA Regional Advocacy Advisor, Kvinna till Kvinna, interview conducted by Nadine Sayegh, Amman, Jordan (8 June, 2017).

[68] Neven Bondokji, *A Journey Mapping of Jordanian Fighters* (Amman: The WANA Institute, 2017)

[69] The WANA Institute conducted previous research that found that the gender variation in drivers of radicalisation including the religious duty of women, seeking alternatives (between jihad and self-destruction), and revenge, which is applicable to mainly Syrian women that have lost someone in the war. Bondokji, et al. *Trapped Between Destructive Choices* (Amman: The WANA Institute, 2017), 9, available at http://wanainstitute.org/en/publication/trapped-between-destructive-choices-radicalisation-drivers-affecting-youth-jordan.

3. Actor-Specific Challenges Affecting Human Security in Jordan

This section attempts to isolate variables affecting different actors in the development sector. This includes power-holders such as government and donors, as well as recipients and civil society partners. The variables are isolated but have clear relations with one another. This indicates, once again, that an inclusive and cohesive effort is needed to resolve this issues – and that this effort must include all relevant parties.

3.1 Beneficiary Disengagement

Anecdotal accounts suggest that beneficiaries only show interest in projects — including P/CVE projects — if they are incentivised through food and transportation allowances.[70] Agencies compensating beneficiaries for their time is not an unusual concept in the Middle East, however participants suggested that beneficiaries are becoming more 'demanding', especially if a large donor is funding the project.[71] While it is understood by involved parties that there indeed must be an exchange between agencies and beneficiaries, encompassed in a financial exchange, this approach is under duress.

Moreover, when the project has a political dimension, participation is lower and the required incentives are higher.[72] **That beneficiaries are less interested in working towards a social impact may be indicative of what some practitioners see to be a slump in the culture of volunteerism and community engagement**.[73] Such apathy can also be driven by programmatic failures. A project manager at MercyCorps provided the example of a gravely mismanaged intervention conducted by another agency in Irbid, which carried over in the form of scepticism and disinterest when MercyCorps attempted to engage in a similar sector.[74]

3.2 De-contextualised Programme Design

Participants argued that many projects are structured in a 'top-down' manner whereby an intervention is pre-designed,[75] sometimes by individuals outside of Jordan.[76] Disconnection from

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[70] Participant at Focus Group Discussion, Amman, 24th May 2017, Safiyyeh Abdurahim Mohammed, Project Manager, Family Development Association, interview conducted by Barik Mhadeen and Nadine Sayegh, Amman, Jordan (15 June, 2017), Saddam Sayyaleh, Fellow at International Youth Foundation (founder at iLearn JO), interview conducted by Nadine Sayegh, Amman, Jordan (23 April, 2017).

[71] Participant at Focus Group Discussion, Amman, 24th May 2017.

[72] Ibid.

[73] Saddam Sayyaleh, Fellow at International Youth Foundation (founder at iLearn JO), interview conducted by Nadine Sayegh, Amman, Jordan (23 April, 2017), Mohammed Noor Khrais, Counter Violent Extremism Officer, UN Development Programme, interview conducted by Nadine Sayegh, Amman, Jordan (23 April, 2017), Participant at Focus Group Discussion, Amman, 24th May 2017.

[74] Zaid Hatokay, Leadership and Community Development Project Manager at MercyCorps, interview conducted by Nadine Sayegh, Amman, Jordan (30 May, 2017).

[75] Farah Mesmar, MENA Regional Advocacy Advisor, Kvinna till Kvinna, interview conducted by Nadine Sayegh, Amman, Jordan (8 June, 2017), Morad al-Qadi, Consultant Leading Youth Empowerment and Civic Engagement Program at Anonymous International NGO, interview conducted by Nadine Sayegh, Amman, Jordan (31 May, 2017), Safiyyeh Abdurahim Mohammed, Project Manager, Family Development Association, interview conducted by Barik Mhadeen and Nadine Sayegh, Amman, Jordan (15 June, 2017), Participant at Focus Group Discussion, Amman, 24th May 2017.

the needs and context of a community[77] not only reduces the efficiency of a human security initiative,**[78]** but compounds narratives of external interventionism and disenfranchisement. Some argue that the humanitarian sector is plagued by a sequence of buzzwords into which donors direct their money,[79] thereby vesting the human security agenda in externals rather and eroding its localised raison d'etre.[80] **There is no doubt that such exercise of soft power is having negative impacts on multiple levels, including causing divisions in society that may not have come into being otherwise.** Trends in donor funding towards refugee populations and the knock on impacts for social cohesion and 'otherisation', is a salient example.[81]

A further concern raised was the short-term lifecycles of interventions. When a food support project in Ma'an was discontinued at the end of the grant period, those who were genuinely dependent felt betrayed and contested the perfunctory manner in which decisions were made.[82] Beneficiaries noted that the food security project, providing basic goods such as rice and sugar, had been withdrawn and was not subject to renewal, leaving poor locals in an overall worse situation. Another example is the inception of waste-management programmes introduced as part of the refugee response. For locals, waste management is a long-term and pressing concern. There are genuine concerns that addressing the problem under the rubric of refugee management will result in only 'Band-Aid' solutions, thus leaving locals with an intensified problem with no tangible solution when refugees depart.[83]

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[76] Khalid Qubajah, National Project Coordinator at UN Industrial Development Organization, interview conducted by Nadine Sayegh, Amman, Jordan (6 June, 2017).

[77] Farah Mesmar, MENA Regional Advocacy Advisor, Kvinna till Kvinna, interview conducted by Nadine Sayegh, Amman, Jordan (8 June, 2017).

[78] Saddam Sayyaleh, Fellow at International Youth Foundation (founder at iLearn JO), interview conducted by Nadine Sayegh, Amman, Jordan (23 April, 2017).
In the case of larger organisations, much of the staff consists of foreigners, more particularly Westerners. While it is thorough and pragmatic to have outside perspectives on local matters, it can be a hindrance to work due to misunderstanding of cultural nuances, even as simple as language barriers. **It also deprives locals of employment opportunities, and in a bleak economic climate, may cause resentment.** For more see Ann Simmons, "Jordanians Seize 'Shark Tank'-Like Opportunity Amid Competition From Syrian Refugees For Work", *Latimes.Com*, 2017, http://www.latimes.com/world/global-development/la-fg-global-jordanian-shark-tank-snap-story.html. See also "Kingdom Incurs More Than $12B As Indirect Cost Of Refugee Crisis — Study", *Jordan Times*, 2016, available at http://www.jordantimes.com/news/local/kingdom-incurs-more-12b-indirect-cost-refugee-crisis-%E2%80%94-study.

[79] Morad al-Qadi, Consultant Leading Youth Empowerment and Civic Engagement Program at Anonymous International NGO, interview conducted by Nadine Sayegh, Amman, Jordan (31 May, 2017).

[80] Dr Amer Bani Amer, General Director at Rased, Al Hayat Center, interview conducted by Nadine Sayegh, Amman, Jordan (4 June, 2017), several participants at Focus Group Discussion, Amman, 24th May 2017.

[81] Participant at Focus Group Discussion, Amman, 24th May 2017. This point was also raised by Khalid Qubajah, National Project Coordinator at UN Industrial Development Organization, interview conducted by Nadine Sayegh, Amman, Jordan (6 June, 2017), Amane al-Diri, Executive Assistant and Ahmad Siam, Director at National Society for Human Rights, interview conducted by Barik Mhadeen and Nadine Sayegh, Amman, Jordan (June 5, 2017), Saddam Sayyaleh, Fellow at International Youth Foundation (founder at iLearn JO), interview conducted by Nadine Sayegh, Amman, Jordan (23 April, 2017), Lana Kreishan, Director at Annwar Charitable Association, interview conducted by Neven Bondokji and Nadine Sayegh, Amman, Jordan (12 April, 2017), Aysha Khilfa, Director at Khawla Bint al-Azwar, interview conducted by Barik Mhadeen and Nadine Sayegh, Zarqa, Jordan (April 19, 2017), Morad al-Qadi, Consultant Leading Youth Empowerment and Civic Engagement Program at Anonymous International NGO, interview conducted by Nadine Sayegh, Amman, Jordan (31 May, 2017).

[82] Lana Kreishan, Director at Annwar Charitable Association, interview conducted by Neven Bondokji and Nadine Sayegh, Amman, Jordan (12 April, 2017).

[83] Mohammed Noor Khrais, Counter Violent Extremism Officer, UN Development Programme, interview conducted by Nadine Sayegh, Amman, Jordan (23 April, 2017).

3.3 Weak Civil Society

While the P/CVE literature highlights the important role of civil society organisations in crafting intervention that are sensitive to local needs and can impact hard-to-reach groups, the reach and strength of CBOs in Jordan is generally understood to be poor.[84] The underlying drivers of such weakness, however, are conceptualised differently by CBOs and **more established agencies.**

CBOs lamented chronic lack of funding,[85] reduced donor engagement in initiatives targeting local communities since 2014, as well as rent hikes and increased operational costs.[86] Such constraints have **limited the ability of CBOs to respond protectively and innovatively to community challenges**. Fuelling this frustration was the fact that some projects targeted non-priorities, particularly in reference to private donors, including building tribal halls and mosques.[87] Others argued that CBOs did not have the capacity to understand or adhere to the regulations attached to donor funding mechanisms, leaving the programming space only accessible to INGOs.[88] Such requirements include the in-depth nature of technical proposals, onerous reporting requirements, book-keeping and audits. CBOs argued that their lack of capacity to meet such standards is often misinterpreted as being indicative of corruption**.**

International agencies perceived these difficulties in a different light. A programme officer at UNDP highlighted that, for some CBOs, the Syrian crisis is viewed as a financial opportunity, and that many grassroots organisations lack the skills and strength to work with large agencies or the government.[89] Corruption was another factor cited as hindering local human security programming.[90] CBOs must increase their work standards, increase transparency and accountability but need capacity building to achieve this.[91]

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[84] Stahl and Wilton, "The Future Of Countering Violent Extremism", (MSc, New York University, 2017). For more, see "Snapshot of Civil Society in Jordan", *Civicus*, 2015, available at http://www.civicus.org/images/Snapshot_of_CS_in_Jordan.pdf.

[85] Lana Kreishan, Director at Annwar Charitable Association, interview conducted by Neven Bondokji and Nadine Sayegh, Amman, Jordan (12 April, 2017), Aysha Khilfa, Director at Khawla Bint al-Azwar, interview conducted by Barik Mhadeen and Nadine Sayegh, Zarqa, Jordan (April 19, 2017), Amane al-Diri, Executive Assistant and Ahmad Siam, Director at National Society for Human Rights, interview conducted by Barik Mhadeen and Nadine Sayegh, Amman, Jordan (June 5, 2017), Saddam Sayyaleh, Fellow at International Youth Foundation (founder at iLearn JO), interview conducted by Nadine Sayegh, Amman, Jordan (23 April, 2017), Safiyyeh Abdurahim Mohammed, Project Manager, Family Development Association, interview conducted by Barik Mhadeen and Nadine Sayegh, Amman, Jordan (15 June, 2017), also raised by participant at Focus Group Discussion, Amman, 24th May 2017; Hussam Tarawneh, Director of Karak Creativity Club, interview conducted by Barik Mhadeen, Amman, Jordan (5 June, 2017).

[86] Aysha Khilfa, Director at Khawla Bint al-Azwar, interview conducted by Barik Mhadeen and Nadine Sayegh, Zarqa, Jordan (April 19, 2017)

[87] Ibid.

[88] Safiyyeh Abdurahim Mohammed, Project Manager, Family Development Association, interview conducted by Barik Mhadeen and Nadine Sayegh, Amman, Jordan (15 June, 2017), Hussam Tarawneh, Director of Karak Creativity Club, interview conducted by Barik Mhadeen, Amman, Jordan (5 June, 2017), Participant at Focus Group Discussion, Amman, 24th May 2017.

[89] Mohammed Noor Khrais, Counter Violent Extremism Officer, UN Development Programme, interview conducted by Nadine Sayegh, Amman, Jordan (23 April, 2017); Khalid Qubajah, National Project Coordinator at UN Industrial Development Organization, interview conducted by Nadine Sayegh, Amman, Jordan (6 June, 2017).

[90] Hussam Tarawneh, Director of Karak Creativity Club, interview conducted by Barik Mhadeen, Amman, Jordan (5 June, 2017), Mohammed Noor Khrais, Counter Violent Extremism Officer, UN Development Programme, interview conducted by Nadine Sayegh, Amman, Jordan (23 April 2017), Dr Amer Bani Amer, General Director at Rased, Al Hayat Center, interview conducted by Nadine Sayegh, Amman, Jordan (4 June 2017), Participants at Focus Group Discussion, Amman, 24 May 2017.

[91] Dr Amer Bani Amer, General Director Rased, Al Hayat Center, interview by Nadine Sayegh, Amman, Jordan (4 June 2017).

3.4 Government Barriers

The government is instrumental in the volume and quality of human security programming. It provides approvals, provides oversight and exerts influence over funding flows.[92] Some note that bureaucracy obstructs effective programming,[93] including the length of time involved in obtaining the necessary approvals to implement. One interviewee cited an initiative promoting female inclusivity in the governorate elections held in August 2017. Despite applying early in the year, approvals were obtained in late May; this delay meant that only a handful of activities were conducted, undermining the overall impact.[94] Others protested the system of funds being channelled through the Ministry of Planning and International Cooperation, which causes delays and opens up opportunities for corruption.[95] International agencies, by contrast, felt that communication channels with the government were improving and streamlining had contributed to improvements.[96] **This may be indicative of power disparities between stakeholders working on human security programming in Jordan, whereby UN bodies and INGOs enjoy strong leverage compared to local CBOs.** The influence of security apparatus in human security programming is also evident. Indeed, private donors refuse to fund any P/CVE efforts or radicalisation themed interventions because they fear increased security 'observation'.[97]

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[92] A sample of interviewees cited that the Ministry of Planning, Investment, and Economic Development as a cause of project delay. However this extends to reach the Ministry of Labour, Ministry of Political and Parliamentary Affairs, and Ministry of Youth have delayed response times.

[93] Mohammed Noor Khrais, Counter Violent Extremism Officer, UN Development Programme, interview conducted by Nadine Sayegh, Amman, Jordan (23 April, 2017), Sylvia Rognvik, Women, Peace and Security Specialist at UNWomen, interview conducted by Nadine Sayegh, Amman, Jordan (27 April, 2017), Paul Fean, Youth Project Manager at Norwegian Refugee Council, interview conducted by Nadine Sayegh, Amman, Jordan (27 April, 2017), Zaid Hatokay, Leadership and Community Development Project Manager at MercyCorps, interview conducted by Nadine Sayegh, Amman, Jordan (30 May, 2017).

[94] Farah Mesmar, MENA Regional Advocacy Advisor, Kvinna till Kvinna, interview conducted by Nadine Sayegh, Amman, Jordan (8 June, 2017).

[95] Dr Amer Bani Amer, General Director at Rased, Al Hayat Center, interview conducted by Nadine Sayegh, Amman, Jordan (4 June, 2017); Amane al-Diri, Executive Assistant and Ahmad Siam, Director at National Society for Human Rights, interview conducted by Barik Mhadeen and Nadine Sayegh, Amman, Jordan (June 5, 2017).

[96] Mohammed Noor Khrais, Counter Violent Extremism Officer, UN Development Programme, interview conducted by Nadine Sayegh, Amman, Jordan (23 April, 2017), Sylvia Rognvik, Women, Peace and Security Specialist at UNWomen, interview conducted by Nadine Sayegh, Amman, Jordan (27 April, 2017), Paul Fean, Youth Project Manager at Norwegian Refugee Council, interview conducted by Nadine Sayegh, Amman, Jordan (27 April, 2017), Zaid Hatokay, Leadership and Community Development Project Manager at MercyCorps, interview conducted by Nadine Sayegh, Amman, Jordan (30 May, 2017).

[97] A Head of a local CBO in Salt, in a Focus Group Discussion with the WANA Institute, Salt, on January 5th 2017.

4.   Theory of Change

Theory of Change (ToC) is a framework for identifying the particular activities and processes needed to generate a lasting positive impact,[98] by mapping out causal relationships and highlighting barriers that need to be overcome. The ToC developed here is intended to guide practitioners and policy makers on how P/CVE projects can be integrated into the paradigm of human security programmes in Jordan. A key conclusion of this research is that **P/CVE efforts need to be perceived and funded as long-term development and human security goals.** Donor and government perceptions of P/CVE programming must hence be realigned and placed within the human security paradigm rather than existing alongside it.

Figure 1 captures the reimagined relation between the three priority thematic areas (refugee and host communities, youth, and gender) as identified by interviewed practitioners. The key challenges for each of these areas are first identified. In the next level, necessary changes in programme design and implementation are explained. These are described as processes due to the imperative of cooperation by key stakeholders in realising the changes. These processes will lead to mid-term outcomes that positively enhance the ability of youth, women and host communities to contribute to and engage in P/CVE efforts, while at the same time enhancing their individual and collective human security. On the long-term, the changes will contribute to a more integrated human security and P/CVE approach.

The relation between challenges, processes, and mid-term outcomes represents a network of influences. These relations are not limited to causal and linear processes. Instead, the web of relations, impacts, and contributions across the three thematic areas are inter-changeable with strong cross-influences. Programmatic changes in the youth sector, for example, cannot be implemented in isolation other necessary changes at the community level, or in women empowerment. The same also applies to the changes needed to achieve longer-term objectives. For example, creating local support networks for women on gender-based violence will gradually promote women as active stakeholders in P/CVE programming.

It is important to note that most challenges are transboundary in that they affect all three actors but with different degrees of impact. For example, streamlining the approval process for projects is the government's responsibility but ultimately affects all actors. Similarly, longer-frame project design is mainly a concern for UN agencies and INGOs, but has knock-on effects for CBOs. These complex relations, captured in the ToC in Figure 1, are also reflected in the policy recommendations in the last section.

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[98] Paul Brest, "The Power Of Theories Of Change (SSIR)", *Stanford Social Innovation Review*, 2010, available at https://ssir.org/articles/entry/the_power_of_theories_of_change. See also, "What Is Theory Of Change? | Theory Of Change Community". *Theory Of Change*, 2017, available at http://www.theoryofchange.org/what-is-theory-of-change/.

Figure 1: Theory of Change for an Integrated P/CVE and HS approach

Thematic Challenges

Processes

Mid-term Outcomes

Direct P/CVE Impact

Long-term Outcome

Social Cohesion

- Rise in tensions between host and refugee communities

- Amend donor discriminatory stipulations on direct assistance
- Work alongside local partners to implement contextualised projects
- Create employment opportunities for the local population through donor-funded programmes

- Projects generate tolerance and acceptance of other social groups
- Raising awareness on the economic and development struggles the government is faced with
- Understanding the shared challenges that face local and refugee communities

Reduce "Relative deprivation" among Jordanians

Gender

- Internalised misogyny that limits empowerment efforts
- Limited participation in public space
- Insufficient participation in CVE projects

- Creating community support networks to fight gender-based violence
- Culturally-sensitive economic programmes
- Increased involvement of women in P/CVE

- Active female role models and local leaders
- Enriching experiences for disenfranchised women that improves the human security of their communities

Women are empowered and participate more vocally in communal and CVE efforts

Youth

- Neglected 11-16 years youth demographic
- Youth perceived as a demographic burden
- Rise in petty crime and increase in idle time

- Narrow age brackets during project design to tend to specific needs
- Rejuvenate out-of-use Youth Centres
- Designing programmes to address local priorities such as increase in drug use

- Improve culture of volunteerism
- Decrease resentment towards state and community
- Youth become socially and politically engaged
- Decrease in petty crime thus lowering threshold in committing violent acts

Reduce youth idle time

Integrated Human Security and P/CVE and HS approach

5.   Policy Recommendations

The policy reccomendations below are designed to address the pertinent issues at hand. As such, they are directed towards any stakeholder working or regulating areas of human security. They target work that needs to be done per thematic issue, as well as issues put forward or facing different actors. As such, they may be thought of as interchangeable and may be opted for implementation by multiple stakeholders.

5.1 Refugee and Host Communities

- Local populations should be involved in project implementation, both to create employment and to ensure that local priorities are met.
- Efforts to foster a culture of community service, including through volunteerism and positive action should be actively pursued.
- Project funding should prioritise marginalised, more populous and high unemployment governorates.

5.2 Youth Engagement

- Youth-directed human security programming should be balanced to cater for all age ranges, with special focus on the 10-15 age group.
- Unused youth centres should be transformed into spaces where youth can fill idle time, including as 'one-stop-shops' with community service provision, assistance as well as youth-centric activities.
- Older youth need to be increasingly involved in the political process, including through youth political parties and power decentralisation projects.

5.3 Gender

- The central role of women in P/CVE efforts should inform and guide women empowerment programmes, focused on building relevant capacities.
- The collection of public gender-disaggregated information should be available to feed project design, particularly in the domain of P/CVE.
- Women's networks should be at the centre of engagement processes, both in the human security and P/CVE sector.
- The slow progress being made in women's empowerment needs to be recognised and more impactful strategies need to be designed that better accommodate cultural sensitivities and constraints.

5.4 Beneficiaries

- The negative impacts of incentivising beneficiary participation in human security activities needs to be counterbalanced by efforts to promote volunteerism, community engagement and civic action, alongside projects advocating tolerance, compassion and human dignity.

5.5 Donors

- Donors need to lead the way in promoting P/CVE efforts as integral components of human security programming, including by opening up funding pools and earmarked programmes.

- Donors need to better coordinate with local CBOs in project design to address local challenges such as drug use, create vocational opportunities and create spaces for host and refugee communities to find common ground.

- Local context must be at the centre of project design, particularly in the P/CVE domain. Local stakeholders are best placed to advise on priorities and P/CVE threats and must be consulted from the project design phase.

5.6 Civil Society

- The positioning of civil society in relation to the local community is strong; this platform should be utilised in P/CVE efforts.

- Donors and CBOs need to craft more effective working relationships. Donors need to better contextualise project design, and prioritise sustainable engagement, while CBOs need to streamline, professionalise and eliminate corruption.

5.7 Government

- If P/CVE efforts are to be understood and implemented as a domain of human security programming, mechanisms need to be created to facilitate integrated planning and execution.[99] One option is that the Ministry of Planning and International Cooperation (MoPIC) establish a working committee with representatives from CBOs, UN agencies, INGOs and donors charged with developing a vision for integrated PVE-human security efforts, as well as coordinating actors and assessing impact.

- The government should introduce transparent and well-publicised processes for project funding, approvals and monitoring.

- Anti-corruption measures should be implemented internally and an external non-governmental watchdog should be setup to ensure accountability.

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[99] This question was brought forward by Dr Heballah Taha, Research Associate, IISS Middle East, Expert Meeting for the Research on Challenges to an Integrated CVE and Human Security Approach in Jordan, organised by the WANA Institute, 30th July 2017, Amman.

6.   Conclusion

This research investigated the nature of human security programming in Jordan to understand how strengths and weaknesses contribute to or mitigate the drivers of radicalisation. From this, a Theory of Change for an integrated P/CVE and human security approach in Jordan was developed. The changes required, make for a web of interactions involving three main actors (the government, CBOs and donors), and three areas of thematic focus (refugee and host communities, youth, and gender). It raises a strong case for the vesting of responsibility for better integrated P/CVE-human security programming in a multi-stakeholder body, perhaps chaired by the Ministry of Planning and International Cooperation.

The findings indicate that de-contextualised, short-term projects have contributed to a polarisation of groups, particularly host communities and refugees. Another finding indicates that youth in Jordan are growing increasingly restless. Research participants cited an increase in petty crime and drug use, and there is a palpable gap in activities and support for pre-teens and young teens. Women's disempowerment can be understood less as a threat than a missed opportunity. Their exclusion from public and economic life means that their impact as influencers and agents of change in P/CVE is untapped.

This paper also discussed the major actors in the development sector. Donors need to better consider local context in all stages of a project. To do this, the donor-CBO gap needs to be addressed; the capacity of CBOs needs to be built so that they can meet the requirements to avail of foreign donor funds. The government must also make reforms to establish a cohesive procedural framework; this includes standardised approval processes, and making available better data to inform project design.

As put forward in the ToC, a broader space needs to be carved out to allow agencies to assess targeted points of intervention, specifically, age-appropriate, locally prioritised and culturally-nuanced P/CVE interventions. In this, a re-conceptualised understanding of P/CVE, placed inside the paradigm of human security, is imperative. A more detailed and evidence-based discussion is necessary to devise such a conceptualisation. This paper highlights the potential for such an approach, pathways forward and starting points for rethinking P/CVE on the parts of policy makers, implementing partners, and donors.

Annex I: Interviewed Practitioners

No.	Name	Position	Gender	Governorate	Date of Interview
1	Lana Kreishan	Director, Annwar Charitable Association	Female	Ma'an	12 April 2017
2	Aysha Khilfa	Director, Khawla Bint al-Azwar	Female	Zarqa	19 April 2017
3	Saddam Sayyleh	Founder, iLearn JO, International Youth Foundation	Male	Amman	23 April 2017
4	Mohammad Khrais	Countering Violent Extremism Officer, UN Development Programme	Male	Amman	23 April 2017
5	Sylvia Rognivik	Women, Peace and Security Specialist, UNWomen,	Female	Amman	27 April 2017
6	Nasser Mardini, Ahmad Obeid	Program Officer, Senior Program Officer, National Democratic Institute	Male, Male	Amman	27 April 2017
7	Dr Paul Fean	Youth Project Manager, Norwegian Refugee Council	Male	Amman	27 April 2017
8	Zaid Hatokay	Leadership and Community Development Manager, MercyCorps	Male	Amman	30 May 2017
9	Morad al-Qadi	Consultant, Anonymous International NGO	Male	Amman	31 May 2017
10	Dr Amer Bani Amer	General Director, Rased, Al Hayat Centre	Male	Amman	4 June 2017
11	Hussam Tarawneh	Director, Karak Creativity Club	Male	Karak	5 June 2017
12	Amane al-Diri, Ahmad Siam	Executive Assistant, Director, National Society for Human Rights	Female, Male	Amman	6 June 2017
13	Khalid Qubajah	National Project Coordinator	Male	Amman	6 June 2017
14	Farah Mesmar	MENA Regional Advocacy Officer, Kvinna till Kvinna	Female	Amman	8 June 2017
15	Safiyyeh Abdurahim Mohammed	Project Manager, Family Development Association	Female	Amman	15 June 2017

Annex II: Interview Questions

1. In your experience, what has been the biggest obstacle to your work on (*change according to interviewee based on human security pillar*)?
2. With the rise of radicalisation concerns, there are arguments that security policies limit the scope and reach of human security programmes. How accurate is this view reflecting on your work in Jordan?
3. How can the political restrictions on your work contribute to the rise of radicalisation in your community?
4. How has funding to your area of work changed in the last few years? Is this change affected by shift of funds to P/CVE efforts?
5. How can the obstacles you face in your work exacerbate radicalisation drivers in Jordan?
6. How does your work on (*change according to interviewee based on human security pillar*) contribute to P/CVE efforts?
7. Aside from state-intervention, what is the biggest barrier to human security in Jordan?
8. How has the refugee crisis affected human security and how has it affected the potential of radicalisation?

Annex III: Participants in the Focus Group Discussion

Date: 24 May 2017

Location: Royal Scientific Society, Amman

Name	Organisation	Gender
Ghada Saba	Saba Hamlet NGO	Female
Iyad Jaber	iDare	Male
Rasha Saleem	Search for Common Ground	Female
Dr Mahmoud Shammari	Arab Centre for Human Rights and International Peace	Male
Mohammad Malkawi	Al-Ofoq Centre for Development and Dialogue	Male
Dr Mahmoud Olaymat	Jordan Association for Development and Political Awareness	Male
Buthaina Zoubi	Basmet al-Khair Charity Assocition	Female
Atika Salameh	Sama al-Badeya Charity Association	Female
Farah Mesmar	Kvinna till Kvinna	Female
Ahmad Obeidat	Centre for Higher Education	Male

Annex IV: Modules of Focus Group Discussion

1. Some interviewees have raised the issue of 'donor fatigue' with regards to funding for human security programmes. Is this statement accurate? If so, why do you think this is?

2. Have volunteers or beneficiaries of programmes become more reluctant to participate in activities, i.e need further incentive (monetary)?

3. With the refugee population continuing to enter and settling across Jordan – have there been any issues in your work with regards to social cohesion? Are groups resenting one another, for example?

4. We have understood that the role of women plays a large role in radicalisation and de-radicalisation. For those working with women, is there freedom to discuss such topics? If yes, has there been further interest, if no, why not?

5. A large programming gap has been identified by a couple of participants with regards to youth. Many feel the age group between 11 and 16 is most neglected and are also the most vulnerable. How accurate is this statement? Is any deviant behaviour seen in this age group?

6. In your work, have you been subject to any red tape by the authorities? Have any bodies attempted to prevent certain programmes?

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