Four Syrian Futures

The conflict raging in Syria shows no sign of abating; it is plagued with too many actors and too many interests at odds with peace. Nonetheless, preparing for even the ugliest of calms is vital, not just for Syrians but for the broader West Asia-North Africa region. To aid this process, the West Asia-North Africa Institute has mapped four scenarios under which a post-conflict Syria might be imagined, the challenges, and the implications for populations living in war-torn areas.

1) A Negotiated Opposition Victory

The option largely preferred by the West — a negotiated opposition victory — would require Asad’s immediate or imminent departure. Such a scenario would most likely see interim-joint governance over reunited territory, excluding the semi-autonomous Kurdish region and areas under Daesh (the so-called Islamic State) and non-participant opposition control. However popular, any negotiated settlement faces major obstacles. Opposition groups and in-house government divisions inhibit even internal consensus. More formidably, the two sides’ negotiating terms are mutually exclusive. While the single issue uniting the opposition is that Asad must go, the President has made it clear that his power is one aspect of Syria he is unwilling to sacrifice. One man’s stubbornness should pose less of an obstacle than the united demand of the entire opposition. But the power and loyalty of Asad’s support structure mean that this is not the case. Instead, external forces hold more sway in Asad’s future, specifically Iran and Russia, whose interests in the region remain inextricably linked to the President.

If negotiations weigh in Iran and Russia’s favour, Asad’s departure need not involve extensive infrastructural changes. An opposition-favoured settlement, by contrast, would require complete institutional overhaul. Any settlement would necessarily exclude hardliners such as Daesh and Jabhat al-Nusra, but would rely on the participation of armed opposition groups in future state building — they are the force behind opposition leverage and exercise, albeit limited, governance functions in rebel-held territories. The predominance of such groups — many of which are Islamist extremists with unknown intentions¹  — suggests that an opposition-led Syria would look very different from its secular past. In either case, parties excluded from the settlement would actively challenge reconstruction. Maintaining stability would likely require long-term international involvement, and deep divisions would make a swift or blood-free reconstruction improbable.

2) A Military Opposition Victory

Prospects for an opposition military victory gained momentum following the cooperative relationship that formed earlier this year between regional Sunni powers Saudi Arabia, Turkey and Qatar. In particular, Saudi acquiescence to Qatar’s support for Islamist groups in Syria enabled the powerful coalition Jaysh al-Fatah and its impressive battlefield successes. Such an outlook has arguably faded in the context of a post-nuclear deal Iran, waning international support for opposition, and Russia’s intensified involvement on Asad’s behalf.

In any case, a violent rebel victory worsens Syria’s prospects for long-term peace. Efforts to empower Syria’s moderate opposition have not translated to efficacy, and the composition of more powerful coalitions is worrisome. A coalition of victors, near-certain to include not only Ahrar al-Sham but al-Qaeda affiliate Jabhat al-Nusra, is unlikely to prioritise the protection, let alone inclusion, of Syria’s non-Sunnis. Proponents of coordination with al-Nusra note the group’s deep nationalism, pragmatism and overtures towards relative moderation. The bar against which al-Nusra is measured, however, is very low. The group has forced Druze conversion, perpetrated violence against Christians, and threatened Alawis. This bodes poorly for hundreds of thousands in Damascus, Latakia and other government-held territories.

3) A Balkanised Syria with an Asad Statelet

As discussed above, Russian escalations in Syria and the Iran nuclear deal may have extended Asad’s lifeline. Against this backdrop, the Zabadani ceasefire brokered by Iran and Turkey may have lit a dim path towards broader calm within a Balkanised Syrian state. This scenario would see a partitioning of government and opposition territories, with separate Kurdish and Daesh-held areas. While the ceasefire may not last, that it was brokered is remarkable. Between its brutal aerial assaults and encouragement of Islamists least likely to compromise, the government has done little to incentivise negotiations. But in doing so, Asad has ruthlessly created conditions for his own endurance; compared to Daesh, Asad is now frequently considered Syria’s lesser evil.

A partitioned Syria risks consolidating sectarian identities and, as demonstrated in the Balkans, is not conducive to lasting peace. A further obstacle is the Asad government itself; prolonging the President’s legacy risks accelerating violent extremism within Syria and beyond. However, there are advantages to a future Syria that includes Asad. While opposition territories will face major logistical challenges, the state has functioning institutions. Moreover, the presence of high-level Sunnis in government ranks and relative pluralism in Damascus indicate a limit to sectarianism. For the secular and minority Syrians fearful of living under Islamist rule, Asad is the safest option.

4) An Expanded Daesh Territory

An expansion of Daesh territory — either militarily or from opposition groups shifting allegiances —would see the imposition of harsh Islamist rule over civilian populations. Despite the 63-member coalition’s efforts to “degrade and destroy Daesh”, the organisation holds large swaths of territory across Iraq and Syria home to some 6 million people. The longer the coalition takes to effectively respond, the more time Daesh has to normalise its presence on the ground. However, the coalition has limited means to combat Daesh’s simplest path of expansion: a reinvigorated Asad government may encourage Syria’s Islamist rebels into their own calculation of lesser evils. Currently, Daesh promotes itself as a defender of Sunnis in Iraq and Syria. If the Sunni opposition’s only real alternative is the hand at which they have suffered barrel bombs, mass disappearances, and chemical weapons, the non-Asad option holds a certain appeal. Moreover, in light of its comprehensive vision for an Islamist caliphate, Daesh is the belligerent most committed to the labour-intensive elements of reconstruction and such efforts are paying off. The group’s capacity to implement rule of law and provide services are attracting those weary of conflict. Displaced Sunnis can choose between uncertain reception in government territory, crime-ridden and corrupt opposition areas, or welcoming and predictable, if brutal, governance under Daesh. This stability calculus is not limited to internally displaced Syrians; as conditions in host states deteriorate, it may apply to returning refugees as well.

Any Syrian Future

As underscored by Russia’s recent intervention, the situation on the ground in Syria is fluid and dynamic; potential Syrian outcomes could look very different a month from now. But understanding these possibilities and their implications highlights reconstruction challenges facing every Syrian future. Planning must reflect these realities. Rather than fixating on an ideal but illusory solution, actors should work to design broad-ranging and highly adaptable contingency plans for the options available. If aspirations for a moral high ground obstruct development of the best outcome conditions permit, the high ground has lost its morality.

¹ The opposition’s largest militant group, Ahrar al-Sham, recently launched a media campaign promising to fight for a ‘moderate Syria.’ Despite this rhetoric, Ahrar is classified as extremist “just shy of al-Qaeda” and has close links to the terrorist organisation. Zahran Alloush, leader of Jaysh al-Islam, projects similar ambiguity, promising protections for minorities despite concerning comments regarding Syria’s Alawis.