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Forging New Strategies in Protracted Refugee Crises
Forging New Strategies in Protracted Refugee Crises
The civil conflict in Syria poses the most complex and immediate humanitarian challenge to the West Asia-North Africa (WANA) region. Over half of the Syrian population has been forcibly displaced. Approximately 630,000 Syrians have registered with UNHCR in Jordan; this number may be closer to 1.4 million if non-registered and pre-existing migrant workers are considered. As the crisis enters its fifth year, the resolve of international donors and the capacity of humanitarian agencies are being tested. The Jordan Response Plan has received approximately 34 percent of its required funding, while only 20 percent of UNHCR’s US$289 million 2015 appeal has been met. As refugees arrive en masse in Europe, commentators are increasingly asking what went wrong and how might the situation be righted?
Unfortunately, this story is not without precedent. The Afghan, Iraqi and Palestinian refugee crises each evolved into protracted displacement scenarios posing long-term challenges for host states, donors and the wider region. The situation must also be placed within the context of broader failings in international refugee policy. Because the vast majority of refugees seek protection in neighbouring, developing states, refugee management usually exists as a partnership. In the words of Oxford University Professors Paul Collier and Alexander Betts: “[d]onors write cheques to support humanitarian relief and host countries of first asylum are expected to provide the territory on the refugees are hosted.” In practice, however, a lack of binding rules on burden sharing to balance the peremptory norm of non-refoulement means that this model creates inequalities.
Another way of conceptualising the situation is as host states providing a global public good. Like other public goods, some states are able to ‘free ride’ on refugee protection by host countries, but not share in the associated burdens. Today, this is manifesting in a ‘north-south impasse’, whereby wealthy developed states (predominantly in the so-called ‘global north’) are inclined to scale-back aid once the urgency of an emergency situation has worn off. Host states (in the so-called ‘global south’) are left to struggle on alone as the crisis becomes more entrenched.
It is clear that protection-centric approaches, rooted in the notion of host states acting as good international citizens, are insufficient. Countries such as Jordan are conspicuously aware of the importance of offering shelter to individuals fleeing conflict – it is a bedrock principle of the Hashemite tradition that has exercised for more than 65 years. But they need more and better options to encourage them to keep their borders open. Phrased another way, if refugees are unable to return home, and the international community is unwilling to host them in large numbers or finance the cost of hosting over the long-term, then states must be offered solutions that work for, or are at minimum not contrary to their national interest.
In the case of Jordan, these interests include maintaining security, offsetting the costs borne by the government and other sectors, and ensuring that existing economic challenges are not exacerbated. Moreover, if the starting point is host state interest, refugee management must be approached through a lens of temporary protection followed by eventual repatriation. Jordan’s economic and demographic profile means that long-term integration is not a policy option, save in exceptional circumstances. From a practical standpoint, this is also the most likely scenario. Statistically, conflicts in middle-income countries (like pre-war Syria) do not last much longer than a decade and the Syrian conflict is now in its fifth year. The evidence is that a minority of refugees locally integrate, and even fewer are resettled; the vast majority return. This is also consistent with the aspirations of the displaced; data indicates that refugees overwhelmingly preference returning to Syria when security conditions improve.
There might even be scenarios under which a large refugee population can contribute to national interests. It is often taken for granted that refugees are, by definition, dependent on the host state and international humanitarian aid, which in turn drives the perception of them as a burden. But this narrative of dependency is not necessarily accurate or inevitable. While all require protection, and some do need comprehensive support, refugee communities also bring with them a diversity of education, wealth, skills and expertise and entrepreneurship. The question thus becomes: how might host states raise policies to mitigate the negative impacts associated with refugee hosting, whilst simultaneously supporting long-term security and economic policy goals?
Over the past two decades, Jordan’s economic strategy has been to invest in a strong education sector geared towards technology-driven innovation. Having become caught in what is known as a ‘middle income trap’, economists have proffered the establishment of large-scale manufacturing. Significant progress has been made; economic and industrial zones have been set up throughout the country, complemented by investment-friendly policies and a clear legislative and regulatory framework. There are still, however, obstacles to overcoming the entry barriers to global trade markets. Jordan must compete, for example, with Asia, which enjoys stability, uninterrupted coastlines, plentiful natural resources and a large, low-cost labour force. Jordan cannot do much to improve its geographic market access, the stability of its neighbours, or its natural resource base. It needs something more, or something different, to generate the conditions to establish a manufacturing cluster. But Jordan does have two important assets. First, the country represents a beacon of stability in an undeniably unfriendly neighbourhood. The strategic importance of this, both to the region and the West, should not be understated. There are great incentives in play to promote Jordan’s stability, and these include investing in its economic potential. Second, as inferred above, Jordan is providing a global public good in terms of refugee hosting. No country wants to see refugees suffering; donor governments do not, however, want to have refugees on their soil in large numbers.
From a humanitarian perspective, this state of affairs is highly disconcerting. But it does bode well for Jordan breaking into and establishing a manufacturing cluster. A principal reason attributed to the under-utilisation of some of Jordan’s development areas is the lack of complementarity between the labour force required and local labour market dynamics. The refugee population constitutes an immediately available, affordable and appropriate skilled set of workers. UNHCR registration data indicates at least 21,208 Syrian refugee builders and the ILO has identified that around 25 percent of refugees residing outside of camps are working in the construction industry.
Would this overcome the issues of neighbourhood, natural resources and market access for businesses to invest in Jordan? The answer is possibly yes, if it was perceived as a sufficiently good profit opportunity. Returning to the idea of Jordan providing a global public good, there may be a strong market for the sale of ‘safe’ products – products that are manufactured by refugees, therefore providing them with a livelihood while they are sheltering from conflict. Effective marketing would capitalise on consumers’ complex feelings towards refugees – their desire to assist, but at the same time not wanting to host them at the same rates as countries like Jordan. Investing in Jordan may also be seen as a profit opportunity to companies looking to position themselves prior to a reconstruction boom in a post-conflict Syria, or for companies forced to leave Syria and that wish to resume operations.
If such incentives were still not sufficient to encourage firms to establish operations in Jordan, other vested stakeholders might be encouraged to play a role. Donor governments need to address the humanitarian situation, but would prefer for this to be in the form of something more constructive and sustainable than continuing aid. As part of a renegotiated aid package, they might offer more attractive free trade or market access agreements, increasing the appeal of Jordan to investors. Europe, which is battling its own refugee crisis, is the obvious stakeholder in this regard.
International financial institutions – the World Bank and International Monetary Fund – might also provide assistance through loans to offset manufacturing development or subsidise plant establishment. Accessing such loans and development assistance has long been problematic for Jordan due to its middle-income status. There is increasing recognition among donors, however, of links between development support for peace-building and post-conflict peace maintenance. It is empirically well established that conflicts reoccur at alarming regularity; around 40 percent of countries relapse into conflict within a decade. Conflict economists, however, have positively linked a lower risk of post-conflict relapse to sustained economic recovery in the years immediately following a cessation of hostilities. Efforts to foster a post-conflict Syrian economy, including by supporting the establishment of industrial and manufacturing plants that could easily and quickly decant into Syria with a trained workforce of repatriating refugees, is thus likely to be seen as strategic investment. It is important to highlight what this means for host states in terms of broader manifestations of regional instability. Like with conflict recidivism, it is well known that civil war in an adjacent country increases the probability of conflict outbreak domestically: according to the UN Economic and Social Council for West Asia “conflicts cluster geographically, possibly suggesting a diffusion mechanism or a spatial contagion effect”. In constructive terms, this means that all states in the region have a vested interest in supporting an economic stable Syria.
While the economics of the situation may appear simple, there are still important questions to be answered. First, how can such a strategy be reconciled with the imperative of creating jobs for Jordanians? In fact, this scheme would create jobs for both Syrians and Jordanians. Moreover, manufacturing and industrial opportunities would establish new white-collar positions — the kinds of jobs to which Jordanian workers are more likely to aspire. Such opportunities might hence begin to address a longstanding tension in the Jordanian economy: the disconnect between the skills sets and ambitions of the bourgeoning youth population, and the number and type of available jobs. It must also be recognised that Syrians are currently operating in the informal labour market. Providing a means to transfer to the formal labour market responds to the externalities stemming from a large informal economy, increases worker safety by curtailing opportunities for exploitation, and creates revenues for the government by way of work permits and income tax. Humanitarian agencies might find it more constructive to offset the cost of work permits for refugees rather than provide food and non-food items. Livelihoods opportunities also provide dignity and autonomy, eliminating some of the criticisms associated with food vouchers and direct assistance.
A second question is whether such opportunities would increase the likelihood of Syrians remaining in-country indefinitely, or encourage more to seek refuge. A critical element of the model proposed is that investment would come from so-called ‘footloose industry’. Following a cessation in hostilities, such companies would have the opportunity to expand operations to Syria, taking advantage of a new market and utilising a trained repatriating worker population. Existing plant, however, would remain in Jordan, the country having established itself as a safe and profitable business environment.
The viability of this model is time-bound. It is contingent on investors identifying a marketing opportunity in the refugee hosting situation, and greatly compromised if refugees return, or another country, such as Lebanon, seeks to exploit the same idea. There is also a time limit concerning the requisite support of external parties; as European authorities begin to formulate policies to address their own migrant crisis, models such as this should be at the forefront of their thinking.
One might then ask, why has Jordan, or another host state, not acted faster? A key issue is how refugee management is currently conceptualised. As stressed at the beginning of this article, there is an inadequate balancing of the obligations of host states against that of other stakeholders. The right to seek refuge and to be protected against refoulement is enshrined in international law, however reciprocal obligations to ease the burden this creates in host states are not. Hosts are well aware of these inequities, and are increasingly hesitant to adopt liberal approaches without greater assurance that they will not be left to foot the bill over the long-term.
New refugee management approaches need to be elaborated and a constructive place to start is the needs and interests of host states, or at least a better balancing of protection with host state imperatives. This nuance is important. In too many displacement situations, an over-emphasis on protection quickly descends into an exercise of boxing ring-type posturing between the host state and humanitarian agencies. Where it is perceived that priorities are not being met, both sides fall back on the only tools they have: financial resources on the part of donors, and a tightening of restrictions on the part of hosts.
Admittedly, the idea that refugee actors should move towards a ‘host state interest’ approach is imbued with risk. Protection is vital and it is UNHCR’s role to maintain this advocacy standpoint. But livelihoods and autonomy are also important and there need to be actors – within UNHCR or in other agencies – investigating, evaluating and proposing these options in a timely manner. This should not be construed as ruthless capitalisation on a vulnerable population. It should be understood as a necessary transition to more sustainable models for refugee hosting at a time when the frequency, depth and protracted nature of displacement has rendered traditional responses insufficient. When the imperative shifts to how donors can help hosts continue to offer protection, a wider range of options can evolve. The model outlined here is by no means the only alternative; there are many modalities under which refugees can maintain their livelihoods, businesses can continue to operate and the labour force can retain its skill-sets. But such evolution will only be successful if bold and innovative solutions are tried and tested to push the international refugee regime forward. Until this time, refugee entrepreneurialism will represent an opportunity that host states, humanitarian agencies and donors ignore to their detriment.