Part One of a Three Part Retrospective on the Arab Spring: The Arab Transitions: Tunisia and Egypt

The Arab uprisings of 2010-2011, prematurely dubbed the Arab Spring, left violence and conflict in their wake. Yemen, Libya, and Syria face protracted violent conflict, and dangerous non-state actors like al-Qaeda and Daesh, the so-called Islamic State, have risen amidst the chaos. Of the two smoothest transitions in Egypt and Tunisia, Tunisia continues its cautious steps towards functioning democracy while Egypt now looks to be moving further and further away from democratic reform. Understanding the conditions that shaped their respective revolutions can help explain what gave them promise and how Egypt's progress veered off course.

The birthplace of the Arab Spring, Tunisia, is now the Arab nation closest to achieving a functioning democracy and vibrant civil society. Tunisia's “Jasmine Revolution” began in December 2010 when vegetable vendor Muhammad Bouazizi set himself aflame in the streets of Sidi Bouzid. The frustrations and humiliation that set off his dramatic suicide caught fire among the Tunisian people. Massive popular protests spread outwards from Sidi Bouzid, as the Tunisian people protested corruption, political repression and poor living conditions. On 14 January 2011, President Zine El Abidine ben Ali abdicated his 23-year rule and fled to Saudi Arabia.

The Jasmine Revolution surprised analysts because, relative to much of the Arab world, Tunisians were well-off. They had functioning institutions, an active civil society, and a large, educated middle class. But the same conditions that made a Tunisian revolution seem unlikely benefited the population after ben Ali's departure: their government and society proved to be a strong foundation for the steps that lay ahead. Moreover, rather than hastily pushing through an amended constitution before moving on to parliamentary elections, as other Arab nations did, Tunisia built its replacement government cautiously. They first held elections for a temporary 217-member National Constituent Assembly (NCA) in October 2011 that would both govern and draft a new constitution.

The Tunisian political incarnation of the Muslim Brotherhood, Ennahda, won a plurality of the seats in the NCA elections. Their success brought tensions with secular elements, and after two political assassinations of prominent secular opposition leaders in 2013, the strain threatened to dismantle Tunisia's fragile progress. The government overcame internal instability largely due to Ennahda's pragmatism. Widespread protests convinced the Ennahda affiliated prime minister and, later, the party as a whole to resign from government.  While the step cost Ennahda its interim power, the Islamist party showed its commitment to Tunisia's long-term success and democratic ideals.

The Tunisian constitution, which officially entered into force on 10 February 2014, has been internationally lauded as the most modern in the Arab world.  It is the product of compromise between Islamists and liberals, leading to the somewhat vague classification of Tunisia as a Muslim but civil state. However it enshrined the importance of equality between the sexes, a clean environment, and sustainable development in law.  The semi-presidential system comprises a strong parliament and prime minister to counterbalance presidential power. And their zero-percent national threshold means that even the smallest parties can gain representation in parliament.  These measures enable political pluralism and checks and balances upon those in power.

Ennahda has not repeated their electoral success; secular establishment affiliated party Nidaa Tounes won the largest number of seats in October 2014 elections. And Nidaa Tounes candidate, Beji Caid Essebsi, then won the 2014 presidential elections. In conducting a second peaceful election cycle, Tunisia met a major milestone in democratic development. Unfortunately, terrorism has rattled the Mediterranean nation’s progress. Mere weeks separated a massacre at the Bardo National Museum from a second deadly shooting at Sousse beach resort. Since the attack, Essebsi has imposed, and later extended, emergency law along with restrictions on basic rights. 

From Tunisia, the Arab Spring moved across North Africa to Egypt, where the revolutionary protests in Tahrir Square began on 25 January 2011.  Only a few weeks later, President Hosni Mubarak, who had ruled Egypt since 1981, stepped down, ending more than 50 years of military rule. By March 2011, a referendum was hastily pushed through with constitutional changes that would allow for elections to be held quickly.  The rushed transition benefited established religious organisations like the Muslim Brotherhood, and a Brotherhood leader, Muhammad Morsi, was elected president in June 2012.

Morsi’s short time in office was characterised by Islamist reforms, consolidation of power, and inadequate response to the people’s economic demands. When demonstrators voiced widespread dissatisfaction, Egypt’s powerful and popular army stepped in to suspend Morsi’s presidency and the Islamist-backed constitution on 3 July 2013. Rightly or wrongly, Egypt's 50-year legacy of military power, meant that Morsi would serve barely a year as Egypt's president.  Without this history of military political involvement, Morsi may have finished his term.
In 2014, Egypt’s General Sisi won presidential elections in a landslide victory.  Egypt's parliamentary reform law, passed quietly in the flurry over Sisi's election, set up a parliamentary system likely to favor individual establishment/pro-military candidates and discourage the formation of political parties.  Parliamentary elections have not yet been held, and thus, Sisi has been able to act relatively unilaterally. However he has avoided consolidating the presidency's power, instead focusing on enhancing state power on a broader scale by providing courts, security services and the chief prosecutor wide discretion to interpret law. 

The state's actions since Morsi's overthrow: banning of religious political parties, mass-incarcerations and death sentences for hundreds of opposition figures, and persecution of journalists, indicate a reversion towards authoritarianism.  Dropped charges against former President Mubarak, while his Brotherhood replacement’s death sentence was upheld in June, further illustrate this shift. Meanwhile, Sinai-based terrorist violence is rising, and one of the region’s most prominent groups, Ansar Beit al Maqdis has pledged allegiance to Daesh, also known as ISIS.

Two distinctions factor critically in the divergence in outcomes between Tunisia and Egypt. First, although Tunisia's Ennahda was modeled after the Muslim Brotherhood and also succeeded in early elections, the party has demonstrated willingness to compromise, respect political pluralism, and share power. During Morsi's abbreviated time in office, the Muslim Brotherhood consolidated a worrying amount of power. Second, while protest movements shared characteristics of spontaneity, absence of leadership, secularism and non-violence, the role of the military in the aftermath of the uprisings differed drastically. Tunisia's military is small and has a history of being marginalized to prevent coups. Egypt's massive military, on the other hand, is accustomed to extensive political and economic influence and governing through emergency law. These differences did not ensure Tunisia's success, nor necessarily doom Egypt to its regression, but understanding their unique contexts can help explain events since Bouazizi's sacrifice.