Violent Extremism: The Bubble that Keeps on Bursting

The international fight against violent extremism has been marked by cycles of bubble and burst: policy-makers turn a blind eye to structural causes until a violent extremist group emerges and bursts the safety bubble. Only then do governments rush to manage the threat. Yet as new affiliates have regularly risen from the ruins — establishing even stronger and more capable grounds — it is high time to question traditional reactive responses and make way for proactive measures.

The world’s recent battle against Daesh is a clear manifestation of a reactive response. When the group declared its so-called Caliphate in an area straddling Iraq and Syria in 2014, various governments took measures to deal with the threat. A Global Coalition against Daesh, now counting 79 members, was formed in September 2014 with the mission of “degrading and ultimately defeating Daesh” through extensive military campaigns. In addition, a number of governments in the region, including Egypt, Jordan, UAE, and Saudi Arabia, have sought to expand anti-terrorism legislations, establish specialised criminal courts, enact anti-cybercrime laws, and introduce longer sentences.

It is clear now that such reactive measures have produced mixed results. A recent US Defence Department Intelligence figure estimates that between 28,000 and 31,000 Daesh fighters remain in Iraq and Syria, despite having spent USD14.3 billion on over 24,000 airstrikes. The United Nations Counter-Terrorism Executive Directorate (CTED) reports a similar story: of the 14,900 fighters that had left the conflict zones in 2017, only 36 per cent are currently imprisoned, while 46 per cent (6,837) have returned home without entering the criminal justice system.

One Step Behind

A reality-check points to one clear characteristic of reactive responses: they are always one step behind extremist groups. When Daesh was already disseminating its masterfully crafted narrative using the internet and various social media platforms, CVE stakeholders started their discussion on how to construct an effective counter/alternative narrative. Anti-cybercrimes legislations followed.

When the group had already established a strong grip over large swaths of territory in Iraq and Syria, declaring the physical caliphate, a global coalition against Daesh was formed to seek its physical destruction. Heavy air strikes followed.

When the anathema alliance between the radical Islamists of Iraq and the former Ba’athists of Saddam’s regime was formed, larger attention was paid to the disenfranchisement of certain local communities in Iraq due to sectarian policy by the Iraqi government. A call for more inclusive policies in Iraq followed.

Likewise, when the military fight against Daesh was nearly concluded, greater importance was placed on discussing the integration and rehabilitation of Daesh fighters intending to return to their countries of origin. A wider discussion on de-radicalisation programmes followed.

While reactive measures were necessary to deal with the immediate security threats, more efforts and resources should be invested in proactive measures to prevent a resurrection of violent extremist groups.

Prevention is Better than Cure

There is a dire need for more proactive measures to address the question of returning Foreign Terrorist Fighters (FTFs) and prevent them from acting as “entrepreneurs or network builders” in the future.
Such measures must start with offering them a more viable alternative to Daesh. A massive body of research into the local drivers of violent extremism suggests that individuals decide to join a radical group as a reaction to contextual grievances, rather than as an action. Interventions should therefore proactively address the underlying complex dynamics of grievances rather than merely fight the symptoms of radicalisation. These include political, social, economic, psychological, and ideological grievances that push individuals towards joining a violent extremist group.

Proactive measures should also aim at building local community resilience through engaging with key community stakeholders who can provide vulnerable individuals with alternative positive worldviews. By opening up new horizons for personal growth, individuals can obtain an enhanced sense of meaning. Spaces for dialogue and social protection schemes are key here.

In parallel, proactive measures must ensure greater cross-agency collaboration and a clear division of responsibilities. A holistic approach is needed that goes beyond the state-centric security interventions addressing only the immediate security concerns, as they have fallen short of dismantling radical ideology and risk reinforcing terrorist activities. Moreover, a recent WANA Institute publication points out that state-centric security models have negatively impacted regional peace and development, as well as political participation and trust. 

We must acknowledge that while Daesh was placed in the global spotlight when declaring its caliphate in 2014, the fertile environment allowing for Daesh’s build-up existed — and was unaddressed — for many years prior to 2014. This enabling environment is even harsher today. A military-guided burst of Daesh’s bubble must not be confused with an enduring defeat of such group or of the broader ideology harbouring it.