Countering Violent Extremism Research in Jordan: High Potential and Limited Impact

After almost three years of sustained interest in Countering Violent Extremism (CVE) research in Jordan, little has changed in the deep structures of governance. The relations between key stakeholders that can promise positive policy changes remain the same. Much hope was placed on the national CVE strategy that was finalised in May 2017 but is not yet made public nor endorsed by the government.

Most of the available research reports on radicalisation in Jordan are based on field research in 2015-2017, and focus on radicalisation drivers, types of fighters, the role of key actors in the radicalisation process and de-radicalisation efforts.

Studies usually refer to push and pull factors in order to explain radicalisation. The push factors consist of contextual and individual frustrations that might push an individual to join an armed radical group. Pull factors, on the other hand, are the incentives offered by radical groups that encourage this decision.

Contextual push factors reflect the public sector’s incompetence to deal effectively with issues such as corruption, nepotism, marginalisation, socio-economic challenges, and the archaic religious and educational discourse. Most local radicalisation experts agree that government inefficiency, lack of political will, and poor trust levels in the government contribute to the radicalisation of individuals, who feel unheard and unprotected by the state.

Thinking about radicalisation in terms of contextual push and pull factors provides a general understanding of the phenomenon. However, it distances the government from its responsibility to enact policy changes that address these drivers. Studies point to contextual socio-economic and political challenges but shy away from holding the government accountable for these policy failures. In this way, radicalisation research is complacent with government dysfunctionalities.

Lack of coordination with government

The disconnect between government bodies and other stakeholders is the key factor behind this complacency. CVE research is based on quantitative surveys and qualitative tools like group discussions and interviews with target groups in local communities. Government bodies only marginally contribute to these discussions.\

NGOs and research centres working on CVE implementation are usually not keen on involving the public sector for two reasons. First, government bureaucracy tends to challenge the implementation. If government bodies are involved as partners, then delays of several months are to be expected and budgeted for. Second, the public sector adopts a defensive attitude when discussing its dysfunctionality. This hinders open discussion and innovation in the design of CVE initiatives. As a result, policy makers and public servants remain distant from observing first-hand the impact of their failures on the ground or from providing direct input into research findings.

Moreover, the role of the governmental CVE Unit, which was first part of the Ministry of Interior and was later moved to the Ministry of Culture, remains vague and weak. As a coordinating entity, it should have facilitated cooperation between government bodies and the research community in Jordan.

When joint discussions with government representatives do take place, they are usually the result of the researcher’s individual initiative and the enthusiasm of individual ministers to nominate representatives. At the WANA Institute, we have successfully organised regular briefing meetings, yet a more coordinated partnership with monitoring and evaluation mechanisms is required to influence policy changes.

No more generic discussion on contextual push factors

Donors and local implementing agencies should invest in designing CVE programmes that nurture a trilateral partnership between government bodies, civil society actors, and research institutes. CVE initiatives rely first and foremost on the efforts and dedication of qualified civil society actors. They also require the trust and full engagement of government bodies that remain isolated and confined to Amman. Lastly, research institutes can provide the needed evidence base and transfer knowledge on successful initiatives from elsewhere.

The new leadership of the CVE Unit is required to take on this role. It should improve the understanding of governmental institutions that the success of de-radicalisation efforts depends on their ability to rectify their current disengagement with local challenges. A coordinated plan should also be put in place to actively involve the local councils that will emerge after the decentralisation elections of August this year in CVE research and initiatives.

The discussion on contextual push factors can no longer remain generic. The government and knowledge generators should equally take responsibility for the failure of evidence and policy to keep up with the pace of change and associated threat levels. Research bodies and civil society actors should actively include the government and guide its bodies in CVE policy making. Simultaneously, the different ministries have to commit to a material level of cooperation if we are to successfully address our radicalisation challenges and meet returnees’ rehabilitation needs.