What Social Contract Do Arab Youth Want?

On 17 December 2010, Tunisian street vendor Mohamed Bouazizi was the spark that lit the fuse, changing the political landscape of West Asia and North Africa. What followed was a series of uprisings that swept across the region. As countries confronted their own version of the ‘Arab Spring’, it became clear that a new social contract was evolving. What should it look like and what opportunities does it provide for the region’s youth?

The Social Welfare State

The evolution of the social contract in the Arab world has witnessed different stages. A version emerged in the aftermath of the Second World War (1950s – 1970s), largely influenced by the rise of post-colonial Arab nationalist and socialist movements. It entailed a model of social welfare ensured by existing political regimes, and a transformation from agricultural communities to industrial societies under highly centralised states.

A decent level of social and economic welfare was maintained for a period of time, yet little was done to pursue meaningful political reforms beyond bright promises and patriotic slogans. Essentially, it was the norm that any educated citizen would secure a job in the public sector. This model was inherently unsustainable and left the Arab world with a heavy legacy of growing financial deficits and a bloated government sector.

Government as Part of the Solution

From the 1970s onwards, the Arab world saw a shift from Thawra [revolution] to Tharwa [wealth] which facilitated a process of bold economic liberalisation and institutional building. The economies of the region were linked to the broader political and global oil economies, largely within the frameworks of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank.

This process came at a social cost: it contributed directly to the enlargement of class differences and consolidated the foundations of the rentier state. High levels of corruption and cronyism plunged the region into a serious financial crisis and led the IMF to impose structural adjustments in a number of countries, pushing them to implement austerity measures based on a neoliberal model. Yet again, the region could not carry on with the existing social contract.

The change began in Tunisia with the bread uprising of 1984, which was followed by a number of similarly-driven uprisings and riots in other countries shortly after. Contrary to the Arab Spring of 2011, Arab governments had the ability to co-opt and contain these uprisings efficiently as they had a monopoly over information and communication channels. Moreover, Arab citizens demanded change and reform from their governments and saw them as part of the solution.

A Region of Young Citizens, not Subjects

Fast-forward to 2011 and the situation was different. Not only was the Arab population far more educated, it also had greater access to internet and was more connected than past generations. The number of internet users in the region has seen a growth rate of 2500% over the past 10 years according to ArabNet, a leading reference for digital businesses in the Middle-East.

Entrepreneurship also became highly regarded among the region’s young population. The Arab Human Development Report 2016 estimates that 60 per cent of the WANA region’s population is under the age of 30. In addition, the World Economic Forum indicates that the region has the youngest average age for entrepreneurs — 26 years old. They also seem to work the hardest, with an average workday of 12.5 hours, which is more than 2.5 hours above the global average for millennials. These are not mere statistics — they are unseized opportunities.

Through this lens, what sets the evolving social contract in the Arab world apart from previous ones, becomes clear. Youth no longer want a ‘seat at the table’ or a job in the public sector. They demand an equal shot in life. The social contract should reward their meritocracy, provide them with the space to innovate and establish start-ups, grant them the freedom to express their opinions constructively, and equip them with the skillsets needed to develop their own capacity. In short, the new social contract should acknowledge young Arabs as citizens, not subjects.

Equally crucial, this new generation of Arab citizens no longer seeks change and reform from their governments. In fact, most of them see their governments as a hurdle getting in the way of achieving their full potential. They are seen as part of the problem, no longer the solution.

Last, the space for ideology in the Arab world has shrunk in favour of concrete, practical programmes that address the day-to-day grievances and challenges of Arab citizens. The dominant propagandist discourse calling for great reform projects that have interpreted everything in a blasphemous way — right and wrong, black and white — is no longer acceptable. The evolving social contract sees progress and achievement — whether of individuals, governments, non-governmental organisations, political parties, or civil society actors — as the only compass.